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Abstract 
 
In Klass and others v Germany, the first surveillance case before the European Court of 
Human Rights, it was acknowledged that the threat of secret surveillance posed by 
highlighting its awareness ‘of the danger such a law poses of undermining or even destroying 
democracy on the ground of defending it.’ This thesis considers a form of surveillance, 
communications data retention as envisioned in Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
and its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. This thesis highlights 
that communications data is not only just as, if not more intrusive than intercepting content 
based on what can be retained. It also reveals that communications data is mass surveillance 
within surveillance. Additionally, this thesis demonstrates that communications data does not 
just interference Article 8 of the Convention, but a collection of Convention Rights including 
Articles 9, 10, 11, 14, Article 2 Protocol 4 and potentially Article 6. Each of these rights are 
important for democracy and Article 8 and privacy underpins them all. Furthermore, this 
thesis highlights that obligation to retain communications data can be served on anything that 
can communicate across any network. Taking all factors highlighted into consideration, when 
assessed for compatibility with the Convention, communications data retention in Part 4 not 
only fails to be ‘in accordance with the law’, it fails to establish a legitimate aim, and fails to 
demonstrate its necessity and proportionality. In establishing that communications data 
retention as envisaged in Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is incompatible with 
the Convention, it demonstrates that it undermines democracy and has sown the seeds for its 
destruction. Not only would the findings of this thesis create an obstacle to an UK-EU post-
Brexit adequacy finding, it would have an impact beyond UK law as many States in Europe 
and outside seek to cement data retention nationally. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
 
1.1 The Explosion of Data and the Information Overload 
 
In 2014, Susan Gunelius wrote about the data explosion of how much data is created every 
minute for certain services.1 This explosion in data lead to Richard Harris predicting that more 
data will be created in 2017 than the previous 5000 years of humanity.2 Harris argued that the 
type of data everyone will create is:  
 
[E]xpanding rapidly across a wide range of industries: biotech, energy, IoT, healthcare, 
automotive, space and deep sea explorations, cyber-security, social media, telecom, 
consumer electronics, manufacturing, gaming, and entertainment.3  
 
In 2017, Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi, and Bart van der Sloot acknowledged that there were 
7.4 billion mobile connections worldwide, 5.5 billion of them in low and middle income 
countries and 2.1 billion people already online.4  According to the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS) Internet Access Quarterly Update, Q1, 89% of adults in the UK had recently used the 
internet, an increase of 1% from 2016.5 In 2013, Ofcom acknowledged that: 
 
The internet is at the heart of how many people communicate, find information and 
seek entertainment. And more and more devices are becoming internet-enabled. As a 
result it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate the use of internet services from 
conventional television, radio and voice communication services – they can all be 
provided by the same device.6 
 
With the Internet of Things (IoT), the digital is spilling over into the analog and merging with 
it7 creating an ‘onlife’ which leads to the ‘new experience of a hyperconnected reality within 
which it is no longer sensible to ask whether one may be online or offline.’8  This has led to 
what Mark Andrejevic regards as ‘infoglut’ or information overload, in which we are in an age 
																																																						
1 Susan Gunelius, ‘The Data Explosion in 2014 Minute by Minute – Infographic’ (12 July 2014) 
<https://aci.info/2014/07/12/the-data-explosion-in-2014-minute-by-minute-infographic/> accessed 27 October 
2017. 
2 Richard Harris, ‘More data will be created in 2017 than the previous 5,000 years of humanity’ (23 December 
2016) <https://appdevelopermagazine.com/4773/2016/12/23/more-data-will-be-created-in-2017-than-the-
previous-5,000-years-of-humanity-/> accessed 27 October 2017. 
3 ibid. 
4 Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi, and Bart van der Sloot, ‘Introduction: A New Perspective on Privacy’ in 
Linnet Taylor, Luciano Floridi, and Bart van der Sloot (eds) Group Privacy New Challenges of Data 
Technologies (Springer Nature 2017), 3. 
5 Office for National Statistics. ‘Internet users in the UK 2017’ (19 May 2017) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/itandinternetindustry/bulletins/internetusers/2017> accessed 
3 January 2018.  
6 Ofcom, ‘Communications Market Report 2013’ (1 August 2013) 
<https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/19731/2013_uk_cmr.pdf> accessed 3 January 2018, 
p259. 
7 Luciano Floridi, ‘A Look into the Future Impact of ICT on Our Lives’ (2007) The Information Society 23:1 
59, 61. 
8 Luciano Floridi, The Onlife Manifesto Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era (Springer 2009), 1. 
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where there is too much information to decipher.9 From a policing and security perspective, 
Andrejevic acknowledges that this leads to data collection without limits as it renders all data 
as potentially relevant, no matter how seemingly trivial, irrelevant, personal or invasive it may 
seem.10 This is precisely what this thesis, from the perspective of the legality of 
communications data retention aims to tackle. 
 
(a) The European Convention on Human Rights, a Bulwark Against Totalitarianism? 
 
The dossier of private information is the badge of the totalitarian state.11 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention Rights) was set up with 
the primary aim (though not its only one)12 of creating a type of collective pact against 
totalitarianism.’13 From as early as 2004, the Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas 
warned that the UK was sleep walking into a surveillance society.14 Jacobs notes that Thomas 
was referring ‘to the increased recording and monitoring of people’s behaviour’ such as ‘data 
retention for (mobile) phone and email communication.’15 History appears to have repeated 
itself with regards to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016), the ‘most intrusive 
surveillance law of any democracy in history’16 as 76% of Britons were completely unaware 
of the legislation in question.17  This public and political debate has been overshadowed by the 
UK’s intention to leave the European Union18 (which will have implications for data protection 
adequacy, see Chapter 8). 
 
Jacobs preferred the term totalitarian society to surveillance society, and did not confine 
totalitarianism to brutal physical suppression.19 For Jacobs, totalitarian societies deliberately 
‘exert explicit influence and control in private lives.’20 Jacobs continues that the issue of 
potential abuse is serious and has to be faced explicitly because preventing totalitarian societies 
is one of the major challenges of our time.21 In addition, Jacobs notes that the ‘emergence of 
																																																						
9 Mark Andrejevic, Infoglut: How Too Much Information is Changing the Way We Think and Know (Routledge 
2013), 1-2.   
10 ibid, 36.   
11 Marcel and Others v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and Others [1991] 2 W.L.R. 1118, [1130]. 
12 Maris Burbergs, ‘How the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence became the 
nursery in which new rights are born: Article 8 ECHR’ in Eva Breams and Janneke Gerards (eds) Shaping 
Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human 
Rights (Cambridge University Press), 318. 
13 Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From Its Inception to the Creation of 
a Permanent Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2010), preface; Luzius Wildhaber, ‘Dialogue 
Between Judges’ (2006) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2006_ENG.pdf> accessed 4 October 
2017. 
14 Richard Ford, ‘Beware rise of Big Brother state, warns data watchdog’ (16 August 2004) 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/beware-rise-of-big-brother-state-warns-data-watchdog-hhv3qtwgswk> 
accessed 3 January 2018.  
15 Bart Jacobs, ‘Keeping our Surveillance Society Nontotalitarian’ (2009) 1(4) Amsterdam Law Forum 
<http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/91/165> accessed 3 January 2018.  
16 Liberty, ‘State Surveillance’ <https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/privacy/state-
surveillance> accessed 3 January 2018.  
17 Aatif Sulleyman, ‘Snooper’s Charter: Majority of Public Unaware of Government Online Surveillance’ (22 
May 2017) <https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/snoopers-charter-investigatory-
powers-bill-government-online-surveillance-majority-uk-unaware-a7749851.html> accessed 3 January 2018. 
18 Ibid; House of Commons Library, ‘Brexit: what happens next?’ (30 June 2016) 
<http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7632> accessed 25 July 2016. 
19 Bart Jacbobs, (n15). 
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. 
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populist movements in Europe, with their limited care for fundamental civil rights, may be seen 
as making this matter more urgent.’22 Dahan concurs23 and Giddens notes that ‘aspects of 
totalitarian rule are a threat’ in advanced societies because surveillance is ‘maximized in the 
modern state.’24 Zöller notes that liberty dies by inches,25 the erosion of civil liberties is not an 
event, but a process (see Chapter 2).  
 
Judge Pettiti in Malone v UK noted that: 
 
The mission of the Council of Europe and of its organs is to prevent the establishment 
of systems and methods that would allow "Big Brother" to become master of the 
citizen’s private life. For it is just as serious to be made subject to measures of 
interception against one’s will as to be unable to stop such measures when they are 
illegal or unjustified, as was for example the case with Orwell’s character who, within 
his own home, was continually supervised by a television camera without being able to 
switch it off.26 
 
George Orwell’s 198427 has been frequently, and rightly read as a warning against totalitarian 
systems,28 the virtual opposite of democracy.29 This is what the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), a judicial organ of the Council of Europe, is tasked with preventing by 
upholding democratic principles.  
 
(b) Undermining or Destroying Democracy on the Ground of Defending it? 
 
The ECtHR in Klass v Germany, the first case on State surveillance before it, acknowledged 
the threat secret surveillance posed by highlighting its awareness ‘of the danger such a law 
poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it.’30 The 
ECtHR continued that Member States could not adopt whatever measures they deem 
appropriate.31 The ECtHR echoed similar sentiments in Weber and Saravia v Germany32 and 
subsequent rulings.33 This demonstrates that secret surveillance does not have to reach the 
threshold of destroying democracy, just undermining it.  
 
This thesis concentrates on only a singular aspect of the many powers found within the IPA 
2016, that of communications data retention. This consideration is important because of the 
																																																						
22 ibid. 
23 Michael Dahan, ‘The Gaza Strip as Panopticon and Panspectron: The Disciplining and Punishing of a 
Society’ (2013) IJEP 4:3 44. 
24 Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical 
Materialism (Cambridge: Polity Press), 310. 
25 Verena Zöller, ‘Liberty Dies by Inches: German Counter-Terrorism Measures and Human Rights’ (2004) 
German Law Journal 5:5 469. 
26 Malone v UK App no. 8691/79 (ECHR, 2 August 1984), Concurring Opinion of Judge Pettit. 
27 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Penguin Classics 2013). 
28 James A. Tyner, ‘Self and space, resistance and discipline: a Foucauldian reading of George Orwell's 1984’ 
(2004) Social & Cultural Geography 5:1 129, 130. 
29 Alexandros Mantzaris, ‘'Totalitarianism', Treason and Containment in Catch-22 (and 1984)’ Comparative 
American Studies An International Journal 9:3 217, 218. 
30 Klass v Germany App no. 5029/71 (ECHR, 6 September 1978), [49]. 
31 ibid. 
32 Weber and Saravia v Germany App no. 54934/00 (ECHR, 29 June 2006), [106]. 
33 Roman Zakharov v Russia App no. 47143/06 (ECHR, 4 December 2015), [232]; Dragojević v Croatia App 
no. 68955/11 (ECHR, 15 January 2015), [83]; Szabó and Vissy v Hungary App no. 37138/14 (ECHR, 12 
January 2016), [57]. 
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UK’s international influence on other countries surveillance laws.34 Roger Clarke has argued 
that data retention arguably ‘represents a greater threat to democracy than it does to 
criminals.’35 He continued that data retention, a form of mass surveillance applies the ‘you’re 
all guilty—we’re just not sure what of yet’ tenet and up until 2001 ‘democratic countries 
decried such attitudes as being a defining characteristic of un-free nations such as East 
Germany under the Stasi.’36 The Stasi archive includes ‘69 miles of shelved documents, 1.8 
million images, and 30,300 video and audio recordings.’37 Bernal also regards data gathering 
such as retention fitting more closely with the Stasi and Romania’s Securitate,38 and fits the 
definition of a police state.39 
 
The term ‘police state’ was used as a means of conceptualising emerging totalitarian regimes.40 
The ECtHR in Klass noted that ‘powers of secret surveillance of citizens, characterizing as they 
do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for 
safeguarding the democratic institutions (author’s emphasis).’41 The case of Klass concerned 
the interception of telecommunications, which demonstrates that the ECtHR does not confine 
police states to Nazi Germany or Stalin’s United States of Soviet Russia (USSR) i.e. secret 
police dragging people from their homes at night,42 and the ‘repression of public liberties, the 
elimination of political exchange, limiting freedom of speech, abolishing the right to strike, 
freezing wages etc.’43 The ECtHR’s understanding is more akin to including the electronic 
police state, coined by Jim Davis, which aims to control technology, information and the people 
who use it.44 For Logan, the electronic police state is the quiet, unseen use of ‘electronic 
technologies to record, organize, search and distribute forensic evidence against its citizens.’45 
Logan continues that ‘every surveillance camera recording, every email you send, every 
Internet site you surf, every post you make, every check you write, every credit card swipe, 
every cell phone ping…are held in searchable databases, for a long, long time.’46 In 2008, 
Logan conducted a study of police states, (including a State’s ability to retain communications 
																																																						
34 -- ‘New law would force Facebook and Google to give police access to encrypted messages’ The Guardian 
(London, 14 July 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/14/new-law-would-force-facebook-
and-google-to-give-police-access-to-encrypted-messages?CMP=share_btn_tw> accessed 3 January 2018; James 
Vincent, ‘The UK Now Wields Unprecedented Surveillance Powers – Here’s what it means’ The Verge 
(Manhattan, New York City, 29 November 2016) <https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/23/13718768/uk-
surveillance-laws-explained-investigatory-powers-bill> accessed 8 January 2018. 
35 Roger Clarke, ‘Data retention as mass surveillance: the need for an evaluative framework’ (2015) 
International Data Privacy Law 5:2 121. 
36 ibid, 127. 
37 Charley Locke, ‘A Rare Look at the Archives of the German Secret Police’ Wired (San Francisco, California, 
11 June 2017) <https://www.wired.com/2017/05/adrian-fish-the-stasi-archives/> accessed 4 January 2018. 
38 Paul Bernal, ‘Data gathering, surveillance and human rights: recasting the debate,’ (2016) Journal of Cyber 
Policy 1:2 243, 259-260. 
39 HL Deb 27 November 2001 vol 629, col 253. 
40 Markus Dirk Dubber and Mariana Valverde, The New Police Science: The Police Power in Domestic and 
International Governance (Stanford University Press 2006), 36. 
41 Klass, (n30), [42]. 
42 Jonathan Logan, ‘The Electronic Police State: 2008 National Rankings’ (2008) 
<https://secure.cryptohippie.com/pubs/EPS-2008.pdf> accessed 4 January 2018.  
43 Pablo González Casanova, Latin America Today (United Nations University Press 1993), 233. 
44 Jim Davis, ‘"Police Checkpoints on the Information Highway’ (1994) Computer underground Digest 6:72. 
45 Jonathan Logan, (n42).  
46 ibid. 
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data) and out of 52, England and Wales was ranked 5th47 the highest amongst Western 
democracies. In 2010, the UK as a whole was overtaken by the USA and was ranked 6th.48  
 
Logan’s assessment, of course, occurred before National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, 
Edward Snowden revealed for example, that the UK’s spy agency, GCHQ, gained access to 
the ‘network of cables which carry the world's phone calls and internet traffic’ and ‘has started 
to process vast streams of sensitive personal information’49 under their TEMPORA 
programme.50 Snowden’s revelations51 have put surveillance powers and privacy into the 
spotlight, resulting in a series of cases, both domestically52 and internationally.53 Nor could the 
assessment consider the Intelligence and Security Committee’s (ISC) (which examines the 
policy, administration and expenditure of the UK’s intelligence agencies)54 avowal of intrusive 
powers such as bulk personal data sets (BPD)55 (sets of personal information about a large 
number of individuals, the majority of whom will not be of any interest to MI5)56 or the Home 
Office’s avowal of s.94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 used to collect communications 
data in bulk.57  The Snowden revelation did not prevent ’the continuation and expansion of 
surveillance powers’58 by the UK. This highlights why the UK’s surveillance regime was 
closely behind less democratic59 States such as North Korea and China. This was even before 
the above-mentioned revelations, which only serves to highlight the necessity of a rigorous 
assessment of data retention’s legality under the ECHR, which had already been invalidated at 
an EU level in Digital Rights Ireland.60 
 
Just as totalitarianism is the opposite of democracy, surveillance itself is its opposite,61 a 
menace,62 a sinister force that threatens personal freedoms.63 Kevin D. Haggerty and Mina 
																																																						
47 ibid. 
48 Jonathan Logan, ‘The Electronic Police State: 2010 National Rankings’ (2010) 
<https://secure.cryptohippie.com/pubs/EPS-2008.pdf> accessed 4 January 2018.  
49 Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, ‘GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables 
for secret access to world's communications’ The Guardian (London, 21 June 2013) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa> accessed 5 
January 2018.  
50 -- Der Spiegel (Hamburg) <http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34103.pdf> accessed 5 January 2018.  
51 Ewen MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, (n49).  
52 Franziska Boehm and Mark D. Cole, ‘Data Retention after the Judgement of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’ (30 June 2014) <http://www.zar.kit.edu/DATA/veroeffentlichungen/237_237_Boehm_Cole-
Data_Retention_Study-June_2014_1a1c2f6_9906a8c.pdf> accessed 31 May 2018, p14-18. 
53 Carly Nyst, ‘At last, the data giants have been humbled’ The Guardian (London, 7 October 2015)  
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/07/data-giants-internet-legal-facebook-google> accessed 
31 May 2018.  
54 Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘About the Committee’ <http://isc.independent.gov.uk/> accessed 31 
May 2018. 
55 Intelligence and Security Committee, Privacy and Security: A modern and transparent legal framework 
(2014, HC 1075), 151-163. 
56 MI5, ‘Bulk Personal Datasets’ <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/bulk-data> accessed 31 May 2018. 
57 Home Office, Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (Cm 9152 2015), 36(b). 
58 Arne Hintz and Lina Dencik, ‘The politics of surveillance policy: UK regulatory dynamics after Snowden’ 
(2016) Internet Policy Review 5:3 1, 5. 
59 Juliet Lapidos, ‘The Undemocratic People's Republic of Korea’ Slate (New York City, 1 April 2009) 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/04/the_undemocratic_peoples_republic_of_k
orea.html> accessed 4 January 2018. 
60 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] ECR I-238. 
61 Kevin D. Haggerty and Mina Samatas, ‘Surveillance and democracy: an unsettled relationship’ in Kevin D. 
Haggerty and Mina Samatas (eds), Surveillance and Democracy (Routledge-Cavendish (2010), 1. 
62 Roman Zakharov, (n33), [171]. 
63 Kevin D. Haggerty and Mina Samatas, (n61). 
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Samatas ask what could be more ‘self-evident that the fact that surveillance curtails personal 
freedoms, inhibits democracy, and ultimately leads to totalitarianism (author’s emphasis)?’64 
Schwartz argued that the widespread, silent collection of personal information in cyberspace 
‘is bad for the health of a deliberative democracy’ because it ‘cloaks in dark uncertainty the 
transmutation of Internet activity into personal data that will follow one into other areas and 
discourage civic participation.’65 Schwartz continued that it also has a negative impact on 
individual self-determination, making it difficult to engage in the necessary thinking out loud 
and deliberation with others upon which choice-making depends.66 Caspar Bowden argued that 
it was ‘incompatible with human rights in a democracy to collect all communications or 
metadata all the time indiscriminately.’67 This is important as the ECtHR has a role in 
enhancing democracy68 and maintaining and promoting the ideals and values of a democratic 
society.69 Consideration of data retention under the ECHR becomes all the more pertinent as 
the UK has voted to leave the European Union (EU) and in the House of Commons have voted 
against (the House of Lords disagreeing)70 retaining the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) 
in UK law after exit day.71 This thesis will highlight the various ways in which communications 
data retention is incompatible with it. In doing so, this thesis will demonstrate that not only 
does data retention severely undermine democracy, it paves the way for its total destruction.  
 
1.2 Research Aims 
 
The principal aim of this thesis is to examine the compatibility of data retention found within 
Part 4 of the IPA 2016 with various rights set out in the ECHR. 
 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
In order to fulfil the research aims, a series of questions are asked in build up, such as whether 
communications data retention poses an equally, if not more serious interference with 
Convention Rights based on the type of data retained. Furthermore, it will be sought out, which 
Convention Rights are engaged by communications data retention. Moreover, the question will 
be asked as to whether communications data retention should be regarded as surveillance. 
																																																						
64 ibid. 
65 Paul M. Schwartz, ‘Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace’ (1999) Vand. L. Rev. 52 1607, 1701. 
66 ibid. 
67 Caspar Bowden, ‘Privacy and Security Inquiry: Submission to the Intelligence And Security Committee of 
Parliament’ (7 February 2014) <https://b1cba9b3-a-5e6631fd-s-
sites.googlegroups.com/a/independent.gov.uk/isc/public-evidence/12march2015/20150312-P%2BS-043-
Bowden.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqU8inv9fTxZ5MVi5GPhH0Z2u9gkKE7yMB3iOOO89VdSiEN3jI_Ak_xqpb
YL1eQHrmbf5djj_q8ZnEpOgM8X-oweDJFf2RmI0I-
O9mSIsTDPblG9aNZbdSghnH3hjSFNeyj0idMFJxlPGsqFwiOJiQfItgKrRlkNim0nEl2X5UoLhXHm-
05_0t75ZdO06d_S6o1OB_dfabXLGl1xCuUmgiwRsOKcn81egRMDl8CfDIO0EedX3OjJPuD7X2uVYQqYeC
8u_ddz3neWhhIzB-70lTFQLBlcw%3D%3D&attredirects=0> accessed 4 January 2018, para 7. 
68 Alastair Mowbray, ‘Contemporary aspects of the promotion of democracy by the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2014) European Public Law 20:3 469. 
69 Soering v UK App no. 14038/88 (ECHR, 7 July 1989), [87]. 
70 Ben Kentish, ‘House of Lords defeats government plans to scrap EU rights charter after Brexit’ The 
Independent (London, 23 April 2018) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-latest-eu-rights-
charter-uk-government-house-of-lords-withdrawal-bill-a8318731.html> accessed 31 May 2018. 
71 Ben Kentish, ‘Brexit: MPs vote against including European fundamental rights charter in UK law’ The 
Independent (London, 16 January 2018) <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-mps-vote-
against-including-european-fundamental-rights-charter-in-uk-law-a8162981.html> accessed 16 January 2018; 
s.5(4) of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. 
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Additionally, it will be necessary to ascertain what services can communications data retention 
obligations can be imposed upon. Finally, all such answers to these questions aids in the 
determination as to whether Part 4 of the IPA 2016 is compatible with identified Convention 
Rights. 
 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
The methodology for this thesis is one of a doctrinal analysis which:  
 
[P]rovides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, 
analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, perhaps, 
predicts future developments.72  
 
This analysis will be informed by other factors,73 making it interdisciplinary, which is a 
convergence of different areas of academic study.74 Chapter 3 considers the intrusiveness of 
communications data, and Chapter 5 which considers data retention as secret surveillance 
within surveillance. The ECtHR’s doctrine of a ‘living instrument’ in which the ECHR must 
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions75 becomes crucial in this regard as a guide 
for interpretation. This is aided by using a fairly creative interpretation76 of the ECHR to argue 
that communications data retention is just as serious (if not more) of an interference as 
interception or how data retention interferes with Convention Rights other than the obvious 
Article 8. This creative interpretation is now supported by the ECtHR’s interpretation of the 
ECHR with regards to communications data being regarded as equally intrusive as content. 
This creative approach and the use of the living instrument will also be used to make future 
predictions, such as data retention obligations encompassing much more than just Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs), phone networks, web-based services and apps, but everyday 
interconnected devices. This approach is consistent with the ECHR in that the ECtHR takes ‘a 
pragmatic, common-sense approach rather than a formalistic or purely legal one.’77 Thus, this 
thesis will not be overly rigid, but not too flexible to extend beyond acceptable parameters.  
 
1.5 Original Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis will make an original contribution to knowledge in a variety of ways. Firstly, it will 
highlight that communications data retention is at least, as equally as serious in terms of 
interference, as interception. This will also highlight the social value of privacy which is then 
utilised to inform the interpretation of the ECHR. 
 
Secondly, the importance of Article 8 ECHR for democracy in that it underpins many 
Convention Rights (Articles 9-11), which are, in and of themselves, crucial for democracy. It 
will also contribute to knowledge by highlighting the implications of data retention for Article 
6 ECHR. Additionally, it will demonstrate that the nature of communications data retention in 
																																																						
72 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 1987. 
73 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) Harv L Rev 10:8 457, 465–6. 
74 Douglas Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’ (2004) 31 JL & Soc 163, 164. 
75 Tryer v United Kingdom App no. 5856/72 (ECHR, 25 April 1978), [31]. 
76 Alastair Mowbray, ‘Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) Human Rights Law Review 
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relation to Article 14, fails to discriminate between those who are in a substantially different 
position and also the possibility biased data to be generated and retained. Moreover, it will for 
the first time, consider how communications data retention affects freedom of movement found 
within Article 2 Protocol 4. 
 
Thirdly, linking to the first contribution, this thesis will highlight the far-reaching implications 
of the IPA 2016 in terms of who can be obligated to retain, and what can be retained. It will be 
demonstrated that data retention obligations have moved on from traditional telephone 
providers and ISPs to websites, any type of network, any device and many more, including 
Internet of Things (IoT) objects. This is due to the redefinition of telecommunications operators 
and demonstrates that data retention has to now be considered in terms of any device that can 
connect to a network or can communicate. It is only then, the far-reaching implications of the 
IPA 2016 can begin to be realised as browsing habits, thoughts, feelings, movements and other 
activities will be subject to a continuous 12-month retention period. This will eventually turn 
one’s city, home and oneself into a Panopticon. Additionally, when one considers who can be 
obligated to retain what, it becomes clear that communications data retention poses at least an 
equally serious interference with Convention Rights as other surveillance methods such as 
interception, when sensitive data such as passwords, sexual preferences, religion and political 
persuasions would be retainable. Further insight is given to the unlimited types of 
communications data that can be retained either through its generation or vague terminology 
by using the examples of Big Data and neurotechnologies which produce mind data. The ability 
to penetrate thoughts would literally create CCTV for inside one’s head. This thesis highlights 
that the who can be served with a retention notice, and what data can be retained has not yet 
been fully appreciated. 
 
Fourthly, this thesis will contribute to the debate on surveillance by arguing that 
communications data retention is mass secret surveillance within surveillance by changing the 
way surveillance is currently understood. 
 
Fifthly, this thesis will be the first in depth analysis of communications data retention that takes 
consideration beyond Articles 8 and 10, and questions the very existence of data retention. Not 
only will the legality of Part 4 of the IPA 2016 be scrutinised, but also whether it serves a 
legitimate aim, and whether it is necessary and proportionate. This thesis will highlight, none 
of these requirements are satisfied. This thesis contributes further by asking deeper questions 
than general proportionality in querying the necessity of whom can be obligated to retain, and 
what can be retained, whether such measures are relevant and sufficient, whether this is the 
least restrictive measure used. This line of enquiry demonstrates that consideration under the 
ECHR goes beyond that under the CFR and highlights ways in which the CFR could be 
enriched by the ECHR. 
 
Sixthly, not only will this thesis highlight the many ways in which communications data 
retention is incompatible with various Convention Rights, but how it also potentially threatens 
the presumption of innocence, fairness, increases the possibility of self-incrimination and 
threatens legal professional privilege, guaranteed by Article 6. 
 
Seventhly, this thesis will highlight that data retention is discriminatory, contrary to Article 14, 
and even the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) approach would still be 
discriminatory and contrary to Article 14.      
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1.6 Chapter Structure 
 
This thesis is broken down into 8 Chapters, the introduction and methodology being Chapter 
1. Chapter 2 briefly considers the legal and political origins of data retention from the 1993 
ILETs report, to the IPA 2016 and the milestone judgment of Digital Rights Ireland which 
invalidated the DRD for its incompatibility with the CFR.  
 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that communications data retention is just as, if not more serious of an 
interference with private life as the interception of content, thus arguing for equivalent 
safeguards. This position has now been supported by the ECtHR in the recent Big Brother 
Watch case. This is done so by first discussing what communications data is, and where it 
comes from. This leads to the consideration of the main types of communications data found 
within the IPA 2016 i.e. Internet Connection Records, Entity and Events Data and the 
requirement to retain all or any description of data (with examples). It also highlights that the 
types of data to be retained extends beyond what was required by EU law. This Chapter also 
highlights the implications of Big Data retention and the social value of privacy. 
 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that data retention is not just a privacy or even an Article 8 issue, but 
involves numerous fundamental rights and democracy itself. This is explored through not only 
explaining why data retention interferes with Article 8, but Articles 9-11, Article 14, 6 and 
Article 2 Protocol 4 and the corresponding rights contained in the CFR (which are meant to be 
equal to or greater than the ECHR protection). All such rights are in their own right, important 
for democracy, and Article 8 underpins them. It also importantly highlights a running theme 
throughout this thesis, data retention, creates a chilling effect on the exercise of fundamental 
rights. Chapter 5 argues that data retention is a form of mass secret surveillance within 
surveillance (which also creates a chilling effect) by demonstrating that not only is it Panoptic 
(knowing of the possibility of being watched), but also Panspectric (being watched unawares). 
It argues that data retention would fall short of David Lyon’s definition of surveillance hence 
why a new understanding is important. The idea that data retention is surveillance is supported 
by not only by literature, but by UK, ECHR and EU law. This Chapter also highlights that 
government and corporations are working in synergy to collectively spy on the populous for 
their own purposes (surveillance within surveillance). This further strengthens the argument 
that data retention should receive the same safeguards interception.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the services obligated to retain communications data. This Chapter details 
how the obligation has extended from ISPs to now cover any device that transmits a signal 
(such as apps, websites, Internet of Things devices etc), highlighting that erosion of liberties is 
done so by inches. Data from your streets, your home and even your body is subject to retention 
notices. Once again this demonstrates that UK law has taken a step further than EU law in this 
regard. Building on the previous Chapters, Chapter 7 asks the important question whether data 
retention in the IPA 2016 is compatible with the rights set forth in the ECHR mentioned in 
Chapter 4. Since Digital Rights Ireland the UK was of the positon that data retention on the 
grounds of national security are outside the scope of EU law. Whether or not this proves to be 
the case, this is within the scope of the ECHR, and its consideration becomes crucial. Given 
the scale of who can be obligated to retain, the types of data to retain, the rights they affect, a 
full assessment under the ECHR is required. Article 8 is used as a template for the qualified 
rights because a violation of 8 ipso facto violates the others, even when separate 
considerations/justifications are considered with each. Data retention is tested on its legality, 
necessity and proportionality. Data retention is also tested on its compliance with Article 6 and 
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14. This Chapter also highlights deficiencies in the CJEU’s ruling in Tele2 and Watson78 and 
how an interpretation of the ECHR can remedy this (also in terms of data protection).  
 
Chapter 8 concludes that data retention in the IPA 2016 is not only incompatible with various 
rights set out in the ECHR, it is also incompatible with democracy for reasons that it goes much 
further than the DRD and that it certainly undermines it and paves the way for its destruction. 
Another important point to consider is that if the UK leaves the EU, it becomes a third-country, 
and the issue of transferring personal data outside of the EU to the UK can only occur if the 
UK satisfies a finding of adequate data protection laws. Given that Chapter 7 demonstrates that 
just one provision of the IPA 2016 is incompatible various rights in the ECHR, it would be 
unlikely that the European Commission would regard UK laws as adequate (if the CFR is to 
be regarded as equal to or greater than), and just like the case of Schrems,79 this would put a 
halt to data transfer from the EU to the UK.  
 
 
																																																						
78 Joined Cases C‑203/15 and C‑698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson [2016] ECR I-970. 
79 Case C‑362/14 Schrems [2015] ECR-I 650. 
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Chapter 2: An Introduction to Communications Data Retention and its 
illegality 
 
2. Introduction 
 
This Chapter is an informative overview which seeks to introduce the notion of 
communications data retention within the European Union (EU) and UK context. The first task 
is one of defining communications data retention. It is then important to consider the history 
of data retention proposals, and to highlight that it was the UK that was the main driving force 
behind data retention laws at national and EU level. Further to this, it will also be highlighted 
that acts of terrorism have served as a pretext (even if a genuine reason) for data retention when 
prior attempts had failed. This demonstrates the post 9/11 effect where politicians ultimately 
overlook the important human rights aspects in the pursuit of perceived security. The reactions 
from the political dimension is met with judicial restraint as seen by courts of EU Member 
States and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) itself in ruling that the Directive 
2006/24/EC (the Data Retention Directive, DRD) was invalid for its incompatibility with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and subsequent ruling banning general and 
indiscriminate data retention across the EU. This Chapter analyses the UK’s response in depth 
to data retention through the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016).  
 
2.1 What is Communications Data Retention? 
 
Communications data retention is as ‘a method of data preservation over a certain period of 
time which is thus available for retroactive investigations into electronic communications by 
competent authorities.’1 The types of data that can be retained will be discussed fully in Chapter 
3, but it is generally described as the ‘who (e.g. David Smith), where (e.g. outside Parliament 
Square), when (e.g. 21:00 BST) and how (e.g. via hotmail.com through a browser or app) of a 
communication (e.g. e-mail message).’2 
 
2.2 Retention in its infancy 
 
Demands for communications data retention can be traced back to the ‘International Law 
Enforcement and Telecommunications Seminars’ (ILETS).3 ILETS was founded by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and has police and security agents from up to 20 
countries.4 Following this, the EU Council of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Ministers 
adopted a Resolution in November 1993, (which was not published) which called upon experts 
to compare the needs of the EU with regards to the interception of telecommunications ‘with 
those of the FBI.’5 More requirements were formulated by the FBI and adopted by ILETS in 
1994 which formed the basis of a second EU Resolution on the interception of 
																																																						
1 Kristina Irion, ‘Accountability unchained: Bulk Data Retention, Preemptive Surveillance, and Transatlantic 
Data Protection’ in Marc Rotenberg, Julia Horwitz and Jeramie Scott (eds), Privacy in the Modern Age The 
Search for Solutions (New Press 2015), 80, n6. 
2 Matthew White, ‘Protection by Judicial Oversight, or an Oversight in Protection?’ (2017) Journal of 
Information Rights, Policy and Practice 2:1 1. 
3 Chris Jones and Ben Hayes, ‘The EU Data Retention Directive: a case study in the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism policy’ (2013), <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-data-
retention-directive-in-europe-a-case-study.pdf> accessed 23 May 2017, p6, n7. 
4 Duncan Campbell, ‘Intercepting the Internet’ The Guardian (London, 29 April 1999) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/1999/apr/29/onlinesupplement3> accessed 31 May 2018. 
5 --Draft Council Resolution on the Interception of Telecommunications, 10090/93 (16 November 1993) 
<http://database.statewatch.org/e-library/1994-jha-k4-03-06.pdf> accessed 23 May 2017.  
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telecommunications adopted in January 1995,6 which had 30 requirements.7 These 30 
requirements set out cooperative obligations of telecommunications companies with law 
enforcement agencies. In the 1999 ILETS report,8 a new issue was discovered, notably with 
the Directive 97/66/EC which made retention of communications data possible only for billing 
purposes. The action required was ‘to consider options for improving the retention of data by 
Communication Service Providers.’9 This would eventually lead to Directive 2002/58/EC, 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector, the e-Privacy Directive (e-PD). 
 
2.3 Passage of the e-Privacy Directive 
 
In the initial proposal stages, Article 15(1) of the e-PD, the European Commission 
(Commission) made no mention of data retention.10  This was due to it merely being an update 
of the pre-e-PD.11 In light of the 9/11 attacks, Article 15(1) was extended to include the 
retention of data for a limited period for certain major public security interests (author’s 
emphasis).12 Statewatch believed this was demanded by former USA President, George W. 
Bush.13 The suggestion from the White House was to ‘[r]evise draft privacy directives that call 
for mandatory destruction to permit the retention of critical data for a reasonable period 
(author’s emphasis).14 This was in actual fact a proposal in response to the Belgian Prime 
Minister (author’s emphasis). Moreover, the European Parliament (EP), in the strongest terms 
opposed this form of retention, in that they urged its use must be entirely exceptional, based on 
specific comprehensible law, authorised by judicial or other competent authorities for 
individual cases and be consistent with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
(author’s emphasis).15 Furthermore, the EP noted that that ‘a general data retention principle 
																																																						
6 Chris Jones and Ben Hayes, (n3), p6. 
7 Council Resolution of 17th January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications, OJ 1996 C 329/01 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1996:329:FULL:EN:PDF> accessed 23 May 
2017. 
8 ILETS Report (1999) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/may/ILETS99-report.doc> accessed 23 May 
2017.   
9 ibid. 
10 Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector’ COM(2000) 
385 final.  
11 Statewatch, ‘Data or data protection in the EU?’ <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/sep/dataprot.pdf> 
accessed 23 May 2017.  
12 Council of the European Union, Common Position adopted by the Council on 28 January 2002 with a view to 
the adoption of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, Statement of Reasons, (29 
January 2002), <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15396-2001-REV-2-ADD-1/en/pdf> 
accessed 23 May 2017; Council of the European Union, Working Party on Telecommunications, Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processing of personal data and the 
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, (16 November 2001) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/13883.pdf> accessed 23 May 2017, 21. 
13 Statewatch, ‘European Parliament and EU governments on a collision course over the retention of data 
(telecommunications surveillance)’ <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/15eudata.htm> accessed 23 
May 2017.  
14 James J. Foster, ’United States Mission to the European Union, Proposals For US-EU Counter-Terrorism 
Cooperation’ (16 October 2001) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/06Ausalet.htm> accessed 23 May 
2017. 
15 Marco Cappato,’European Parliament, 2nd Report on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
directive concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector’ (24 October 2001) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/cappato.pdf> accessed 
23 May 2017, p29. 
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must be forbidden’ and that ‘any general obligation concerning data retention’ is contrary to 
the proportionality principle.16 
 
However, as noted above, the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre had occurred,17 which 
led to the Commission accepting the additional sentence of Article 15(1)18 the EP had an 
opportunity to halt this addition, which initially was the case on November 2001, but eventually 
reversed its position on May 2002.19 Data retention was opposed by 40 civil liberties 
organisations to vote against the retention of communications data,20 the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party (WP29),21 the European Data Protection Commissioners, 22 the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), European Internet Services Providers Association 
(EuroISPA), the US Internet Service Provider Association (USISPA), the All Party Internet 
Group (APIG)23 and at the G8 Tokyo Conference.24 With the EU accepting UK’s data retention 
proposal, it highlights something that members of the UK government denied any plans of, and 
as Judith Rauhofer notes ‘the UK had managed to obtain an enabling provision which would 
allow member states’ to obligate data retention’25 demonstrating it was the UK that was more 
influential than the US in this regard.  
 
2.4 Data Retention within the UK and other EU Member States 
 
Prior to the adoption of the e-PD, in the UK, the National Crime and Intelligence Service 
(NCIS) made a submission (on behalf of the Mi5/6, GCHQ etc) to the Home Office on data 
retention laws.26 Blanket data retention was preferred and was ironically noted that a targeted 
approach would be a ‘greater infringement on personal privacy.’27 Lord Cope noted that ‘vast 
banks of information on every member of the public can quickly slip into the world of Big 
																																																						
16 Abu Bakar Munir and Siti Hajar Mohd Yasin, ‘Retention of communications data: A bumpy road ahead’ 
(2004) The John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 22:4 731, 734; Clive Walker and Yaman 
Akdeniz, ‘Anti-Terrorism Laws and Data Retention: War is over?’ (2003) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
54:2 159, 167. 
17 Judith Rauhofer, 'Just Because You're Paranoid, Doesn't Mean They're Not After You: Legislative 
Developments in Relation to the Retention of Communications Data' (2006) SCRIPTed 3 322, 331. 
18 Statewatch, ‘EU: Final decision on surveillance of communications European Commission sells-out, 
European Parliament vote due in May, January-February 2002, vol 12 no 1’ 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/may/05Asurv.htm> accessed 23 May 2017. 
19 Statewatch, ‘European Parliament caves in on data retention’ (30 May 2002) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/may/10epcavein.htm> accessed 23 May 2017; A breakdown of the 
voting can be seen here - Statewatch, ‘The vote in the European Parliament to accept data retention and 
surveillance by the law enforcement agencies: an analysis’ 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/may/15epvote.htm> accessed 23 May 2017.  
20 Statewatch, ‘Coalition asks European Parliament to vote against data retention’ ‘(23 May 2002) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/may/09coalition.htm> accessed 23 May 2017; The letter can be viewed 
here: 22 May 2002<http://gilc.org/cox_en.html> accessed 23 May 2017.  
21 Opinion 4/2001 on the Council of Europe's Draft Convention on Cyber-crime’ (22 March 2001) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2001/wp41_en.pdf> accessed 23 May 2017, page 7. 
22 Statement of the European Data Protection Commissioners, (11 September 2002) 
<http://www.fipr.org/press/020911DataCommissioners.html> accessed 23 May 2017.   
23 Abu Bakar Munir and Siti Hajar Mohd Yasin, (n15), p746-749. 
24 G8 Government Industry Workshop on Safety and Security in Cyberspace, (May 2001) 
<http://cryptome.org/g8-isp-e-spy.htm> accessed 23 May 2017.  
25 Judith Rauhofer, (n17), 331. 
26 Roger Gasper, NCIS submission on data retention law: Looking to the future – clarity on communications 
data retention law’ (21 Aug 2000) <https://cryptome.org/ncis-carnivore.htm> accessed 26 May 2017. 
27 ibid, para 3.1.5. 
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Brother.’28 However, Charles Clarke, the then junior Home Office Minister, and Patricia 
Hewitt, an ‘E-Minister’ both made the claim such plans would not come into fruition.29 When 
questioned about the NCIS’s proposals, Hewitt maintained that Charles Clarke and herself 
disagreed with said proposals and said that it should not be implemented.30  
 
But as the previous section noted, the UK did intend to allow itself the power to obligate data 
retention, and did by using the EU as a proxy. The first law to formalise data retention was 
under the controversial31 Part 11 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA 
2001) (now omitted by Schedule 10(62) of the IPA 2016). This came into force three months 
after the 9/11 attacks.32 This allowed for the voluntary (and if need be mandatory) retention of 
communications data by communication service providers (CSPs). During the House of Lords 
debates on ATCSA 2001, Lord Rooker ironically noted that Part 11 was not to be used as 
generalised [fishing] expeditions33 when this is exactly how data retention is described.34 Lord 
Phillips correctly stated that ‘we cannot defend our values by suspending them.’35 The then 
Assistant Commissioner to the Information Commissioner Jonathan Bamford observed that 
‘Part 11 isn't necessary, and if it is necessary it should be made clear why.’36 The Earl of 
Northesk was more vocal in criticism, not only highlighting the reversal in the UK’s position 
on retention, but noting that ‘there is no evidence whatever that a lack of data retained has 
proved an impediment to the investigation of the atrocities’ on 9/11.37 
 
It has been suggested that data retention was possible from as early as 1984 via s.94 of the 
Telecommunications Act 1984,38 which may explain how it was possible to retain data in the 
aftermath of 9/11.39 Member States such as France and Belgium had, like the UK adopted data 
retention provisions prior to the e-PD40 with Belgium adopting prior to 9/11.41 This 
demonstrates data retention was not something that was brought about by the e-PD, but could 
be used as justification for such measures. 
 
																																																						
28 Kamal Ahmed, ‘Secret plan to spy on all British phone calls’ The Guardian (London, 3 December 2003) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2000/dec/03/kamalahmed.theobserver> accessed 26 May 2017. 
29 Caspar Bowden, ‘CCTV for inside your head Blanket Traffic Data Retention and the Emergency Anti-
Terrorism Legislation’ (2001) <http://europe.rights.apc.org/eu/cctv_for_the_head.html> accessed 23 May 2017; 
Judith Rauhofer, (n17), 228; Patricia Hewitt and Charles Clarke, Joint letter to Independent on Sunday, 28 Jan 
2000.  
30 Trade and Industry Committee, UK Online Reviewed: the First Annual Report of the E-Minister and E-Envoy 
Report (HC 66 1999-2000), Q93. 
31 Caspar Bowden, (n29). 
32 Judith Rauhofer, (n17), 331. 
33 HL Deb 27 Nov 2001 vol 629 cc142-62, 152. 
34 Franziska Boehm and Paul de Hert, The rights of notification after surveillance is over: ready for 
recognition? (Yearbook of the Digital Enlightenment Forum, IOS Press 2012), 19-39. 
35 HL Deb 27 Nov 2001 vol 629 cc183-290, 249. 
36 ibid, 252.  
37 HL Deb 4 Dec vol 629 col. 808-9. 
38 Jim Killock, ‘ISPs will break the law if they continue to retain our data’ (9 April 2014) 
<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2014/are-the-government-and-isps-breaking-the-law-by-continuing-to-
retain-our-data> accessed 23 May 2017.  
39 HL Deb 27 Nov 2001 vol 629 cc183-290, 252. 
40 Yves Poullet,’The Fight against Crime and/or the Protection of Privacy: A Thorny Debate!’ (2004) 
International Review of Law Computers and Technology 18:2 251, 252. 
41 ibid. 
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After the e-PD came into force, nine out of fifteen states planned or were planning to adopt 
retention legislation.42 With the controversial Article 15(1)43 in mind, Statewatch made a 
prediction that ‘[o]nce the fundamental principles in the existing 1997 Directive on privacy 
and telecommunications are cast aside they will never be reinstated.’44 Tony Bunyan of 
Statewatch commented that: 
 
EU governments claimed that changes to the 1997 EC Directive on privacy in 
telecommunications to allow for data retention and access by the law enforcement 
agencies would not be binding on Members States - each national parliament would 
have to decide. Now we know that all along they were intending to make it binding, 
“compulsory”, across Europe.45 
 
2.5 Data Retention across Europe and the beginning of the Data Retention Directive 
 
Within the same year of the coming into force of the e-PD, Belgium proposed a (binding) Draft 
Framework Decision on the retention of traffic data and on access to this data in connection 
with criminal investigations and prosecutions46 which was leaked to Statewatch.47 The 
Decision appeared to speak on behalf of law enforcement and service providers across the EU 
without actually having their opinions referred to (author’s emphasis). The Commission noted 
that only an approach that brings together the expertise and capacities of government, industry, 
data protection supervisory authorities and users will succeed in meeting such goals (author’s 
emphasis).48 Not only did Statewatch49 and Privacy International50 highlight legal flaws of the 
Draft Framework Decision, but industry also highlighted that data preservation51 i.e. targeted 
storage on specified end users should be favoured over data retention.52 Statewatch noted that 
																																																						
42 Statewatch, ‘Majority of governments introducing data retention of communications’ 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jan/12eudatret.htm> accessed 23 May 2017.  
43 Daniel B. Garrie and Rebecca Wong, ‘Privacy in electronic communications: the regulation of VoIP in the 
EU and the United States’ (2009) C.T.L.R. 15:6 139, 144. 
44 Statewatch, ‘EU: Final decision on surveillance of communications European Commission sells-out, 
European Parliament vote due in May’ (January-February 2002) vol 12 no 1, 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/may/05Asurv.htm> accessed 25 May 2017.  
45 Statewatch, ‘Surveillance of communications: data retention to be “compulsory” for 12-24months’ (2002) < 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/aug/analy11.pdf> accessed 25 May 2017, p1. 
46 Belgium’s Draft Framework Decision on the retention of traffic data and on access to this data in connection 
with criminal investigations and prosecutions (2002) <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/aug/05datafd.htm> 
accessed 25 May 2017.  
47 Statewatch, ‘Surveillance of communications EU: data retention to be "compulsory" for 12-24 months- draft 
Framework Decision leaked to Statewatch’ (23 August 2002) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2002/aug/05datafd1.htm> accessed 25 May 2017.  
48 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of Regions: Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of 
Information Infrastructures and Combating Computer-related Crime, COM/2000/0890 final <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0890> accessed 25 May 2017, para 48. 
49 Statewatch, (n42). 
50 Privacy International, ‘Memorandum of Laws concerning the Legality of Data Retention with regard to the 
Rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights’ (10 October 2003) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/oct/Data_Retention_Memo.pdf> accessed 25 May 2017. 
51 Caspar Bowden, ‘Digital Surveillance, Chapter Five Part I’ (28 April 2013) 
<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/digital-surveillance/chapter-five-part-I> accessed 25 May 
2017. 
52 Common Industry Statement on Storage of Traffic Data for Law Enforcement Purposes (4 June 2003) 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/jun/CommonIndustryPositionondataretention.pdf> accessed 25 May 
2017. 
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this ‘shows that the EU governments always intended to introduce an EC law to bind all 
member states to adopt data retention.’53  
 
Despite the failure of Belgium’s Draft Framework Decision, there was another attempt on 28 
April 2004 proposed by, the UK, France, Ireland, and Sweden.54 As Rauhofer notes, due to the 
general failure of Part 11 of the ATCSA 2001, the UK sought an alternative way to achieve its 
aim, by focussing on a harmonised approach on the issues of data retention by taking steps to 
convince other EU Member States to introduce minimum data retention periods.55This Draft 
Framework Decision highlighted the lack of harmonisation between Member States on data 
retention.56 However, Cooper and Blaney explained that the date chosen (28 April 2004) by 
the four governments to table their proposal was deliberately done to marginalise the powers 
of the Commission and Parliament in the deliberative process as on 1 May 2004, Member 
States lost their right of initiative and the Commission and EP had gained a ‘co-decision 
procedure’ for Third Pillar initiatives with First Pillar ramifications.57 Not only was this Draft 
Framework Decision critiqued by Cooper and Blaney, but Statewatch noted the ‘grave gaps in 
civil liberties protection remained’ and that it was worse than the proposal by Belgium due to 
its breadth and depth such as extending the retention period (author’s emphasis).58 The Council 
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE)59 raised concerns about the Draft Framework 
Decision as although they supported the fight against crime a terrorism, they were worried by 
the growing initiatives taken at the European level which, under cover of the fight against 
terrorism, were serious infringements to fundamental freedoms and rights.60  
 
The Legal Services for the Council of the EU noted the dubious legality of the Draft Framework 
Decision,61 which was withheld from the public and Members of the EP.62  The EP’s 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) rejected the Draft Framework 
Decision noting that any such power should be compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR, which 
																																																						
53 Statewatch, (n45), p3. 
54 Draft Framework Decision on the retention of data processed and stored in connection with the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services or data on public communications networks for the 
purpose of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of crime and criminal offence including 
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it was not for lack of legality, necessity and proportionality.63 Importantly the EP noted that 
the ECtHR: 
 
[H]as stressed that the contracting states do not have unlimited discretion to subject 
individuals within their territory to clandestine surveillance. Given that corresponding 
powers, conferred on the ground that the intention is to defend democracy, threaten to 
undermine or destroy democracy, the Court stresses that contracting states are not 
allowed to adopt any measure they deem appropriate in order to combat espionage or 
terrorism (author’s emphasis).64 
 
However, during the rejection of the Draft Framework Decision and the proposal for a 
Directive, the 7/7 bombings in London had occurred.65 Just as the 9/11 attacks, this was used 
a fresh justification for data retention at the EU level.66 This was despite the then UK Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair noting that ‘all the surveillance in the world’ could not have prevented 
those attacks.67 As Roger Clarke has noted: 
 
[M]ost critical driver of change, however, has been the dominance of national security 
extremism since the 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA, and the preparedness of 
parliaments in many countries to grant law enforcement agencies any request that they 
can somehow link to the idea of counter-terrorism.68 
 
The UK had used its Presidency of the European Council (Council)69 to essentially give the EP 
less than two months’ preparation (one year less than for the e-PD) of a final committee 
report.70 In addition to this, the EP had to utilise the unduly hasty ‘first reading only’ procedure 
which was criticised by many as an attempt on part of the Council and the UK Presidency to 
‘prevent an in-depth investigation of the actual need for mandatory data retention.’71 
Furthermore, it was reported that then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke (who as noted above 
apparently did not favour data retention) was reported to have told Members of the EP (MEPs) 
to agree on proposals or ‘he would make sure the EP would no longer have a say on any justice 
and home affairs matter.’72 Clarke also noted that if an agreement could not be reached, the 
prior Framework Decision was still on the table.73 It was further noted that the UK sought to 
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achieve data retention harmonisation before the end of its Presidency, considering that next in 
line was Austria, who were firmly against data retention.74  
 
The EP had instructed Alexander Alvaro MEP of the LIBE to prepare a report on the proposed 
Directive, this included a list of compromises but some key changes.75 When attempts to reach 
an agreement with the LIBE, the UK used it Presidency to directly target leaders of the two 
biggest political groups within the EP in a private meeting, making no concessions, yet 
declaring it a ‘compromise.’76 The DRD came into force on the 3 May 2006 which sought to 
harmonise data retention across the EU by placing retention obligations on publicly available 
electronic communications services or public communications networks for harmonisation of 
telecoms rules law enforcement purposes.77 This was so despite the pleas from Privacy 
International (PI), the European Digital Rights Initiative (EDRi), 90 NGOs and 80 
telecommunications service providers to MEPs.78 In the UK, this was subsequently followed 
by the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 200779 and 2009.80  
 
 
2.6 Data Retention at the EU level 
 
(a)  Two Opposing Views  
 
There were two contrasting views of the legality of the DRD, that of Francesca Bignami, and 
Mariuca Morariu. Bignami argued that the DRD was an accessible, detailed and democratically 
enacted law, continuing that any rule (Chapter 7 will highlight this to be incorrect) that is 
detailed and available to the public satisfies the requirements of the ECHR (author’s 
emphasis).81 It was further maintained that a two-year retention period was proportionate.82 
Whereas Morariu argued that the DRD raised several controversies  such as lock of correlation 
between aim and objective, lack of definition of serious crime etc and failed to clearly justify 
its necessity.83  
 
(b)  Legal Challenges 
 
The first legal challenge to the DRD, was an unsuccessful challenge to its legal basis (i.e. 
whether it should have been pursued under First (Single Market) or Third Pillar (policing)),84 
with the result being the former. This meant the only way now was to challenge the law itself, 
which ultimately occurred before the CJEU. Prior to this, however, data retention was met with 
challenges at a domestic level, with ‘Bulgaria’s Supreme Administrative Court, the Romanian, 
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German Federal, Czech Republic Constitutional Courts and the Supreme Court of Cyprus all 
declaring national implementation of the DRD either invalid or unconstitutional (in some or all 
regards) and incompatible with Article 8 ECHR.’85 
 
Digital Rights Ireland (DRI) brought the first litigation to challenge domestic and European 
data retention laws on fundamental rights grounds.86 Before the High Court of Ireland (HCI),87 
DRI amongst others things sought for the HCI to request a preliminary reference to the CJEU 
on the validity of the DRD under the CFR.88 The HCI subsequently granted the motion of a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU under Article 267 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
EU (TFEU).89 Similarly, the Austrian Constitutional Court90 sought a preliminary reference on 
similar grounds, to which the CJEU joined the cases.91  
 
(c) A Quest for the Necessity of the DRD 
 
On 9 July 2013, judges of the CJEU’s Grand Chamber asked for proof of the necessity and 
efficiency of the DRD.92 Despite the lack of statistical evidence from representatives of the  
Member States, Commission, Council, EP still asked the CJEU to reject the complaints by DRI 
and others.93 Only the Austrian government were able to provide the most extensive statistics 
on use of communications data which involved no cases of terrorism (author’s emphasis).94 
The UK representative  maintained that there was no ‘scientific data’ to underpin the need of 
data retention which raised the question of what data the DRD had been therefore based upon.95 
This lack of evidence of assumed necessity (from the Commission)96 was consistent with the 
findings of the WP29 and the European Data Protection Supervisors (EDPS) (author’s 
emphasis).97 Moreover, Chris Jones and Ben Hayes note that the plural of the Commission’s 
anecdotes is not ‘data’ and:  
 
[E]ven to the extent that case studies can be seen to objectively demonstrate the 
Directive’s effectiveness, it does not necessarily follow that they justify the Directive’s 
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scope, application, or absence of protection for due process and fundamental rights 
(author’s emphasis).98 
 
(d) Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Digital Rights Ireland 
 
In Digital Rights Ireland,99 Advocate General (AG) Cruz Villalón sought, amongst other 
things, to determine whether the DRD was ‘provided for by law’ within the meaning of Article 
52(1) of the CFR, and whether it satisfied proportionality within the meaning of Article 
52(1).100 Article 52(1) provides that a limitation of rights contained in the CFR must be 
provided by law, proportionate in which limitations necessary and genuinely meets objectives 
of general interest. AG Cruz Villalón proceeded to consider the DRD in light of Article 7 
(privacy) and 8 (data protection) CFR,101 but ultimately considered the DRD in light of Article 
7 only102 because the latter was of secondary importance.103 AG Cruz Villalón concluded that 
the DRD as a whole is incompatible with Article 52(1),104 but this was due to primary focus 
being on access and use of data, not its retention (author’s emphasis).105 
 
(e) Judgment of the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland 
 
Unlike AG Cruz Villalón, the CJEU ruled that data retention raises questions of not only Article 
7 and 8, but also 11 (freedom of expression) CFR.106 The CJEU, however, proceeded on 
considering the DRD in light of Articles 7 and 8 only.107 The CJEU criticised the DRD for 
practically interfering with fundamental rights of the entire EU population without distinctions, 
exceptions (professional secrecy), relationships between data retained and the aim pursued 
(time, geography, persons and serious crime), not laying down substantive and procedural 
conditions relating to access and subsequent use which was not based on objective criteria, and 
which above all was not dependent on prior judicial authorisation.108 The CJEU ruled that the 
EU legislature exceeded its limits imposed by compliance of proportionality in light of Article 
7, 8 and 52(1) CFR,109 and therefore ruled the DRD as invalid.110 
 
(f) The Aftermath of Digital Rights Ireland 
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The CJEU’s ruling has been regarded as ground-breaking,111a milestone,112 a significant step 
in developing fundamental rights protection113 (even in the national security context)114 and a 
landmark115 ruling in that it: 
 
1. Imposed a new level of responsibility on the EU legislator to protect fundamental 
rights; 
2. Subjected EU legislation to a novel strict judicial scrutiny test; 
3. Declared invalid EU law for violation of fundamental rights; and 
4. Composed substantive instructions for law makers at the EU and Member State level 
to guarantee suitable protection for privacy and data protection.116 
 
The CJEU’s position is regarded as closing ranks with the ECtHR jurisprudence by treating 
collection and use of data as two separate interferences with privacy and data protection.117 
McIntyre argues that it in fact extends protection beyond the ECtHR jurisprudence in that it 
relied on ex post facto controls and takes a step further with regards to need for prior judicial 
control.118 However, it has also been argued that this merely reflects already (but not often 
cited) existing ECtHR jurisprudence.119 It has also been regarded as putting an end to mass 
surveillance and comes to the same conclusion as AG Cruz Villalón, but for different 
reasons.120 The invalidation of the DRD also meant that it was invalid from the date it came 
into force.121 
 
(g)  National Responses to Digital Rights Ireland 
  
Niklas Vainio and Samuli Miettinen noted that there were two interpretations of Digital Rights 
Ireland, permissive and strict.122 The permissive approach does not take issue with blanket 
retention in and of itself, but the lack of accompanying safeguards123 as ‘some form of 
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mandatory data retention in order to combat serious crime and terrorism might indeed be 
compatible with the’124 CFR. The strict approach entails that blanket indiscriminate data 
retention is now forbidden125 as Martin Husovec notes forbidding this ‘seems to be an 
indispensable precondition’ given that the following paragraph suggests how to proportionally 
limit such retention.126 
 
The Austrian Constitutional Court (ACC)127 and Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC)128 both 
ruled national data retention laws as unconstitutional. As did the Romanian Constitutional 
Court (RCC).129 Netherlands’s District Court of The Hague (DCH) also ruled that national 
measures were invalid for going too far, violating freedom of expression and lacked evidence 
of necessity.130 
 
(h) The UK’s response to Digital Rights Ireland 
 
For three months, the UK did nothing,131 then suddenly fast-tracked132 ‘emergency legislation,’ 
the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014) which was adopted 
within three days.133 Niklas Vainio and Samuli Miettinen were unconvinced of the UK 
Government’s position that DRIPA 2014 satisfied many of the requirements of Digital Rights 
Ireland as the differences between DRIPA 2014 and the DRR were ‘minimal.’134 A challenge 
against DRIPA 2014, brought by David Davis MP, Tom Watson MP and others was soon to 
follow on the grounds of Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 and 8 CFR.135 
 
The English and Welsh High Court (HC) ruled that s.1 of DRIPA 2014 was inconsistent with 
EU law for failing provide clear and precise rules on access and use of communications data 
in relation to precisely defined serious crimes and not having prior independent/judicial 
authorisation for said access.136 The English and Welsh Court of Appeal (CoA) took a radically 
different approach137 to the HC, but sought clarification from the CJEU on whether its ruling 
in Digital Rights Ireland were meant to be treated as mandatory requirements (clear and 
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precise, accessible rules, judicial control of access to communications data etc) by Member 
States.138 
 
(i) Preliminary References 
 
Alongside the CoA’s preliminary reference, the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeals 
(SACoA) among other things, asked the CJEU whether a general obligation to retain 
communications data was compatible with Article 15(1) of the e-PD taking account of Articles 
7, 8 and 15(1) of the CFR.139 The President of the CJEU decided to join both references.140 
 
(j) Opinion of A-G Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 and Watson 
 
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 and Watson noted that Article 15(1) gave Member States a 
choice141 and Member States can avail themselves of the possibility subject to the conditions 
laid out in Article 15(1) itself i.e. general principles of Union law, the CFR and Digital Rights 
Ireland.142 AG Saugmandsgaard Øe also maintained that the CFR is applicable to national 
measures of data retention, but not access of police and judicial authorities.143AG 
Saugmandsgaard Øe maintained that each of the safeguards mentioned by the CJEU in Digital 
Rights Ireland must be regarded as mandatory.144 AG Saugmandsgaard Øe concluded that 
Member States should not be precluded from creating general data retention obligations if such 
laws are: 
 
1. Accessible, foreseeable and adequately protects against arbitrary interference; 
2. Respects the essence of Article 7 and 8 CFR; 
3. Strictly necessary i.e. the only measure possible to achieve objective; 
4. Accompanied by all the safeguards mentioned in Digital Rights Ireland; and 
5. Must be proportionate.145 
 
(k) The CJEU’s Judgment in Tele2 and Watson 
 
Unlike AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, the CJEU held that retention146 and access147 to 
communications data fell within the scope of the e-PD (author’s emphasis). Furthermore, the 
CJEU held that data retention not only raises questions of compatibility with Article 7 and 8 
CFR, but also Article 11 CFR (freedom of expression),148 and thus must be taken into account 
when interpreting Article 15(1) of the e-PD.149 The CJEU ruled that national laws that 
implement a general indiscriminate power to retain exceeds the limits of what constitutes what 
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is strictly necessary in democratic society as required by Article 15(1) as required by Articles 
7, 8, 11 and 52(1) CFR.150 
 
The CJEU echoed the view of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in the rules governing access to 
communications data must be legally binding (author’s emphasis).151 The CJEU further 
elaborated laws governing access must lay down substantive and procedural conditions.152 The 
CJEU also favoured notification when it would no longer jeopardise investigations,153 and to 
guarantee security and data protection, all data must be retained within the EU, subject to 
irreversible destruction at the end of the retention period.154 
 
(l) Initial Reaction to Tele2 and Watson, and the UK’s response 
 
Initial reactions to the CJEU’s judgment in Tele2 and Watson were positive, many regarding it 
as a blow to the UK data retention surveillance regime.155 The Legal Services of the Council 
acknowledged that ‘a general and indiscriminate retention obligation for crime prevention and 
other security reasons would no more be possible at national level than it is at EU level.’156 On 
30 November 2017, the Home Office responded with a consultation seeking to amend certain 
provisions of the IPA 2016 (including that which concerns data retention) to comply with Tele2 
and Watson.157 These potential amendments will be considered separately (as they are not yet 
law) for their compatibility with the ECHR in Chapter 7. 
 
In Tom Watson and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department158 the CoA were 
asked to determine the legality of DRIPA 2014 in light of Tele2 and Watson.159 Despite ruling 
that DRIPA 2014 was inconsistent with EU law for not limiting the purposes of retention to 
fighting serious crime and access to communications data was not based on prior review by a 
court or administrative body,160 the CoA declined to grant declaratory relief that it contained 
no limitations.161 The three reasons were that: 
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I. It was not argued that DRIPA 2014 was unlawful for failing to provide direct or indirect 
links between data retained of an identifiable public and serious crime. 
II. The CJEU’s judgment as in response and applied to Swedish law and therefore not 
directly applicable to DRIPA 2014; and 
III. The HC would be dealing with such matter later that year. 
 
This position is problematic due to it relying on the CJEU’s judgment only applying to Swedish 
law, when it in fact applies to every EU Member State.162 Moreover, DRIPA 2014 does permit 
general retention as it allows the possibility to do so, the only difference between Swedish law 
and DRIPA 2014, is that the former is a ‘catch all’ and the latter is a ‘power that can catch all’ 
to argue otherwise is playing semantics.163 Instead of addressing the issue, the CoA performed 
legal gymnastics to avoid answering the question as to whether DRIPA 2014 permitted general 
data retention.164 
 
When the issue came before the HC in Liberty v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
and Others165 they ruled that the IPA 2016 was incompatible with EU law for the same reasons 
that DRIPA 2014 was.166 The HC ruled that s.87(1) of the IPA 2016 did not involve the content 
of communications,167 Chapter 3 will disprove this reasoning. The HC also did not consider 
the ECHR implications of the IPA 2016,168 nor did they consider that the IPA 2016 permitted 
general and indiscriminate data retention.169 This necessitates the importance of this thesis 
considering data retention through the ECHR, particularly in Chapters 4 and 7. 
 
2.7 Conclusions  
 
This Chapter has briefly demonstrated the politics behind the adoption of data retention 
measures, particularly in the UK and at an EU level. It has shown that the UK (and not the US) 
was the main driving force behind data retention harmonisation across the EU through the 
DRD, something that even the US has never adopted.170 This has been described as a master 
class in diplomacy and political manoeuvring171 but it must also noted that the calls for data 
retention tend to be at their strongest following an act of terrorism as governments often act in 
a ‘knee-jerk’ manner.172 Simon Davies believed Charles Clarke was hell-bent as an act of 
political desperation to give the pretence of leadership in Europe.173 The haste at which the 
DRD was passed ‘left MEPs little time to consider its effect and to organise effective 
opposition’ and those who voted in favour may not have done so on an informed basis.174 
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Various Member State Courts rejected national implementation of data retention measures 
which was soon outlawed at an EU level by the CJEU. The CJEU subsequently ruled that 
general indiscriminate data retention was not permissible in the EU. However, considering that 
the UK has been a driving force for data retention, with many Member States seeking to follow 
suit and ignore the CJEU,175 it is necessary in this thesis to go above and beyond the CJEU and 
their reasoning, by considering data retention envisaged in Part 4 of the IPA 2016 through the 
lens of the ECHR. The then EDPS, Peter Hustinx, regarded the DRD as the most privacy 
invasive instrument ever adopted by the EU in terms of scale and the number of people it 
affects176 and its compatibility with Article 8 of the ECHR became questionable (author’s 
emphasis).177 These observations make it crucial to consider in the next Chapter, just how 
privacy invasive the communications data that can be retained via Part 4 of the IPA 2016. 
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Chapter 3: Communications data is just as, if not more intrusive than 
content 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter focusses specifically on the communications data to be retained and its 
intrusiveness. In order to achieve this, it first needs to be understood what this data is and where 
it comes from. Communications data, also referred to as traffic1 and metadata2 is further 
defined in UK law as Internet Connection Records (ICR) (i.e. website visited), entity Data (i.e. 
contact details), and events Data (i.e. sending a message/making a call).3 Though Sophie Stalla-
Bourdillon et al have argued equating metadata with communications data can be misleading 
and have the consequence of unduly broadening the scope of telecommunications operators’ 
data retention obligations.4 This Chapter, will, however, demonstrate that telecommunications 
operators’ data retention obligations are unduly broad irrespective of distinctions between 
communications data and metadata as their analysis took place before the introduction of the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016).  
 
This Chapter examines the specifics of communications data, relevant communications data, 
ICR, entity and events Data found within the IPA 2016. Looking into the specifics of these 
types of data provides an illustration of what it can reveal, and it is against this backdrop that 
these classes of data will be assessed for their intrusiveness. This Chapter also considers the 
potential for third party data to be retained and its implications. 
 
The IPA 2016 allows for data to be generated for the purposes of retention. It is not clear what 
this data may be, only that it would include ICRs.5 This Chapter will highlight that much of the 
data retention discussion concerns the revealing nature of communications data but little is 
discussed about the Big Data elephant in the room. This Chapter will give an example of how 
intrusive the any/all description of data to be retained can be. Finally, this Chapter will briefly 
note interference becomes more severe based upon whom has access to retained data. This 
Chapter will therefore conclude that the types of data to be retained (any data already in a 
telecommunications operators’ possession, any description of data or capable of obtaining) or 
generated for retention) puts interference with fundamental rights on the same (if not more) 
magnitude as content, and thus adversely effects the essence of the right. Such conclusions 
would mean that the safeguards for content and communications data should be the same.  
																																																						
1 Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe uses it synonymously in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 
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View from the UK’ in Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes and Paul De Hert (eds), Data Protection on the Move 
(Springer 2016), 438. 
5 Section 87(11) of the IPA 2016. 
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3.2 Communications data and/or Metadata: What is it, and where does it come 
from? 
 
When discussing data retention, the terminology used is often either communications data or 
metadata. For the purposes of this thesis, they are one and the same.6 It is sometimes described 
as data about data i.e. all other information excluding the content, the where, when, who, how 
long, and how (of communications).7 This includes information about the time, duration, and 
location of a communication as well as the phone numbers or email addresses of the sending 
and receiving parties.8 This may also include device information i.e. make/model number.9 But 
where does this data come from? Bruce Schneier10 explains that computers constantly produce 
data through their input and output, but also as a by-product of everything they do. 
 
Computers continuously document what they are doing i.e. your word processor keeps a record 
of what you have written, even overwritten versions of what you have written, and only erases 
them when disk space is needed for something else.11 Schneier further explains that connecting 
to the internet only increases the amount of data that is produced, whether it be websites visited, 
ads clicked on or words typed. Your computer, the sites you visit, the computers in the network 
all produce data. Your browser sends data to websites about the software you have, when it 
was installed, the features enabled, to the point where one can be uniquely identified,12 by for 
example, unique device IDs (discussed below).  
 
Schneier also notes that data is a by-product of modern technological social interactions, such 
as the use of social media i.e. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Google. These systems do not 
just transfer data, they also create records of your interactions with others.13 Schneier continues 
that mobile phones are constantly producing data about your general location. Use of that 
phone produces even more data, and with smart phones more still due to the data production 
of apps and GPS receivers.14 Newell notes that: 
 
Metadata is generated whenever a person uses an electronic device (such as a computer, 
tablet, mobile phone, landline telephone, or even a modern automobile) or an electronic 
service (such as an email service, social media website, word processing program, or 
search engine). Often, this results in the creation of considerable amounts of 
information (metadata).15  
 
On the notion of smart phones and social media, Abdulaziz Almehmadi details what he calls 
the spy in your pocket.16 Almehmadi notes that smart features on your smartphone are not just 
tools for collecting personal information for sale, but harvesting information from sensors via 
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Norton 2016), 15. 
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16 Abdulaziz Almehmadi, The Spy in Your Pocket (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2017). 
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app permissions.17 Almehmadi gives the example of information collected from ones Global 
Positioning System (GPS), camera, microphone and contact list.18 Schneier continues that 
making purchases creates data, modern cars generate yet more data, from the speed, to how 
hard pedals are pressed19 
 
Schneier came to the conclusion that he had been looking at things backwards, for example, a 
refrigerator is not a refrigerator with a computer, it’s a computer that keeps food cold, your 
phone is a computer that makes calls, your car is a computer with wheels and an engine.20 
Schneier rightly points out that computers are becoming increasingly embedded into more and 
more products that are connected to the internet21 (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6) 
which, consequently, will increase the amount of data produced.22 
 
3.3 Is communications data just as intrusive as content? 
 
Communications data has often been distinguished from the content of communications. To 
understand this distinction, it is necessary to understand what content actually means. Content 
is usually described as what is within a message such as the body of an email or conversation 
over the telephone (author’s emphasis).23 The IPA 2016, s.261(6) defines content as any 
element of the communication or data logically associated with which reveals anything of what 
might reasonably considered the meaning of the communication. Section 261(6)(a) and (b), 
however, considers inferences24 that can be drawn from communications does not equate to 
content, neither does systems data25 as set out in s.263(4).26 Systems data is described as data 
which may be used: to identify, or assist in identifying, any person, apparatus, system or 
service; to identify any event; or to identify the location of any person, event or thing.27  
 
This section deals with controversy surrounding the intrusiveness of communications when 
compared to content. 
 
(a)  Not as Intrusive?  
 
UK courts have had a tendency to acknowledge that interception of content is more intrusive 
than access to communications data.28 This is also, and not surprisingly, the position of various 
																																																						
17 ibid, 28. 
18 ibid, 29-38. 
19 Bruce Schneier, (n10), 17. 
20 ibid, 18. 
21 ibid, 18. 
22 ibid, 20. 
23 Davis & Ors, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors [2015] EWHC 
2092 (Admin), [13]. 
24 Explanatory notes to IPA 2016, para 728. 
25 Which means any data that enables or facilitates, or identifies or describes anything connected with enabling 
or facilitating, the functioning of any of the following— (a) a postal service; (b) a telecommunication system 
(including any apparatus forming part of the system); (c) any telecommunications service provided by means of 
a telecommunication system; (d) a relevant system (including any apparatus forming part of the system); (e) any 
service provided by means of a relevant system. 
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law enforcement agencies e.g. the National Crime Agency, police forces etc,29 and GCHQ.30 
This was also the position of the then Independent Reviewer of Terror Legislation, David 
Anderson Q.C.31 The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of the UK Parliament 
acknowledged that communications data makes it possible to build a richer picture of an 
individual, but they were of the opinion that it was significantly less intrusive than content 
(author’s emphasis).32 The then Home Secretary, Theresa May MP likened the newly defined 
ICRs as the modern equivalent of an itemised phone bill.33 In Schrems, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) maintained that the legislation permitting the public authorities to 
have access on a generalised basis to the content of electronic communications must be 
regarded as compromising the essence of Article 7 (Article 8 ECHR’s corresponding right) of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) (author’s emphasis).34 In contrast, the CJEU in 
Digital Rights Ireland held that data retention does not adversely affect the essence of Article 
7 and Article 8 (data protection) because it does not permit the acquisition of knowledge of the 
content of the electronic communications as such (author’s emphasis).35 The essence of the 
right (which may be similar to the ‘very substance of the right’)36 is adopted from the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).37 The ECtHR have used the 
essence of the right for various Convention Rights38  and therefore, there is no reason why this 
could not be adopted for the interpretation of Article 8. Though not defined, Hoyano indicates 
that it may mean that there is an absolute indispensable core to the right which cannot be 
impaired regardless of the circumstances of any particular instance.39 The ECtHR in Uzun v 
Germany40 regarded surveillance via GPS interfered less with Article 8 than interception of 
phone calls. This was used as justification by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) in 
Liberty and Others v GCHQ and Others to maintain that interference with communications 
data as a whole was not as serious as interception.41  
 
In the USA, there has been an inconsistent approach in regards to communications data. The 
District Court for the Southern District of New York42 highlighted that telephone service 
subscribers maintained no legitimate expectation of privacy in their call data, whereas the 
District Court for D.C.43 maintained there is a very significant expectation of privacy.44 
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However, on 22 June 2018, the US Supreme Court ruled that the Government violates the 
Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure) by accessing mobile phone location data 
without a search warrant where there is a legitimate privacy interest.45 This, however, was only 
confined to a type of communications data, location data, and it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to consider what a ‘legitimate privacy interest’ entails. These contrasting views highlight 
that there is still a line drawn between communications data, and the content of said 
communications. Kift and Nissenbaum, however, argue that the National Security Agency’s 
(NSA) position that metadata is non-sensitive data no longer makes sense, nor did it to begin 
with, because it always created an expectation of privacy.46 
 
(b)  Just as, if not More Intrusive? 
 
One of the key elements of classifying content as more intrusive than communications data is 
the assumption that people are more concerned about what they are actually saying, than who 
they are saying it to. The truth of the matter is that sometimes people care more about the 
communications data than the content.47  For example, an email reply with just the text ‘lol’ 
reveals very little, but the communications data associated with that email can reveal the 
sender/recipient email address, the date and time it was sent, the subject line, the service used 
of both sender and recipient, the anti-spam application used and in some instances an 
approximate location of the sender.48  
 
As Schneier suggests, communications data gives us context,49 and context matters because it 
gives us meaning.50  It has been noted that the effect of communications data ‘is that a very 
comprehensive dossier on an individual's private life can be produced (including contacts, 
where he or she has been, is, or will be going, and his or her interests and habits).’51 This 
opinion has also been endorsed by the German Constitutional Court where they believed that 
’it cannot automatically be assumed in this connection that recourse to these [sic] data carries 
fundamentally less weight than the content-based monitoring of telecommunications.’52 The 
following press release stated that ‘[e]ven though the storage does not extend to the contents 
of the communications, these data may be used to draw content-related conclusions that extend 
into the users’ private sphere (author’s emphasis).’53 Saiban and Sykes have also supported this 
notion by stating that ‘[a]lthough the content of the data may not be revealed, it will be clear 
from certain website and email addresses what kind of content is being viewed (author’s 
emphasis).’54 Solove is also of this opinion.55 This highlights the problematic definition of 
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content in s.261(6) of IPA 2016 as it essentially proclaims content is meaning, but not that kind 
of meaning that can be gained from the communications data (even if it produces the same 
meaning). The explanatory notes to the IPA 2016 noted that ‘[w]hile it is possible to draw an 
inference from the fact a person has contacted another person this is distinct from the content 
of, for example, the telephone call.’56 This, distinction however, does not reflect reality as a 
study by Stanford University demonstrated the type of inferences they could draw from phone 
metadata.57 
 
It is difficult to conclude that such inferences do not detail the meaning of the communication. 
Moreover, collected internet traffic data has even been regarded by Alberto Escudero-Pascual 
and Gus Hosein as mildly more sensitive than traditional telephone traffic data (author’s 
emphasis).58 This is why it was unhelpful for the then Home Secretary, Theresa May MP to 
claim that ICR were equivalent to phone bills as her own evidence submitted to the draft Joint 
Committee of the Investigatory Powers Bill demonstrated that communications data goes well 
beyond just billing data.59 May’s statement is contradicted when considering ICRs60 as a 
telephone bill can reveal who you’ve been speaking to, when and for how long, but your 
internet activity reveals everything you do online (author’s emphasis).61 
 
This is why it has been suggested that interference with communications data at the very least 
is as just as serious as interference with content (author’s emphasis).62 The Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI), considered that this might be a possibility.63 Advocate General (AG) 
Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 and Watson noted that that in the individual context a general 
data retention obligation would facilitate equally serious interference as targeted surveillance 
measures, including those which intercept the content of communications (author’s 
emphasis).64 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29) was of the opinion that 
metadata and content should both have the same high level of protection.65  
 
Escudero-Pascual and Hosein have suggested that ‘[t]raffic data analysis generates more 
sensitive profiles of an individual’s actions and intentions, arguably more so than 
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communications content (author’s emphasis).’66 AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 and Watson 
maintained that risks associated with the access to communications data may be greater than 
access to the content of communications.67 As Roberts notes, the interference posed by data 
retention cannot solely be based on the nature of the data but also whom has access.68 Paul 
Bernal notes that gathering of communications data is of a greater intrusion than the 
examination of content. This is because communications data is structured, making it more 
suitable for aggregation and analysis. Furthermore, content can be disguised more easily 
through encryption69 or using coded language.70 Examples of how communications data can 
constitute a greater intrusion than content is now to be provided. Andrew Reed and Michael 
Kranch demonstrated, even with a HTTPS (encrypted) protected Netflix videos, the videos 
watched could still be identified using only the TCP/IP headers71 (which would be classed as 
relevant communications data).72 Bernal notes many intimate subjects are often deliberately 
avoided (to avoid disclosure of sexuality, religion and health information) when writing 
content, this can be determined by communications data analysis.73 
 
This revealing nature is given further weight based on its usefulness in terms of prevention or 
detection of crime, or the prevention of disorder, or prevention of death or injury or 
safeguarding national security.74  The ISC were ‘surprised to discover that the primary value 
to GCHQ of bulk interception was not in reading the actual content of communications, but in 
the information associated with those communications (author’s emphasis).’75 The NSA’s 
General Counsel, Stewart Baker admitted that ‘metadata absolutely tells you everything about 
somebody's life. If you have enough metadata, you don't really need content (author’s 
emphasis).’76 Former director of the NSA and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Michael 
Hayden agreed with Bakers comments as being ‘absolutely correct’ because ‘[w]e kill people 
based on metadata.’77 Using metadata from 55 million phone users in Pakistan aids NSA in 
who to target for drone strikes.78  
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Most importantly, the ECtHR in Big Brother Watch were not persuaded: 
 
[T]hat the acquisition of related communications data is necessarily less intrusive than 
the acquisition of content. For example, the content of an electronic communication 
might be encrypted and, even if it were decrypted, might not reveal anything of note 
about the sender or recipient. The related communications data, on the other hand, could 
reveal the identities and geographic location of the sender and recipient and the 
equipment through which the communication was transmitted. In bulk, the degree of 
intrusion is magnified, since the patterns that will emerge could be capable of painting 
an intimate picture of a person through the mapping of social networks, location 
tracking, Internet browsing tracking, mapping of communication patterns, and insight 
into who a person interacted with.79 
 
The ECtHR’s position echoes arguments made in this subsection, and takes a step further than 
the CJEU in considering content and communications data as equals. This has important 
ramifications for appropriate safeguards when communications data is concerned (see Chapter 
5). One could argue that the IPT in Liberty and Others used the ECtHR’s ruling in Uzun to 
make the distinction between communications data and content. However, the: 
 
The IPT’s reasoning was based on the false analogy raised by the Respondent…that 
because GPS data didn’t amount to the required seriousness of that of interception, the 
same principle applied to communications data. However, in accepting this analogy the 
IPT made a critical error as location data, derived from GPS isn’t the only data that 
forms part of the broad definition of communications data…Therefore, when the IPT 
gave weight to Uzun it did so by considering a case of an isolated specific type of data, 
which cannot be used to justify an argument that interference is less severe whilst 
ignoring the cumulative total of the different types of communications data.80 
 
In further support of the ECtHR’s position, it is important to now consider communications 
data as envisaged in the IPA 2016 and the level of intrusiveness. 
 
3.4 Data by type and intrusiveness 
 
Part 4 of the IPA 2016 concerns the issuing of data retention notices. This part also provides 
insight into what data can be retained. Section 87(1) of the IPA 2016 allows the Secretary of 
State to issue retention notices on telecommunication operators to retain ‘relevant 
communications data.’ Section 87(4) details that telecommunications operators are not to retain 
‘third-party’ data,81 but s.87(4)(d) allows this data to be required to be retained if it is used or 
retained for a lawful purpose. Section 87(11) concerns the retention of ICRs and s.87(9)(b)(i) 
provides that retention notices can obligate data to be generated for the purposes of retention.  
It is necessary to break down and discuss relevant communications data, third party data, ICRs, 
generated data and their intrusiveness separately.  
  
(a)  Relevant Communications Data 
 
																																																						
79 Big Brother Watch v UK App nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 24960/15 (ECHR, 13 September 2018), [356]. 
80 Matthew White, ‘Protection by Judicial Oversight, or an Oversight in Protection?’ (2017) Journal of 
Information Rights, Policy and Practice 2:1 1, 9. 
81 Explanatory notes to IPA 2016, (n24), para 262. 
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According to s.87(11) of the IPA 2016, relevant communications data includes the sender or 
recipient (human or not) of a communication, its time, duration, type, mode/pattern or fact of 
communication, the telecommunications system82 the communication has been transmitted to, 
from or through and its location. 
 
These five categories, Graham Smith suggests, at face value appear to go wider than the data 
types found under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014) 
(which implemented the DRD definitions) as amended by the Counter Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015 (CTSA 2015).83 Smith notes that the scope of ‘relevant communications data’ 
captures communications not just between humans. This, Smith highlights, ‘sweeps up not 
only background interactions that smartphone apps make automatically with their supplier 
servers, but probably the entire internet of things’84 (see Chapter 6). Smith continues that ‘data 
such as the ‘type, method or pattern’ of communication’ extend beyond the familiar 
sender/recipient, time and location.85 For example, logging onto Facebook via an iPhone using 
Safari.  
 
Smith highlights that when considering what relevant communications data consists of, there 
are 14 (with ‘identifier’ no longer present in the IPA 2016) interlinked definitions that make it 
up.86 This includes: 
 
1. Relevant communications data, 
2. Telecommunications system, 
3. Person, 
4. Communications data, 
5. Communication, 
6. Apparatus, 
7. Telecommunications operator, 
8. Telecommunications service, 
9. Entity data, 
10. Events data, 
11. Entity, 
12. Content of a communication; and, 
13. Data.  
 
Telecommunications operator/service/system and apparatus will be dealt with in more detail 
in Chapter 6 highlighting that what can be retained is dependent on who can be obligated to 
retain. Although s.87 of the IPA 2016 refers to ‘relevant communications data’ it is important 
to note that s.261(5)(a) defines communications data as either entity or events data which is or 
is capable of being held or obtained, by or on behalf of the telecommunications operators. This 
includes data held by a telecommunications operator or available directly from the network 
which identifies a person or device on the network, ensures that a communication reaches its 
																																																						
82 See Chapter 6. 
83 Graham Smith, ‘Never mind Internet Connection Records, what about Relevant Communications Data?’ (29 
November 2015) <http://www.cyberleagle.com/2015/11/never-mind-internet-connection-records.html> 
accessed 8 April 2017.  
84 ibid. 
85 ibid. 
86 ibid. 
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intended destination, describes how a person has been using a service or is about the 
architecture of the telecommunication system itself.87 
 
Entity (which is a person or thing)88 data refers to data about entities or links between them 
and telecommunications service/systems but according to the explanatory notes does not 
include information about individual events,89 this includes phone numbers, service identifiers, 
physical address, or IP addresses.90 Section 81(1) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000 (RIPA 2000) defines person (which the IPA 2016 is silent on) as including any 
organisation and any association or combination of persons. Therefore, entity data can be 
summarised as data about an individual, any group of individuals or any object. This, therefore, 
contrary to the explanatory notes, can provide information about individual events. 
 
Events data is defined in s.261(4) and can be summarised as identifying and describing events 
taking place on a telecommunication system or other device which consist of one or more 
entities engaging in an activity at a specific point, or points, in time and space.91 The 
explanatory notes to IPA 2016 gives examples of the fact that someone has sent or received an 
email, phone call, text or social media message; the location of a person when they made a 
mobile phone call or the Wi-Fi hotspot that their phone connected to; or the destination IP 
address that an individual has connected to online.92 The explanatory notes also details that 
entity data is generally less intrusive than events data without explaining why.93 
  
Given that the relevant definitions discussed above recite ‘communication’ and ‘data’ 
frequently, it is important to highlight their definitions also.94 Communication is defined in 
s.261(2) as: 
 
a) anything comprising speech, music, sounds, visual images or data of any description, 
and  
b) signals serving either for the impartation of anything between persons, between a 
person and a thing or between things or for the actuation or control of any apparatus.  
 
Data is defined in s.263(1) which includes data which is not electronic data and any information 
(whether or not electronic). Combining these definitions above will later highlight that the 
types of data that can be retained under Part 4 is essentially limitless. However, in order to 
make sense of the relevant communications data issue, some insight can be gleamed from the 
Home Secretary, who presented evidence to the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory 
Powers Bill gave a table (see Table A) of examples what is considered to be communications 
data and content.95 Although not a definitive legal source, it does give some insight into what 
is considered communications data.  
																																																						
87 Explanatory notes to IPA 2016, (n24), para 723. 
88 Section 261(7) of the IPA 2016. 
89 Explanatory notes to IPA 2016, (n24), para 725. 
90 ibid, para 727. 
91 ibid, para 726. 
92 ibid, para 727. 
93 ibid, para 223. 
94 For an excellent breakdown of definitions, see Graham Smith, ‘Relevant Communications Data revisited’ (15 
March 2016) <http://www.cyberleagle.com/2016/03/relevant-communications-data-revisited.html> accessed 9 
April 2017.   
95 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, written evidence, (n59), Home Office, p515-517; 
Similar to the types of data found in the Retention of Communications Data under Part 11: Anti-terrorism, 
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Communications data Content 
Postal 
• Name of a 
customer of a postal 
product 
• Address of a 
customer of a postal 
product 
• Phone number 
of a customer of a 
postal product 
• Email address 
linked to a 
customer’s account 
of a postal product 
• Any 
redirections 
in place on a 
customer’s 
account 
• Accou
nt details 
used to pay 
for the 
service 
• The 
address on a 
letter or 
parcel in the 
postal 
system 
  
• Any 
replacement 
address put on a 
letter or parcel to 
facilitate re-
direction 
• Billing data 
for sending mail 
(e.g. corporate 
account) 
• The content of a 
letter or parcel 
NB for a postcard the 
content would be the 
message on the postcard 
and picture on the front. 
The address and other 
information added to 
facilitate delivery of the 
package would be 
communications data. 
Mobile Telephony including SMS, MMS, EMS 
• Cell mast 
name 
• Cell mast 
locations 
• Cell mast 
sector 
• Network maps 
• 2G/3G/4G 
coverage maps 
• Name/address 
of a customer 
• Email 
address 
linked to a 
customer’s 
account 
• Devic
e identifiers 
linked to a 
customer’s 
account –
e.g. IMSI, 
IMEI, Mac 
Address 
• Accou
nt details 
used to pay 
for the 
service 
• Dialle
d phone 
number 
• Phone 
number of a 
customer 
• Dialling 
phone number 
• Time/date/loc
ation a phone call 
was made 
• Device 
identifiers linked to 
a communication 
• Billing data 
• A handshake 
between a phone 
and a cell mast so 
the network knows 
where to route a call 
• The audio of a 
phone call 
• The body of a text 
message 
• An image sent as 
an MMS 
Internet access NB – this may additionally include information in relation to internet 
applications (below) where held by the internet access provider for business purposes 
																																																						
Crime and Security Act 2001 Voluntary Code of Practice <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2003/draft/5b.pdf> 
accessed 17 April 2017. 
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Broadband Public Wi-fi Mobile   
• Routing 
information 
• Name of a 
customer 
• Address of a 
customer 
• Phone number 
of a customer 
• Device 
identifiers linked to 
a customer’s 
account –e.g. IMSI, 
IMEI, MAC 
Address 
• Email address 
linked to a 
customer’s account 
• Account 
details used to pay 
for the service 
• User name 
• Password 
• Billing data 
• RADIUS logs 
(IP session 
start/stop) 
• Destination IP 
address and port 
number 
• The domain 
url (this is the part 
such as 
bbc.co.uk)** 
• Server Names 
indicator** 
• Public source 
IP address and port 
number 
• Time/date/loc
ation of an internet 
communication 
• Device 
identifiers linked to 
a communication 
• Volumes of 
data 
uploaded/download
ed 
Instead of the 
location/addre
ss of the 
broadband 
router the 
following data 
may 
additionally 
be captured: 
• Wi-fi 
access point 
name 
• Wi-fi 
access point 
address 
• Wi-fi 
access point 
device 
identifiers 
e.g. MAC 
address 
• Cover
age maps 
  
NB – What 
may appear as 
a single wi-fi 
access session 
to a customer 
may actually 
constitute 
multiple 
sessions 
using differen
t wi-fi access 
points or a 
number of 
applications 
on a device 
opening 
separate 
connections. 
A session may 
also use 
mobile data 
for some 
periods where 
the data in the 
next column 
Instead of the 
location/address of 
the broadband router 
the following data 
may additionally be 
captured: 
• Cell mast 
name 
• Cell mast 
sector 
• Cell mast 
locations 
• Network maps 
• 2G/3G/4G 
coverage maps 
• Device 
identifiers (e.g. 
MAC address, 
IMSI, IMEI) of the 
device connecting 
to the mobile 
internet – e.g. 
phone, tablet, 
dongle 
• Device 
identifiers (e.g. 
MAC address) of 
any other devices 
using the internet 
through that 
connection (some 
devices can 
broadcast their 
signal allowing 
another device to 
use their 
connection). 
• A handshake 
between a phone 
and a cell mast so 
the network knows 
where to route a 
mobile data session 
• NAT/PAT 
logs 
  
NB – what may 
appear to a customer 
to be a single mobile 
• The url of a 
webpage in a browsing 
session (e.g. 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/s
tory or news.bbc.co.uk 
or 
friend’sname.facebook.
com) 
• The content of the 
webpages being 
viewed, including any 
text, images, audio and 
videos embedded in the 
page 
• The names and 
content of any files 
transmitted over a peer 
to peer connection 
• Private posts 
being transmitted to or 
viewed on a webserver 
* 
• A like message 
being posted on social 
media * 
  
NB – in practice an 
internet access provider is 
often unable to 
distinguish what traffic it 
is carrying from a source 
IP to a destination IP. 
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• Location/addr
ess of access point 
such a broadband 
router 
  
will be 
relevant 
  
  
internet session may 
be multiple sessions 
for the same reasons 
as for public wi-fi 
access. 
Internet applications (such as Internet Telephony, Internet email) 
• Routing 
information 
• Name of a 
customer 
• Address of a 
customer 
• Phone number 
of a customer 
• Email address 
linked to a 
customer’s account 
• Time/date/loc
ation at 
logon/logoff/reconn
ect 
• Accou
nt details 
used to pay 
for the 
service 
• User 
name (or 
other 
credentials 
used to 
access the 
service)*** 
• Passw
ord 
• Billin
g data 
  
• Email address 
of the sender or 
recipient of an 
email 
• Caller and 
callee for voip calls 
• Source IP 
address and port 
number 
• Message type 
(e.g. email, IM) 
• Time/date/loc
ation of each 
internet 
communication 
• The body of an 
email 
• The subject line of 
an email 
• Any attachments 
to an email 
• The audio/ visual 
of an internet call 
• The messages 
comprising a 
conversation in an 
internet chat 
Table A 
 
(b)  Passwords and Usernames  
 
The definition applies to username and passwords associated with Broadband (i.e. BT, Virgin, 
Talktalk) and what the Home Secretary regards as Internet applications such as Internet 
telephony (i.e. Skype, Whatsapp) and Internet email (i.e. Gmail, Hotmail etc). It must be noted 
that Internet applications does not appear to be limited to Internet telephony and Internet email, 
and this therefore could include web browsing (i.e. Safari, Chrome), peer-to-peer services (i.e. 
BitTorrent, Utorrent).96 This can also include media (i.e. Youtube, BBC iPlayer) information 
search (i.e. Google search, Bing search), communities (i.e. Facebook, Twitter), entertainment 
(i.e. Playstation Network, X-Box Live, Netflix), e-business (i.e. Amazon, eBay), finance (i.e. 
Barclays online banking) and other applications.97 Many of these applications can overlap, but 
the examples serve to highlight the breadth of coverage.  
  
As Kevin Fu et al note 
 
Passwords are the primary means of authenticating users on the Web today. It is 
important that any Web site guard the passwords of its users carefully. This is especially 
																																																						
96 Encyclopaedia ‘Internet Applications’ <http://www.encyclopedia.com/computing/news-wires-white-papers-
and-books/internet-applications> accessed 10 April 2017.  
97 National Institute of Open Schooling ‘Internet Applications and Services’ 
<http://oer.nios.ac.in/wiki/index.php/INTERNET_APPLICATION_AND_SERVICES> accessed 10 April 
2017. 
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important since users, when faced with many Web sites requiring passwords, tend to 
reuse passwords across sites.98 
 
They continue that ‘[c]ompromise of a password completely compromises a user.’99 It is this 
compromising nature which puts passwords and usernames at the most intrusive end of 
communications data. Some passwords need not be stored for authentication,100 would they 
require generation for the purposes of retention via s. 87(9)(b)(i)? If a Broadband provider 
provides the router, this will contain network/router username and password, which would be 
classed as communications data. Obtaining a router’s username and password can lead to 
malicious actors pretending to be genuine sites with the aim of stealing username and 
passwords for other internet applications, such as bank details.101 Obtaining network username 
and password can lead to all traffic being intercepted.102 If any of the traffic is difficult to 
intercept because of the use of a third party application (which uses encryption), then the 
username and password for these services (which would fall under Internet applications) could 
also be used to defeat encryption. Moreover, if the username and password for example, 
Google Password Manager103 was compromised, this would reduce the difficulty in gaining 
access to other Internet applications. This not only demonstrates an example of entity data104 
being more intrusive than events data, but how two types of communications data could 
compromise essentially anything done online. These two types of data alone would make any 
argument that content is more intrusive than communications data superfluous because not 
even the services provided to the consumer can guarantee safety,105 let alone the 
Government.106 
 
(c)  Unique Identifiers and Location Data  
 
																																																						
98 Kevin Fu, Emil Sit, Kendra Smith, Nick Feamster, ‘Dos and Don'ts of Client Authentication on the Web’ 
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99 ibid. 
100 Leigh Lundin, ‘PINs and Passwords, Part 2’ (11 August 2013) <http://www.sleuthsayers.org/2013/08/pins-
and-passwords-part-2.html> accessed 10 April 2017. 
101 Michael Horowitz, ‘Defending your router, and your identity, with a password change’ (19 March 2008) 
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10 April 2017.  
102 Mike Chapple, ‘Wireshark tutorial: How to sniff network traffic’ TechTarget (Newton, Massachusetts, 
October 2008) <http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/Wireshark-tutorial-How-to-sniff-network-traffic> 
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<https://www.labnol.org/internet/google-passwords-manager/29077/> accessed 10 April 2017; Abdulaziz 
Almehmadi, (n16), 60-61. 
104 Home Office, ‘Communications Data DRAFT Code of Practice’ (November 2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663675/November_2017_IPA_
Consultation_-_Draft_Communications_Data_Code_of_Pract....pdf> accessed 16 January 2018, para 2.42. 
105 Alfred Ng, Steven Musil, ‘Equifax data breach may affect nearly half the US population’ CNet (7 September 
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October 2017. 
106 BBC, ‘Previous cases of missing data’ BBC News (London, 25 May 2009) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7449927.stm> accessed 10 October 2017. 
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There are various identifiers for phones alone. 107 Table A also regards device identifiers that 
are linked to a customer’s Broadband/mobile account as communications data. Moreover, this 
includes the identifiers associated with communications associated with said 
Broadband/mobile service. Finally, communications data also consists of Wi-Fi access point 
identifiers, device identifiers when using mobile internet and any devices identifiers of any 
other devices using the internet through that connection. The Home Secretary’s evidence gives 
an example of such identifier, the Media Access Control (MAC). These are unique hardware 
numbers for computers.108 Bluetooth technologies periodically advertise MAC addresses.109 
According to Edward Snowden the NSA has a system that tracks the movements of everyone 
in a city by monitoring the MAC addresses of their electronic devices,110 Cunche agrees this is 
very possible,111 with traffic and retail store monitoring already happening.112 Tim Banks 
argues that ‘there is a greater probability of correlation between the owner of the device and 
the MAC address than there is of an IP address and an individual.’113 This is possibly because 
IP addresses can be dynamic i.e. the IP address changes each time there is a new connection to 
the internet, as noted in Breyer,114 whereas MAC addresses are not (unless hidden by the device 
owner).115 Mapping the movements is also possible through other devices identifiers such as 
the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and the International Mobile Station 
Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers. These are also classed as communications data. IMSI and 
IMEI numbers are unique mobile device identifiers, in which ISMI catchers116 can retrofit 
location monitoring technologies to determine the location of a target within one metre,117 
though they have been argued to not be as effective as once thought.118  
 
This leads to the necessary discussion regarding location data/information119 given that this 
also falls under communications data. Location data/information is regarded ‘as any type of 
data that places an individual at a particular location at any given point in time, or at a series 
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of locations over time.’120 This also encompasses ‘geo-positioning other than latitude, 
longitude and altitude, which can be ascertained with varying degrees of precision.’121 There 
is another important term, geo-location data, which refers to data generated by electronic 
devices that can be used to determine the location of the relevant devices and their users.’122 
The WP29 regards that ‘the combination of a MAC address of a WiFi access point with its 
calculated location’ should be treated as personal data.123 Location data is also regarded as 
personal data for the purposes of Article 4(1) of the Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)).  
 
In Recommendation AAA, the ISC regards approximate location data to be not as sensitive as 
communications data plus because the latter includes a more detailed class of information about 
a person’s habits, such as preferences or lifestyle choices and websites visited.124 However, as 
Teresa Scassa125 and Anne Uteck126 have suggested, location data can be used to create a data 
picture of movements of identifiable individuals.127 Rozemarijn van der Hilst would go further 
than the WP29 and GDPR and argue that location could be considered ‘sensitive personal 
data’128 or a ‘special category of personal data because ‘it can reveal information about a 
person’s habits, (future) whereabouts, religion, and can even reveal sexual preference or 
political views.’129 This highlights not only that location data can reveal very intimate details, 
it can be used to make future predictions based on current data possessed.130 Though the WP29 
did acknowledge that: 
 
A behavioural pattern may also include special categories of data, if it for example 
reveals visits to hospitals and religious place, presence at political demonstrations or 
presence at other specific locations revealing data about for example sex life.131 
 
Sensitive/special categories of personal data is defined in Article 9(1) of the GDPR as: 
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[P]ersonal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or 
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, 
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning 
health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation...  
 
The Grand Chamber (GC) of the ECtHR in S and Marper highlighted that where ethnic origin 
can be inferred from data, their retention is ‘all the more sensitive and susceptible of affecting 
the right to private life.’132 Abdulaziz Almehmadi details a real-life example of how Google 
Maps could generate a pattern of lifestyle, who one is and how time is spent based on location 
data emitted from a mobile phone.133 Prior to this, Kai Biermann noted how our own phones 
betray us, 134 giving the example of Malte Spitz of the German Green party who published the 
data that was retained under Germany’s data retention laws. Zeit Online created an interactive 
map which detailed Spitz’s movements,135 based on nearly 36000 data points. 136 Biermann 
continued that this data revealed: 
 
[W]hen Spitz walked down the street, when he took a train, when he was in an airplane. 
It shows where he was in the cities he visited. It shows when he worked and when he 
slept, when he could be reached by phone and when was unavailable. It shows when he 
preferred to talk on his phone and when he preferred to send a text message. It shows 
which beer gardens he liked to visit in his free time. All in all, it reveals an entire life 
(author’s emphasis).137  
 
In 2011, Mark Gasson et al conducted a study138 of tracking four individuals from three EU 
Member states via their GPS enabled mobile phones. Their location data were stored in a 
central database for automated and manual processing (akin to data retention) in order to form 
profiles. Gasson et al noted that based on location data, a job profile could likely be drawn for 
certain participants.139 Gasson et al were also able to infer the relationship (a business) between 
two of the participants based on travel patterns.140 Gasson et al were also able to infer that one 
participant was in some way involved with children, based on trips to the park and 
kindergarten.141 Based on routine, Gasson et al were also able to infer shopping habits based 
trips to petrol stations.142 On the issue of sensitive personal data, Gasson et al noted that 
although determining a participant’s religion was inconclusive it may be possible to classify a 
person’s specific religion with some degree of certainty, due to the fact that most mainstream 
religions have a defined routine, held in identifiable locations.143 A point that Gasson et al note 
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is that based on just the data examined there was ‘real potential for incorrect conclusions being 
reached based on the data.’144 This could have significant impact on individuals.145 
 
In 2006, using raw GPS data, Lin Liao et al146 were able to make inferences about daily 
activities and movements and even when routine was broken. Gerald Friedland and Robin 
Sommer were able to find private addresses of celebrities as well as the origins of otherwise 
anonymized Craigslist posting from geo-location data.147 A website called ‘I know where your 
cat lives’148 uses location data from EXIF images149 which is uploaded on social media to 
broadcast where cats live, therefore revealing addresses. Dr Alex Pentland, director of MIT's 
Human Dynamics Laboratory noted that '[j]ust by watching where you spend time, I can say a 
lot about the music you like, the car you drive, your financial risk, your risk for diabetes.’150  
 
The WP29 highlighted that behavioural patterns ‘may also include data derived from the 
movement patterns of friends, based on the so-called social graph.’151  van der Hilst noted that 
there ‘is a possibility that the use of location tracking devices causes effects that are so harmful 
to an individual or to society at large.’152 In doing nothing, we may ‘end up being a society that 
distrusts, that we break down the social fabric that we call networked groups and allow 
ourselves to be taken control over by the techno-political elite.’153 The societal value of privacy 
is highlighted and the potential for its devaluation to change society forever. This is all the 
more serious as location data is difficult to anonymise.154  
 
(d)  Third Party Data 
 
During written evidence to the Joint Committee on the draft Investigatory Powers Bill 
(JCDIPB) the Home Office noted that there were no proposals being brought forward for the 
retention of third party data.155 This section will prove that although there may have been no 
proposals (when in fact there were),156 third party data retention is still possible. Third party 
data is described as ‘information that’s collected by an entity that doesn’t have a direct 
relationship with consumers’157 or anyone.158 Or more specifically, where ‘one 
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telecommunications operator is able to see the communications data in relation to applications 
or services running over their network, but where they do not use or retain that data for any 
purpose.’159 As noted above, s.87(4)(d) of the IPA 2016 allows third party data to be retained 
if it is used or retained for a lawful purpose. BT in their written submissions highlight that to 
obtain third party data from Facebook, it would have to ‘examine all the data, including the 
content.’160 In order to do this, BT would have to conduct Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) which 
enables the ISP to access information addressed to the recipient of the communication only.161 
This, as the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) maintains, requires the interception 
of the metadata and content (author’s emphasis).162 Therefore, s.87(4)(d) allows data that has 
been intercepted to be retained and in doing so stretches beyond what is argued to be 
communications data as DPI can allow the original content of the communication to be 
reconstructed in full and analysed.163 There is no indication in the IPA 2016 that such data 
would be treated as content.  
 
Moreover, this can be imposed on telecommunications operators via s.87(9)(b)(i) by requiring 
them to process data for the purposes of retention. iiNet (in an Australian context) argued that 
data retention would force commercial businesses to become agents of the state in storing and 
safeguarding large databases they have no business need to do so.164 This is certainly true for 
UK businesses when one considers that data generated can be obliged. 
 
The WP29 also opined that requirements for operators to retain traffic data which they do not 
need for their own purposes would constitute a derogation without precedent to the 
finality/purpose principle.165  
 
Steven Dalby noted that it is ‘seriously overstated’ that service providers engage in data 
retention for their own purposes to track URLs, source and destination IP addresses, e-mail 
headers and the like.’166 However, BT’s own Broadband privacy policy indicates that they keep 
information about how their Broadband is used, to manage traffic flows (traffic management), 
improve services and for marketing purposes (author’s emphasis). BT notes that this includes 
(and therefore is not limited to) IP addresses and other traffic data including websites 
individuals have visited.167 They also state that the law requires them to keep certain (not 
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defined) information about service use for 12 months for law enforcement and national security 
purposes. 
 
There are issues to be taken with the position adopted by BT. Firstly, Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon 
noted that website names are application-level metadata, and would require DPI to obtain this 
information,168 and therefore BT would be conducting interception. Secondly, traffic 
management is possible without the use of DPI, thus enhancing both privacy and security.169 
Thirdly, BT does not define what it considers traffic data, so it is impossible to deduce just how 
intrusive the policy is, but there is some indication based on keeping information on ‘how’ 
their services are used i.e. as noted, what websites are visited. Fourthly, the EDPS has 
maintained that traffic management policies other than for maintaining delivery and security 
of service (including limiting congestion) should require consent.170 Fifthly, BT have misstated 
the law, the law does not require them to retain data for 12 months, the law permits the 
Secretary of State and Judicial Commissioner to oblige them to retain data for 12 months, and 
more importantly, this fact should not be made public according to s.95(2) of the IPA 2016 
unless the Secretary of State has approved (s.95(4) of the IPA 2016). If retaining data for 12 
months without a notice served, this would run contrary to data protection and human rights 
standards. Sixthly, the information BT stores may be used for purposes beyond law 
enforcement and national security whether the obligation came from s.1 of DRIPA 2014 or 
s.61(7) of the IPA 2016. Seventhly, and possibly the most worrying is that s.46 of the IPA 2016 
could allow this interception in any event. Section 46(2) allows any business (s.46(4)(a)) to 
conduct interception if it constitutes a legitimate practice reasonably required for the purpose, 
in connection with the carrying on of any relevant activities for the purpose of record keeping. 
Subsection 2(b) indicates that this includes communications relating to business activities. Due 
to being vaguely defined, this essentially allows interception for ‘business purposes.’ This 
would fit with the Home Office’s narrative in 2009 where they noted that ‘DPI is a term used 
to describe the technical process whereby many communications service providers currently 
identify and obtain communications data from their networks for their business purposes 
(author’s emphasis).’171  Given the definitions of communication and data noted in s.261(2) 
and s.263(1) what is to stop for example, another Phorm scandal?172 This involved BT, 
TalkTalk and Virgin Media making a deal with Phorm to covertly intercept traffic of their 
customers. If Regulations are made for business purpose interception, s.87(4)(d) would not 
apply because this would constitute a lawful purpose for retention. Therefore, this could allow 
interception of data and its retention173 unsuspectedly, therefore again, highlighting the severity 
of interference and that third-party data actually can be retained.  
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(e)  Internet Connection Records 
 
Internet Connection Records are defined in s.62(7) of the IPA 2016 as communications data 
which may be used to identify or assist in identifying a telecommunications service when a 
communication occurs and the data that is generated or processed by the telecommunications 
operator when supplying said service to the sender of the communication. It is essentially a list 
of our online activity.174 
 
Section 62(7) itself does little to highlight this, nor is it further clarified in the explanatory 
notes, nor does the technical standards of the Internet define them.175 ICRs do not ‘naturally 
exist within the technical infrastructure of a telecommunications operator’ and so would have 
to make infrastructural changes in order generate and retain ICRs (author’s emphasis).176 The 
Government did indicate that ICRs are ‘records of the internet services that have been accessed 
by a device’ for example ‘a record of the fact that a smartphone had accessed a particular social 
media website at a particular time.’177 The Government further maintained that ICRs do not 
provide a full browsing history, nor does it reveal every webpage that a person visited or any 
action carried out on that webpage.178 
 
Claiming that ICR does not reveal every webpage visited (which Graham Smith and Open 
Rights Group think otherwise)179  does not detract from the fact that they are a truncated form 
of everyone’s180 web browsing history181 which can be very revealing.182 Many have noted that 
retaining ICR will reveal sensitive personal information, such as political and religious views, 
sexual orientation, health conditions and spending habits.183 Liberty and others184 also noted 
that equating phone bills with ICRs is a false  comparison as they would provide (or at least 
that is the intention)185 a detailed record of a 12 month log of websites visited, communications 
software used, system updates downloaded, desktop widgets used (e.g. calendars, notes), every 
mobile app used (e.g. Whatsapp, Signal, Google Maps), and logs of any other device 
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connecting to the internet, such as games consoles, baby monitors, digital cameras and e-book 
readers.186 Due to the absence of definition of an ‘internet communications services’ noted in 
s.62(4)(b)(i) and (5)(c)(i) of the IPA 2016,187 it is likely that a natural meaning would be used 
and thus potentially very expansive. Acquiring what is considered ICR would also require some 
form of DPI to intercept all packets to determine what is and what is not communications 
data.188 Moreover, this would capture third party data,189 which again disproves the position of 
the Home Office regarding not wanting third party data retention.190 Given that it has been 
noted that ICRs would require generation for retention, it is important to consider data 
generation for the purposes of retention. 
 
(f)  Generated Communications Data 
 
As noted above, ICR would need to be generated in order to be retained, this however, does 
not limit the possibilities for other data to be retained. As techUK noted, a CSP may be required 
to generate data about the location of its users and then store that data purely for the purposes 
of law enforcement.’191 Moreover, s.87(9)(b) can place requirements for obtaining (including 
by generation) data for the purpose of retention. Smith asked the question as whether this could 
mean that a telecommunications operator could obligate a customer or third party to generate 
data so it could be obtained and retained,192 such as Sonos (wireless sound system) compelling 
its customers to accept their new privacy policy (which collects more data e.g. email addresses 
and location data) or risk their sound system ceasing to function.193 Telecommunications 
operators could be obligated to conduct traffic and social network analysis and data mining194 
either to be obtained or generated for retention purposes, increasing the severity of 
interference.195 Furthermore, s.87(9)(b) can also impose requirements for the processing of 
data for retention. This point is highlighted due to the fact that for example, Microsoft’s 
Windows 10196 raised significant concerns with the WP29. Their concerns were based on some 
of the personal data collected and further processed within Windows 10, and specifically the 
default settings or apparent lack of control for a user to prevent collection or further processing 
of such data.197 Despite changes proposed to Windows 10, the WP29 were still concerned about 
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the level of protection of users’ personal data,198 in which the Dutch Data Protection Authority 
found a breach of data protection laws in October 2017.199  
 
The title for Part 4, which contains the retention powers, refers not to the retention of relevant 
communications data, but to certain data. This implies that retention is not limited to relevant 
communications data. Given that s.87(9)(b) does not refer to relevant communications data but 
just ‘data,’ it may be possible that telecommunications operators could be obliged to 
obtain/generate and retain data as defined in s.263(1) which includes (and therefore not limited 
to) data which is not electronic data and any information (whether or not electronic). Therein 
lies the danger, because data is so broadly defined, it makes the possibilities as to what can be 
retained, endless, such as speech data allegedly being hoovered up by Instagram.200 The only 
example given is that of ICRs, but it is clear that s.87(9)(b) would not be limited to them. For 
example, it could force zero-logging201 Virtual Private Networks202 (VPNs) to now log data by 
way of generation for the purposes of retention. This would effectively defeat the purpose of 
their existence (to prevent web histories from being stored and masking locations). This means 
that data can still be more intrusive than what is considered ‘content.’ This concern might not 
be as far away as some might think, Facebook has announced that it seeks to develop 
technology that would be able to read a person’s mind in order to communicate.203 The risks 
of using brainwaves to eavesdrop and gain passwords204 is already here, which is matched by 
calls for human rights to protect mental privacy, cognitive liberty, mental integrity and 
psychological continuity.205 This is an early signpost of how Article 8 and Article 9 (freedom 
of religion/thought/conscious) interrelate as discussed in Chapter 4 in light of who can be 
obligated to retain (Chapter 6). Retention of thought data would truly encompass what Caspar 
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Bowden highlighted when he coined the term ‘CCTV for inside your head’206 with respect to 
data retention.  
 
(g)  The Big Data Elephant in the Room 
 
Ashlin Lee has argued that communications data retention is only the ‘tip of the data iceberg’ 
as it is but one example ‘of the emerging ecosystem of digital traces, fragments and identifiers 
that are created as a part of digitally-mediated social interactions.’207 Lee refers to Big Data 
(which communications data is crucial for),208 which the Oxford English Dictionary defines 
as: 
 
Extremely large data sets that may be analysed computationally to reveal patterns, 
trends, and associations, especially relating to human behaviour and interactions.209 
 
Though Shoshana Zuboff argues Big Data as of yet has no reasonable definition.210 Lee 
continues that it is tempting to focus solely on communications data retention, but to do so 
would ignore the vast amounts of data being collected and used today and the social questions 
they raise211 because Big Data systems seem to be connected to the interests of society as a 
whole (author’s emphasis).212  
 
As Manon Oostveen notes, on a basic level, Big Data clashes with privacy and the protection 
of personal data because the collection of data in the acquisition phase can reveal intimate 
details about a person’s life.213 Big Data casts doubt on the distinction between personal and 
non-personal data, clashes with data minimisation, undermines informed choice,214 and 
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presents a challenge to purpose limitation.215 Its accuracy has been described as 
‘contentious.’216 It has also been argued that European data protection laws are insufficient to 
deal with Big Data due its dependency on identifiability of an individual and its focus on the 
individual (which Big Data does not concern itself with).217Big Data is likely to only benefit 
key commercial entities such as Google, Facebook or Amazon, and not  society at large,218 in 
which divisions in society could intensify,219 increasing inequality220 and even threatening 
democracy,221 especially with fake news.222 It is also the foundation of surveillance capitalism 
(see Chapter 5).223 Despite this, it has been argued that the ECtHR’s approach to Article 8 
‘could prove indispensable in the age of Big Data’224 and may ‘lay down stricter and more far-
reaching rules and obligations than those following from the GDPR.’225 
 
For the purposes of the IPA 2016, Big Data would fall under the umbrella term of 
communications data, which could be retained in three ways. The first is to be found in s.87(b) 
of the IPA 2016 where retention notices can oblige telecommunications operators to retain all 
or any description of data (therefore, not even limited to Big Data). Thus, for example, Splunk, 
which uses Big Data226 to profile individuals to make them uniquely identifiable227 could be 
served with a retention notice to retain this data. It also highlights why the definition of ‘data’ 
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in s.263(1) of the IPA 2016 becomes important, because of the nigh unlimited228 possibilities 
of what could be retained.  
 
The second way is via data generation in which s.87(9)(b) could compel a telecommunications 
operator to generate Big Data for the purposes of retention. Big Data generation for policing 
purposes could be imposed on telecommunication operators because they are often 
‘overwhelmed by the sheer volume of data collected through digital surveillance methods, and 
lack the technological capabilities to use it for operational purposes.’229 This runs the risk of 
retaining data that produces biased230 results based on race,231 (as the ECtHR has previously 
acknowledged)232 gender and socio-economic background.233 Due to the vagueness of 
s.87(9)(b), there is no detail on how this (or what) is to be achieved, and thus the secretive234 
algorithms used,235 which can be artificially intelligent.236 
 
The third, is under what constitutes entity data. The JCDIPB referred to LINX’s submission on 
entity data being exceptionally broad as it could include anyone interacting over a 
telecommunications operator’s network. 237 This would be wider still because of the definition 
of telecommunications operator (see Chapter 6) would encompass companies such as Apple, 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo! and others and everything they knew about everyone.238 
The JCDIPB acknowledged that given the sophisticated automated profiling of users 
undertaken by such companies, it would not be difficult to see how entity data would be 
considerably more detailed and intrusive than subscriber data as envisaged in RIPA 2000 
(author’s emphasis).239 The potential detail of entity data based upon the detailed automated 
profiles created was of great concern to the JCDIPB.240  
 
Continuing with entity data, David Lyon highlights social media sucks up data of ordinary 
users’ social activities to be quantified and classified, Big Data goes beyond this (author’s 
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emphasis).241 Many corporations seek to capitalise on Big Data242 as it ‘draws on data streams 
from social and online media as well as personal devices designed to share data.’243 For 
example, Facebook’s social graph, ‘a global mapping system of users and how they are related 
to each other’ and the biggest on the planet244 has been likened to practices of the Stasi.245  In 
2011 it was pointed out that Facebook stores up to 800 pages of personal data per user account 
which includes deleted messages, events not attended and every machine used to log into 
Facebook with (author’s emphasis).246 Similarly, Judith Duportail demonstrated that Tinder 
kept 800 pages of her online dating behaviour (author’s emphasis).247 Google is the largest and 
most successful Big Data company because it is the most visited website, thus having the 
largest data exhaust.248 It also is largely the reason the explosion in attractiveness of Big Data 
analytics.249 Big Data analytics is not just conducted by Google and Facebook, but many other 
large internet-based firms and appears to be the default model for most online startups and 
applications.250  
 
Big Data analytics is also prevalent in marketing, finance, insurance, at work, through devices 
and platforms, data brokers,251government and corporate databases, and private and public 
surveillance cameras.252 
 
Therefore, the main difference between communications data (as discussed before this 
subsection) and Big Data, is that with the latter, the data is already aggregated,253 the mosaic254 
notion of communications data, and the profiles built from them are readily available. Thus, 
the sensitive profiles of an individual’s actions and intentions are readily retainable, further 
increasing the severity of interference. As Fisher et al put it, ‘big data analytics is a workflow 
that distills terabytes of low-value data…down to, in some cases, a single bit of high-value 
data.’255 As Feiler points out ‘everybody's communicational behaviour would be automatically 
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analyzed for certain 'suspicious' communication patterns - irrespective of any anterior 
suspicion.’256 
 
The bias in Big Data to be retained could be based on what telecommunications are obligated 
to generate for law enforcement (due to ethnic profiling,257 which can intensify ethnic 
profiling)258 or inherent within the operations of the telecommunications operators.259  
 
(h)  Big Data, Group Privacy, the social value of Privacy and Article 8 ECHR 
 
Taylor et al noted that in the era of Big Data ‘where analytics are being developed to operate 
at as broad a scale as possible, the individual is often incidental to the analysis’ but instead 
are directed at the ‘group level.’260 As van der Sloot notes, Article 34 ECHR allows groups to 
make applications to the ECtHR.261 van der Sloot continues that ‘large groups are or society 
as a whole is affected and that group or societal interests are undermined’ by Big Data 
processes (author’s emphasis).262This reference to society allows for an important discussion 
on the social value of privacy and Article 8. Solove notes that privacy is a recognition that in 
certain circumstances it is in society’s best interests to curtail the power of its norms, in 
protecting the individual for the good of society.263 It has been argued that ‘that a sociological 
analysis is useful in illuminating aspects of human rights law in ways that remain largely 
absent in legal scholarship.’264Regan regarded privacy a common value because we all 
recognise its importance in our lives, a public value because it is necessary to the proper 
functioning of a democratic political system, and a collective value because technology and 
market forces make it increasingly difficult for any of us to have privacy unless we all have 
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privacy at a similar level.265 Hughes builds on the latter two aspects highlighting that privacy 
is good for democracy and in terms of voter autonomy and its attraction of talented people to 
public office.266 Privacy fosters autonomous individuals, providing them with space to 
develop opinions and ideas (such as this thesis), which in turn improves society as a whole.267 
Privacy is also important for ideas unconnected to democratic functions connected to broader 
autonomy based activities such as freedom of speech and building different types of social 
relations.268 Malloggi argues that if we fail to protect the sphere of social relationships, we 
may also fail to defend a democratic state,269 and an attack on privacy is consequently an 
attack on autonomy.270 Malloggi argues that post-Snowden ‘we know that the privacy of 
citizens has been disregarded’ by the US and EU.271 For Malloggi, privacy is the substratum 
of every social relationship, and if privacy is defended for a group, it means that we preserve 
the individual’s autonomy because surveillance at group level is dangerous for the 
maintenance of a democratic society and the freedom of expression which conditions it.272van 
der Sloot adds that although the ECtHR has not recognised group privacy (grouping based 
upon algorithms etc that salient features of interest, according to some particular purpose)273 
as such, they have accepted that large groups and entire towns can complain under Article 
8.274 Forgetfulness (due to data retentions endurance) is not just an individual good, but a 
social good.275 They contend that a world where everything one does is recorded and never 
forgotten is not a world conductive to the development of democratic citizens.276  
 
(i)  An Example of the retention of the any or all description of data: Session-Replay 
Scripts and Password Managers 
 
Section 87(2)(b) of the IPA 2016 can be used to oblige telecommunications operators to retain 
all or any description of data. For the purposes of this Chapter, Session-Replay Scripts will be 
used as an example. Session-Replay scripts are third-party website analytic scripts that record 
keystrokes, mouse movements, scrolling behaviour along with the contents of the page 
visited.277 Englehardt et al note this could include information regarding medical conditions, 
credit card details, passwords without submission of said information liking it to someone 
looking over your shoulder (author’s emphasis).278 Englehardt et al also demonstrated how 
third-party scripts could exploit web browser’s password managers by extracting usernames 
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and passwords.279 Websites using such third-party scripts would fall under retention 
obligations as they would be considered telecommunications services.280This would only serve 
to highlight another way in retention of communications data at the very least puts it on par 
with interception of content. 
 
3.5 Interference based upon whom has access 
 
As Roberts noted above, interference posed by data retention cannot solely be based upon the 
nature of the data but whom has access. The ECtHR has stressed that the risk of abuse is 
intrinsic to any system of secret surveillance.281 The CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland referred 
to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the risk of unlawful access and use of said data282 and AG 
Saugmandsgaard Øe highlighted the very real risk of abusive or illegal access to retained data 
based on the ‘extremely high’ number of requests by Sweden and the UK.283 As Bernal notes, 
once data is gathered, the risks of misuse, misappropriation, hacking, loss, corruption, error 
and function creep become more apparent.284 Under the IPA 2016 many public authorities now 
have access to retained data for which sufficient justification has not been made285 which is a 
concern.286 Moreover, outside of the bodies that have lawful access, the vulnerability to e.g. 
hacking serves to increase the severity of interference posed. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
This section has considered specific types of communications data, and more general 
observations to reveal just how intrusive they are. It was highlighted that two types of 
communications data, username and password, in and of themselves was enough to render 
communications data more intrusive than content, because obtaining this would completely 
compromise the individual or user. It also highlighted how intrusive other forms of 
communications data can be for example, location data which can lead to revealing sensitive 
personal data. Consideration was also given to the fact the retention of ICRs and third party 
data would require interception, the very thing that would make available the content of 
communications. These types of communications data can also reveal sensitive personal data 
and habits. Finally, as it was noted that for ICRs to exist, they would have to be generated, but 
it was highlighted that ICRs are not the only type of data that could be generated as Part 4 
leaves the possibility for other unknown types of data (such as mind data) which are not limited 
to relevant communications data to be retained. Communications data such as ICRs,287 entity 
data,288 and all and any description of data extend well beyond the data types to be retained at 
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an EU level. Said data could and would also be more intrusive than the content of 
communications. 
 
The Interception of Communications Commissioner (IoCC) in a report detailed: 
 
761,702 items of communications data were acquired by public authorities during 2015. 
An item of data is a request for data on a single identifier or other descriptor, for 
example, 30 days of incoming and outgoing call data in relation to a mobile 
telephone would be counted as one item of data.289  
 
Given what could be revealed from telephone data mentioned above290 it demonstrates how 
intrusive powers can be masked, when in reality the amount of items of data could be in the 
hundreds or thousands. Would 12 months of call data also only be classed as one item of data?  
This one item of data could tell public authorities a great deal about the individual concerned. 
A long enough history of phone communications data can be used to determine socioeconomic 
status, and can ‘accurately reconstruct the distribution of wealth of an entire nation or to infer 
the asset distribution of microregions composed of just a few households.’291 This will only 
intensify with what is now considered under the umbrella term of communications data. This 
relates back to the mosaic notion of communications data in which the cumulative total of 
different types of communications data292 has to be considered. Such data may be used to 
predict gender, age group, marital status, job and number of people in the household,293 it can 
uncover the hidden patterns of our social lives, travels, risk of disease—even our political 
views.294  
 
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) also felt the distinction 
between communications data and content were no longer persuasive because it can go beyond 
even that conveyed by accessing the content of a private communication (author’s emphasis).295 
 
This intrusiveness intensifies further because communications data is already parsed in a 
computer-readable form that allows it to be combined with billions of other pieces of 
communications data,296 particularly in light of Big Data’297 which provides a ‘God’s eye view 
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of ourselves.’298 Big Data analysis is possible through retaining all or any description of data, 
the generation and obtaining of communications data and entity data. This includes traffic, 
social network analysis, and data mining which together would ‘allow for fishing expeditions 
and a continuous surveillance of the entire population,’299a situation Judge Pettiti warned 
against300 many years before. One in ten business in the EU (and 15% of UK businesses) 
analyse Big Data301 and this is likely to increase. 
 
Also, even if one were to follow this arbitrary distinction in intrusiveness, iiNet has 
demonstrated that embedded data about communications like Twitter, Facebook, and websites 
does in fact reveal content of communications (such as tweets), and lots of it.302 Therefore, 
even taking into account the CJEU’s restrictive approach on the essence of right in comparison 
to data retention and access to content, making such a distinction becomes more 
unconvincing.303 Moreover, in Digital Rights Ireland the CJEU did not examine profiling or 
analytical use of data (which Big Data by itself allows) which does touch upon the essence of 
the right to privacy and others.304 It was also demonstrated that access to retained data should 
factor into the severity of interference with the rights in question. 
 
In R.E v United Kingdom305 the ECtHR acknowledged that it generally only applies strict 
criteria with regards to interception cases, but accepted this would depend on the circumstances 
of the case at hand and the level of interference with Article 8.306The ECtHR continued that it 
has not excluded the principles developed in interception jurisprudence as the divisive factor 
would be the level of interference and not the technical definition of that interference (author’s 
emphasis).307 This would be consistent with the ECtHR’s ‘pragmatic, common-sense approach 
rather than a formalistic or purely legal one.’308 
 
Although this case concerned covert-surveillance, such a position can be applied to 
communications data which is supported by the ECtHR in Szabo where it was maintained that: 
 
Given the technological advances since the Klass and Others case, the potential 
interferences with email, mobile phone and Internet services as well as those of mass 
surveillance attract the Convention protection of private life even more acutely 
(author’s emphasis).309 
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This demonstrates that even if the UK considers communications data as less revealing than 
content, a human rights approach will consider the impacts of rights, and not constrain itself to 
technical definitions. This is even more so as the ECHR is regarded as a ‘living instrument’ in 
which it must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.310 Lestas notes the ‘living 
instrument’ has shifted from ‘commonly accepted standards in domestic legislation to signs of 
evolution of attitudes amongst modern societies (author’s emphasis).’311 Given that Chapter 4 
will highlight that privacy and data protection are valued by individuals and society, this should 
also inform the ECtHR’s interpretation. Furthermore, the ECHR must not be confined to the 
intentions of their authors as expressed many decades ago.312 What is more, the ECtHR noted 
with regards to its own case law that a failure to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach 
would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement.313 Alastair Mowbray welcomes the 
ECtHR’s creativity regarding the interpretation and application of the Convention.314 Such 
creative interpretation should guide the ECtHR to conclude that communications data is just as 
if not more intrusive than access to the content. Given that the ECtHR already takes a robust 
approach to data protection315 the use of new technologies in surveillance and databases,316 this 
evolution would be consistent. This would also fall in line with AG Saugmandsgaard Øe’s 
opinion in Tele2 and Watson that in the individual context, a general data retention obligation 
would facilitate equally serious interferences as interception. To add further weight to this 
point, data retention will involve some form of interception depending on what 
communications data is sought. The ECtHR applies stricter standards regarding interception,317 
and thus the same standards should apply here. As judge Pettiti in Malone articulated that the 
ECtHR:  
 
[F]ulfils that function by investing Article 8…with its full dimension and by limiting the 
margin of appreciation especially in those areas where the individual is more and more 
vulnerable as a result of modern technology (author’s emphasis).318 
 
Chapter 5 will detail further why the same strict standards of interception should apply to data 
retention due to both constituting secret surveillance. This Chapter has also demonstrated ways 
in which communications data can create a more serious interference. In conclusion, there is 
at least an arguable319 case that data retention as envisaged in the IPA 2016 adversely effects 
the essence of rights that are interfered with has been made. Wisman, in the opinion of the 
author is correct in concluding that data retention ‘is the codification of arbitrariness and 
therefore irreconcilable with the essence of the right to private life.’320 The CJEU should 
reconsider their position on this and have the opportunity to do so given the preliminary 
reference from the IPT.321 Given the ECtHR’s position in Big Brother Watch, it should no 
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longer be a question of should the ECtHR apply the standards of interception to data retention, 
but they must as a matter of necessity. 
 
Both the OHCHR and ECtHR spoke of communications data in terms of privacy etc, however, 
as noted above, in order to retain certain communications data, DPI will have to be used and 
in this regard Fuchs noted that we do not only need privacy and data protection assessments, 
but broader societal impact assessments (author’s emphasis).322 This reaffirms the notion that 
privacy has a societal importance, and furthermore, privacy and even data protection, are not 
the only fundamental rights that need to be considered because ‘the human rights impact of 
data retention on the ability to create profiles, or to confirm a future suspicion, has rightly been 
highlighted as a human rights risk (author’s emphasis).’323 The next Chapter discusses the 
implications of data retention on other fundamental rights as well as privacy and data 
protection. An ECHR perspective becomes all the more important as communications data 
retained324 by information society services325 and entity data326 falls outside the scope of Tele2 
and Watson.327 This would not be the case under the ECHR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																						
322 Christian Fuchs, ‘Implications of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Internet Surveillance for Society’ (2012) 
<http://www.projectpact.eu/privacy-security-research-paper-
series/%231_Privacy_and_Security_Research_Paper_Series.pdf> accessed 21 April 2017. 
323 Emily Taylor, ‘The Privatization of Human Rights: Illusions of Consent, Automation and Neutrality’ 
(January 2016) <https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_no24_web_2.pdf> accessed 19 October 
2017. 
324 Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Evangelia Papadaki and Tim Chown, (n4). 
325 See Chapter 6. 
326 Liberty, (n35), [151]. 
327 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson [2016] ECR I-970. 
	61	
Chapter 4: Data Retention, a fundamental rights issue? Article 8 ECHR 
and Article 7 EU Charter underpinning democracy in the digital age? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It must be noted that from the outset, as the previous Chapter indicated, the types of data that 
can be retained under Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016) includes 
communications data and content.  
 
This Chapter seeks to highlight that data retention affects not just privacy or private life, but 
other fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and religion. This approach will 
consider rights protected under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
European Union’s (EU) Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Article 8 ECHR and it’s CFR 
equivalent, Article 7 will be considered given that the latter has the same meaning and scope,1 
thus reference to Article 8 includes Article 7. Establishing that data retention interferes with 
Article 8 ECHR/7 CFR, leads to arguing further that private life encompasses more than just 
privacy. An in-depth analysis of private life case law is considered to highlight the multiple 
ways in which data retention threatens it. This will also be the case for family life and 
correspondence. ‘Home' will be discussed in Chapter 6, whereas the data protection aspect of 
Article 8 will be discussed here also. This is specifically protected by Article 8 CFR. 
 
Exclusively focussing on Article 8, (which is usually considered as the main human right that 
bears the brunt of surveillance interferences)2 would be a disservice to the issues at hand. 
Surveillance has pervasive effects ‘on several other human rights.’3 Paul Bernal notes that 
privacy is only one aspect of surveillance because it impacts on other fundamental rights. 
Bernal notes that surveillance impacts upon freedom of expression, association, and religion. 
He also notes that surveillance can impact upon a fair trial, and can also have discriminatory 
implications.4 This necessitates an assessment of the types of data retained and its impact upon 
Article 9-11, 14 and 6 ECHR. Article 2 Protocol 4 will also be considered given the importance 
of location data discussed in Chapter 3. In addition to Chapter 3, it demonstrates further just 
how serious of an interference the types of data retained poses to fundamental rights. Each of 
these rights are important for a functioning democracy, and Article 8 underpins them all. This 
also builds on the idea of the social value of privacy and its importance to democracy through 
legal analysis. 
 
The then United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), Ms. Navi Pillay, 
commented in an expert seminar that digital communications technologies have become part 
of the very fabric of our everyday lives.5 Due to information technology innovations, there has 
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been a dramatic improvement in real-time communications and information sharing, which in 
turn foster democratic participation thereby improving human rights.6 There was, however, a 
flip side, in that such new technologies are vulnerable to mass surveillance. There are even new 
technologies covertly designed (such as the Evident Tool, made by BAE)7 for the purpose of 
facilitating said surveillance which in turn threaten individual rights such as privacy, freedom 
of expression, association and thus inhibits the free functioning of a vibrant civil society.8 The 
importance of the UNHCHR’s comments highlighted, albeit briefly, that what is at stake is not 
just the notion of privacy, but other fundamental rights and the functioning of society. Though 
it has been argued, and will continue to be argued, that privacy is more than just an individual 
right, it is true that data retention is a threat to the free functioning of a vibrant civil society. 
This is precisely why the United Nations (UN) and Council of Europe (CoE) have rightly 
argued ‘that the rights held by people offline must also be protected online.’9 
 
4.2 Article 8: The right to respect for private and family life, home and 
correspondence 
 
Article 8 states: 
 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society… 
 
Private and family life and correspondence will be considered in this Chapter. The threshold 
for interference is not an especially high one,10 and such justification11 for interferences does 
not necessarily have to be factual.12 Private and family life, and correspondence is interfered 
with by: 
 
[T]he mere existence of the legislation itself there is involved, for all those to whom the 
legislation could be applied, a menace of surveillance; this menace necessarily strikes 
																																																						
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14276&LangID=E> accessed 14 
February 2017.  
6 ibid. 
7 Rob Evans, ‘BAE 'secretly sold mass surveillance technology to repressive regimes'’ The Guardian (London, 
15 June 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jun/15/bae-mass-surveillance-technology-
repressive-regimes> accessed 5 November 2017. 
8 Ms. Navi Pillay, (n5). 
9 ibid; United Nations General Assembly, ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the 
Internet’ (27 June 2016) <https://www.article19.org/data/files/Internet_Statement_Adopted.pdf> accessed 25 
April 2017; Resolution 68/167 adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 2013, ‘The right to privacy in 
the digital age’ (21 January 2014) <http://undocs.org/A/RES/68/167> accessed 25 April 2017; Council of 
Europe, ‘Human Rights for Internet Users’ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/internet-users-rights/guide> accessed 
28 April 2017.  
10 AG (Eritrea) v Secretary of State [2007] EWCA Civ 801, [28]. 
11 Douwe Korff, ‘The Standard Approach Under Articles 8-11 ECHR and Article 2 ECHR’ (2009) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/events/conference_dp_2009/presentations_speeches/KORFF_Douwe_a.pdf> 
accessed 5 November 2017. 
12 Ivana Roagna, ‘Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2012) 
<https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=09000016806f1
554> accessed 6 April 2017, p35. 
	63	
at freedom of communication between users of the postal and telecommunication 
services (author’s emphasis).13  
 
This supports van der Schyff's view, who has argued for a wider interpretation of a right’s 
scope because a narrow interpretation would essentially leave the applicant with the difficult 
task of proving that their right had been interfered with.14 A wider interpretation would 
intensify the onus on the Member State to justify why it had interfered with the applicant’s 
right in the first place, placing the State on guard in consciously having to respect people’s 
rights.15  
 
In Colon v Netherlands16 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) noted in relation to 
Article 3417 where it was noted that in principle, it is not sufficient to claim to be a victim under 
Article 34 ECHR by the mere existence of legislation but it does entitle: 
 
[I]ndividuals to contend that legislation violates their rights by itself, in the absence of 
an individual measure of implementation, if they run the risk of being directly affected 
by it; that is, if they are required either to modify their conduct or risk being prosecuted, 
or if they are members of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the 
legislation. 
 
This raises the interesting question of whether widespread data retention would have the same 
effect because citizens are left with either abstaining from using the internet or other common 
electronic communications channels or face the risk of being subject to surveillance.18 The 
Romanian Constitutional Court accepted this ‘take it or leave it’ approach to technology use 
and data retention.19 
 
Ursula Kilkelly notes that Article 8 concepts are dynamic insofar as their meaning is capable 
of evolving and also, that they have the potential to embrace a wide variety of matters, some 
of which are connected with one another and some of which overlap.20 The following 
subsections will detail why various aspects of Article 8 are interfered with, starting with private 
life. 
 
(a)  Private life 
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The ECtHR in Malone v United Kingdom21 observed that telephone communications data (i.e. 
numbers dialled) were an integral part of telephone communications data, any storage of such 
and release to the police without consent amounted to an interference with Article 8. In Amann 
v Switzerland, the Grand Chamber (GC) of the ECtHR reiterated that storing data relating to 
the “private life” of an individual falls within Article 8.22 More specific to communications 
data, the ECtHR in Copland v United Kingdom23 ruled that that the collection and storage of 
personal information relating to the applicant’s telephone (numbers called, the dates and times 
of the calls, and their length and cost),24 as well as to her e-mail (all e-mail activity was 
logged)25 and Internet usage (websites visited, the times and dates of the visits to the websites 
and their duration),26 without her knowledge, amounted to an interference with her right to 
respect for her private life and correspondence.27 Specifically on data retention, the GC in S 
and Marper made it clear that ‘the mere storing of data relating to the private life of an 
individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8 (author’s emphasis).’28 
This is so irrespective of whether there is involvement of computer technology and expertise 
to make sense of said data.29 S and Marper has clear applications to the detailed information 
revealed about individuals’ private lives by communications data.30  
 
This interference can be explained for several reasons. Storing information that pertains to 
Article 8 is not in line with the states’ general negative obligations ‘to respect human rights, 
which only requires states to refrain from interfering with the rights of individuals without 
sufficient justification (author’s emphasis).’31 The GC acknowledges that ‘everyone has the 
right to live privately, away from unwanted attention’32 and data retention would be the 
antithesis of this. Moreover, Bernal discusses the harm of surveillance when referring to 
historian Quentin Skinner33 noting that it’s the very existence of the system that is also harmful 
(author’s emphasis).34 As Solove suggests, surveillance can have problematic effects on 
privacy because it can create anxiety, discomfort and alter behaviour.35 Because of its 
inhibitory effects, surveillance is a tool for social control,36 whether for better or worse, 
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surveillance is harmful in all settings.37 It is Kafkaesque because it also creates powerlessness, 
vulnerability, and dehumanisation created by the assembly of dossiers of personal information 
where individuals lack any meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of their 
information.38 This dehumanisation makes no difference whether surveillance is conducted by 
an undercover police officer or a computer algorithm tracking ones every move.39 This accords 
with the GC’s position in S and Marper where it was noted that the storage of data however 
obtained has a direct impact on the private life interest of an individual’s irrespective of 
subsequent use of said data (author’s emphasis).40 This not only rejects41 the UK's Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (IPT) reasoning42 that genuine intrusions of Article 8 only occur when the 
data is ‘read,’ but also the sentient being argument (which the IPT’s logic stems from) which 
notes computer sifting does not invade privacy because private data is kept from humans.43 
Bernal notes that this is the logic behind the ECtHR’s reasoning in Klass that the mere existence 
of laws that allows data gathering produces the menace of surveillance which interferes with 
Article 8, S and Marper is the logical extension of Klass (author’s emphasis).44 Moreover, not 
only does data gathering pose harms and risks, it also creates vulnerabilities for the data 
(misuse, misappropriation, hacking, loss, corruption and error) the surveillance systems 
(intentional, accidental misuse by authorities and third parties) and function creep.45 Bernal 
continues that data gathering  as a matter of course regardless of innocence or guilt fits more 
closely with police states such as East Germany’s Stasi, and Romania’s Securitate.46 Douwe 
Korff went further by arguing that today’s capabilities are what the Stasi only could have 
dreamed of.47 This is precisely why the ECtHR in Klass highlighted its awareness ‘of the 
danger such as law poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of 
defending it.’48  
 
However, this argument can be pursued further because ‘the term “private life” must not be 
interpreted restrictively.’49 As Ivana Roagna details, the notion of ‘private life is much wider 
than that of privacy, encompassing a sphere within which every individual can freely develop 
and fulfil their personality, both in relation to others and with the outside world (author’s 
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emphasis).’50 The European Commission of Human Rights (ECommHR) acknowledged as 
much from as early as 1976.51  It was noted in Szabo that: 
 
Given the technological advances since the Klass and Others case, the potential 
interferences with email, mobile phone and Internet services as well as those of mass 
surveillance attract the Convention protection of private life even more acutely 
(author’s emphasis).52 
 
This statement allows for further consideration of various aspects of private life to highlight 
the impact of communications data retention has.  
 
(b)  Other ways in which data retention impacts on private life 
 
ECommHR acknowledged that private life does not end at ‘the right to privacy, the right to 
live, as far as one wishes, protected from publicity.’53 Private life has also been acknowledged 
to be a ‘broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition.’54 Private life encompasses the 
physical and psychological integrity of a person.55  
 
i. Psychological Integrity 
 
In S and Marper the applicants maintained that retention of fingerprints and DNA data would 
have psychological implications, especially for children. From an EU perspective, Advocate 
General (AG) Cruz Villalón in Digital Rights Ireland noted that the ‘vague feeling of 
surveillance created raises very acutely the question of the data retention period (author’s 
emphasis).’56 Rozemarijn van der Hilst noted that according to a German poll on the effects of 
the implementation of the Data Retention Directive, 52% said they would not use 
telecommunications for contact with drug counsellors, psychotherapists or marriage 
counsellors and 11% said they had already abstained from using phone, cell phone or email in 
certain occasions.57 This is better known as the ‘chilling effect’ whereby ‘the fear of being 
watched or eavesdropped upon makes people change their behaviour, even behaviour that is 
not illegal or immoral.’58 Data retention may not meet the threshold59 for affecting 
psychological integrity, but Moreham believes interception (which data retention is just as 
intrusive as (see Chapter 3)) would.60 Moreover, Valerie Aston by implication notes that data 
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retention has the potential to result in an intrusion into psychological integrity, as well as 
limiting personal autonomy.61  
 
ii.  Personal Autonomy 
 
This chilling effect relates to autonomy, which is an important principle underlying the 
interpretation of the guarantees provided for by Article 8.62 This is crucial given that ‘the very 
essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom.’63 The ECtHR 
regards personal autonomy as ‘ability to conduct one's life in a manner of one's own 
choosing.’64 Personal autonomy is said to encompass a sphere in which ‘everyone can freely 
pursue the development and fulfilment of his or her personality and to establish and develop 
relationships with other persons and the outside world.’65 This principle has two aspects, 
personal development, and development with others. As Bernal notes: 
 
People use the internet to establish and support personal relationships, to find jobs, to 
bank, to shop, to gather the news, to decide where to go on holiday, to concerts, 
museums or football matches. Some use it for education and for religious observance – 
checking the times and dates of festivals or details of dietary rules. There are very few 
areas of people’s lives that remain untouched by the internet.66  
 
This nurtures autonomous individuals, providing them with space to develop opinions and 
ideas, which in turn betters’ society as a whole.67 Failure to protect the sphere of social 
relationships, may also lead to a failure in defending a democratic state68 as privacy is 
important for democracy, in terms of voter autonomy and its attraction of talented people to 
public office (author’s emphasis).69 The ECtHR acknowledges the importance of social 
relationships in that private life covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person, the 
right to approach others and establish and develop relationships with other human beings 
(private social life)70 and it can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and 
social identity (author’s emphasis).71 This also includes ethnic identity in the sense that any 
negative stereotyping of a group, when it reaches a certain level, is capable of impacting on the 
group’s sense of identity and the feelings of self-worth and self-confidence of members of the 
group. This in turn can be seen as affecting the private life of members of the group,72 raising 
discrimination issues (see below).  
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Chapter 3 discussed what could be revealed from the umbrella term of communications data, 
it is worth just summarising that it can reveal religious, sexual preferences, political leaning73… 
all in all, it reveals an entire life (author’s emphasis).74 This can be based on browsing habits, 
to just places visited. The ECtHR firmly asserted that ‘there can be no doubt that sexual 
orientation and activity concern an intimate aspect of private life.’75 Although falling more 
firmly with the data protection aspect of Article, it has been noted that intimate data i.e. 
regarding health status, religious attitudes fall within Article 8.76 Conversations with political 
associates also fall within the ambit of private life,77 especially since privacy has a political 
value.78 The ability to develop oneself and form relationships is increasingly done so online, 
and data retention interferes with all these activities. This is an early indicator of the democratic 
underpinning Article 8 possess.  
 
In Niemetz v Germany79 the ECtHR stressed that private life included professional and business 
activities as it was difficult to distinguish when an individual may be conducting business 
activities and when not. This is especially when business activities are of a liberal nature such 
as lawyers, journalists80 and civil society organisations.81 This, therefore, also raises issues (but 
not limited to) of legal professional privilege, the protection of journalistic sources and 
monitoring the very organisations that seek to challenge said surveillance laws.  
 
iii.  Anonymity 
 
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, David Kaye noted that broad mandatory data retention policies limit an individual’s 
ability to remain anonymous. 82 Kaye continues that requiring Internet services and 
telecommunications providers to retain data results in the state by proxy having everyone’s 
digital footprint. 
 
The right to anonymity is not (as of yet) an explicit principle found within Article 8, but it will 
be argued that it is an inherent feature and is consistent with respecting private life. This can 
be seen in in Rotaru v Romania, where the GC rejected Romania’s argument that engaging in 
political activities acted as a waiver to anonymity83 by agreeing there was an interference with 
Article 8.84 The Budapest Convention and the Council of Europe’s Declaration on Freedom of 
Communication on the Internet regard anonymity (and encryption) as a legitimate principle in 
protecting privacy, protection against online surveillance and to enhance freedom of 
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expression.85 This link between anonymity and privacy was also observed by Catalina Botero 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,86 with both the Canadian Supreme 
Court87 and US courts recognising the importance of anonymity. Anonymity forms the basis 
of Patrick Breyer’s challenge against German data retention laws.88 In Delfi AS v Estonia the 
GC acknowledged that anonymity is capable of promoting the free flow of ideas and 
information in an important manner, including, notably, on the Internet.89 However, it was also 
noted how the dissemination can aggravate the effects of unlawful speech.90 The GC did 
acknowledge that individuals may only be traceable, to a limited extent, through the 
information retained by Internet access providers.91 This, however, does not take into account 
that data retention obligations do not just fall on squarely on ISPs (as David Kaye notes above), 
but many other service providers as will be discussed.92 When the GC acknowledged that 
anonymity is an important value93 on the Internet, this was done without bearing in mind the 
wide extent at which data can be retained, and who can be obligated to retain. This would only 
serve to highlight the greater importance of the value of anonymity.  
 
Chapter 3 noted that under Part 4 of the IPA 2016, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) could be 
compelled to generate data possibly revealing browsing habits, thus destroying anonymity. 
Privacy International’s General Counsel, Caroline Wilson Palow noted concerns about 
anonymity regarding Internet Connection Records (ICRs).94 Palow noted that if ICRs revealed 
that someone visited crimestoppers-uk.org – an anonymous tips website designed to solve 
crimes, who put in that tip could easily be figured out. Palow concluded that destroying 
anonymity could undermine the ability to solve crime. Support for Palow’s claims come from 
Jennifer Cole and Alexandra Stickings who note that independent research conducted by UK 
charity Crimestoppers highlighted that 95% of those that contacted the organisation would not 
have gone directly to the police (author’s emphasis).95 This could be for many reasons 
including anonymous reporting being less intimidating than a face-to-face,96 feelings of 
vulnerability to crime, not necessarily being a law abiding citizen themselves or fear of 
reprisals for reporting a crime.97 On destroying anonymity, Cole and Alexandra note that digital 
traces (such as phone number, IP Address and geolocation)98recorded by technology (such as 
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the ISP or the reporting system itself)99 for reporting crimes ‘now make it easier than ever to 
trace a report back to the person who made it.’100 Crimestoppers specifically withholds 
communications data from the police when passing on reports.101 As Cole and Alexandra 
highlight, communications data are often captured automatically and its separation inside the 
reporting system is likely to be extremely important if it is to offer the perception and 
reassurance of relative anonymity in the context of witness protection.102 Additionally they 
note (using an example) that although Crimestoppers reports are inadmissible in court, without 
leads for police to follow, convictions may not be possible.103   
 
David Kaye also noted that: 
 
Encryption and anonymity, today’s leading vehicles for online security, provide 
individuals with a means to protect their privacy, empowering them to browse, read, 
develop and share opinions and information without interference and enabling 
journalists, civil society organizations, members of ethnic or religious groups, those 
persecuted because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, activists, scholars, 
artists and others to exercise the rights to freedom of opinion and expression.104 
 
Linking with freedom of expression, Lord Neuberger in the UK noted that in the context of 
anonymous speech, an author’s Article 8 rights reinforces their Article 10 rights.105 Neuberger 
continued that in this context, Article 8 rights are of fundamental importance (author’s 
emphasis).106  
 
Anonymity must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of 
disorder or crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (author’s emphasis).107 
However, the general nature of retention powers as Breyer notes interferes with anonymity108 
(by even impeding or eliminating it)109 on a scale that cannot be compared to KU v Finland110 
which concerned the anonymity of an individual. Finland were found to be in violation of 
Article 8 because national law could not compel ISP’s to provide the identity of a person who 
placed an advertisement of a minor online. Notably, the ECtHR held that on occasion, Article 
8 and 10 must yield to other legitimate imperatives such as the prevention of disorder/crime 
(author’s emphasis).111 This was seized upon by the Home Office to justify blanket 
indiscriminate data retention as envisaged in the draft Communications Data Bill.112 Breyer 
also notes (in reference to Rotaru) that anonymity has been traditionally linked to the protection 
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of personal data.113 Since truly anonymous data is not personal data and so not a data protection 
issue. Recital 26 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) notes that anonymous data is not personal data and therefore does not apply to it. 
However, in light of Big Data, achieving anonymity is meaningless as it serves ‘little more 
than fig leaves to hide the actually easy reidentifiability of the data.’114 Re-identification is 
possible through the cross-referencing of anonymous data,115 moreover, anonymity is no 
safeguard against the possibility of characterising individuals’ behaviour or forecasting future 
behaviours.116 Therefore, the distinction between personal data and anonymous data is no 
longer clear.117   
 
iv.  Data Protection 
 
Another aspect of private life protection derives from personal data regulation. The ECtHR has 
been willing to accept a number of the notions essential to the right to data protection under 
the scope of the Convention.118 In S and Marper the GC noted that the protection of personal 
data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for 
private…life.119 The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) noted that the protection of 
personal data ensures a person’s right to respect for private life, freedom of expression and 
association120 (which links to section 4.5/6). Personal data has been defined as ‘any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable individual.’121 The GC continued that domestic law must 
afford appropriate safeguards to prevent any such use of personal data as may be inconsistent 
with the guarantees of Article 8.122 This includes123 consistency with Articles 5 (quality of 
data),124 6 (special categories of data)125 and 7 (data security)126 of the Convention of 1981.127 
The GC also considered the relevance of Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (87) 
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15 on the use of personal data in the police sector128 Both the provisions and principles of 
Convention of 1981 and Recommendation No. R (87) 15 are of some importance when 
considering safeguards.129  The GC highlighted that need for safeguards is all the greater where 
personal data is undergoing automatic processing (exasperated by ever greater frequency of 
privacy invasive technologies which may affect social life more generally)130, not least when 
such data are used for police purposes (author’s emphasis).131 Moreover, national law should 
ensure that such data are relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they 
are stored, preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no longer 
than is required for the purpose for which those data are stored (author’s emphasis).132 
Additionally, the GC maintained that adequate guarantees must be in place so that retained 
personal data were efficiently protected from misuse and abuse, especially concerning 
protection of special categories of more sensitive data (author’s emphasis).133 These sensitive 
personal data includes data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other 
beliefs, health or sexual life. This, therefore, displays the interlink between various aspects of 
private life where data protection has a connection with anonymity and the various aspects of 
autonomy i.e. social identity etc. The GC in S and Marper noted that ‘[w]here a particularly 
important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin allowed to the 
State will be restricted.’134 As Bart van der Sloot notes, autonomy and informational self-
determination have been accepted as core rationales underlying Article 8 ECHR in cases 
regarding the processing of personal data,135 thus sharing similarities with German Basic 
Law.136 This point becomes important considering Facebook (albeit in Australia and New 
Zealand) has been accused137 (but denies)138 of exploiting young user’s data by helping 
advertisers target teens who felt ‘worthless.’ This is important as Aral Balkan argues that new 
technologies should be looked at as extensions of ourselves.139 
 
EU texts are also of importance, the ECtHR referred to Article 8 (right to the protection of 
personal data) of the CFR,140 the (replaced) Directive 95/46/EC, Data Protection Directive 
(DPD) and GDPR.141 This is important given that the ECtHR’s expansive recourse to external 
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rules of international law142 because it can inform the ECtHR’s reasoning.143 The GDPR also 
interlinks with the ECHR in that Article 88(2) refers to safeguarding the data subjects human 
dignity, which is the very essence of the ECHR. The European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) explains further that better respect for and safeguarding of human dignity could 
counterweigh the pervasive surveillance and power asymmetry which now confronts 
individuals. The EDPS continued that the ECHR is the starting point with regards to the 
inviolability of human dignity, which is fundamental for a collection of rights including privacy 
and data protection, hence the introduction of Convention 108 and subsequent data protection 
regimes to deal with potential for the erosion of privacy and dignity through large scale 
personal data processing.144 
 
Data protection (Article 8 CFR) has been argued to extend145 beyond ‘privacy.’146 It has been 
argued that data protection promotes informational self-determination which flows from the 
individual’s right to personality and redresses detrimental power and information asymmetries 
between data subjects and those that process their personal data.147  It has also been noted that 
data protection extends beyond privacy because processing of personal data must be done fairly 
and for a specified purpose.148 However, privacy is a much broader concept,149 it was 
previously noted above that private life relates to autonomy, informational self-determination 
amongst others aspects. Moreover, Lilian Edwards noted that the European data protection 
system had in practice been less than satisfactory which intensified with the Internet as the 
direct marketing medium highlighted dismaying gaps in the system.150 Tijmen Wisman 
highlights that in the age of the Internet of Things ‘when data leave[s] the exclusive control of 
the individual, this data might be protected according to the law, but still there will be a breach 
of privacy.’151 This lack of control intensifies in light of Big Data.152 One thing is certain 
however, data protection and privacy do not protect the exact same interests.153 Moreover, on 
the specifics of data retention, data protection is argued to provide insufficient protection 
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because it negates the protective effects of most of the eight Data Protection Principles and is 
susceptible to function creep (future undefined purposes).154 Any breach of Article 8 should be 
enforced.155 Nor is the ICO a powerful regulator156 which may raise adequate safeguard issues 
with Article 8. Whether data protection or right to respect for private life provides greater 
protection is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to remember that the GC in S 
and Marper noted that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance, not only 
to private, but family life157 also (author’s emphasis). This not only implies that every aspect 
of personal data is now within the scope of private life, it leads to a discussion on another aspect 
of Article 8, that of family life. 
 
4.3 Family life 
 
Similar to the notion of private life, family life is also a loose concept. 158Relationships that 
have been found to be covered by family life includes biological and non-biological 
relationships.159 The ‘mutual enjoyment by members of a family of each other’s company 
constitutes a fundamental element of family life.’ 160 Baroness Hale in Countryside Alliance161 
went further and highlighted that Article 8 reflects two separate fundamental values, one being 
the inviolability of personal and psychological space where individuals develop their own sense 
of self and relationships with others. Hale continued that this is ‘fundamentally what families 
are for and why democracies value family life so highly’ as they ‘nurture individuality and 
difference’162 something that totalitarian regimes seek to subvert. 
 
The importance of family life becomes more profound in the digital era where it has been 
suggested that social media could strengthen family bonds, reunite improve family 
relationships and personal development.163 Raelene Wilding demonstrated that ‘the desire to 
communicate across distance was nevertheless common to all the families’ describing them as 
‘transnational families.’164 Wilding continued that the lack of face-to-face contact sometimes 
‘made the relationship feel so much more intimately connected.’165 In 2013, Microsoft 
demonstrated that one in three families use technology to communicate within the home 
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(author’s emphasis).166 Family members communicating with each other leads to the necessary 
discussion on correspondence.  
 
4.4 Correspondence  
 
Correspondence aims to protect the confidentiality of private communications, which has also 
been interpreted as guaranteeing the right to uninterrupted and uncensored communications 
with others.167  
 
As traditional ideas of correspondence evolve, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence evolves also. This 
was affirmed in Copland v United Kingdom.168 The ECtHR held that the monitoring of 
telephone calls which consisted of analysis ‘of the college telephone bills showing telephone 
numbers called,  the  dates and times of  the  calls and their length and cost’ the ‘web sites 
visited, the times and dates of the visits to the web sites’ and the ‘analysis of e-mail addresses 
and dates and times at which e-mails were sent’ amounted to an interference with private life 
and correspondence within the meaning of Article 8.169 The ECtHR acknowledged that Article 
8 protects the confidentiality of private communications and the confidentiality of all the 
exchanges in which individuals may engage for the purposes of communication (author’s 
emphasis).170 Although correspondence applies to all communications, there are notable 
examples of privileged communications that are more important, including correspondence 
with lawyers (which may have Article 6 implications, discussed below),171 medical 
profession,172 Members of Parliament,173and as mentioned above numerous times 
correspondence with journalists. Just as Solove notes, who one may contact may be more 
important to the individual than what was actually communicated.174 In acknowledging that 
correspondence is interfered with irrespective of the contents of a communication,175 the 
ECtHR has extended protection to the means or method of communication.176  
 
This highlights links between private life and correspondence in terms of the anonymity of 
journalistic sources and also the professional activities of the journalist. The ECtHR noted the 
impact upon professional activities: 
  
[T]he right of journalists not to disclose their sources cannot be considered a mere 
privilege to be granted or taken away depending on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of 
their sources, but is part and parcel of the right to information, to be treated with the 
utmost caution.177  
 
																																																						
166 Tim Lumb, ‘New Microsoft research: technology and the home’ (28 October 2013) 
<https://www.marketingsociety.com/the-library/new-microsoft-research-technology-and-home> accessed 8 
November 2017. 
167 Ivana Roagna, (n12), p32. 
168 Copland v United Kingdom, (n23), [10-13].  
169 ibid, [44].  
170 Michaud v France App no. 12323/11 (ECHR, 6 December 2012), [90]. 
171 Petrov v Bulgaria App no. 15197/02 (ECHR, 22 May 2008), [43]. 
172 Szuluk v UK App no. 36936/05 (ECHR, 2 June 2009), [39]. 
173 ibid, [53]. 
174 Daniel Solove, (n35), 68; Daniel Solove, ‘Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law’ (2004) 72 The 
George Washington Law Review 1701, 1728. 
175 A v France App no. 14838/89 (ECHR, 23 November 1993), [34-7]; 
176 Ivana Roagna, (n12), p33. 
177 Tillack v Belgium App no. 20477/05 (ECHR, 27 November 2007), [65]. 
	76	
Protection of journalistic sources is vital for democratic societies as without protection, the 
ability to provide accurate and reliable information may be undermined.178 Data retention poses 
unique challenges179 to the protection of journalists (and other professions) discussed below.  
 
4.5 Data retention: A Fundamental Rights Issue 
 
In the Belgian Linguistic Case the ECtHR noted that the ECHR must be read as a whole, and 
as a consequence, a matter specifically dealt with by one provision may be regulated by other 
provisions of the ECtHR.180 Benjamin J Goold noted, ‘[i]t is hard to imagine, for example, 
being able to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, or freedom of religion 
without an accompanying right to privacy.’181 The same sentiments are true in the 
communications data context.182 
 
The following sections considers rights other than Article 8, but it is Article 8 which links and 
underpins them. This includes Articles 9 (religion, thought and conscience), 10 (expression), 
11 (association), 14 (non-discrimination), 6 (fair trial) and Article 2 of Protocol 4 (free 
movement). Similar rights are provided for by the CFR, thus bringing in an EU element which 
was recognised by the European Parliament as cornerstones of democracy; whereas mass 
surveillance was incompatible with (author’s emphasis).183  
 
The then Interception of Communications Commissioner (IoCC) in the UK criticised public 
authorities and designated persons for focusing primarily on Article 8 and not giving due 
consideration to Article 10.184 It is therefore necessary to now consider Article 10 ECHR. 
 
4.6 Freedom of Expression and Article 10 
 
Privacy is not the enemy of freedom of speech, it is its closest ally.185 
 
The then Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression, Frank La Rue commented on interrelation between privacy and freedom of 
expression. He contended that the right to privacy is often understood as an essential 
requirement for the realisation of the right to freedom of expression and any undue interference 
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with privacy can both directly and indirectly limit the free development and exchange of 
ideas.186 Although this freedom of expression especially on the internet can pose risks to private 
life187 (such as tarnishing reputation)188 the latter can enhance the former. It is important to 
consider whether data retention interferes with freedom of expression. 
 
(a)  Does Data Retention interfere with Freedom of Expression? 
 
In Digital Rights Ireland, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was asked 
whether Directive 2006/24, the Data Retention Directive (DRD) was compatible with the right 
to freedom of expression laid down in Article 11 of the Charter and Article 10 ECHR.189 The 
CJEU did acknowledge that data retention raises questions relating to freedom of expression190 
and felt that it was not inconceivable that data retention may have an effect on the exercise of 
that right.191 Ultimately, the CJEU felt it was unnecessary to examine data retention in light of 
Article 11,192 and thus went no further. In Tele2 and Watson, however, the CJEU did this time 
find that blanket indiscriminate data retention of all data, of all persons, of all communications 
would be incompatible with Article 11 (including Article 7, 8 and 52(1) of the CFR).193 The 
CJEU noted that: 
 
[T]he retention of traffic and location data could nonetheless have an effect on the use 
of means of electronic communication and, consequently, on the exercise by the users 
thereof of their freedom of expression, guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter (author’s 
emphasis).194  
 
If one considers the approach in Klass, the ECtHR noted that the mere existence of secret 
surveillance laws threatened the freedom of communication between users of 
telecommunications services, interference is, established. The CJEU did not explain why 
Article 11 CFR was interfered with, thus it is important to consider Article 10 ECHR and to 
ascertain why data retention interferes with freedom of expression in various ways. 
 
(b)  Article 10 ECHR 
 
Article 10(1) provides that: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers.  
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Given that Article 11 CFR is Article 10 ECHR’s equivalent, under Article 52(3), it will be 
given the same scope and meaning. The ECtHR has previously held that Article 10 applies to 
communications via the Internet,195 irrespective of the type of message conveyed196 and 
irrespective of whether it is commercial in nature.197 In Delfi, the GC acknowledged previous 
case law in agreeing that ‘user-generated expressive activity on the Internet provides an 
unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression.’198 Moreover, it has been 
stressed that ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a 
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s 
self-fulfilment (author’s emphasis).’199 This relates to privacy, and Article 8 in two respects, 
one, in that Article 8 and Article 10 are foundations of democracy, and two, self-fulfilment is 
inextricably linked to the notion of autonomy where one ‘can freely pursue the development 
and fulfilment of his personality.’200 Crucially, the ECtHR has acknowledged that the storage 
of personal data related to political opinion engages Article 10 due to the adverse effects (see 
discussions on chilling effects)201 caused by storage without any concrete proof of actual harm 
(author’s emphasis).202 This, also relates to the data protection aspect of private and family life 
because it involves the processing of data pertaining to political opinions/affiliations. This, 
therefore, as suggested above, meets the Klass approach of interfering with the freedom of 
communication under Article 8 must be applied mutatis mutandis to Article 10203 and thus 
requires justification.  
 
(c)  Autonomy and Development and Fulfilment 
 
Chapter 3 noted that privacy is important for ideas that are unconnected to democratic functions 
which are connected to broader autonomy based arguments for freedom of speech and 
intellectual development.204 Freedom of expression (including artistic expression) is important 
for the development and manifestation of individuals’ identities in society.205 The ECtHR have 
agreed, noting that freedom of expression is essential for each individual’s (and for a family)206 
self-fulfilment.207 This relates to other aspects of private life, notably the development and 
embracing of physical, social and ethnic identities, interlinking Article 8 and 10.  
  
(d)  Information and Ideas 
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Article 10 is applicable not only to information or ideas that are favourably received, 
inoffensive or indifferent, but to those that offend, shock and disturb, without such pluralism, 
tolerance and broadmindedness there can be no ‘democratic society.’208 
 
It is important to allow space to develop opinions and ideas to benefit society.209 In a 
successfully developing society all of its members contribute by means of their talents, energy 
and intellect.210 This all requires the communication of ideas, and the freedom to do so. As 
Solove suggests, anonymity or the use of pseudonyms, both of which has allowed freedom of 
expression to flourish, protects those who read or listen to unpopular ideas.211 
 
(e)  Anonymity, Whistleblowing and Journalism  
 
Anonymity was discussed at length in section 4.2(b)(3). It is worth repeating, however, what 
Lord Neuberger212articulated, in that in the context of anonymous speech, an author’s Article 
8 rights reinforces their Article 10 rights (because it amongst other things, grants anonymity), 
in which Article 8 rights become of fundamental importance.213 Moreover, Frank La Rue in 
2013 argued that anonymity of communications is one of the most important advances enabled 
by the Internet, allowing individuals to express themselves freely without fear of retribution or 
condemnation. 214 La Rue continued that restrictions on anonymity can have a chilling effect, 
which dissuades the free expression of information and ideas.215 This can also result in 
individuals’ de facto exclusion from vital social spheres, undermining their rights to expression 
and information, and exacerbating social inequalities,216 such as direct and indirect censorship 
due to China’s Twitter-like ‘Weibo’ which introduced real-name registration.217 Additionally, 
it can have an evident chilling effect on victims of all forms of violence and abuse, who may 
be reluctant to report for fear of double victimisation.218 This raises private life aspects such as 
autonomy, physical and psychological integrity.  
 
As Bernal maintains, strong anonymity is needed for whistleblowers.219 David Wilson220 
stressed the importance of why whistleblowers need anonymity, where he detailed whistle 
blowing which lead to his unemployment and affected his employment prospects.221 Such 
issues can both fall within the ambit of Article 8 and 10222 as the latter includes ‘the freedom 
to impart information.’223 
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Wilson noted that his whistleblowing only gained traction once he went to the press.224 It is 
therefore important to discuss the press, journalism, whistle blowing and data retention in 
relation to Article 10. Journalism is regarded as the ‘fourth estate’225 (a segment of society 
having significant influence on society outside of the political system) in which political 
reporting and investigative journalism attract a high level of protection under Article 10.226 
Protections, however, are uniquely challenged in the context of data retention.227 A study by 
the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) on behalf of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) highlighted that 
legal source protection was jeopardised by mandatory data retention laws because of the risk 
of exposing sources.228 Another key finding was that without substantial limitations and 
protections of data retention, investigative journalism that relies on confidential sources will 
be difficult to sustain and reporting in many other cases will encounter inhibitions on part of 
potential sources.229 Even when journalists encrypt content they may neglect the metadata, 
leaving behind digital breadcrumbs when they communicate with their sources, making it easy 
to identify sources with insufficient or non-existent safeguards.230 It was also noted that the 
chilling effect on confidential sources is further exacerbated given the risk of profiling and 
exposure by the combinations of data retention and Big Data analysis.231 The UK has dropped 
to 40th place in the World Press Freedom Index, citing the IPA 2016 as having ‘insufficient 
protection mechanisms for whistleblowers, journalists, and their sources, posing a serious 
threat to investigative journalism.’232 Given the revealing nature of communications data, 
journalists could unwittingly disclose their sources by virtue of the fact that communications 
between them and whistleblower is retained. Maintaining the confidentiality of sources is not 
a mere privilege dependent upon the lawfulness of their sources, but is a part to the right to 
information, which is to be treated with utmost caution.233 This not only compromises the 
professional activities protected under private life, it also interferes with the correspondence of 
both journalist and source. Another aspect of whistleblowing is the fact that concerns disclosed 
by whistleblowers can cross national boundaries, affecting members of the public in more than 
one country and requiring a response by regulators and governments in multiple States, 
particularly where the worker operates in an industry that is globalised and operates 
transnationally.234 This warrants the discussion of the ‘regardless of frontiers’ aspect of Article 
10.  
 
(f)  Regardless of Frontiers 
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The idea of freedom of expression ‘regardless of frontiers’ takes on a new meaning in the 
Internet era as it empowers individuals around the world with the potential to seek, receive, 
and impart information and ideas in unprecedented ways.235 Hyde and Savage note that cross-
border whistleblowing also relates to the aviation and food sector,236 and others such as surface 
transportation, shipping, road haulage, energy production and financial services.237 The ECtHR 
in Ekin Associations v France238ruled that restrictions on foreign publications is in direct 
conflict with the notion of ‘regardless of frontiers’ and ultimately held that Article 10 had been 
violated, as it was in the Spycatcher case.239  It has already been noted that data retention and 
surveillance in general has a chilling effect on various rights protected by the ECHR, this point 
is more profound when considering extraterritorial surveillance. In Human Rights Watch & 
Others v The Secretary of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office & Others240 the IPT 
ruled that Article 1 (jurisdiction) of the ECHR did not apply to the surveillance carried out by 
UK intelligence agency GCHQ when the individual concerned was not physically present in 
the UK. If Article 1 does not apply, then the corresponding rights set out in the Convention are 
not applicable. This position has been heavily criticised especially because the surveillance 
actually did take place within UK territory.241 What this would mean in practice is that when 
communicating from abroad, whether surveillance is conducted in the territory of the UK, 
Convention rights do not apply. There is a risk that intelligence agencies may exploit this gap 
to circumvent Convention protections through the use of intelligence sharing arrangements242 
and therefore uncontrolled data retention could ensue with impunity. More worrisome is that 
if a person present in the UK uses a VPN and sets their location abroad, would the ECHR again 
be said to be not applicable? If the answer is yes, then the UK would be in violation for the 
simple fact that Article 1 would apply because said person is in the UK. This is why, whatever 
the location, when conducting surveillance, the ECHR should be adhered to. Failing to do so 
would compromise the essence of free flow of information, regardless of frontiers. Not only 
does this affect private life in aspects of personal development, professional activities and 
autonomy in general when communicating with persons abroad. It can have an impact of family 
life in, for example, communications between family members in different countries. This in 
turn relates to an interference with the correspondence aspect of Article 8, the greater 
propensity for a chilling effect to materialise, and thus, again, highlights the interrelation 
between Articles 8 and 10. The inhibitory effects of the free flow of information affects one’s 
ability to receive and impart information.  
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(g)  Receive and impart information 
 
Although not a strict form of censorship in the traditional sense used about permissions in print 
media, and also not a real-time delay to electronic communications, data retention may still be 
seen to be something that engages the strand of Article 10 ECHR encompassing the qualified 
right to receive and impart information.243  Alex Matthews and Catherine Tucker demonstrated 
that post-Snowden revelations negatively affected (chilling effect) Google search terms 
deemed both personally-sensitive and government-sensitive.244 Search data, on generic, 
sensitive (potentially embarrassing) and on Homeland Security’s list was collected for the US 
and its top 40 international partners.245 It showed that search terms deemed troubling from a 
personal and private perspective dropped 4%.246 It also provides the first substantial empirical 
documentation of a chilling effect, both domestically and internationally, that appears to be 
related to increased awareness of government surveillance.247 Moreover, the chilling effect 
found to be more prominent in countries that are considered US allies due to initial 
unawareness of US activities.248 Finally, it was noted there was a decrease in health related 
search terms, which was argued may have an impact economic welfare of citizens.249 This is 
just one example, but if individuals are deterred from making health related searches, this may 
affect their physical and social identity, thus hindering their autonomous development 
protected under private life. Jon Penney also found similar chilling effects and noted these 
findings have implications for the health of democratic deliberation among citizens and the 
health of society.250  
 
As David Kaye noted, surveillance (including data collection and retention) can create a 
chilling effect on the freedom of expression of ordinary citizens who may self-censor for fear 
of being constantly tracked. This included a wide range of vulnerable groups such as racial, 
religious, ethnic, gender and sexual minorities, members of certain political parties, civil 
society, human rights defenders, professionals such as journalists, lawyers and trade unionists, 
victims of violence and abuse, and children. 251  
 
Frank La Rue highlighted the interlink between privacy and freedom of expression further 
noting that states cannot ensure the freedom to receive and impart information without 
respecting, protecting and promoting privacy. La Rue continued that252 privacy and freedom 
expression are interlinked and mutually dependent where an infringement upon one can be both 
the cause and consequence of an infringement upon the other. Without adequately securing 
privacy, security and anonymity of communications, journalists, human rights defenders and 
whistleblowers, for example, cannot be assured that their communications will not be subject 
to States’ scrutiny. 
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Another aspect of the freedom to receive and impart information derives from Breyer’s 
analysis253 that if the state does not fully compensate telecommunication operators, then prices 
for their services may significantly increase, or formerly ‘free’254 services may cease to be 
offered. Bernal and others have noted that Internet Connection Records (ICRs) are expensive 
and the burden of costs may also (as well as government) fall on ordinary Internet users.255 
LINX argued that costs are unlikely to be recoverable even if the government reimburses ISPs 
for the full capital costs and ongoing direct operational expenses.256 Section 249 of the IPA 
2016 deals with telecommunications operator reimbursement. Subsection(7) specifically deals 
with the costs of retention notices, but there is no guarantee of full remuneration because 
discretion is given to the Secretary of State to consider what is appropriate,257 so long as it is 
not £0.258 As Breyer notes this could have the consequence of decreasing the amount of 
information people can afford to circulate, which ultimately interferes with freedom of 
expression.259 Being unable to (re-)circulate information may again have an indirect effect on 
the development of individuals protected under Article 8 and opinions under Article 10.  
 
(h)  Facts and opinion 
 
Article 10 covers both facts and opinions.260 The GC in noted that there is very little scope for 
restrictions on political speech.261 Chapter 3 detailed how data retention interferes with political 
views, which is special/sensitive data, and therefore relates to data protection aspects of Article 
8. 
 
Moreover, iiNet has demonstrated that embedded data about communications like Twitter, 
Facebook, and websites does in fact reveal substantial amount of the content of 
communications (such as tweets).262 Therefore, data retention would not just retain the 
communications data associated with tweets, but the actual tweets itself, making it far easier to 
identify individuals, thus interfering with anonymity, private life and the ability to express 
oneself.  
 
This section has demonstrated the interrelation between Article 8 and Article 10 ECHR, and in 
many cases where the former underpins the latter. Pluralism, is established in the jurisprudence 
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of the ECtHR, especially when it comes to freedom of expression and religion.263 An 
interrelationship between Article 10 and 9 is argued to exist.264 The Steering Committee of the 
CoE on Media and Information Society (Steering Committee) noted that the Internet allows 
the expression of political convictions, as well as religious and non-religious views which 
concerns the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as enshrined in Article 9 of 
the ECHR.265  
 
4.7 Freedom of Religion, Thought, Conscience and Article 9 ECHR 
 
Article 9(1) ECHR notes: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
 
The CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly agreed that surveillance (including data retention)266 
endangers freedom of religion.267 It’s CFR equivalent is Article 10.  
 
(a)  General Principles 
 
Freedom of religion is regarded as one of the foundations of a democratic society within the 
meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most essential elements 
of the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, skeptics and the unconcerned268 and humanists.269 That freedom entails, inter alia, 
freedom to hold or not to a religion and that to practice or not to practice it.270 The aspect of 
‘identity of believers’ relates to the social identity aspect of private life as discussed above.  
 
(b)  Freedom to Manifest a Belief  
 
The freedom to manifest one’s religion can be done in public or in private.271 This closely 
relates with the private life aspect of Article 8 which can be considered in conjunction.272 The 
freedom to manifest one’s religion also encompasses the ability to convince one’s neighbour 
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i.e. through teaching.273 Although there is a differentiation the ECtHR in Campbell and Cosans 
v the United Kingdom274 differentiated between opinions/ideas and belief, 275 it still relates to 
the freedom to impart information aspect of Article 10 and can be considered in conjunction 
with Article 9 if it is necessary276 or relates to religion.277 This would ultimately also relate to 
the freedom to receive information under Article 10 and respecting correspondence under 
Article 8, and therefore, ultimately freedom of communication. 
 
(c)  Freedom to Hold a Belief 
 
The right to hold a belief is unconditional and absolute.278 This relates to the personal autonomy 
aspect of private life in that ‘autonomy is salient in the reasoning of the Court and most notably 
under Article 9.’279 
 
(d)  Article 9 and its relationship with Data Retention 
 
In Sinan Isik v Turkey the ECtHR noted that: 
 
[T]he right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs also has a negative aspect, namely an 
individual’s right not to be obliged to disclose his or her religion or beliefs and not to 
be obliged to act in such a way that it is possible to conclude that he or she holds – or 
does not hold – such beliefs. Consequently, State authorities are not entitled to 
intervene in the sphere of an individual’s freedom of conscience and to seek to discover 
his or her religious beliefs or oblige him or her to disclose such beliefs.280 
 
It has already been noted Chapter 3 how communications data can reveal philosophical or 
religious beliefs.281 Data retention forces the disclosure of religion or belief via State 
intervention through retention notices which for example, captures web history. Therefore, the 
mere existence of data retention laws likely interferes with Article 9 because it makes it 
possible to conclude whether one holds a religion or belief. This also establishes another link 
with Article 8 as the mere storage of personal data interferes with private and family life.282 
This interferes with the data protection aspect of Article 8 more profoundly because religion is 
classed as sensitive/special data and thus the rules on processing become stricter. Due to the 
state ‘intervening’ by retaining this data, another aspect of private life arises, that is of personal 
development which can be inhibited by the reluctance to seek out information due to the 
chilling effect discussed throughout this Chapter. This therefore again becomes an Article 8 
and Article 10 issue. Another aspect of the interrelation between Article 9 and Article 8 is the 
correspondence aspect, although concerning interception (which is actually possible through 
																																																						
273 Ivanova, (n271), [78]. 
274 Campbell and Cosans v the United Kingdom App no 3578/05 (ECHR, 25 February 1982), [36] 
275 ibid. 
276 Glas Nadezhda Eood and Anatoliy Elenkov v Bulgaria App no. 14134/02 (ECHR, 11 October 2007), [59]. 
277 Murphy v Ireland App no. 44179/98 (ECHR, 10 July 2003), [60-1]. 
278 Ivanova, (n271), [79]. 
279 Begum Bulak and Alain Zysset, ‘“Personal Autonomy” and “Democratic Society” at the European Court of 
Human Rights: Friends or Foes?’ (2013) UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2 
<http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1470685/1/2UCLJLJ230%20-%20Personal%20Autonomy.pdf> accessed 8 May 
2017, p248. 
280 Sinan Isik v Turkey App no. 21924/05 (ECHR, 2 February 2010), [41]. 
281 Paul Bernal, (n4), 253. 
282 Folberø and Others v Norway App no. 15472/02 (ECHR, 29 June 2007), [98]. 
	86	
Part 4),283 data retention also threatens the privileged communications of religious ministers,284 
thus striking at the freedom of communication, which in turn can have an effect on their 
professional activities, also protected under private life. It has also been shown that surveillance 
can have a chilling effect on those practising a particular religion. It was statistically confirmed 
that ‘that Muslim-Americans not only believe the government monitors their routine activities, 
but that such concerns have translated into actual changes in daily behavior.’285 
 
In regards to conscience, Bernal notes that Apple, Google and Microsoft’s ‘digital assistants,’ 
Siri, Now and Cortana all aim to predict what one knows, to the extent that Google and 
Facebook can know people better than they know themselves.286 One reason is due to self-
deception,287 the other is the frailty of human memory, something that Google is not prone to 
because it remembers perfectly, forever (author’s emphasis).288 This may raise issues (already 
touched upon by the CJEU)289 of the right to be forgotten and data portability where ‘the right 
for the data subject to object to the further processing of his/her personal data, and an obligation 
for the data controller to delete information as soon as it is no longer needed for processing.’290 
The right to be forgotten, or as Bernal phrases it, a right to delete291 is currently being 
considered by the ECtHR in M.L. v. Germany and W.W. v. Germany under Article 8.292 
 
Moving on from predictability, Facebook has announced that it seeks to develop technology 
that would be able to read a person’s mind in order to communicate.293 Neuroscientist Mark 
Chevillet hinted that Facebook’s goal would require non-invasive sensors to detect brain 
signals associated with word thinking, algorithms to figure out the intended word, Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) to aid the algorithm and technology called ‘diffuse optimal tomography’ 
which would shine infra-red light onto brain tissue to deduce patterns of neurons based on light 
scattered.294  Such neurotechnologies have applications in device control, real-time 
neuromonitoring, neurosensor-based vehicle operator systems, cognitive training tools, 
electrical and magnetic brain stimulation, wearables for mental wellbeing, virtual reality 
systems and for everyday activities including gaming, entertainment, and smart- phone’s 
remote control.295 Apple and Samsung are incorporating neurogadgets into their major 
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products.296 It was predicted that neurodevices would gradually replace the keyboard, mouse, 
touchscreen and voice command as the preferred way to interact with computers.297 This will 
lead to an increase the availability of brain information to third parties, exposing them ‘to the 
same degree of intrusiveness and vulnerability to which is exposed any other bit of information 
circulating in the digital ecosystem.’298 
 
The mind is a ‘kind of last refuge of personal freedom and self-determination.’299 The risks of 
using brainwaves to eavesdrop and gain passwords300 is already here, which is matched by calls 
for human rights to protect mental privacy, cognitive liberty, mental integrity and 
psychological continuity.301 Cognitive liberty is synonymous with freedom of thought302 yet 
more precisely evokes the idea ‘individuals should have the right to autonomous self-
determination over their own brain chemistry.’303 It is necessary for all other liberties.304 For 
Bublitz, an aspect of cognitive liberty entails the protection of individuals of coercive or 
unconsented use of neurotechnologies.305 This may have implications for Article 9, if data from 
neurotechnologies are to be retained because this would fall under ‘unconsented use.’ 
Moreover, unlike Articles 8, 10 and 11, the restrictions of Article 9 apply only to the 
manifestation of religion and beliefs, not the thoughts themselves,306 as they are absolute 
(author’s emphasis).307If neurotechnologies can be used to discern the contents of thoughts 
against one’s will (non-consent)308‘it would have a chilling effect not only on expression but 
also on the source of expression, and thus it would impact the freedom people have even to 
entertain those thoughts.’309 The very notion of freedom of thought could very well be put 
																																																						
296 ibid. 
297 ibid. 
298 ibid, 12. 
299 ibid, 1. 
300 Ajaya Neupane, Lutfor Rahman and Nitesh Saxena, ‘PEEP: Passively Eavesdropping Private Input via 
Brainwave Signals’ (2017) <https://info.cs.uab.edu/saxena/docs/nrs-fc17.pdf> accessed 5 September 2017; 
Charlie Osborne, ‘How hackers can hijack brainwaves to capture your passwords’ (8 May 2017) 
<http://www.zdnet.com/google-amp/article/how-hackers-use-brainwaves-to-capture-your-
passwords/?utm_content=buffer5b8d1&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer
> accessed 5 September 2017; Tom Simonite, ‘Using Brainwaves to Guess Passwords’ (5 May 2017) 
<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604293/using-brainwaves-to-guess-passwords/?set=604330> accessed 5 
September 2017. 
301 Marcello Ienca and Roberto Andorno, (n295); Marcello Ienca, ‘Do We Have a Right to Mental Privacy and 
Cognitive Liberty?’ (3 May 2017) <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-we-have-a-right-to-
mental-privacy-and-cognitive-liberty/> accessed 11 October 2017; Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees and Sarah J. 
L. Edwards, I Know What You're Thinking: Brain imaging and mental privacy (Oxford University Press 2012); 
Jesper Ryberg, ‘Neuroscience, Mind Reading and Mental Privacy’ (2017) Res Publica 23:2 197; Francis X. 
Shen, ‘Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law’ (2013) Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 36:2 653; 
Woodrow Barfield and Alexander Williams, ‘Law, Cyborgs, and Technologically Enhanced Brains’ (2017) 
Philosophies 2:6. 
302 Marcello Ienca and Roberto Andorno, (n295), 10. 
303 Charlotte Walsh, ‘Psychedelics and Cognitive Liberty: reimagining drug policy through the prism of human 
rights’ (2016) International Journal of Drug Policy 29: 80, 83. 
304 Marcello Ienca and Roberto Andorno, (n295), 10. 
305 Jan-Christoph Bublitz, ‘My Mind Is Mine!? Cognitive Liberty as a Legal Concept’ in Elisabeth Hildt and 
Andreas G. Franke (ed), Cognitive Enhancement An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Dordrecht: Springer 2013), 
234.   
306 Ivanova, (n271), [79].  
307 Charlotte Walsh, (n303), 83; Marcello Ienca and Roberto Andorno, (n295), 15. 
308 Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum, ‘Powers, Non-Consent and Freedom’ (2014) Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 91:1 136. 
309 Adina L. Roskies, ‘Mind Reading, Lie Detection, and Privacy’ in Jens Clausen and Neil Levy (ed), 
Handbook of Neuroethics (Springer Netherlands 2015), 687. 
	88	
under threat as retention of thought data could be seen as taking ‘coercive steps to make him 
change his beliefs.’310 
 
Several questions arise, under what conditions could brain information be collected, what 
components shall be disclosed and made accessible to others, who should access this and what 
should be the limits to consent in the area?311 It was noted that neurotechnologies creates risk 
of unparalleled intrusion into the private sphere causing physical or psychological harm or 
unduly influencing one’s behaviour.312 For Ienca and Andorno, the mere collection of brain 
data can violate mental privacy.313 Brain signals also allow the tracing or distinguishing of 
one’s identity.314 This establishes a link between Article 9 and 8 in that this would touch upon 
aspects of the latter with regards to physical, psychological and moral integrity, identity, 
autonomy, informational self-determination and data protection. However, Ienca and Andorno 
argue that privacy and data protection are insufficient to deal with emerging neurotechnological 
scenarios, hence the need for the formal recognition of mental privacy.315 For example, Article 
8 is a relative, rather than an absolute right, as some argue probing the mind against one’s will 
should be prohibited in all circumstances.316 This raises no issues, if this falls within the ambit 
of freedom of thought in Article 9, but with Article 8, it may well be justifiable. Falling under 
the later, it would be argued that the State’s margin of appreciation should be even narrower 
than retention of other forms of communications data as this would be of the utmost sensitivity. 
An alternative would be for the CoE to adopt an Additional Protocol dealing specifically with 
mental privacy. However, for these purposes, it is argued that Article 9 would be the best 
protection currently available due to its absolute nature of freedom of thought and conscience. 
 
Given that smart phones, devices and apps are covered by the IPA 2016,317 retention of thought 
data would truly encompass what Caspar Bowden highlighted when he coined the term ‘CCTV 
(or Big Brother)318 for inside your head.’319 Thus, ultimately interfering with one’s conscience. 
The GC has noted where ‘the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Article 9 of 
the Convention must be interpreted in the light of Article 11.’320  For this reason, it is necessary 
to now consider data retention and its implications on Article 11.  
 
4.8 Article 11 ECHR 
 
Article 11(1) maintains that: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests. 
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Article 12 CFR is Article 11’s equivalent.  
 
(a) The Importance of Freedom of Association 
 
Zvonimir Mataga argues that freedom of association enables individuals to protect their rights 
and interests in alliance with others.321 Mataga continues that such possibility is of the utmost 
importance since, from a sociological aspect, association means creation or accession to an 
organisation – which is due to its characteristics able to achieve goals which an individual alone 
would not be able to achieve at all, or at least not effectively. This also relates to the very 
important aspect of private life in that it protects individual’s right to develop and form 
relationships with the outside world. Manfred Nowak highlighted the dualist nature of freedom 
of association as granting civil and political rights. Regarding the civil rights aspect, freedom 
of association protects against arbitrary interference by the State or private parties when, for 
whatever reason and for whatever purpose, an individual wishes to associate with others or has 
already done so. From the political rights perspective, it is indispensable for the existence and 
functioning of democracy, because political interests can be effectively championed only in 
community with others (as a political party, professional interest group, organization or other 
association for pursuing particular public interests).322 The civic and political freedoms aspect 
was also noted by the GC in Zdanoka v Latvia.323 Moreover, the GC has also ‘on numerous 
occasions affirmed the direct relationship between democracy, pluralism and the freedom of 
association.’324 
 
(b) The Importance of Freedom of Assembly 
 
The GC too has stressed the importance of freedom of assembly where they noted that ‘the 
right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and, like the right 
to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society.’325 Moreover it was noted 
that measures to supress freedom of assembly other than in cases of incitement to violence or 
rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and unacceptable words used and 
however illegitimate demands made may be, may endanger democracy.326  
 
(c) Differentiating Assembly from Association and their respective application 
 
In order to highlight the significance of freedom of assembly and association in respect of data 
retention, it is first necessary to distinguish between both concepts. The idea of freedom of 
association encompasses the right to form or be affiliated with a group or organisation pursuing 
particular aims.327 Article 11 affords protection to any group considered an 
association.328According to Mataga, associations within the meaning of Article 11 has an 
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autonomous meaning independent of state classifications.329 For the ECtHR, ‘association’ 
presupposes ‘a voluntary grouping for a common goal.’330 Although trade unions are 
specifically mentioned in Article 11, the ECtHR interprets the term ‘association’ very broadly 
to include a number of form of associations. This includes the right to join and form 
associations, (especially) political parties, religious organisations, employer associations, 
companies and various other forms of association,331 including environmental associations.332 
Moreover, Article 11 protects informal associations provided that they fulfil the minimum 
degree of organisation and size and companies.333 
 
What distinguishes association from assembly is the: 
  
(i) higher degree of institutional organisation (does not require legal status, requires 
more than mere social gathering, and some degree of continuity);  
(ii) voluntary character; and  
(iii) the pursuit of a common goal (for mutual or public benefit).334  
 
The GC regards that assembly should not be interpreted restrictively, as the right covers both 
private meetings and meetings in public places, whether static or in the form of a procession; 
in addition, it can be exercised by individual participants and by the persons organising the 
gathering.335  
  
(d) Association and Assembly in the Digital Age 
 
In their paper, Douglas Rutzen and Jacob Zenn argue that freedom of association and assembly 
applies to online communities i.e. Facebook groups, social networks.336 Although using 
slightly different criteria337 for determining what constitutes association, it will be argued this 
is still applicable to the ECtHR’s interpretation. Rutzen and Zenn use the examples of ‘“April 
6 Movement” that originated in Egypt; the “One Million Voices Against FARC” that originated 
in Colombia; and “Mir Hussein Mousavi’s” Facebook page that originated in Iran.’338 
 
Movement Description 
April 6 Movement Facebook group, reported on strikes, 
alerted online networks about police 
activity, organised protests against illegal 
government activity, obtained over 
100,000 members by 11 March 2011, and 
promoted ‘millions march.’ 
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One Million Voices Against FARC Facebook group, based on concern about 
FARC’s actions, acquired 100,000 
members within a week, highly organised 
– setting up officer roles on issues of 
legal reform to public relations, 
coordinated community organisers 
spanning nearly 50 countries to raise 
funds for advertising campaign and to 
plan protest that reached between 
500,000 and 2 million. 
Mir Hussein Mousavi’s Facebook page, providing a framework 
for citizen journalism, sought to raise 
awareness of events happening in Iran to 
gain inside and outside support.339 
 
Rutzen and Zenn detailed that each group had what the ECtHR would consider a common goal. 
As they were Facebook groups, membership was voluntary (though individuals can be added 
to Facebook groups by others, they can also remove themselves). Finally, as Rutzen and Zenn 
note, the original creators ‘provided leadership and institutional structure to their 
organisations.’340 These would qualify as ‘associations’ not only under international law341 but 
also under the Article 11 ECHR. 
 
Regarding assembly, Rutzen and Zenn noted this is also covered online referring to online 
government petitions as an example.342 As noted above, the ECtHR has noted that assembly 
includes public and private meetings whether static or in the form of demonstrations. 
Therefore, physical proximity is not necessary as private static meetings could include Skype 
meetings,343 Whatsapp Group Chat,344 and public static meetings could include livestreaming 
conferences via Youtube.345  
 
To further add to this, it serves as a reminder that the UN and CoE have already maintained 
that rights available offline should be readily available online also. The Steering Committee in 
their guide (as recommended by the Committee of Ministers (CoM)346 to human rights for 
Internet users when referring to Article 11 noted that users have ‘the right to peacefully 
assemble and associate with others using the Internet.’347 They continued that this included 
‘forming, joining, mobilising and participating in societal groups and assemblies as well as in 
trade unions using Internet-based tools (author’s emphasis).’348 This includes signing of 
petitions (as Rutzen and Zenn mention above) to participate in a campaign or other forms of 
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civic action.349 Crucially, the Steering Committee noted that ‘user should have the freedom to 
choose the tools for the exercise of the rights such as websites, applications or other services 
(author’s emphasis).’350 This would, therefore, put in a whole ranges of services beyond those 
(Skype, Whatsapp and Youtube) mentioned above. Formal recognition of social groups, in line 
with Article 11 is not required, moreover, online protests are permissible subject to 
limitations.351 This overwhelmingly demonstrates how online association and assembly are 
protected under Article 11. What binds the online aspect of freedom of assembly and 
association, is the freedom of communication with others. Albeit briefly discussed above, 
Mataga noted that Article 11 has relationships with other Convention Rights.352 
 
(e) Interrelation between Article 11 and 8-10 
 
The relationship between Article 10 and 11 has been highlighted by the GC in United 
Communist Party of Turkey and others v Turkey that: 
 
[N]otwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 
must also be considered in the light of Article 10. The protection of opinions and the 
freedom to express them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of assembly and 
association as enshrined in Article 11… That applies all the more in relation to political 
parties.353  
 
Regarding the relationship with Article 9, the ECtHR has ruled Article 11 needs to be 
interpreted in light of Article 9 as it includes the freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest one’s religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance.354 Furthermore, in Young, James and Webster v United Kingdom the 
ECtHR ruled that ‘[t]he protection of personal opinion afforded by Articles 9 and 10…in the 
shape of freedom of thought, conscience and religion and of freedom of expression is also one 
of the purposes of freedom of association as guaranteed by Article 11 (art. 11).’355 Articles 9-
11 ‘are designed to protect the freedom to share and express opinions, and to try to persuade 
others to one's point of view, which are essential political freedoms in any democracy.’356 
 
The GC recognises that freedom of association is particularly important for persons belonging 
to minorities, including national and ethnic minorities, and that, as laid down in the preamble 
to the Council of Europe Framework Convention:  
 
[A] pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect the ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a national 
minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve and 
develop this identity. 357  
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Moreover, it was noted that ‘forming an association in order to express and promote its identity 
may be instrumental in helping a minority to preserve and uphold its rights.’358 This establishes 
a link between association and ethnic identity (mentioned above) in which a lack of respect is 
capable of impacting on the group’s sense of identity and the feelings of self-worth and self-
confidence of members of the group. This can be seen as affecting the private life of members 
of the group.359 
 
Both Golubovic360 and Mataga361 have noted the relationship between Article 11 and the aspect 
of ‘home’ in Article 8 when referring to Niemetz v Germany, due to it including business 
premises.362 Due to Article 8 being applicable to natural and legal persons,363 Mataga argues 
that ‘it would follow that business premises of an association also fall to be protected under 
Article 8 of the Convention.’364  
 
Regarding assembly, Valerie Aston notes that there is a ‘significant overlap between 
interference in privacy rights and those relating to the restriction of assembly.’365 In Sørensen 
and Rasmussen v Denmark the GC noted that personal autonomy ‘must therefore be seen as an 
essential corollary of the individual's freedom of choice implicit in Article 11 and confirmation 
of the importance of the negative aspect of that provision.’366 Autonomy non-exhaustively 
interlinks Articles 8-11 in more ways than one (see above). The interlinks become more 
apparent when considering association, assembly and data retention.  
 
 
(f) Data Retention and Freedom of Association and Assembly 
 
As Mataga has noted, ‘[a]n interference with the freedom of association will normally not be 
caused by the law itself…even though such a situation would also be conceivable, but rather 
by a decision…given in applying that law.’367 Interference could be established in both cases. 
First, following the Klass approach, that the mere existence of surveillance laws which can be 
applied to anyone interferes with Article 11. This is because retention of data that relates to 
association or assembly necessarily interferes with Article 11. As Bernal notes, the knowledge 
of the existence of surveillance can produce more conformist behaviour which would impact 
directly on the willingness to exercise the freedom of both assembly and association.368 Bernal 
further notes that this will increase due to the increasing interactions between technologies, 
geolocation and the Internet of Things (IoT).369 For Bernal, the power effect of gathering data 
and holding it impacts upon autonomy.370 Secondly, this is supported by the approach in 
Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v Sweden, the ECtHR has acknowledged that the storage of 
personal data related to affiliations and activities engages Article 11.371 Using the Klass and 
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Segerstedt approach, the mere existence of data retention laws and actual retention of 
association/assembly data therefore interferes with Article 11 and requires justification. This, 
of course, also relates to the data protection aspect of private and family life. 
 
So, the question becomes, what communications data could be classed as association/assembly 
data? There are a multitude of data, (given that association and assembly also applies online) 
for example, an email address or a phone number of a known association. This could also 
include web history which reveals a list of e.g. environmental association websites visited. The 
communications data from social media accounts that are used to spread protest messages and 
to boycott products is an example of communications data pertaining to online assembly. The 
time, duration, location of a Skype chat of a e.g. Greenpeace meeting. This leads on to a very 
specific type of communications data, location data.372 Bruce Schneier pointed out that 
‘location information is valuable, and everyone wants access to it.’373 Rozemarijn van der Hilst 
argued that location data could be considered ‘sensitive personal data’374 or ‘special category 
of personal data.’375 This is due to the fact that ‘[a]ggregated location data can reveal 
information about a person’s habits, (future) whereabouts (author’s emphasis).’376 This 
highlights not only that location data can reveal very intimate details, it can be used to make 
future predictions based on current data possessed.377 It can also reveal someone’s religion,378 
which would as noted above, engage Article 8, due to it being sensitive personal data, and 
Article 9 due to the storage of data which can make said religion identifiable. All in all, 
communications data (especially entity data) retention can reveal an entire life.379 Therefore 
the data can reveal, who is associated with who, who organised what, who demonstrate where 
and when. 
 
Another way to establish interference is by restriction. Mataga notes that ‘[m]easures 
restricting the right to freedom of association will usually fulfil’ the condition of 
interference.380 Regarding assembly, the ECtHR has noted that ‘interference with the right to 
freedom of assembly does not need to amount to an outright ban, legal or de facto, but can 
consist in various other measures taken by the authorities (author’s emphasis).’381 Restrictions 
can include both ‘measures taken before or during a gathering and those, such as punitive 
measures, taken afterwards.’382 It was noted that a ban could have a chilling effect on 
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participation and thus create interference.383 However, from a data retention perspective, a ban 
is not the important ingredient, it is the fact that the ECtHR acknowledges that a chilling effect 
can give rise to interferences with Article 11. van der Hilst has noted that the ‘blanket and 
indiscriminate retention of sensitive personal data over a longer period of time can have a 
severe ‘chilling effect’ (author’s emphasis).’ He continued that this may ‘reduce people’s 
willingness to participate in public life, which is a loss for the democratic functioning of 
society.’384 Jillian York has highlighted the link between harmful effects of surveillance on 
freedom of expression and association in that ‘metadata…and its wide-scale capture creates a 
chilling effect on speech and association (author’s emphasis).’385 There has been evidence386 
from a US perspective of surveillance causing chilling effects. The Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF), in a case against the NSA have also argued that the collection of phone 
records violates the US First Amendment as it discourages ‘members and constituents from 
associating and communicating with them for fear of being spied on.’387 Aston notes that the 
[t]he fear that information may be transferred as a result of surveillance activities is itself 
restrictive of autonomy, whether or not information is retained or disseminated in any 
particular case (author’s emphasis).’388  
 
In Gillan and Quinton the applicants argued that a laws existence could have an intimidatory 
and chilling effect on the exercise of those rights. The ECtHR left open the question of whether 
the mere existence of stop and search powers interfered with Article 10 and 11.389 Although 
the question concerned stop and search powers, the problem of chilling effects has been well 
documented throughout this Chapter, and therefore relevant in this context. The definition of 
serious crime for data retention purposes are undergoing amendments to comply with Tele2 
and Watson.390 Serious crime does have a definition in the IPA 2016 through s.263(1) in three 
parts. The third is pertinent to this discussion here in which serious crime is defined as conduct 
by a large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose. First, it must be noted that person 
is defined in s.81 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000) (and not in 
the IPA 2016) as including (therefore not limited to) ‘any organisation and any association or 
combination of persons.’ Therefore, it is made explicit by virtue of RIPA 2000, that being part 
of association in pursuit of a common purpose (which by definition is one of the ingredients of 
an association) could be regarded as serious criminals. The definition of serious crime equally 
applies to assembly. This is problematic because ‘common purpose’ is not defined.391 Any 
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meeting, any group chat, whether offline or online could, therefore, be caught if serious crime 
was added to the justifications of retention, and it is therefore, important to highlight that this 
mere possibility interferes with Article 11 irrespective of any chilling effect. Furthermore, if a 
group of persons with a common purpose satisfies the definition of serious crime, then it would 
not be unreasonable to conclude that this equally applies to regular crime (for which a retention 
notice currently can be issued) which can classify groups as two or more people.392  
 
Just as the CJEU noted in regards to freedom of expression, the retention of communications 
data would have an effect on the use of means of electronic communication and thus on the 
exercise of freedom of association and assembly. This would therefore, strike at the freedom 
of communication with others, whether this is to organise associations and assemblies offline 
or online. Online because the necessary communications data which can highlight associations 
or assemblies can be revealed, and offline because location data can reveal where an individual 
has been, disclosing sensitive/special personal data. It is for this reason, necessary to consider 
the possible implications for movement in physical space, which is protected under Article 2 
of Protocol 4. 
 
4.9 Article 2 of Protocol 4 ECHR 
 
Article 2(1) of Protocol 4 states that everyone lawfully within state territory shall have ‘have 
the right to liberty of movement.’ Article 2(3) Protocol 4 sets out that any restriction on this 
right, amongst other things must be in accordance with the law. The first instance of 
considering data retention on the possible implications on freedom of movement came from 
the Romanian Constitutional Court (RCC).393 The RCC acknowledged that data retention may 
affect ‘the exercise of the right to free movement.’394 The RCC continued that this was due to 
what was being required to be retained.395 When the RCC ruled national implementation of the 
DRD to be unconstitutional, one of the reasons behind this was due to the fact that Article 25 
of the Constitution (Freedom of Movement) had been breached as data retention would affect 
the exercise of said right. Similar arguments were raised by Digital Rights Ireland before High 
Court of Ireland (HCI)396 but was rejected because Digital Rights Ireland did not have standing 
as a company.397 The argument was that the:  
 
[T]racking and storing of the movements of any person carrying a mobile telephone 
amounts to an interference with the…right to travel …insofar as it establishes a system 
of state-mandated surveillance of the movements of the overwhelming majority of the 
population.398 
 
Although Digital Rights Ireland’s point was rejected, the HCI left it open the issue open to 
natural persons as it was acknowledged that there was a ‘greater force in the argument that 
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there is a right to confidential travel within the State’ but could be circumscribed in the interests 
of preventing crime.399 Movements and activities, offline and on are now leaving a ‘footprint’ 
in the form of traffic data which synthesize the puzzle of our everyday movements.400 Data 
retention symbolises the ‘disappearance of disappearance’ putting freedom of movement in 
jeopardy,401 because it ties in with autonomy.402 As Mitrou points out, this is anchored in 
Article 2 Protocol 4 because it concerns the right to move without being traced.403  
 
From an ECHR perspective, it is important to note the case of Shimovolos v Russia.404 The case 
concerned the applicant having their name stored on a ‘Surveillance Database.’ Whenever a 
person on this database decided to travel, the Department of Transport would be notified.405 
The ECtHR noted that the Surveillance Database which allowed the collection of the 
applicant’s movements within Russia interfered with their private life,406 and violated it 
(author’s emphasis).407 What is of importance here is that once the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 8, they, of their own motion (likely through Rule A1(1)),408 asked whether having the 
applicant’s name in the Surveillance Database violated Article 2 Protocol 4.409 The ECtHR 
concluded that based on a finding of violation of Article 8, although the point was admissible, 
no separate issue arose under Article 2 Protocol 4.410 This acknowledges the interplay between 
Article 8 and Article 2 Protocol 4, in which either or both may be examined depending on the 
circumstances of the case.411 This, therefore, highlights that the ECtHR are prepared to accept 
that storing data on movements may engage Article 2 Protocol 4, which would fall in line with 
the RCC. 
 
To strengthen the engagement of Article 2 Protocol 4, location data will be considered. 
Blumberg and Eckersley regard locational privacy as ‘the ability of an individual to move in 
public space with the expectation that under normal circumstances their location will not be 
systematically and secretly recorded for later use (author’s emphasis).’412 However, the ECtHR 
in Uzun v Germany413 distinguished GPS surveillance from visual and acoustical surveillance 
because the latter ‘disclose[s] more information on a person's conduct, opinions or feelings.’ It 
is contended that the ECtHR are mistaken in this context. As noted before Dr Alex Pentland 
highlighted that just ‘by watching where you spend time, I can say a lot about the music you 
like, the car you drive, your financial risk, your risk for diabetes.’414 Furthermore, it was already 
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noted that location data can reveal a person’s religion and Blumberg and Eckersley has noted 
how location databases can reveal very sensitive information.415 The then (and first) Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, noted that surveillance impacts upon various rights 
including freedom of movement because they all require ‘privacy to be able to develop 
effectively.’416 Scheinin continued that freedom of movement is substantially affected by 
surveillance because the ‘creation of secret watch lists, excessive data collection and sharing 
and imposition of intrusive scanning devices or biometrics, all create extra barriers to mobility 
(author’s emphasis).’417 
 
It becomes clear that data retention interferes with freedom of movement that is protected by 
Article 2 Protocol 4. There is, however, a caveat, with regards to the UK. The UK signed 
Article 2 Protocol 4 on 16 September 1963, but did not ratify it. Therefore, the ECtHR would 
not have jurisdiction to consider it.418 However, ratification is not necessary for it will be 
sufficient  ‘that the relevant international instruments denote a continuous evolution in the 
norms and principles applied in international law.’419 There are many international law 
principles governing freedom of movement, from the Article 13 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and  Directive 2004/38/EC. This allows Article 2 Protocol 4 to be applied to rights 
that have been ratified and can be enforced in the UK indirectly.420 It has already been noted 
that Article 2 Protocol 4 interlinks with Article 8 in terms of data retention. Freedom of 
movement has also been linked with Articles 9,421 11422 and 10.423 It has already been 
established that data retention interferes with each of these Convention Rights which only 
serves to strengthen their links with Article 2 Protocol 4. The European Parliament’s 
Directorate General noted that the digital applications of freedom of movement and the right 
to counsel has not been sufficiently explored.424 The latter point is important considering that 
Martin Scheinin highlighted that surveillance can have an impact on due process rights,425 and 
for that reason it is necessary to consider Article 6. 
  
4.10 Article 6 ECHR 
 
(a) Relevant Provisions of Article 6 
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It has highlighted that ‘the respect for private correspondence under Article 8 relate either 
directly or indirectly to the right to a fair trial.’426The relevant provisions of Article 6 in relation 
to data retention are Article 6(1), (2) and 3(c) which respectively provide for in the 
determination of one’s civil rights and obligations or any criminal charge against them, 
everyone is entitled to a fair trial, presumption of innocence and the right to effective legal 
assistance. This is loosely similar to Article’s 47/8 of the CFR. 
 
(b) Does Surveillance Engage Article 6? 
 
The question of whether surveillance engages Article 6 was first dealt with in Klass, in which 
the ECtHR ruled even if it were, it was not violated.427 The reasoning was that due to the very 
secretive nature of surveillance i.e. subject not knowing, they were incapable of initiating a 
priori judicial control, which, therefore, escapes the requirements of Article 6.428 However, in 
Kennedy v UK, the ECtHR were reluctant to answer the question as to whether Article 6 applies 
to surveillance measures, instead acting on the assumption that it did based on the IPT’s 
reasoning of what constitutes a civil right, which did not in fact violate Article 6.429 This has 
been severely criticised by JUSTICE for departing from Klass as Article 6 ‘can only be 
[engaged] once a person has been notified of a surveillance decision that the requirements of a 
fair hearing come into play.’430 Grace has suggested that engaging and interfering with Article 
8 ‘ensures that the requirement of the determination of the civil rights of the 'subject' is met in 
terms of subsequently engaging Article 6.’431 This, therefore, proceeds on the assumption that 
surveillance measures such as data retention engages Article 6, in which the two other 
requirements, presumption of innocence and the right to effective legal assistance will need to 
be considered. 
 
(c) Data Retention and the Presumption of Innocence: Rethinking ‘Criminal Charge’? 
 
The presumption of innocence is one of the fundamental principles governing criminal law 
procedure and is included in all the most important international documents of human rights.432 
The first linking of presumption of innocence and data retention (concerning DNA and 
fingerprint data) came from the GC in S and Marper v UK. The GC noted that it:  
 
[I]s true that the retention of the applicants’ private data cannot be equated with the 
voicing of suspicions. Nonetheless, their perception that they are not being treated as 
innocent is heightened by the fact that their data are retained indefinitely in the same 
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way as the data of convicted persons, while the data of those who have never been 
suspected of an offence are required to be destroyed (author’s emphasis).433 
 
The risk of stigmatisation434 highlights that the GC had concerns with the retention of data 
(albeit indefinite) of those who were only ever suspected and never convicted, a presumption 
of guilt.435 Additionally, crucially, it highlights that those who were never suspected, their data 
has to be destroyed. From a communications data retention perspective, however, this is not 
the case as it marked a swing from a post-crime to a pre-crime society, based on risk 
assessment, suspicion and pre-emption.436 As Mariuca Morariu notes, it is this ‘preemptive 
action where condemnation occurs first before the search for proof commences…that inflicts 
heavy losses on civil liberties.437  
 
This was highlighted by the RCC where they noted that data retention applies to all, regardless 
of whether they have committed crimes or not or whether they are the subject of an 
investigation or not. For the RCC, this would likely to overturn the presumption of innocence 
and to transform a priori all users of electronic communications technology into people 
susceptible of committing terrorism crimes or other serious crimes.438 
 
The CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland and in Tele2 and Watson also picked up on the fact that 
the DRD did not require any relationship between the data whose retention is provided for and 
a threat to public security.439 However, for the presumption of innocence to apply, an individual 
has to be ‘charged’ with a ‘criminal offence.’ The terms ‘criminal charge’ and ‘charged with a 
criminal offence’ in Articles 6(1) and (2) respectively have the same meaning.440 Under Article 
6 ‘criminal charge’ has an autonomous meaning and not confined to national categorisations.441 
A ‘charge’ could be defined as the ‘official notification given to an individual by the competent 
authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence’ or whether ‘the situation 
of the [suspect] has been substantially affected.’442 Regarding the ‘criminal’ aspect of Article 
6, the ECtHR has developed certain criteria to assess applicability based upon: 
 
1. classification in domestic law;  
2. nature of the offence; and 
3. severity of the penalty that the person concerned risks incurring.443 
  
Therefore, the question becomes, would data retention trigger the ‘criminal charge’ aspect of 
Article 6(2) for the presumption of innocence to apply? Thomas and Geert take the restrictive 
view that the presumption of innocence applies only as a procedural safeguard once a specific 
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crime has been attributed to an individual.444 However, Alwin Van Dijk has argued that ‘any 
act that might convey to a reasonable actor that he is not presumed innocent of a punishable 
offence constitutes a [presumption of innocence] interference (author’s emphasis).’445 
Importantly, Alwin Van Dijk gives the example of wire-tapping as an example of presumption 
of innocence interference.446 Jonida Milaj and Jeanne Pia Mifsud Bonnici, however, note that 
ECtHR jurisprudence cannot meet the extensive requirement of Van Dijk because the 
application of presumption of innocence is ‘linked with a specific criminal proceeding’ and 
thus would not apply to individuals whom mass surveillance treats as general suspects.447   
 
Despite this, Milaj and Bonnici contend that mass surveillance undermines the operation of the 
principle as a procedural safeguard through the stages of a criminal process.448 Milaj and 
Bonnici refer to the European Parliament’s recognition of the relationship between mass 
surveillance and the presumption of innocence.449 It is important to note that the European 
Parliament were aware that these surveillance programmes were another step ‘towards the 
establishment of a fully-fledged preventive state…often not in line with… the presumption of 
innocence.’450 As Antonella Galetta states, the criminal justice process usually consists of 
several consequent states from the presumption of innocence to investigation, evidence 
collection, charge, trial, guilty verdict and punishment.451 The, preventative state, however, is 
the antithesis of this. We are not quite in Minority Report territory yet, but the foundations for 
it are being laid out.  
 
Katerina Hadjimatheou has articulated on several occasions that surveillance does not 
necessarily undermine the presumption of innocence452 and the ‘least costly morally and most 
efficient when used as a means of enforcing the rules of a specific activity or institution.’453 
But this line of reasoning would forego any need to deduce grounds of suspicion454 and does 
not fully consider the chilling effect it creates irrespective of the legality and morality of 
behaviour, nor the lack of specificity of activities that ‘justify’ surveillance. Further, it does not 
consider that some forms of untargeted surveillance are just as if not more intrusive than 
targeted surveillance.455 Moreover, Milaj and Bonnici highlight several reasons why mass 
surveillance (which is relevant to data retention)456 threatens the presumption of innocence 
because: 
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1. mass surveillance places significant personal information in the hands of authorities, in 
which the individual is unaware,  
2. information could be gathered when an individual was not a suspect and subsequently 
used against them potentially making it un-rebuttable, 
3. this leads to a de facto overturning the burden of proof457 during the stages of a criminal 
process from the accuser to the accused; 
4. due to the lack of transparency and the information asymmetry between the accuser and 
the accused, the presumption of innocence can no longer serve anymore as a procedural 
safeguard for the individual in the mass surveillance era.458  
 
Antonella Galetta adds to this by noting that pre-crime surveillance creates distrust between 
citizen and the state,459 though Katerina Hadjimatheou believes there is a lack of evidence 
supporting this.460 But this trust is implicitly linked with the chilling effect of the exercise of 
rights, which has been well evidenced. Galetta not only highlights the link between the 
presumption of innocence and the reputational aspect of Article 8, but the dual dimension of 
Article 6(2), the legal and moral presumption of innocence.461 Galetta uses S and Marper and 
the risk of stigmatation the ECtHR elucidated to as a basis to argue that the ECtHR ‘recognises 
that the presumption of innocence does not only give rise to a human right but also to a moral 
value that should be safeguarded.’462 Galetta concludes a clear stance from the ECtHR 
expanding the scope of presumption of innocence is desirable as this would keep pace with 
society as the ‘law must mirror societal developments and provide answers to social needs.’463 
Galetta makes note of the ‘[l]iving law’ as the highest expression of the synthesis between law 
and society.’464Such a position is entirely feasible considering that the ECHR is  ‘living 
instrument’ in which it must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.’465  
 
Additionally, a criminal charge under Article 6(2) could be engaged by the substantial effect it 
has on an individual. Throughout this Chapter, it has been noted how data retention not only 
interferes with but chills the exercise of fundamental rights. Furthermore, in Barry v Ireland 
the ECtHR concluded that once a search warrant had been issued and executed on the 
applicant’s premises, it amounted to a charge within the meaning of Article 6.466 In Romanova 
v Russia the ECtHR considered the possibility of searches and secret surveillance substantially 
affecting the applicant (thus amounting to a charge) and only declined to do so because neither 
party made submissions on that matter.467 This implies that secret surveillance can also 
substantially affect someone within the meaning of Article 6(2). Data retention has been 
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likened to ‘fishing’468 exercises which is designed to bring in information,469 similar to a search. 
Moreover, data retention is a form of secret surveillance,470 and due to the fact that one’s 
property and devices within it will in future likely to be connected to the Internet via the Internet 
of Things (IoT),471 any retention of data substantially affects the individual involved for the 
purposes of Article 6(2). Therefore, taking into account the GC’s concern in S and Marper, the 
RCC assertion regarding data retention, the CJEU acknowledging data retention not 
distinguishing between suspects, the arguments made by Milaj, Bonnici, Galetta, the position 
on substantially affected person and the ECHR being a ‘living instrument,’ it is in the author’s 
opinion that data retention does trigger Article 6(2) and therefore the presumption of innocence 
should apply. The presumption of innocence has been closely linked with the right to not 
incriminate oneself.472 
 
(d) Self Incrimination 
 
Chapter 6 discusses whom the obligation to retain can be imposed on. It will be demonstrated 
that this can include ‘home grown’473 communications data as well as commercial.  Conrad 
Fischer notes that when communications data in the systems of end users i.e. Skype, private 
mail servers are regarded as legal communications data, therefore eligible for retention, the 
inevitably of privilege against self-incrimination applies.474 In Saunders v UK, the ECtHR 
noted that the right to not incriminate oneself is primarily concerned with respecting the will 
of an accused to remain silent but does not extend to compulsory powers such as measures 
issued by warrants, breath and blood samples etc.475 Fischer notes that self-incrimination only 
applies to the active cooperation of the accused in which he notes that ‘an obligation to retain 
and disclose home grown private traffic data as a form of forced active cooperation.’476 As 
Smith noted, customers or other third parties could be obliged to generate data to be retained.477 
 
Furthermore, the previous Chapter noted that passwords are a type of communications data. In 
S & Anor, R the English and Welsh Court of Appeal (CoA) acknowledged that privilege against 
self-incrimination may be engaged by a requirement of disclosure of knowledge of the means 
of access to protected data under compulsion of law.478 The fact that passwords amount to 
communications data for retention discloses them.  
 
Self-incrimination also raises issues with regards to neurotechnologies (mentioned above) 
because as Ienca and Andorno note, it becomes a question of: 
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[W]hether the mere record of thoughts and memories without any coerced oral 
testimony or declaration is evidence that can be legally compelled, or whether this 
practice necessarily requires the ‘will of the suspect’ and therefore constitutes a breach 
of the privilege against forced self-incrimination.479  
 
There is a risk that people may be protected against self-incriminatory statements, but not their 
thoughts480 a ‘self-incrimination may now occur silently just as aloud (author’s emphasis).’481 
 
(e) Effective Legal Assistance 
 
Bernal notes that surveillance can interfere with the legal process in many ways, one of which 
is the interference with the lawyer’s correspondence with their clients.482 A person must be 
able to, without constraint, consult a lawyer whose profession involves giving independent 
legal advice to all who need it. 483 This demonstrates the link with the correspondence aspect 
Article 8.484 The ECtHR has noted that the accused’s rights to communicate with his advocate 
out of hearing of a third person is part of the basic requirements of a fair trial in a democratic 
society and follows from Article 6(3)(c). Moreover, if a lawyer is unable to confer with his 
client and receive confidential instructions from him without surveillance, his assistance loses 
much of its usefulness whereas the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are practical 
and effective.485 Any limitation on relations between clients and lawyers, whether inherent or 
express, should not thwart the effective legal assistance to which a defendant is entitled.486 
Additionally, any interference with privileged material ‘should be exceptional, be justified by 
a pressing need and will always be subjected to the strictest scrutiny (author’s emphasis).’487 
 
From a UK perspective, in Re McE,488 the House of Lords discussed legal professional 
privilege (LPP), surveillance and Article 6(3)(c). When referring to ECtHR case law, Lord 
Carswell noted ‘the effect of the supervision, not the supervision in itself, which brought about 
the breach’489 of Article 6. Lord Neuberger highlighted that: 
 
[I]t is self-evident that knowing that a consultation or the communication may be the 
subject of surveillance could have a chilling effect on the openness which should 
govern communications between lawyer and client.490 
 
The Law Society and the Bar Council (the professional bodies representing barristers and 
solicitors in England and Wales) raised concerns about data retention and LPP.491 They note 
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that the problem with bulk communications data retention is that it does not prevent LLP data 
from entering the ‘pool’ in the first place,492 something which the Council of Bars and Law 
Societies of Europe (CCBE)493 and the CJEU highlighted.494 The Law Society and Bar Council 
considered that ‘new legislation should prevent an obligation being placed on service providers 
to retain data relating to communications to or from users known to be professional legal 
advisers (author’s emphasis).’495 This was also the position of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in 
Tele2 and Watson.496 Jessica Sobey notes that ‘[k]nowing who a lawyer contacts, when the 
contact was made and even where the point of contact was in geographical terms at the time, 
can be enough to represent a material breach of privilege.’497 Thus, this could have the chilling 
effect Lord Neuberger highlighted, not only undermining Article 6(3)(c), but also Article 
6(1),498 correspondence under Article 8, but also the professional aspect of private life, and 
ultimately striking at the freedom of communication between lawyer and client. The pertinent 
points of failing to discriminate data retention practices leads to the final Convention Right for 
consideration, Article 14.  
 
4.11 Article 14 ECHR 
 
Article 14 sets out that: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status. 
 
Unlike Article 1 Protocol 12,499 Article 14 is not freestanding,500 therefore, having no 
independent existence.501 For this reason it has been regarded as odd,502 parasitic,503 Cinderella-
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esque,504 and weak.505 However, when the ECtHR has noted that when Article 14 is considered 
to have a fundamental aspect to the case, it will be considered,506 even where there has been no 
violation of the substantive right.507 Article 14 requires there to be a difference in treatment of 
persons in analogous, or relevantly similar, situation, it need not be identical.508 For the ECtHR, 
‘the principle of non-discrimination between individuals as regards their enjoyment of public 
freedoms, which is one of the fundamental principles of democracy (author’s emphasis).’509 
 
Due to the indiscriminate nature of data retention, it is difficult to rely on anything within 
Article 14 other than ‘other status,’ which is described as personal status.510 This has often been 
interpreted ‘very widely’ be the ECtHR and would seem ‘that almost any distinction within the 
ambit of a Convention right can trigger an Art 14 inquiry.’511 Data retention raises indirect 
discrimination aspects of Article 14. The GC in D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic512 noted 
that:  
 
[A] difference in treatment may take the form of disproportionately prejudicial effects 
of a general policy or measure which, though couched in neutral terms, discriminates 
against a group…may amount to “indirect discrimination”, which does not necessarily 
require a discriminatory intent. 
 
On the specifics of DNA data retention, Sedley LJ in the CoA considered Article 14 in the 
aspect of indirect discrimination.513 Sedley LJ noted that central to ‘indirect discrimination is 
the ostensibly neutral factor which on analysis significantly and unjustifiably disadvantages a 
protected group (author’s emphasis).’514 Sedley LJ continued that ‘[t]o take as your pool simply 
the group which asserts that it is being discriminated against and to find – as you practically 
always will – that they are all being treated the same is to defeat the rationale of indirect 
discrimination (author’s emphasis).’515 Sedley LJ concluded that the legal issue is one of 
‘discrimination between legally innocent people who respectively have and have not been 
investigated.’516 Although on appeal to the House of Lords (HoL) in which Lord Steyn rejected 
Sedley LJ’s position,517 it was noted that ‘there is a material distinction between individuals 
who have had their fingerprints and samples lawfully taken in consequence of being charged 
with a recordable offence and those who have not (author’s emphasis).’518 The GC in S and 
Marper, unfortunately declined to express a view after finding a violation of Article 8.519 
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However, in RJM, in Lord Walker’s leading judgment, noting there are two types of ‘personal 
characteristics,’ i.e. personal/other status, those that are intimate, and importantly those that 
‘are more concerned with what people do, or with what happens to them (author’s 
emphasis).’520 It is this idea of what people do and what is done to them which would make 
having ones data retained subject to the application of ‘other status.’ The status of being 
presumed innocent, and more importantly, not under any suspicion of wrong doing. This would 
of course be somewhat consistent with the ECtHR’s position of not confining other status to 
the ‘sense of being immutable or innate to the person.’521 Therefore, for the purposes of 
communications data retention, it has been noted throughout this Chapter that Articles 6, 8-11 
and Article 2 Protocol 4 apply, similarly Article 14 would therefore be applicable.  
 
Data retention fails to discriminate between suspects and non-suspects, the legal profession 
and journalism etc. In Thlimmenos v Greece522 the GC found that refusing to admit an 
individual to a profession because of a criminal conviction amounted to a violation of Article 
14 in conjunction with Article 9 where that conviction was due to conscientious objection. 
Importantly, the GC noted that: 
 
The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under 
the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable 
justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different 
(author’s emphasis).523  
 
This is why Article 14 becomes fundamental to the aspect of communications data retention. 
Data retention as currently envisioned does not distinguish between suspects and non-suspects, 
it does not take into consideration parts of society whose communications data require special 
protection. AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 and Watson thought it desirable that data such as 
those subject to LLP or which makes it possible to identify journalist source should be excluded 
from data retention obligations.524  
 
There is also an issue regarding Big Data retention.525 There is a clear bias in Big Data to be 
retained as could be based on what telecommunications are obligated to generate for law 
enforcement (due to ethnic profiling,526 which can intensify ethnic profiling)527 or inherent 
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within the operations of the telecommunications operators.528 Biases529 based on race,530 (a 
point the ECtHR has previously acknowledged)531 gender and socio-economic background532 
would all fall under the ambit of Article 14. This relates to what Lyon describes surveillance 
as ‘social sorting.’ He continues that it ‘classifies and categorizes relentlessly, on the basis of 
various – clear or occluded – criteria’ and [i]t is often, but not always, accomplished by means 
of remote networked databases whose algorithms enable digital discrimination to take 
place.’533 Such surveillance can create a chilling effect on the freedom of expression of ordinary 
citizens and a wide range of vulnerable groups.534 Penney’s research has suggested that women 
and younger people are more likely to be chilled and are less likely to take steps to defend 
themselves from regulatory actions and threats.535 It has also been statistically demonstrated 
that Muslim-American’s change their behaviour due to government surveillance fears.536 This 
also demonstrates that ‘other status’ need not be solely relied upon in this regard as Article 14 
covers amongst other things as race, colour, sex and religion. 
 
What is also important in regards to ‘other status’ is that the GC acknowledges that one’s place 
of residence constitutes an aspect of personal status for the purposes of Article 14.537 Article 
14 can also be linked with Article 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4 in that discrimination deters 
and inhibits self-fulfilment as it will prevent ‘people from expressing themselves freely due to 
the fear of how others or society will react.’538 This is particularly true in the surveillance 
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context as being forced to disclose information poses a ‘threat to self-fulfilment because it 
enables discrimination.’539 
 
4.12 Conclusions: Article 8 underpinning democracy 
 
This Chapter has highlighted the various ways in which communications data retention 
interferes with or chills the exercise of various Convention Rights. The starting point was 
consideration for the most obvious right in question, Article 8 and the various ways in which 
data retention interfered with this right. Just as van der Hilst noted ‘it became apparent that the 
right to respect for private life, besides having a value on its own, is of instrumental importance 
to the fulfilment of other rights (author’s emphasis).’540 The former Independent Reviewer of 
terrorism legislation David Anderson Q.C., shared a similar view.541 Wachter echoes what has 
been argued in this Chapter, that privacy and Article 8 is a necessary precondition for self-
development, personal fulfilment and the free enjoyment of fundamental human rights. 542 
Wachter continues that Article 8 promotes tolerance, equality and informational self-
determination to fight discrimination, and is essential (but not limited to) for the exercise of 
Article 9-11 rights. 543 This is exacerbated by digital technologies which communications data 
collection and storage threaten not only Article 8, but 9-11,544 6, 14 and Article 2 Protocol 4.  
 
Not only the private life aspect of Article 8, but family life, correspondence become relevant. 
It has already been seen that privacy and therefore Article 8 is not just an individual value, but 
a societal one, and ultimately one for democracy. Scheinin has noted that ‘[t]he right to privacy 
is therefore not only a fundamental human right, but also a human right that supports other 
human rights and forms the basis of any democratic society.’545 There can be no democracy 
without pluralism,546 and this Chapter has demonstrated how Article 8 necessitates and 
underpins all of the rights that promote it. For this reason, Wachter strongly argues that privacy 
must be elevated above other human rights because ‘it is the basis for personal development 
and fulfilment and due to its position as an underlying, enabling requirement for the realisation 
of other human rights.’547 In the context of digital technologies, this is certainly within the 
power of the ECtHR by interpreting the ECHR as a living instrument548 in creative ways.549 
 
The position of Article 8 being a pillar of democracy is also highlighted by the ECtHR where 
it was noted in Gorzelik and Others.550The ECtHR’s role in the promotion of democracy has 
been noted,551 and with that, to promote democracy, the ECtHR must ensure that chilling 
effects are minimised as: 
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The value of protecting against chilling effects is not measured simply by focusing on 
the particular individuals who are deterred from exercising their rights. Chilling effects 
harm society because, among other things, they reduce the range of viewpoints 
expressed and the degree of freedom with which to engage in political activity.552 
 
For this reason, surveillance programmes (including data retention) cannot be reduced to 
questions of privacy or data protection v security, but have to be framed in terms of collective 
freedoms and democracy. 553 This, will ultimately lead to the question of what nature, scale and 
depth of surveillance can be tolerated in and between democracies?554 Throughout this Chapter, 
it has been argued that data retention is synonymous with surveillance, the next Chapter will 
explain why data retention is surveillance.
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Chapter 5: Communications Data Retention as Mass Secret Surveillance 
within Surveillance? 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
One of the major battle grounds of the data retention debate focusses on whether data retention 
is surveillance or not, this Chapter seeks to clarify the debate. In this Chapter I will not only 
argue that data retention is a form of mass secret surveillance (considering past and 
contemporary measures) by highlighting that Lyon’s definition1 may no longer be adequate. It 
will also be argued that surveillance should not be normalised whilst also demonstrating that 
data retention has striking similarities with the Panopticon.2 In addition to the Panopticon, I 
will demonstrate that data retention is also Panspectric3 and would actually be classified as 
surveillance under national and European law. Finally, in this Chapter I highlight that although 
the Panopticon is usually associated with State power, it will be demonstrated that the State 
and private entities work in synergy in which the State allows or mandates them to conduct 
surveillance for which it can utilise. Hence data retention is also mass secret surveillance within 
surveillance. This will strengthen the argument made in Chapter 3 that the same strict 
safeguards for interception and secret surveillance should equally apply to data retention. 
 
In 2001, during the debate on Clause 102 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill4 
regarding a provision for mandatory retention of communications data, both Lord Phillips5 and 
Earl of Northesk6 discussed the extent of mass surveillance. Lord Thomas Gresford 
acknowledged the potential for surveillance ‘of every member of the community who uses a 
mobile telephone or e-mail’7 and Elizabeth France, the then Data Protection Commissioner 
noted that this would amount to disproportionate general surveillance of communications.8 
 
Lord Rooker, however, disagreed believing that the very idea was ‘extravagant in the 
extreme.’9 Over a decade later similar sentiments were echoed during the debates on what 
would soon to be the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016), by the opposition10 and 
Government.11  
 
(a) An Overview  
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In the joined cases C‑203/15 and C‑698/15 (Tele2 and Watson),12 Advocate General (AG) 
Saugmandsgaard Øe noted similarities between communications data retention and 
interception. Particularly, the AG made reference to the fact that ‘a general data retention 
obligation will facilitate equally serious interference as targeted surveillance measures, 
including those which intercept the content of communications (author’s emphasis).’13 The 
AG, did not go so far as referring to data retention as mass surveillance,14 instead regarding it 
as mass interference affecting a substantial part, if not all of the relevant population.15 In 
regards to interception, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has on more than one 
occasion observed such a measure as secret surveillance.16 Although the ECtHR has not yet 
defined what secret surveillance measures are, it, however, established a link between data 
retention and surveillance. The contention is that if interception and data retention pose similar 
levels of interference with fundamental rights (as Chapter 3 demonstrated), and the former 
being considered a measure of secret surveillance, it will be argued that the latter should also 
be regarded as secret surveillance. However, before such considerations, it is important to 
reflect upon previous iterations of data retention. 
 
5.2 Data retention prior to the digital age 
 
The retention of data, is not, however, a new technique made possible because of the advances 
in technology. Technology has only created a new way to retain and disseminate data. Higgs 
considers data retention from the period of 1500 to 2000 in England. Higgs argues that one of 
the main features of a modern Western state which sets it apart from its previous political 
formations is the central collection and analysis of information, especially that of individuals.17 
Higgs notes that in general terms information is held on citizens in Britain by the modern 
central state for a limited number of functions such as ‘the extraction of taxes; the provision of 
welfare; the prevention of crime; the general identification of citizens and state employees; and 
the protection of property rights.’18 Higgs highlights that what is striking about this list is that 
such activities were not unknown to pre-modern England nor were they carried out in complete 
isolation from the central state.19  
 
Higgs points out that it was in the twentieth century that ‘the citizen body and intellectuals 
began to grow uneasy at the nature of information gathering by central government, and its 
perceived threat to civil liberties.’20 One of such reasons was the impact of new technologies 
of information handling.21 Higgs highlights that the database has made access to personal 
information and its integration much easier.22 Developed by Herman Hollerith in 1890, and 
introduced into the British census in 1911, Higgs highlighted the dangers of databases as it was 
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utilised by the Nazi Germany to organise the Holocaust.23 Higgs continues with the 
development of ‘electronic means of data storage and analysis after the Second World War’ 
which  ‘allowed these databases to be easily integrated.’24  
 
Higgs regards this period as when the British Information State came of age.25 Fingerprints 
were one of the pieces of information made available from the Police National Computer 
(PNC). Throughout his article, Higgs refers to storage, collection and databases of information 
as surveillance. This Chapter explains why his position is correct. The case S and Marper v 
United Kingdom26 concerned the indiscriminate retention of DNA and fingerprints, and ruled 
such activities as incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR.27 Brown draws an analogy with 
DNA/fingerprint retention and communications data retention,28 because as Brown notes, the 
ECtHR is not just concerned with the use of data, but its retention. Taking into account Higgs, 
this begins to highlight that communications data should be considered a form of surveillance. 
Therefore, it is important to consider just what is regarded as surveillance by experts. 
 
5.3 Surveillance theories and its relationship with data retention 
 
(a) What is Surveillance? Why Lyon’s definition may no longer be adequate  
 
Surveillance is said to be rooted in the French verb surveiller translating to ‘watch over.’29 
David Lyon, a prominent figure30 in the discussion on surveillance studies, viewed surveillance 
as ‘the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, 
management, protection or direction.31 The Oxford dictionary defines it as the close 
observation, especially of a suspected spy or criminal.32 According to Lyon, surveillance is 
focussed when it is orientated towards an individual even when aggregate data may be used in 
the process. Furthermore, surveillance is systematic when it is intentional, deliberate, and 
depending on certain protocols and techniques; when it does not happen randomly or 
spontaneously. Lyon elaborated that surveillance happens when data collection becomes 
routine. In “societies that depend on bureaucratic administration” based on information 
technology it occurs as a “normal” part of everyday life. Usually, surveillance results in power 
relations, in which the “watchers are privileged.”33  
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Lyon does not determine what ‘attention’ means in the surveillance context, nor does he 
consider by whom or what ‘focus’ is attached to.34 Without considering the purposes of said 
surveillance, this definition, it is contended, does not fully appreciate the significance of the 
retention of communications data as the definition begins with surveillance being focused on 
individuals. This would therefore disqualify data retention (or CCTV for example) from the 
ambit of Lyon’s definition, even if it satisfied the other requirements of systematic and routine. 
As noted earlier, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 and Watson and various UK Lords during 
the passage of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill35 noted how data retention could 
affect substantial segments of the population. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in the case C-293/12 (Digital Rights Ireland) noted how Directive 2006/24 (Data 
Retention Directive, DRD) covered all subscribers and registered users and therefore entailed 
an interference with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European population 
(author’s emphasis).36 The CJEU went further and elaborated that the DRD covered: 
 
…in a generalised manner, all persons and all means of electronic communication as 
well as all traffic data without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made 
in the light of the objective of fighting against serious crime (author’s emphasis).37  
 
Secondly, Lyon refers to surveillance as being systematic i.e. intentional, deliberate and does 
not happen randomly or spontaneously. Although data retention can be ordered, say in a 
retention notice, which is by definition deliberate, the effects of said notice cannot be said to 
be anything but spontaneous. Having one’s data retained is entirely dependent upon the 
telecommunications operator they use. Section 1(5) of the Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014) noted that retention notices must not exceed 12 months. The 
DRD allowed data to be retained for between 6 to 24 months. The CJEU in Digital Rights 
Ireland critiqued this as permitting retention ‘without any distinction being made between the 
categories of data…on the basis of their possible usefulness… or according to the persons 
concerned.’38 DRIPA 2014 made no such distinction between categories of data to be retained, 
nor does the IPA 2016 and therefore would affect individuals solely based on the service they 
used. This would also affect those who may not use a service that is subject to a retention notice 
because the fact that they are the receiver of information subjects them to being passive subjects 
of retention.39 This indicates the randomness as to the effects of data retention. The CJEU in 
Tele2 and Watson has now outlawed general and indiscriminate data retention.40 The CJEU 
further qualified data retention by holding that the categories of data to be retained, the means 
of communication affected, the persons concerned and the retention period adopted should be 
limited to what is strictly necessary.41 However, the CJEU did permit retention on the basis 
which makes it possible to identify a public,42 which could argued to be ‘focussed.’ But in the 
same vein, this identifiable public criterion is not based on individual suspicion,43 and therefore 
it is submitted that this does not truly reflect the focussed nature of surveillance powers. The 
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AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 and Watson noted a disadvantage of data retention is ‘the 
fact that the vast majority of the data retained will relate to persons who will never be 
connected in any way with serious crime (author’s emphasis).’44 Unless data retention, or more 
correctly, data preservation45 is based and used upon reasonable suspicion46 surveillance in this 
context can never truly be focussed. 
 
Thirdly, Lyon’s definition refers to surveillance as being routine. This would only be relevant 
insofar as data retention continuously or routinely affects the fundamental rights of those 
concerned, not to the fact that a retention notice, for example, need only be issued once a year 
and therefore, not on a day-to-day basis. Regarding attention, Lyon did not specify whether 
this meant man or machine attention, if it is the former, then again, data retention would be 
disqualified because no human attention is required for the actual retention of data. If, however, 
attention does not require human intervention, this still would not qualify data retention as 
surveillance because it is not focussed on individuals. Finally, Lyon’s definition of surveillance 
is silent on information being stored, and only refers to day-to-day collection without 
elaborating from whose perspective, the watcher or the watched. It is therefore important to 
consider other ideas of surveillance as Lyon’s definition may no longer adequate for some 
modern forms of surveillance, such as data retention.  
 
Lyon himself, accepts that there are exceptions to his definition, giving the example of police 
general surveillance, in the form of a ‘dragnet.’47 Lyon suggests these exceptions are important 
as they add nuance to understanding the bigger picture.48 Indeed, these types of surveillance 
are of vital importance in understanding it, but it will be argued that such measures of 
surveillance should not be regarded as ‘exceptions.’ 
 
Moreover, Fuchs regards Lyon’s surveillance studies as being ambivalent in character, in that 
he adopts both neutral and negative connotations of surveillance.49 Fuchs defines neutral 
concepts of surveillance making one or more assumptions: 
 
1. There are positive aspects of surveillance.  
2. Surveillance has two faces, it is enabling and constraining.  
3. Surveillance is a fundamental aspect of all societies.  
4. Surveillance is necessary for organization.  
5. Any kind of systematic information gathering is surveillance.50  
 
This negative concept of surveillance is inherently linked to information gathering for the 
purposes of domination, violence, and coercion.51 In an analogy to data retention, Lyon argues 
that just because a network of searchable databases appears to be able to track down minute 
details of personal life, does not mean it will do so, and if it does so, this does not mean it will 
have a negative impact on the individual.52 This may be true as an individual may never know 
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they are the subject of a database query, but this may nevertheless infringe fundamental rights, 
and so measurable negative impacts are only relevant to a certain degree. This however, 
constrains privacy to quantifiable harms resulting in fewer privacy problems being 
recognised.53 
 
Lyon also maintains that surveillance is an ordinary part of everyday life even though it may 
sometimes take extraordinary turns.54 This it is submitted, lies the danger of normalising 
surveillance, just because it happens very frequently, does not presuppose that this should be 
considered ‘ordinary.’  
 
(b) Rejecting the normalisation of surveillance 
 
Wood and Webster elaborate on this point describing the UK’s position as a bad example.55 
They argue that the normalisation of surveillance has important ethical and political 
consequences, which although inevitable for everyday life, have to be called into question.56 
They also note that the normalisation of surveillance in the UK has gone much further than 
elsewhere and because the UK is considered a ‘model’ to be aspired to by security 
professionals, the threat of the UK being a bad example to other European nation-states 
becomes very real. Support from this can come from the fact that it was the UK that played a 
major role in the EU adopting the DRD, and that subsequent EU Member states’ national 
court’s ruling that national implementation was unconstitutional. That is not to say, that the EU 
does not unilaterally act to increase surveillance capabilities.57 Wood and Webster point out 
that the domestication of security and globalisation of surveillance would be ‘limited if their 
results did not become increasingly 'normal' and part of the experience of everyday life.’58 
Continuing that: 
 
What would in the previous mode of ordering be regarded as temporary or even entirely 
unacceptable becomes unremarkable, mundane, normal and consequently may not even 
be challenged.59  
 
Wood and Webster use the example of CCTV in the UK to demonstrate this. They highlight 
how remarkable it was by the distinct lack of non-academic opposition, and the evidence which 
questions the efficiency of CCTV.60 Wood and Webster then question why was this so. They 
point to several reasons: 
 
1. What CCTV represents, rather than what it does – showing ‘something is being done’ 
about the potential source of risk, a ‘security theatre.’ 
2. The perception that CCTV is there [for the protection of] people. 
3. Normalisation of CCTV through its footage and the birth of reality TV. 
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4. Allowing viewers to give visual narratives to the incomprehensible i.e. placing 
meaning, even if erroneous.61 
 
Wood and Webster explain that none of these arguments have anything to do with the 
technological properties of cameras or actual functioning of the systems per se, but how 
surveillance works at the level of emotion, symbolism and culture. The normalisation of 
surveillance will occur when these three domains are colonised,62 for example, using customer 
data for a ‘hilarious new marketing campaign.’63 Sheridan adds that social conditioning and 
the normalising of the presence of surveillance devices has conditioned the wider population 
to ignore the lenses. CCTV is designed to be unobtrusive so that the gaze of the subjects passes 
over them, allowing for various overlapping lines of sight for whomever happens to be in the 
control booth.64 Wood and Webster also noted that another reason is the computerisation of 
services, making it more citizen friendly and citizen-focussed. This dataveillance, ‘the 
management and categorisation of data derived from surveillance’ is seen to be working to 
provide what citizens want – the efficient and convenient delivery of public services and 
without it, put these services at risk. This functioning reinforces the normality of the collection, 
storage and sorting of large amounts of personal data, and the privileged or protected access or 
even 'ownership' of personal data by the state or, increasingly, its private partners or 
subcontractors.65 Wood and Webster maintain this reduces social negotiations to ‘no longer 
about what information one chooses to give but how that information is to be given (or 
taken).’66 An example of this is the tracking MAC addresses when members of the public use 
the London Underground.67 
  
This argument also rings true for data retention, as noted above, there is the flat-out denial that 
data retention is surveillance. There was also a letter written by the then Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett MP advocating that data retention ‘is a private function that arises out of the 
commercial service that the communication service providers provide.’68 This a clear 
misdirection which can shift the focus onto private companies69 when they and the state require 
equal attention. The rhetoric of not having these laws would be ‘putting lives at risk’70 and the 
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urgency for the DRD in light of the London 7/7 bombings71 despite the then Prime Minister 
Tony Blair implying ‘all the surveillance in the world’ could not have prevented the attacks72 
highlights the tactics used to normalise data retention.  
 
Wood and Webster continue to critique those that refer to the term ‘surveillance society’ as it 
is bland which although recognises the widespread usage of surveillance technologies but tells 
little how these technologies are felt, experienced or the different dimensions and deviations in 
surveillance practice.73 Wood and Webster also point out that due to databases: ‘in time, given 
the right (or wrong) circumstances we can all retrospectively become suspects - which means 
that we are actually always already potential suspects (author’s emphasis).’74 Wood and 
Webster finally conclude that changes to the normalisation need to come from the demand of 
citizens, to increase knowledge of surveillance and its consequences, to learn lessons from 
continental Europe so that where surveillance has become normal, it can be made strange and 
questionable again, and where it remains unusual to keep it the subject of active political 
debate. Nor should liberties be a matter of state manipulation at the constant shifting of goal 
posts in the name of security. The idea that living in a world of changing and flexible threats 
to security means that human rights are equally mutable and ephemeral needs to be resisted.75 
 
In warning of the dangers of surveillance,76 Richards points to the lack of understanding of 
privacy and why it matters as a reason of why we may not know why surveillance is bad and 
should be wary.77 Haggerty notes that it is difficult for Westerners to envision and appreciate 
the dystopian potentials inherent in certain technologies.78 To which Sheridan adds it is for 
more comforting to assume that ‘If I have nothing to hide, I have nothing to fear’ which of 
course is a mindset deliberately cultivated by the same institutions that gather the data in the 
first place.79 In time, Sheridan continues, this ‘lack of imagination on the possible, and even 
probable, logical extreme of mass surveillance and the modern panopticon could prove 
disastrous.’80 This mindset, Sheridan adds, means that the general public are largely unaware 
when a new technology enters the game (such as artificial intelligence in CCTV)81 and exploits 
them in ways they never thought possible, in which little can be done to prevent it because such 
abuses of power were never conceived of.82 One way argued to combat normalisation of 
surveillance, is to restrict or prohibit indiscriminate surveillance technologies.83 
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Hintz and Dencik’s supports Wood and Webster’s view noting that despite the Snowden 
revelations and invalidation of the DRD, ‘government policy in the immediate aftermath… 
was marked by the continuation and expansion of surveillance powers.’84 This was made with 
reference to the DRIPA 2014 and the IPA 2016.85 In the original draft Communications Data 
Bill (dCDB), this fell on telecommunications operators, which has since been replicated in the 
IPA 2016, essentially, different law, same provision and purpose, and therefore adding to its 
normalisation. This demonstrates a continuation of the dCDBill and an expansion of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000). As Wood and Webster noted, to 
challenge the normalisation of surveillance, it requires challenge from informed citizens etc, 
but Hintz and Dencik note this is limited to specific digital rights groups and does not resemble 
the protests seen in the US and Germany.86 This was not helped by media bias as much 
reporting on the Snowden revelations were used to justify mass surveillance, leading to a 
notably muted87 UK public response.88 One member of a UK-based focus group said ‘I think 
because so much of what we do is capable of being collected now, I think we’ve gone beyond 
that point [of challenging the collection of data] (author’s emphasis).’89 Shoshana Zuboff  calls 
this ‘psychic numbing’ which ‘inures people to the realities of being tracked, parsed, mined, 
and modified – or disposes them to rationalize the situation in resigned cynicism.’90 Due to the 
lack of public challenge, media justification, strong role of security discourse and governmental 
composition:  
 
[H]ave hindered a more fundamental review of surveillance practices so far and have 
moved policy debate towards the expansion, rather than the restriction, of surveillance 
in the aftermath of Snowden.91 
 
This normalisation of surveillance, does not just have implications for the UK. As Wood and 
Webster, and Hintz and Dencik highlight the UK being a ‘model’92  could influence other 
countries, particularly those with authoritarian regimes and poor human rights records.93  
Another aspect, not considered by Hintz and Dencik which could contribute to the 
normalisation of surveillance, is lack of will to hold those that carry out unlawful surveillance 
to account.94  
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Another critique of normalising surveillance stems from Fuchs, who argues that if everything 
is surveillance, it becomes difficult to criticise repressive forms of it.95 Though it could be 
argued all systematic collection of data is negative, because it interferes with fundamental 
rights, and criterion such as the justification for the collection, the use of data, consent and 
other factors that could be used determine whether this remains negative. As Fuchs notes, 
surveillance tries to bring about behavioural changes in which data that is processed can be ‘so 
that potential or actual physical, ideological, or structural violence can be directed against 
humans in order to influence their behaviour.’96  
 
(c) General Surveillance is Not the Exception 
 
In continuing with defining surveillance, Lyon’s own previous definition was ‘any collection 
and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purposes of influencing or 
managing those whose data have been garnered.’97 Such a definition would have encapsulated 
data retention, however, his later definitions (see above) have been reaffirmed.98Lyon considers 
that general surveillance measures are the exception, this, however, is untrue. As Higgs noted, 
the collection of vast amounts of data is something that has occurred for hundreds of years. 
There are more recent examples, such as the invalidation of the DRD by the CJEU in Digital 
Rights Ireland which had faced constitutional challenges in various EU Member states. The 
CJEU’s ruling in the case of C-362/14 (Schrems) declared that the Commission’s US Safe 
Harbour Decision is invalid, because it authorised on a generalised basis, storage of all the 
personal data of all the persons whose data was transferred from the EU to the United States 
without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in the light of the objective 
pursued and without an objective criterion being laid down for determining the limits of the 
access of the public authorities to the data and of its subsequent use (author’s emphasis).99 The 
ECtHR’s Grand Chamber (GC) judgment in Zakharov v Russia ruled that Russia’s surveillance 
measures, which amongst other things allowed ‘interception of all telephone communications 
in the area where a criminal offence has been committed’100 violated Article 8 of the ECHR.101 
Not long after Zakharov the ECtHR ruled on surveillance again in Szabo and Vissy v Hungary 
where it was ruled that the new technologies which enabled the Government to ‘intercept 
masses of data easily concerning even persons outside the original range of operation’ without 
any safeguards violated Article 8.102 The ECtHR in Big Brother Watch has also ruled that 
regime (brought to light by Snowden) for external surveillance under the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000) was incompatible with Articles 8 and 10.103  There 
was also the CJEU’s judgment in Tele2 and Watson ruled that blanket and indiscriminate data 
retention as unlawful. There is a cases pending in ECtHR on data retention,104 and in the CJEU 
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on the new Safe Harbour termed Privacy Shield.105 On 4 November 2015, then Home 
Secretary, Theresa May MP, admitted that s.94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 (TA 84) 
had been used to allow security and intelligence agencies to gain access, in bulk, to 
communications data from communication service providers, both domestically and abroad.106 
Section 94 directions prior to 4 November 2015, and directions by the Foreign Secretary prior 
to October 2016 have been ruled unlawful by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT).107 The 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson, published his findings into 
the proven operational case for the use of bulk powers (such as bulk interception, bulk 
acquisition of communications data and compiling bulk personal datasets) by the UK’s security 
and intelligence services.108 The UK Government has implemented similar powers in the IPA 
2016.109 There are even allegations that six police forces in the UK have brought ‘IMSI-
catchers’ that can both track the movements of mobile phone users within a given area, and 
intercept texts and calls.110 UK police forces are also rolling out facial recognition camera’s 
which are subject to legal challenges.111 In addition to the tracking of MAC addresses 
mentioned earlier, not informing customers that e-receipts can be declined,112 sharing patient 
data without consent,113 Virtual Alabama in the US which combines three-dimensional 
satellite/aerial imagery of the state with geospatial analytics that reveal relationships, trends, 
and patterns in incoming data all add to the non-exceptional nature of general surveillance.114 
Such surveillance practices are not limited to the US or Europe.115 
 
Despite Lyon maintaining his later definition of surveillance, he accepts that ‘surveillance 
practices have been moving steadily from targeted scrutiny of ‘‘populations’’ and individuals 
to mass monitoring in search of what Oscar Gandy calls ‘‘actionable intelligence.’’116 It is 
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unclear what distinction Lyon is asserting to make between targeted scrutiny117 of populations 
and mass monitoring as both can mean the same thing. The similarities lie in what is defined 
as “populations” (which Lyon does not define) as both European Courts have noted, certain 
surveillance measures can potentially affect all (of the population) within a state’s jurisdiction 
and can therefore amount to mass monitoring. General measures of surveillance can no longer 
be, if they ever were, considered exceptions but the norm. 
 
Lyon also maintains that ‘surveillance data are not gathered about everyone in the same way, 
or with the same intensity.’118 This, however, depends on the mode of surveillance as powers 
of general data retention and bulk powers tend not to make distinction between individuals 
concerned or data to be obtained.  
 
Heather Brooke correctly noted that with bulk collection powers, ‘the potential exists for 
anyone to be watched at any time (author’s emphasis)’ and the ‘point of Jeremy Bentham’s 
Panopticon wasn’t that everyone was actually watched at all times, it was that they could all 
potentially be watched (author’s emphasis).’119 Although this Chapter will propose an 
argument that extends beyond AG Cruz Villalón’s Opinion in Digital Rights Ireland, it does 
highlight similarities between data retention and the Panopticon. A-G Cruz Villalón noted that: 
 
The collection of such data establishes the conditions for surveillance which, although 
carried out only retrospectively when the data are used, none the less constitutes a 
permanent threat throughout the data retention period to the right of citizens of the 
Union to confidentiality in their private lives. The vague feeling of surveillance created 
raises very acutely the question of the data retention period (author’s emphasis).120 
 
This reasoning opened up the idea of data retention creating the circumstances that enabled EU 
citizens to be watched anytime their data was accessed. This facilitates a discussion on 
Bentham’s Panopticon, later works in its relationship with surveillance and its relevance to 
untargeted measures of surveillance. 
  
5.4 Bentham’s Panopticon 
 
The idea of the Panopticon was first coined by Jeremy Bentham,121 who believed the 
Panopticon, or Inspection House122 would be a ‘new mode of obtaining power of mind over 
mind’ in unknown quantities and degrees to those who choose to have it.123 Bentham 
articulated that the more constantly the persons to be inspected are under the eyes of the 
persons who should inspect them, the more perfectly will the purpose of the establishment have 
been attained (author’s emphasis). In addition to this, Bentham highlighted that ideal perfection 
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would require continuous inspection, but knew this to be impossible.124 It is as this point when 
Bentham’s first letter highlights one of the fundamentals of his Panopticon, namely that the 
inspector should conceive themselves as all seeing.125  
 
The Panopticon consisted of a circular building, with prisoners occupying the circumference. 
Prisoners would be secluded from one another, separated by cells. The apartment of the 
inspector would occupy the centre, which would be separated from the circumference by vacant 
space.126 The inspector would not be able to see all inmates simultaneously, they would have 
to adjust their positions accordingly.127  
 
This demonstrates that although inspection cannot occur to everyone at all times, it creates the 
circumstances in which anyone could be watched highlighting the link between the Panopticon 
and data retention as noted by Heather Brookes and AG Cruz Villalón’s where anyone’s data 
could be ‘viewed.’ To argue that data retention is a form of surveillance likened to a 
Panopticon, it is important to consider Michel Foucault’s vision of power, discipline, and the 
Panopticon. 
 
5.5 Foucault’s Discipline and Punish 
 
Foucault is arguably the most influential thinker for the elaboration of negative surveillance 
concepts.128 Fuchs maintains that Foucault regarded surveillance as a form of disciplinary 
power, which are regarded as ‘general formulas of domination.’129 This is derived from what 
Foucault considers disciplines of the body which included an: 
 
…uninterrupted, constant coercion, super- vising the processes of the activity rather 
than its result and it is exercised according to a codification that partitions as closely as 
possible time, space, movement.130  
 
Domination, Foucault observed, encloses humans to various institutions in order to control 
behaviour, partition and rank131 and to normalise punishment, hierarchies, homogenise, 
differentiate, and exclude.132 Foucault argued that for successful disciplinary power, it required 
hierarchical observation, the normalising judgement, and the examination.133 Foucault 
continued that the exercise of discipline required a mechanism that coerced by means of 
observation ‘an apparatus in which the techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of 
power (author’s emphasis)’134 For example, the retention of communications data, makes it 
possible for data to be accessed, therefore making it possible to ‘see’ into the lives of those 
whose data has been retained. Big Data, of course, making this much easier. Information 
asymmetries135 can provide and facilitate power, and that the collection and use of metadata 
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can significantly impact the relationships between governments and their citizens.136 
 
Another form of domination, referred to as ‘dehumanisation’ by Solove is based upon the 
Kafka metaphor in which databases foster a state of powerlessness and vulnerability created 
by people’s lack of any meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of their 
personal information.137  
 
In the specific context of data retention, Roberts argued that domination is a condition that can 
exist in the absence of such awareness of it.138 Roberts maintains that acquisition of data can 
allow inferences to be drawn about individuals’ in which counterstrategies can be devised to 
manipulate and nudge individuals’ to make particular choices.139 Such manipulation Roberts 
contends, depends on the subject being unaware that they have suffered the loss of privacy and 
that information gained is used to ensure decisions are made based on the manipulators’ 
preferences. This point is important because awareness leaves open the possibility of 
resistance.140 Such an inability to resist would nullify Article 8.141 The interference posed by 
data retention cannot solely be based on the nature of the data but also whom has access,142 
which are many, and thus a concern.143 Basing his premise on Pettit’s idea of domination 
(arbitrarily interfering with choices)144 Roberts noted that if there isn’t a nexus between the 
extent and exercise of power, it cannot be said to be a necessary means of meeting a stated 
objective.145 It instead provides for those who: 
 
[P]ossess it with the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis – the power to interfere 
in ways that do not track the interests of who might be on the receiving end of it. It is 
the acquisition of such power that establishes the dominating relationship. It does not 
matter whether or not the agent or agency that has acquired it is inclined to use it. The 
mere fact that it has been acquired is contrary to the interests of the subject of the loss. 
It places him in a position of dependency vis-à-vis those who possess the power – his 
ability to choose freely is dependent on the continuing good will or benevolence of the 
agent or agency (author’s emphasis).146  
 
Roberts concluded that retention notices under DRIPA 2014 and would now be IPA 2016 
would confer a dominating power against which individuals ought to be protected against by 
the right to privacy.147 
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Surveillance for Foucault, secretly prepares a ‘new knowledge of man’ with the observer seeing 
‘without being seen.’148 Foucault maintained that an almost ideal model for observation were 
these observatories i.e. the military camp which is ‘the diagram of a power that acts by means 
of general visibility’ the ‘spatial ‘nesting’ of hierarchized surveillance (author’s emphasis).’149 
Foucault believed that the ‘perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single 
gaze to see everything constantly’ a ‘perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre 
towards which all gazes would be turned (author’s emphasis).’150 Analogies with data retention 
can be drawn in this regard, as the purpose of retention is to ensure that communications data 
does not escape. Although it is true that access to this data can be obtained by various public 
authorities, it is suggested that this ‘centre’ to which Foucault speaks of, could be regarded as 
the state.151 Foucault referred to Ledoux when building the Arc-et-Senans,152 all the buildings 
were to be arranged in a circle, opening on the inside, at the centre of which a high construction 
was to house the administrative functions of management. Foucault believed this allowed all 
activities to be recorded, perceived and judged.153 Similar to data retention (recorded), which 
allows the possibility of access to data (perceived) which in turn allows a public authority to 
judge and act upon. 
 
For Foucault, hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or 
transferred as a property; but functions like a piece of machinery. This enables, Foucault argues 
‘the disciplinary power to be both absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and always alert’ 
and ‘absolutely ‘discreet, for it functions permanently and largely in silence.’154 This, it is 
submitted, draws an analogy with data retention in that any number of individual’s data can be 
retained without them ever knowing. In relation to normalising judgement, Foucault described 
at the heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism, referring to 
unwritten laws of punishment.155  
 
This punishment (confusion, coldness, indifference etc)156 could be associated with what is 
known as the chilling effect.157 Under pervasive surveillance, individuals are inclined to make 
choices that conform to mainstream expectations.’158 This would correlate with AG Cruz 
Villalón notion of data retention creating a vague sense of surveillance. In addition to, this idea 
of a chilling is important as Solove has argued that when performing a balancing test, the social 
benefits of privacy should be principally considered.159  
 
In regards to examination, Foucault noted ‘that examination introduced a whole mechanism 
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that linked to a certain type of the formation of knowledge a certain form of the exercise of 
power (author’s emphasis).’160 Thus, acquiring knowledge through examination demonstrates 
an exercise of power. In addition, Foucault noted that: 
 
Disciplinary power…is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes 
on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the 
subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is 
exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen, of being able always to be 
seen (author’s emphasis).161 
 
This, Foucault maintains, objectifies subjects of examination.162 A similar analogy can be 
drawn between the secretive nature of data retention and the fact that individual’s data is subject 
to state actions. 
 
Further to this examination, Foucault notes that we are entering the age of the infinite 
examination (always seen) and of compulsory objectification.163 Importantly, Foucault 
highlighted that examination introduces individuality into the field of documentation ‘places 
individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; it engages them 
in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them (author’s emphasis).’164 These 
procedures of examination were accompanied at the same time by a system of intense 
registration and of documentary accumulation. A ‘power of writing,’ Foucault contended was 
constituted as an essential part in the mechanisms of discipline.165  
 
This keeping of records, Foucault contends, formed an integral part of the process in which 
those were subjected to the disciplinary regime.166 Foucault noted that fundamental conditions 
of a good discipline must include procedures of writing that made it possible to integrate 
individual data into cumulative systems in such a way that they were not lost to enable 
individuals to be located in the general register in which each datum of the individual 
examination might affect overall calculations.167 Foucault further added, thanks to the 
apparatus of writing it allowed the subjection of individuals ‘under the gaze of a permanent 
corpus of knowledge’ and ‘constitution of a comparative system that made possible the 
measurement of overall phenomena…in a given ‘population.’168 
 
For Foucault, discipline is about the individualisation of subjects in a descending fashion where 
power becomes more anonymous and functional.169 Foucault notes with examples of children 
being more individualised than the adult, the patient more than the healthy, the mentally ill and 
delinquent than the mentally stable and non-delinquent.170 This notion of individualisation can 
also be turned on the healthy, the mentally stable, the law abiding.171 Foucault is highlighting 
that surveillance need not be limited to those who are of interest, but to those who might be of 
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interest, given the right information is obtained. This strikes a similarity to the DRD, as Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque in his concurring opinion in Szabo and Vissy, noted that it created 
compulsory, suspicion-less, and untargeted data retention obligations.172  
  
(a) Foucault and the Panopticon 
 
Foucault believed that the Panopticon173 was surveillance that is based on a system of 
permanent registration174in which all events are recorded.175 For Foucault, the Panoptic 
‘mechanism arranges spatial unities that make it possible to see constantly and to recognize 
immediately (author’s emphasis).’176 Individuals in Panoptic mechanisms, Foucault believed 
were the object of information and never a subject in communication.177 A major effect of the 
Panopticon is to induce ‘a state of conscious and permanent visibility’ ensuring the automatic 
functioning of power.178 Foucault continues that this arranges ‘things that the surveillance is 
permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action (author’s emphasis).’179 Foucault 
further adds that ‘the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary 
(author’s emphasis).’180 Foucault articulated that it would be too much and too little for 
individuals to be constantly observed, too little as what matters is that individuals know they 
are being observed, and too much he has no need of being so.181 Referring to Bentham, Foucault 
noted that power should be visible and unverifiable, visible in that individuals know that they 
are spied upon, and importantly unverifiable because individuals must never know whether 
they are being looked at in any given moment, but must be sure that they may always be so.182 
Regarding data retention, for example, the DRD enacted and implemented by Member States 
could be argued as satisfying the requirement of visibility, this may also be more apparent due 
to greater awareness since the Snowden revelations. Unverifiable as the CJEU noted that it 
interfered with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European population183 in a 
generalised manner.184 The unverifiable notion accords with a corresponding ECHR safeguard 
in that under certain circumstances an individual can claim to be a victim of a violation of the 
Convention by the mere existence of secret measures or laws permitting such measures without 
having to allege they were actually applied to them.185  
 
Foucault maintained that due to the mechanisms of observation, the Panopticon gains in 
efficiency and in the ability to penetrate into behaviour in which knowledge follows the 
advances of power, that can lead to discovering new objects of knowledge over all the surfaces 
on which power is exercised.186 Similar to data retention which allows knowledge to be 
obtained from communications data which can then subsequently be matched up with other 
communications data, this can be amplified with Big Data.187 In other words, 
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knowledge/information is power,188 and data is knowledge, whosoever has control over data, 
exercises power. Foucault regards the Panopticon as the ‘perfect exercise of power’189 because 
it can reduce the number who exercise power whilst increasing those who are subject to it.190 
In addition to this, Foucault adds it allows the intervention at any moment and because the 
constant pressure acts even before the offences, mistakes or crimes have been committed.191 
The strength of this, is that ‘it never intervenes’ and is ‘exercised spontaneously and without 
noise.’192 An analogy between Foucault’s idea and data retention can be drawn, as access to 
communications data is made possible at any moment. This also contrasts with Lyon’s 
definition of surveillance only being spontaneous as an exception. 
 
Foucault regards surveillance as permanent, exhaustive and omnipresent ‘capable of making 
all visible, as long as it could itself remain invisible.’193 Foucault also noted that the ideal point 
of penalties would be ‘an indefinite discipline’ an ‘interrogation without end’ a ‘judgement that 
would at the same time be the constitution of a file that was never closed.’194 This is similar to 
the cyclical nature of data retention.195 
 
Foucault argues that the drawing up of tables was one of the great problems of disciplinary 
power in the 18th century196 Fuchs notes that the modern equivalent for tables are: 
 
…digital databases that store huge amounts of data that can be automatically collected, 
assessed, manipulated, and remixed, are available in real time, are distributed at high 
speed all over the world, are easy and cheap to collect and distribute, and can be 
duplicated without destruction of the original data. The computer database enables an 
extension and intensification of surveillance based on tables.197  
 
Fuchs continues that computers and computer networks used for surveillance constitute what 
Foucault described as one of the ‘innovations of disciplinary writing.’198  It is this connection 
power/knowledge, Fuchs acknowledges, that Foucault stresses as constitutive for surveillance 
takes on the form of power/digital data in the information age.199 
 
5.6 The Contemporary Panopticon 
 
When Foucault reenergised his interpretation of Bentham’s Panopticon, he did not have in 
mind the computerisation of surveillance, and this is where it is important to consider as Fuchs 
suggests, the Panopticon in the information age.  
 
(a)  Gordon and the Electronic Panopticon 
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Diana Gordon was one of the first to consider the electronic Panopticon in terms of the National 
Criminal Records System in the United States.200 Gordon highlighted that one of the most 
rapidly expanding, but least noticed state activities were the ‘collection, combination, and 
dissemination of computerized criminal justice records.’201 Gordon likened national 
computerised systems as a ‘panoptic schema’ with the record the surrogate as the inmate and 
law enforcement as the warden, which knows no bounds as the warden becomes the boss, 
landlord and banker, enclosing one in the electronic Panopticon.202 Gordon highlighted that ‘as 
the number and variety of records grows, along with the amount and kind of data contained in 
them, judgments about what persons and behaviours are appropriate subjects for data 
surveillance become less and less discriminating.’203 Similarly with communications data 
retention, data retention is purely limited to which telecommunications operators a retention 
notice is issued upon and therefore more and more indiscriminate. 
 
Gordon argues that with such systems ‘[t]he analogy of the ‘panoptic schema,’ which oppresses 
its subjects with the potential for surveillance as well as its actuality’204 is relevant in this 
regard. Gordon continues that the managers of the modern Panopticon have at least the option 
of using every bit of available information.205 
 
(b)  Other forms of the Contemporary Panopticon 
 
Shoshana Zuboff builds on Bentham’s and Foucault’s Panopticon, the ‘Information 
Panopticon’ and applies it to the work environment.206 Unlike Bentham’s envision, Zuboff’s 
Information Panopticon did not rely upon physical structures and human supervision,207 but 
instead, a computer that kept track of workers’ every move and recorded it.208  Sheridan notes 
that the workers in Zuboff’s literature were far more likely to take more care in their work to 
ensure complications did not arise, and if they did, made sure that they could not be held liable. 
On a wider social level, this would entail that the public are more likely to look inward and 
engage in self-surveillance, monitoring both what they do and say to be more in line with social 
norms and not draw the attention of the system,209 the chilling effect. Poster argued that: 
 
Today’s ‘circuits of communication’ and the databases they generate constitute a 
Superpanopticon, a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers or guards 
(author’s emphasis).210  
 
And so what we see here is how Betham’s Panopticon has evolved211 to encapsulate the 
information era, in particular, the recording, or retention of data. 
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(c) David Lyon – from Big Brother to the Electronic Panopticon 
 
For balance, a critique of the electronic Panoptic is considered by Lyon. Lyon in the mid-
nineties considered how far the Panopticon provided a useful model for understanding 
electronic surveillance.212 In discussing Orwell’s 1984 Lyon remarks that ‘[t]he challenge of 
electronic surveillance is missed if it is reduced to a concern merely with privacy.’ This is true 
given the analysis in Chapter 4. Lyon refers to the idea of Bentham’s Panopticon as being 
significant because it gave the impression of an all-seeing power.213 
 
But in his critique, Lyon refers to the Panopticon as only a powerful metaphor for 
understanding electronic surveillance.214 Lyon notes that beyond the metaphor is the model, 
which Lyon refers to as the ‘normalising of discipline, the exaggerated visibility of the subject, 
the unverifiability of observation, the subject as bearer of surveillance, the quest for factual 
certainty’ and asks to what extent are they present in each context.215  
 
Lyon cites Giddens and agrees that in different institutions, there is a difference in timescale 
when any individual is subjected to the Panopticon, giving the example that inmates are 
incarcerated all the time whereas schools etc, only part of the day is subjected to this. Lyon 
quite rightly maintains that one may now, due to advances in technology take it home with him 
as a consumer, creating the possibility of being subjected to the Panopticon. Lyon, however, 
believes that it was ‘still not clear that this in itself augurs a general societal panopticism.’216 
Lyon makes this assertion, without actually assessing ways in which the Panopticon could 
affect those at home with new technologies such as Amazon Alexa, Apple’s Siri, or for 
instance, the way in which s.94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 (and the Digital 
Telephony Act) was utilised to obtain vast amounts of communications data. Of course, he 
could not have known because it was made public 19 years later, but this clearly satisfies the 
‘unverifiability of observation’ Lyon spoke of. This highlights the possible continuous nature 
where one could be subjected to surveillance in for example, the workplace217 and at home 
when using electronic devices in both instances particularly using work devices at home.218 
The use of s.8 of the RIPA 2000 for bulk interception, the DRD, the revelations of Snowden, 
and the IPA 2016 only serve to amplify this, and therefore the idea of ‘the exaggerated visibility 
of the subject’ weakens because it demonstrates just how unknowingly exposed to surveillance 
we have become. On 16 November 2016, the Intercept published an article detailing the extent 
of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) surveillance practices.219 This details that not only 
does the NSA gather as much intel on citizens, but under the BLARNEY program this allowed 
them to: 
 
[M]onitor communications related to multiple countries, companies, and international 
organizations. Among the approved targets were the International Monetary Fund, the 
																																																						
212 David Lyon, ‘From Big Brother to Electronic Panopticon’ in David Lyon (ed) The Electronic Eye: The Rise 
of Surveillance Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 57-80. 
213 ibid. 
214 ibid.  
215 ibid. 
216 ibid. 
217 Copland v UK App no. 62617/00 (ECHR, 3 April 2007). 
218 Chris Smith, ‘iOS 9.3 will tell you if your employer is tracking your iPhone’ (2 March 2016) 
<http://bgr.com/2016/03/02/work-iphone-privacy-ios-9-3/> accessed 21 November 2017. 
219 Ryan Gallagher and Henrik Moltke, ‘TITANPOINTE The NSA’s Spy Hub in New York, Hidden in Plain 
Sight’ The Intercept (16 November 2016) <https://theintercept.com/2016/11/16/the-nsas-spy-hub-in-new-york-
hidden-in-plain-sight/> accessed 17 November 2016.  
	131	
World Bank, the Bank of Japan, the European Union, the United Nations, and at least 
38 different countries, including U.S. allies such as Italy, Japan, Brazil, France, 
Germany, Greece, Mexico, and Cyprus.220 
 
Lyon then considers the links made between capitalism and the Panopticon. Lyon was of the 
opinion that consumers are seduced into conformity rather than coerced into compliance for 
fear of Big Brother.221 It is true that products and services can be utilised to get consumers 
hooked,222 but in the same vein, most people, even those that are studying areas related to 
surveillance and privacy are unlikely to read terms of services or privacy policies, and if they 
do, spend little time reading and therefore focussing what they want from a service, rather than 
privacy or data sharing concerns.223 Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch in a study demonstrated that 98% 
of participants agreed to corporations taking their child away in payment for use of their 
services.224  Nehf uses the Hansel and Gretel metaphor in which we are: 
 
We are happily eating all the cookies, candy, and gingerbread, enjoying what we think 
are the benefits of sharing personal bytes of data in the information society. As we do 
so, we may be fattening ourselves for someone else's feast, unaware of the fate that may 
await us.225 
 
Privacy trade-offs are also argued to be fallacious.226 Moreover, Lyon made no mention of the 
‘Crypto Wars’ in which governments ‘fought to control the use of encryption, while privacy 
advocates insisted its use was essential — not just for individual freedom, but also to protect 
the commercial development of the nascent internet.’227  This of course, demonstrated the 
resistance to Panoptic coercion. To a lesser degree this is also true when the issue becomes that 
of cookies, trackers and consent, many websites dump cookies on devices which can track 
user’s online activity without consent,228 or even coerce users into usage of services, accepting 
terms defined by said companies. 229 Even after Lyon’s piece, this trend did not disappear as 
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Marx identifies other forms of social control involving the requesting volunteers based on 
appeals to good citizenship or patriotism; using disingenuous communication (e.g. In entering 
here you have agreed to be searched); the trading of personal information for rewards and 
convenience; and utilising hidden or low visibility information collection techniques.230 
Furthermore, this intensifies with Big Data, where Rhoen notes that it is shifting power away 
from data subjects and consumers to the data controllers, allowing them to influence consumer 
behaviour or decision making.231 Rhoen considers whether paid for or not, usage of services in 
exchange for the collection and use of personal data (for profit) amounts to ‘privacy 
contracts.’232 Rhoen continues that if data controllers become too powerful, the validity of 
consumers’ and data subjects’ consent or autonomy when entering into privacy contracts can 
be questioned.233 Rhoen refers to Barnett and Duval who define power ‘as the production, in 
and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
circumstances and fate (author’s emphasis).’ 234 Rhoen continues that data controllers use their 
existing structural power (lack of consumer bargaining power) over data subjects in the 
contracting phase to increase their institutional power after the contract is concluded (the data 
controller obtaining a method of exerting power over the consumer i.e. personal advertising).235 
Such unaccountable236 power structures may have influenced the 2016 US Presidential 
Elections and the EU Referendum by influencing individuals to recruit them to an idea.237  
 
The Panopticon may be used to control behaviour through fear, but that is not the only way in 
which the internalisation of control can occur, this could also be through guilt, embarrassment, 
shame, irritation238 or even rewards.239 Sheridan argues further that: 
 
[T]he most important thing to come out of Snowden’s revelations was the return of 
panoptic power to the Foucaultian model.240  
 
The Panopticon may not be the perfect idea of what constitutes surveillance, but it has helped 
shape understandings of surveillance in the past, present241 and has implications for the future. 
Even if one were to agree that the Panopticon is just a powerful metaphor, Solove notes that: 
 
Metaphors function not to render a precise descriptive representation of the problem; 
rather, they capture our concerns over privacy in a way that is palpable, potent, and 
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compelling. Metaphors are instructive not for their realism but for the way they direct 
our focus to certain social and political phenomena.242 
  
Sheridan highlights that because contemporary surveillance is often done without the 
knowledge of the subjects, Snowden had pulled back the curtain on the Panopticon. By 
destroying the illusion, Snowden reminded people that ‘yes, there were provisions in place that 
certain powerful people had access to any sort of personal data they wanted about anyone in 
the country, to be accessed as they wished.’243 
 
In relation to data retention and the Panopticon, Portela and Cruz-Cunha suggested that: 
 
… there is an analogy between the historical concept of the panopticon...and the 
retention of... data... [as]... the panopticon draws its power from the fact that the 
surveilled never know if they are surveilled... therefore internalise habits as if they were 
surveilled (author’s emphasis).244  
 
(d) Internalisation – The Panopticon and self-restraint/discipline and a rejection of 
Foucauldian critics  
 
Manokha notes that much of the focus in surveillance studies has been on the 
domination/power aspect of the Panopticon, when this is not the only or even most important 
aspect.245 Foucault himself acknowledging that ‘it is only one aspect of the art of governing 
people in our societies (author’s emphasis).’246 This focus on power and domination has led to 
a one-sided and limited interpretation, which has led to many (including Lyon above) 
dismissing it as being inadequate.247 Manokha notes that as well as Bentham’s Panopticon 
being about having power over an individual, it is also concerned with the power one exercises 
over themselves through self-discipline and restraint, making coercion unnecessary.248 This 
unnecessary reliance on coercion is echoed by Foucault.249 Foucault in Discipline and Punish 
and later works constantly referred to the Panopticon as resulting in self-restrain, self-
objectification and becoming the principle of one’s own subjection.250 This as noted above has 
the effect of ‘obtaining power of mind over mind’ and what is known as the chilling effect, 
mentioned in this Chapter and discussed in detail in Chapter 4. This discussion need not be 
repeated here, but it is essential to note that Manokha observed that since the Snowden 
revelations which pulled back the curtain on the Panopticon there has been chilling effects in 
journalism, social media behaviour (online and offline), political opinions and identity 
expressions.251 For said reasons, Manokha noted that the metaphor of the Panopticon is ‘not 
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only…still relevant but it is actually more relevant today than with respect to Western societies 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’252   
 
Taking this and the above into account, Portela further argued that data retention as being better 
described as ‘panspectron.’253  
 
5.7 From Panopticon to Panspectron? 
 
The Panspectron was coined and distinguished from the Panopticon by Manuel DeLanda where 
he writes that a Panspectron ‘compiles information about all at the same time, using computers 
to select the segments of data relevant to its surveillance tasks (author’s emphasis).’254 This 
can include all information from the electromagnetic spectrum.255 The Panspectron is 
concerned about mass surveillance and control.256 Hookway257 argued that the Panopticon had 
been replaced by the Panspectron. Building on this, Braman continues that:  
 
In a panspectron, no surveillance subject is identified in order to trigger an information 
collection process. Rather, information is collected about everything and everyone all 
the time. A subject appears only when a particular question is asked, triggering data 
mining in information already gathered to learn what can be learned in answer to that 
question. While in the panopticon environment the subject knows that the watcher is 
there, in the panspectron environment one may be completely unaware that information 
is being collected.258 
 
Such lack of awareness was also noted by Sheridan259 with Braman highlighting that the 
Panspectron was already a reality encompassing areas such as electronic communications and 
would continue to increase in other aspect of our lives unless effective legal barriers are re-
enacted.260 In addition to this it was highlighted that ISPs were pressured or required to 
maintain digital records of transactions and communications.261 Although it was noted that data 
retention laws could be regarded as visible for Panoptic purposes, it cannot be assumed that 
everyone would know and to the extent such laws permit retention.  
 
(a) Data retention is both Panoptic and Panspectric? 
 
Considering both the Panopticon and the Panspectron, it is argued that for the purposes of data 
retention, this could theoretically be both. Dahan notes that Panoptical and Panspectral 
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technologies are not mutually exclusive and can coexist.262 Whether surveillance is Panoptic 
or Panspectric depends upon the awareness of the individual concerned. For example, data 
retention could be argued to be Panoptic because one is aware of Part 4 of the IPA 2016 and 
the retention notices that can be issued under it. Data retention could also, equally be argued to 
be Panspectric because it may not be known to the masses what extent data retention interferes 
with fundamental rights and the extent at which data is collected, aggregated for predictions. 
This can be further explored because under a retention notice, a telecommunications operator 
can be required to generate data, and it is this generation of data that would put an individual, 
even if they knew the ins and outs of Part 4 in the dark about just what data about them is being 
generated. In similar fashion, from a US perspective, Sheridan notes: 
 
The public was told that these surveillance activities were being carried out, and their 
data was subject to review by any authorized party. The problem was that the average 
citizen did not know the extent of said review. Many things that we assumed to be 
private were in fact open secrets to those with the right clearance.263 
 
A far greater issue, however, is extent of the surveillance across the entire electromagnetic 
spectrum and the predictive use made of that data.  
 
5.8 Other ideas of data collection/retention as surveillance 
 
The Surveillance Studies Network maintained that ‘where we find purposeful, routine, 
systematic and focused attention paid to personal details, for the sake of control, entitlement, 
management, influence or protection, we are looking at surveillance.’264 This like Lyon refers 
to focussed surveillance and prediction. However, Marx had misgivings with dictionary 
definitions of surveillance as new technologies did not especially apply to a ‘suspect’ (i.e. 
focussed, see Oxford Living Dictionary above) but could apply to geographical places265 and 
spaces, particular time periods, networks, systems and categories of person.266 Marx highlights 
that a better definition of surveillance would be ‘the use of technical means to extract or create 
personal data (author’s emphasis).’267 The relation to data retention in the IPA 2016 is quite 
similar in that data can be retained or created for further analysis. For Marx, new surveillance 
has low visibility, or is even invisible, it is involuntary, the data collection is often integrated 
into routine activity and is more likely to be automated involving machines rather than 
humans.268 Marx continues that data collection is often carried out remotely by third parties in 
which the data can be available in real time, can be continuous and offer information on the 
past, present and future.269 The subject of data collection goes beyond individual suspects270 
as would any obligation to retain as it is focussed on services used. Marx regards surveillance 
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as a quest for information,271 and this is true for data retention as the purpose is to keep 
information on a ‘just in case’ basis.  
 
5.9 Data retention as surveillance, a legal perspective 
 
(a) Data Retention as Surveillance in EU Law 
 
From an EU law perspective, the idea that data retention is a form of surveillance is implied by 
the wording of Article 5(1) of the e-Privacy Directive. Article 5(1) requires Member States to 
prohibit the ‘listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of 
communications and the related traffic data by persons other than users (author’s emphasis).’ 
This implies that storage of traffic data is a type of surveillance of communications. This is 
also reflected in Article 5 of the proposed e-Privacy Regulation.272 
 
In Digital Rights Ireland273 AG Cruz Villalón, opined that the DRD may cause a vague feeling 
of surveillance274 and that retention allows retrospective scrutiny, thus establishing conditions 
for surveillance.275 This is similar to what Williams and Johnson refer as reconstructive 
surveillance.276 The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29) argued that general data 
retention would make surveillance that is authorised in exceptional circumstances the rule.277 
 
(b) Data Retention as Surveillance under the ECHR 
 
Under the ECtHR’s case law, it was previously noted that e-mail and internet usage fall within 
the ambit of Article 8278 and on numerous occasions has held that the storage of private 
information amounts to279 or is akin to280 secret surveillance. The GC in Zakharov noted that 
‘that the existence of practices permitting secret surveillance be established and that there was 
a reasonable likelihood that the security services had compiled and retained information 
concerning his or her private life (author’s emphasis).’281Even where secret surveillance282 is 
carried out by private bodies, a State is under positive obligations to protect and respect private 
life.283 This, according to Judge Pinto de Albuquerque includes the ‘[u]nconsented collection, 
access and analysis of…communications, including metadata.’284 On the same day, Pinto de 
Albuquerque also maintained that the DRD enabled surveillance capabilities.285 Therefore, this 
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supports the idea, from an ECHR perspective that retention, whether by public or private 
entities constitutes surveillance.  
 
(c) Data Retention as Surveillance in UK law 
 
In Davis and Watson, the English Divisional Court distinguished Kennedy v United Kingdom 
from Digital Rights Ireland in that the former concerned an individual warrant of interception 
issued by the Secretary of State while the latter concerned a general data retention regime on a 
potentially massive scale.286 The Court of Appeal referred to this distinguishing feature and 
held that the former ‘was concerned with an individual warrant and not mass surveillance 
(author’s emphasis),’287 therefore, clearly indicating that ‘data retention is mass 
surveillance.’288 
 
A legal UK definition for surveillance can be found in s.48(2) of the RIPA 2000 which 
‘includes’ (and therefore not limited to):289  
 
1. monitoring, observing or listening to persons, their movements, their conversations or 
their other activities or communications;  
2. recording anything monitored, observed or listened to in the course of surveillance; and 
3. surveillance by or with the assistance of a surveillance device.  
  
‘Communication’ for the purposes of s.81(1)(b) and (c) RIPA 2000 includes data of any 
description and signals between persons, persons and things, and things and things. This has 
been replicated in s.261(2)(a) and (b) of the IPA 2016. It is plausible to argue said definitions 
are Panspectric. Thus, communications data would fall within the ambit of s.48(2). This implies 
that the monitoring or observing, any recording of such monitoring in the course of surveillance 
or by a surveillance device of communications data is to be treated as surveillance. In addition 
to this, s.81(1) defines person as any organisation and any association or combination of 
persons and so surveillance does not need to be targeted at any one individual to constitute 
surveillance, it can thus constitute mass surveillance. The definition of ‘person’ is what allowed 
interception to be carried out in bulk in the so called ‘thematic warrants.’290 
 
Further elaboration on construing the definition of surveillance comes from the Investigatory 
Powers Tribunal (IPT) in Vaughan v South Oxfordshire District Council.291 Here, the IPT held 
that ‘the way in which s48(2) is drafted means that conduct which has as its purpose such 
monitoring or observation would be surveillance within the meaning of the act, even if no 
actual monitoring of any persons took place (author’s emphasis).’ 
 
The IPT placed great emphasis on purposes. It is clear that the purpose of data retention is to 
aid in the interests of national security, the purposes of preventing or detecting crime or of 
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preventing disorder and many more. Therefore, even if one is to argue that data retention itself 
is not surveillance, the conduct of data retention allows for the access of communications, 
which consequently enables the monitoring of communications data, as AG Cruz Villalón in 
Digital Rights Ireland pointed out, it establishes the conditions for surveillance.  Even if that 
data is never accessed, the purpose for data to be retained, remains unchanged, and 
consequently the conduct of retention still enables it to fall within the definition of surveillance.  
If one were to argue that data retention is not monitoring or observing, then this is countered 
by the ‘recording’ element of s.48(2). Recording in this context should be given a broad 
interpretation such as pen and paper292 as surveillance is inclusive, not exclusive and should 
therefore apply to the capturing of data inherent in data retention. 
 
In Re: a complaint of surveillance,293 the IPT drew some conclusions about the definition of 
surveillance in that it is essentially an intelligence gathering activity involving various means 
which is not constrained by ‘surveillance in ordinary English usage.’ Section 48(2) may operate 
to amplify the ordinary meaning, thus identifying particular aspects of intelligence gathering 
without expressly defining surveillance itself, or providing when or where it takes place, or 
who is conducting it.  
 
The IPT’s reasoning demonstrates just how broad the definition of surveillance can be. If the 
purpose of data retention is to gather intelligence i.e the communications data of persons, then 
based on the IPT’s reasoning, the retention process itself is essentially surveillance.  The 
various means by which surveillance can be conducted leaves it open to suggestion that data 
retention could fall within this ambit, as the IPT did not define those various means, it in fact 
left it open as potentially going beyond the ordinary English meaning.  
  
Regarding surveillance devices, the then Chief Surveillance Commissioner, Sir Christopher 
Rose noted that the ‘Internet is a surveillance device as defined by RIPA section 48(1) [means 
any apparatus294 designed or adapted for use in surveillance.’295 If this contention is correct, 
then any monitoring, observing, recording of internet activity would constitute surveillance by 
a surveillance device, and would thus again put data retention within the ambit of surveillance. 
One could argue that the use of a surveillance device could be argued further, if one considers 
the devices that actually enable the retention of communications data. One could even delve 
deeper into the issue of surveillance devices. For example, Cisco’s Netflow Auditor296 can 
allow real time or long term historical visibility of every network flow recorded.297 Rafi Sabel 
argues that Netflow Auditor is the solution to assist ‘ISP’s to quickly comply at a low cost 
whilst properly allowing data retention rules to be implemented’ (author’s emphasis).298 So in 
a broad and narrow sense, the ability to retain data can constitute a surveillance device. Section 
48 is silent on data retention and given the inclusive definition of surveillance, there is nothing 
to suggest that it is not. It has been suggested that data retention can satisfy all three aspects of 
s.48(2).  
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5.10 Data Retention as Mass Surveillance 
 
Now that it has been argued that theoretically and legally, data retention is a form of 
surveillance, it is important to consider whether it also constitutes mass surveillance. Roger 
Clarke, suggested that the primary purpose of surveillance was to collect information about 
individuals or en masse.299 Clarke subsequently highlighted that ‘[d]ata retention 
proposals...are unequivocally a weapon of mass surveillance’ (author’s emphasis).300  In the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution’s 2nd Report titled Surveillance: Citizens 
and the State301 it was understood that there were two broad types of surveillance, mass 
surveillance and targeted surveillance. Mass surveillance also termed ‘passive’ or ‘undirected’ 
surveillance is not targeted on any particular individual but gathers information for possible 
future use.302   
 
Roberts and Palfrey argues303 that the monitoring amounts to surveillance. Not in the traditional 
sense, but due to its functional similarities, by requiring the collection of data about citizens 
without their consent, enabling the state to use data to control some of the subjects of 
monitoring. Stalla-Bourdillon maintains that ‘the systematic character of the collect, as well as 
its scope, and its possible uses that are at the core of mass surveillance techniques.’ Stalla-
Bourdillon continues that ‘they are imposed [as] a general monitoring duty which consists of 
gathering and retaining information about their users (author’s emphasis).’304 The logical 
conclusion that can be drawn from this is that if data retention is surveillance, then general data 
retention obligations must be classified as mass surveillance. 
 
5.11 Surveillance within surveillance 
 
Regarding the Panopticon, Lyon highlights the impression Foucault gives ‘that citizens of 
modern nation-states find themselves increasingly to be the subjects of centralised carceral 
discipline.’305 Richards notes that due to the blurring of public and private surveillance 
practices, models of understanding surveillance such as the Panopticon are the most out of 
date.306 But to suggest that Foucault only focussed on centralised surveillance is to 
mischaracterise his position. Foucault noted that the Panopticon ‘is a marvellous machine 
which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces homogeneous effects of power’ 
(author’s emphasis).307 Foucault continued that the Panopticon could be utilised by anyone (or 
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society as a whole) for any purpose.308 As can the Panspectron, if one considers the Gaza 
strip.309 
 
Fuchs is also in agreement where he added that ‘Foucault’s analysis does not exclude that the 
methods of surveillance can become more decentralized and dispersed because’310 surveillance 
is a ‘…network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top 
and laterally.’311 The latter, in which can be termed ‘Sousveillance’312 can be regarded as 
surveillance of citizens by citizens or institutions,313 which has been explored to some extent 
by Mark Andrejevic.314  
 
Mitrou also noted the technique of folding private organisations into government surveillance 
networks creates a system of ‘distributed surveillance’ which allows the state to overcome 
practical limits on its resources.315 Using Foucault’s ideas of surveillance and discipline316 
Boyle highlights examples in the United States where ‘the state has worked actively to embed 
or hardwire the legal regime in the technology itself’317 by various means such as being 
mandated by law.318 This is true for the UK also where the state can require intercept 
capabilities, and require the development of practices in which data can be retained. Boyle 
warned that if digital technologies enlarge our space for living, the dangers posed by that 
expansion will prompt a reasonable demand ‘that the Panopticon be hardwired into the 
"technologies of freedom’319 (becoming more Panspectric) that enable freedom of 
expression.320 
 
Ogura argued that ‘the common characteristics of surveillance are the management of 
population based on capitalism and the nation state.’321 Shoshana Zuboff coins the term 
‘Surveillance Capitalism’ in which ‘profits derive from the unilateral surveillance and 
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modification of human behaviour.’322 And just like the Panopticon, surveillance capitalism 
seeks to reward and punish.323  
 
Oscar Gandy would describe this as the ‘Panoptic Sort’ which is ‘a technology that has been 
designed and is being continually revised to serve the interests of decision makers within the 
government and the corporate bureaucracies.’324 Gandy concluded that this created ‘an 
antidemocratic system of control that cannot be transformed because it can serve no purpose 
other than that for which it was designed—the rationalization and control of human 
existence.’325  
 
Sullivan builds upon Gandy’s Panoptic Sort for contemporary purposes in light of the Snowden 
revelations.326 Sullivan points to the likes of Google, Twitter, and Facebook being the Panoptic 
Sort to which Gandy’s work identified, in some instances having both legal and financial 
interests in handing over sensitive personal information to government agencies. This is also 
reflected in the IPA 2016 in relation to reimbursing the costs of retaining Internet Connection 
Records but that is not really an incentive, more a reimbursement of expenses.327 Sullivan 
concluded without transparency in the ways in which governments and corporations gather, 
store and search our data, the data Panopticon will persist.328 This begins to demonstrate the 
term of ‘surveillance within surveillance’ in relation to data retention, in which private 
corporations initially conduct surveillance for their own purposes and then such surveillance 
becomes subject to state control i.e. retaining the seeds of said prior surveillance.  
 
The Panoptic Sort was also regarded as a difference machine that sorts individuals into 
categories and classes on the basis of routine measurements. Gandy regarded this as a 
discriminatory technology which allocates options and opportunities on the basis of those 
measures and the administrative models that they inform good. This system of power and 
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disciplinary surveillance identifies, classifies and assesses.329 Fuchs draws a Panoptic sort 
analogy with Facebook330 and concludes that it is a form of surveillance that exerts power and 
domination by making use of specific qualities of the contemporary Internet, such as user-
generated content and permanent dynamic communication flows.331  
 
A decentralised Panopticon may also have a legal basis. In Europe, this takes its form from 
data protection laws.332 These laws regulate the processing of personal data by data 
controllers.’ At an EU and UK level, data controllers can process data without consent if it 
serves a legitimate interest such as marketing,333 or another legal basis, and this is what allows 
companies such as Google and Facebook to accumulate vast amounts of data. Former CEO of 
Google, Eric Schmidt once said: 
 
In a world of asynchronous threats, it is too dangerous for there not to be some way to 
identify you. We need a [verified] name service for people. Governments will demand 
it (author’s emphasis).334  
 
In regards to data retention, telecommunications operators can be compelled to retain and 
generate (Big and other) data, surveillance within surveillance. Fuchs concludes that 
surveillance today is not Panoptic because surveillance technologies are centralised and 
hierarchic but because states and corporations are dominant actors that accumulate power that 
they can use for disciplinary surveillance.335  
 
5.12 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has sought to demonstrate from theoretical and legal perspectives, why 
communications data retention should be regarded as secret mass surveillance within 
surveillance. This has been achieved by considering theories of surveillance and concluding 
that data retention can be both Panoptic, and Panspectric. The Panopticon, popularised by 
Faucoult highlighted that disciplinary power is not about acts of physical violence (just as 
Jacobs notes with regards to totalitarian societies),336 it trains, drills and normalises people337 
turning them docile,338 inducing the chilling effect. It is unsurprising that Foucault’s work on 
power is regarded as mattering more than ever today.339  
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In addition to this, the ECHR, EU and UK law also demonstrate that data retention is a form 
of surveillance, based on jurisprudence and statutes. Moreover, the synergy between 
governments and private corporations highlighted the dual surveillance nature whereby the 
latter would conduct their own surveillance (allowed by national law) and give the former 
subsequent control, or the former would mandate surveillance for subsequent control creating 
what has been coined surveillance within surveillance. As Foucault accepted, ‘that there were 
real forces of violence in the world, and not only state violence. There is also corporate violence 
due to enormous condensations of capital.’340  General consensus from focus groups have 
demonstrated that ‘that the collection of metadata is seen as surveillance.’341 Reasons for this 
centred around:  
 
[I]deas such as giving consent for data collection, personal ownership of data, questions 
around why this data would need to be collected, the lack of anonymity and the ability 
to be identified by the collection of [useful] metadata.342 
 
It has been recommended that the UK government take views of the public into account on 
digital surveillance and privacy and would have to do more to persuade the public that bulk 
data collection is anything but mass digital surveillance.343 Moreham notes that ‘[b]ecause 
information collection and storage is regarded as a form of surveillance, Art.8(2) is applied 
strictly in these cases’344 highlighting why the same strict standards of interception must apply 
to data retention.345  
 
This Chapter avoided defining surveillance itself as the focus was placed upon data retention. 
Constructing a definition of surveillance based on a specific type of surveillance measure may 
have had the unintended consequence of defining it too narrowly. Haggerty and Samatas have 
noted the difficulty scholars face when making generalisations about surveillance because of 
the different dynamics and implications of various types.346 This approach was adopted by 
Foucault, who declined to define power because people would win more freedom by declining 
to define in advance ‘all the forms that freedom could possibly take.’347 Thus, the metaphor of 
the Panopticon was used to demonstrate how best to describe data retention as surveillance. 
Moreover, relying upon the dictionary and Lyon’s definition of surveillance proved to be too 
narrow in themselves.  
 
In arguing that data retention can be Panoptic, McMullan asks in the world of digital 
surveillance and data capture are we still objects of information?348 McMullan continues that 
in the ‘private space of my personal browsing I do not feel exposed – I do not feel that my body 
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of data is under surveillance because I do not know where that body begins or ends.’ McMullan 
articulates that due to the anonymity of the internet, rather than normalising behaviour, the 
opposite happens. McMullan argues that due to the Internet of Things (IoT), the 
interconnectivity of regular objects (cars, homes, even sex objects)349 via the internet, the vast 
data created about our lives will most likely ‘wind its way towards corporate and government 
reservoirs.’ McMullan highlights that there may not be a communicating tower, but there will 
be communicating sensors in our most intimate objects. The idea of the IoT becomes important 
in the question on to whom an obligation to retain can be imposed upon as we move closer to 
an all-encompassing Panspectron.  
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Chapter 6: Who is obligated to retain? Everything that ‘communicates’? 
 
6.1 Introduction  
  
This Chapter considers what types of communication service providers are under an obligation 
to retain communications data. Although the UK has voted to leave the European Union (EU), 
it is still a Member State and thus EU law still applies as would any retained EU law. The 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29) (created by Directive 95/46/EC to provide 
independent advice to the European Commission on data protection matters)1 expressed its 
hesitancy to impose retention obligations on a wider number of communications service 
providers because it was felt unnecessary (author’s emphasis).2 The WP29 also stressed that 
the European Commission must ensure that when extending the scope of the new e-Privacy 
instrument, this should not automatically allow Member States to bring new communication 
services in the scope of new or existing national data retention legislation.3 The WP29 did not 
expand upon why such restraint was necessary, but the UK has exercised none. This Chapter 
will demonstrate the implications of adding retention obligations to new communications 
service providers. 
 
The obligation to retain communications data under EU law lies with publicly available 
electronic communications services.4 The UK uses its own terminology of what were once 
public telecommunications services, and are now telecommunications operators. This Chapter 
discusses the definitions of electronic communications services/networks and 
telecommunications services/systems/operators whilst also highlighting the public and private 
element, with the latter increasing the scope of retention obligations. This Chapter also 
concerns itself with the evolution of who could be obliged to retain from public 
telecommunications services to telecommunication operators which now includes both 
telecommunication services and telecommunication systems, removing the public barrier 
which was once present. This signifies the UK’s extension beyond EU law to include 
essentially anything that can communicate across any network i.e. WiFi, Bluetooth, the devices 
themselves that enable communications, software, apps, websites etc, emerging networks and 
services and devices, and devices related to the Internet of Things (IoT). This will highlight 
how the IoT will bring about interferences with the ‘family life’ and ‘home’ aspect of Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) relating back to Chapter 4. 
Furthermore, this Chapter will demonstrate that under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 
2016) the power to obligate retention does not just fall upon the Secretary of State and Judicial 
Commissioner but on public authorities and others. The obligation to retain could essentially 
capture anything that communicates ever, and therefore be imposed on anyone. 
 
6.2  What does European Union and UK Law have to say? 
 
a. EU law 
 
																																																						
1 Glossary <https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/glossary/a_en> accessed 30 November 2017. 
2 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2016 on the evaluation and review of the ePrivacy 
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Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC (Directive on privacy and electronic communications, 
the e-Privacy Directive) allows Member States to adopt legislative measures providing for the 
retention of data for a limited period justified on the grounds such as national security, defence, 
public security, and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal 
offences or of unauthorised use of the electronic communication system. Article 3(1) sets out 
that retention obligations apply to publicly available electronic communications services (ECS) 
in public communications networks (PCN). 
 
Article 2(c) of Directive 2002/21/EC defines ECS as a service which consists wholly or in part 
in the conveyance of signals on networks. This excludes broadcasting services which exercise 
editorial control over content, and information society services (ISS). An ECS would be an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) such as TalkTalk using BT’s network (PCN) but not internet 
telephony (VoIP) or e-mail and instant messaging providers,5 demonstrating the limited6 scope 
of who could be obligated to retain. This is further restricted by the ‘publically available’ 
element meaning any ECS that is provided so as to be available for use by members of the 
public.7 Due to ECS not covering ISS (which are over the top services (OTT)) this would 
exclude services like Skype, Google search, Whatsapp and Netflix8 from retention obligations 
when said services do not wholly or mainly concern itself with the conveyance of signals and 
content services. Brown does however point to an interesting conflict of interpretation, Recital 
20 of the e-Privacy Directive imposes obligations on service providers who offer publicly 
available electronic communications services over the Internet. He opines that if a provider is 
offering a service “over the Internet,” that service does not consist in the conveyance of signals, 
and instead, on the basis of the definitions, would be an ISS.9 However, where there is a conflict 
between a preamble and a Community act, the latter takes precedence.10 Moreover, many 
services over the internet can be purely content based services (Netflix), thus again outside the 
definition of ECS. 
 
b. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000) 
 
Under the old regime of RIPA 2000, retention obligations were imposed on public 
telecommunications services. Telecommunications services fall under the category of 
communications service providers (CSPs).11 The meaning of a telecommunications service can 
be found in s.2(1) and s.81(1) RIPA 2000 which states that any service that consists in the 
provision of access to, and of facilities for making use of, any telecommunication system 
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(whether or not one provided by the person providing the service); and “telecommunication 
system” means any system (including the apparatus comprised in it) which exists (whether 
wholly or partly in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) for the purpose of facilitating the 
transmission of communications by any means involving the use of electrical or electro-
magnetic energy (see Smith’s example below). This can be subdivided into public and private 
telecommunication systems. Private telecommunication systems are telecommunication 
systems which without itself being a public telecommunication system are systems that are 
attached, directly or indirectly and whether or not for the purposes of the communication in 
question, to a public telecommunication system and its apparatus is both located in the UK and 
used for making the attachment to the public telecommunication system.  As Barclay notes that 
‘[s]ection 1 goes beyond section 1 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 which the 
current Act repeals, by the inclusion of private telecommunications service.’12  
 
This, however, was done in response13 to Halford v UK where the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) discovered that Interception of Communications Act 1985 (ICA 1985) did not 
apply to internal communications operated by public authorities nor were there any provisions 
in other domestic law which regulated interception made on such systems.14 Reid and Ryder, 
echoed by Benjamin15 summarised this by stating this inclusion of private telecommunications 
systems is required in order guarantee that provisions of RIPA 2000 extend to the internet as 
access to the internet is generally provided by private organisations, thus putting ISPs within 
the ambit of RIPA 2000.16 Smith in support of this assertion pointed out that private 
telecommunication systems are likely to catch any private network where it is possible to send 
and receive emails, which would include most office networks.17  
 
This assertion that telecommunication systems includes the internet requires some clarification 
by describing what the internet is in basic terms. According to the Federal Networking Council 
(FNC),18 the internet is a global information system that: 
 
(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the Internet 
Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons;  
(ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-
compatible protocols; and  
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services 
layered on the communications and related infrastructure described herein. 
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In simple terms, the Internet Protocol (IP) transfers data19 over a network of computers (the 
internet) from sender to receiver, which are identified by an (IP) address20 that is allocated to 
both.21 This is similar to posting a letter as it requires at least a destination address for the postal 
services to deliver to.22 The transmission of data can occur over wired or wireless networks 
which use electrical signals or electromagnetic waves.23 
   
Reid and Ryder (and Fenwick) pointed to a deficiency with the definitions of 
telecommunication systems, notably that new technology may mean that some systems are 
completely outside the ambit of the Act, for example certain internal intranet systems used by 
commercial organisations.24 Smith further elaborates this point by referring to the Explanatory 
Notes of RIPA,25 Smith highlights the distinction between an office network, linked to a public 
telecommunication system by a private exchange and secure office intranet, the former falling 
within the definition of private telecommunications system and the latter is not. Smith regards 
the reference to secure office intranet as ‘puzzling’ because according to the definitions of a 
private telecommunications system a secure intranet would only fall outside this if it were 
completely physically isolated from the public network.26  Smith also refers to the comments 
of Charles Clarke (the then Home Secretary) regarding the public-private distinction where he 
stated:27 
 
…on the matter of public-private systems and domestic systems…we believe, that 
domestic systems are unequivocally private systems. The end of the public system is 
the network termination point, which is usually the white BT box… Any extensions 
after that, whether to the PC or anything else, are part of the householder's private 
system.28 
 
Smith suggests that although Clarke’s explanation is in accordance with established 
distinctions between public and private networks, it does not reflect what is said in RIPA 2000 
itself. Smith elaborates on this point by referring to one of the ingredients under RIPA 2000 is 
whether any public telecommunications service is provided by means of any part of the 
system.29Smith notes as s.2(1) of RIPA 2000 states that any service that consists in the 
provision of access to any telecommunication system which leads Smith to conclude that if 
offered or provided to a substantial section of the public, it becomes a public 
telecommunications service.30  Smith’s example which refers to an individual in an household 
who were to host a website or a collection of MP3 files on a domestic PC, or store webcam 
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pictures and make them available through the domestic phone line.31 Smith suggests that, on 
the face of it this would appear to constitute offering the public access to the system consisting 
of the domestic PC (especially now due to the rise of home-workers and small businesses being 
run from the home).32 Smith went on to point out that if apparatus used for the provision of 
hosting services is to be regarded as apparatus for the purpose of facilitating the transmission 
of communications within the definition of telecommunications systems, this would render the 
parts of the domestic system used for that purpose a public telecommunications system for the 
purposes of RIPA 2000.33 If one looks to RIPA 2000 s.81, the definition of apparatus, this 
includes any equipment, machinery or device and any wire or cable, where the PC could fall 
under equipment, machinery or device, and the facilitating the transmission of communications 
could be the web hosting/MP3 storing. What Smith is arguing is that the web-hoster is not the 
telecommunication service, but is the telecommunication system. This would also apply to 
content and application providers such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo!, Microsoft, Tencent, 
Alibaba, Baidu, Amazon, eBay, Netflix, and Apple34 and even ISPs themselves.35  In order to 
store and process their content, these content and application providers require investment in 
data centres which contain thousands of metal racks, powerful computers (severs) or devices 
for data storage.36 This equipment, just like Smith’s web hosts PC would fall under apparatus 
for the purposes of s.81 and would thus be public telecommunication systems. This, however, 
would mean that the obligation to retain cannot be imposed in instances such as these because 
they are not public telecommunication services.37 This demonstrates that the obligation to 
retain under RIPA 2000 and the e-Privacy Directive are very similar in that they are mostly 
concerned with ISPs and not OTT services.  
 
c. Communications Act 2003 
 
The Communications Act 2003 (CA 2003) replaced certain sections of the 
Telecommunications Act 1984 (TA 1984). Notably Schedule 3, para 5(b) states that ‘the words 
“telecommunication services”, wherever occurring, there shall be substituted “electronic 
communications services.”’ The ICA 1985 also used the term telecommunications service 
interchangeably with the TA 1984.38 This would imply telecommunications services and ECS 
are to some degree to be treated as one and the same under UK law, therefore making it 
necessary to consider the CA 2003. This can be supported by Ofcom’s general conditions 
guidelines, where they assert there are three main types of service providers. The first are ECS 
or networks which include both public and private networks, mobile and fixed (unless 
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otherwise stated) voice telephony, data and internet.39 It would have been preferable for Ofcom 
to make a distinction between ECS and networks when giving examples of both as different 
legal rules may apply to each. Section 32(1) of the CA 2003 defines an ECN as a transmission 
system (plus associated equipment, software and stored data) for the conveyance, by the use of 
electrical, magnetic or electro-magnetic energy, of signals of any description i.e. a public 
electronic communications network includes a network of mobile phone cables or a mobile 
phone network40 and the internet.41 Section 32(2) notes that an ECS is a service consisting in, 
or having as its principal feature, the conveyance by means of an electronic communications 
network of signals, except in so far as it is a content service. The Information Commissioner’s 
Office took this to mean that members of the public can sign up to in order to send or receive 
electronic signals e.g. a phone contract or internet connection,42 thus putting ISPs within the 
ambit of public ECS.43 One thing to note here however is that ISS which are not wholly 
involved in the conveyance of signals are not explicitly excluded from the definition of ECS. 
The CA 2003 implements44 Directive 2002/21/EC (the Framework Directive),45 and almost 
replicates the Article 2(a) definition of ECN. This further supports the notion that the internet 
is an ECN which is similar to the notion of a telecommunications system.  
 
d. The UK’s ever-expanding definitional approach, indicative of a trend? 
 
Watson and Ingram46 refer to the ‘Twitter Joke Trial’47 (concerning sending messages of a 
"menacing character" contrary to s.127(1)(a) and (3) of the CA 2003) and noted that by the 
High Court regarding the Internet as a public ECN (for the purposes of the CA 2003), it would 
put services like Twitter, an ISS,48 under data retention obligations, which is problematic.49 
The High Court was right to agree that without the Internet, Twitter would not exist50 but erred 
when it considered that a ‘tweet’ was a ‘message’ sent by a public ECS for the purposes of 
s.127(1).51 Section 127(1) requires the message be sent via a public ECN not service. When 
Twitter was regarded as within the ambit of s.127(1)52 it was unclear whether this meant a 
public ECN or within the definition of ECS because adding ‘by an [ECS]’ implies Twitter is 
such a service. If it is the former (which Informm and others53 believed), this contradicts 
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conditions/general-conditions-guidelines/> accessed 1 December 2017. 
40 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Key concepts and definitions’ <https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-pecr/key-concepts-and-definitions/> accessed 1 December 2017.  
41 Graham Smith, (n17), 977. 
42 Information Commissioner’s Office, (n40). 
43 Recital 10 of Directive 2002/21/EC; Opinion 7/2000 of the Article 29 Working Party, (n35), p5.  
44 New EC Regulatory Framework for the regulation of electronic communications, 
<http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/ind_info/eu_directives/> accessed 20/08/2014.   
45 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) 
<http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/ind_info/eu_directives/> accessed 20/08/2014. 
46 Chris Watson and Bailey Ingram, ‘The Twitter Joke Judgment: The Law with Unintended Consequences?’ 
(17 August 2012) <http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed27370> accessed 1 December 2017. 
47 Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin). 
48 Lilian Edwards, ‘Section 127 of the Communications Act 2003: Threat or Menace?’ (10 September 2012) 
<https://www.scl.org/articles/2579-section-127-of-the-communications-act-2003-threat-or-menace> accessed 1 
December 2017. 
49 ibid. 
50 Chambers, (n47), [23-24]. 
51 ibid, [25]. 
52 ibid. 
53 Carrefax, ‘Twitter Joke Trial | WLR (D) Case Summary’ (1 August 2012) 
<https://carrefax.wordpress.com/2012/08/01/twitter-joke-trial-wlr-d-case-summary/> accessed 1 December 
	151	
explanatory notes for the CA 2003.54Watson and Ingram also continued that this was indicative 
of a trend given the draft Communications Data Bill (dCDB) dispensed the public private 
network distinction altogether.55  
 
e. Data Retention Investigatory Powers Act 2014 and the telecommunications service 
 
The now repealed Data Retention Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014) continued the 
indicative trend of expanding the services in which retention obligations could be imposed 
upon. Section 1 maintained the public element. Section 5 noted that a telecommunications 
service was a service that consisted in the provision of access to, and of facilities for making 
use of, a telecommunication system include any case where a service consists in or includes 
facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may 
be transmitted, by means of such a system (author’s emphasis). 
  
The Explanatory Notes56 makes clear that the definition of “telecommunications service” 
includes companies who provide internet-based services, such as webmail. Simply put, the 
definition applies to anything that allows or can allow the creation, management or storage of 
communications across networks. This is because DRIPA 2014 does not define 
‘communications’ which could range from sending an email, a forum post, to making a search 
on eBay as all require communication in some form for the task at hand to be completed.  
 
During the passage of DRIPA 2014, the then MP Elfyn Llwyd interpreted the then Clause 5 as 
extraordinarily affecting services outside the UK’s jurisdiction.57James Brokenshire MP 
asserted that Clause 5 was intended to clarify what was always covered by the definition of 
telecommunications services.58 This is simply a falsity and untenable as the public had no way 
of knowing how the Home Office might have interpreted the provisions either in the minds of 
its officials or in its previous dealings with CSPs.59 Moreover, the provisions of ‘facilitating 
the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be 
transmitted, by means of such a system’ has been inserted into the new definition. Carol Harlow 
mentions, by implication that RIPA 2000 did not extend to web-based services as she noted 
that proposals to include in the next Queen’s Speech extensions to RIPA’s60 ambit have been 
announced to cover more modern forms of communication, including internet-based email, 
twittering and tweeting, Blackberries, Skype, mobile phone texting, social networking sites 
like Facebook and even online games. Kelly Fiveash reported that one industry source told El 
Reg that warrants under the new law could be served on publishers who provide message 
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boards for their readers.61 This appears to be part of a trend by the UK government to impose 
obligations on social media e.g. extremist content.62 These extensions beyond RIPA 200063 
and the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA 2001) were also noted based on 
what was not covered i.e. nothing beyond ISP and telephone company logging.64 This 
demonstrates that, contrary to the assertion of Brokenshire MP, the definition of 
telecommunications service had been amended and significantly extended65 by DRIPA 2014. 
 
An example of the implications of this extension can be demonstrated with cloud-based 
services. Office Online can facilitate the creation of (new Word document) communications. 
This document would be stored on Onedrive (a cloud-based service).66 Draft emails could also 
be affected as they can be (or have the potential to be) transmitted. Not an expansion per se67 
but DRIPA’s Code of Practice stated that CSPs may therefore include those persons who 
provide services where customers, guests or members of the public are provided with access 
to communications services e.g. WiFi, that are ancillary to the provision of another service, for 
example in hotels, restaurants, libraries and airport lounges.68 This obligation could be imposed 
on either the ISP or the ancillary service provider69 or both, potentially creating two sets of 
similar or the same retained data,70 with the latter not constituting the processing of personal 
data.71 DRIPA 2014 would also catch those that are considered virtual ISPs, these are services 
that provide access to the internet using the infrastructure of wholesale ISPs.72  
 
Another extension in DRIPA 2014, is that of an actual telecommunications operator. Section 
25(1) of RIPA 2000 defined them as a person who provides a postal service or 
telecommunications service. Section 107(1) of the ATCSA 2001 maintained that CSPs (which 
could be obliged to retain) meant the same as telecommunications services in RIPA 2000. In 
DRIPA 2014, by virtue of s.1, a retention notice was not imposed on a CSP or public 
telecommunications service, but on a public telecommunications operator, a seemingly 
																																																						
61 Kelly Fiveash, ‘ISPs 'blindsided' by UK.gov's 'emergency' data retention and investigation powers law’ The 
Register (London, 14 July 2014) 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/07/14/isps_blindsided_by_ukgovs_rushed_data_retention_and_investigatio
n_powers_law/> accessed 3 December 2017.  
62 Heather Stewart, ‘May calls on internet firms to remove extremist content within two hours’ The Guardian 
(London, 20 September 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/19/theresa-may-will-tell-
internet-firms-to-tackle-extremist-content> accessed 3 December 2017. 
63 R. Jay, ‘The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 – Recent Developments’ (15 January 2015) 
<https://www.scl.org/articles/3279-the-data-retention-and-investigatory-powers-act-2014-recent-developments> 
accessed 3 December 2017. 
64 Caspar Bowden, ‘Closed circuit television for inside your head: blanket traffic data retention and the 
emergency anti-terrorism legislation’ (2002) Duke Law and Technology Review 1 1, 5.   
65 Written evidence submitted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (IPB0017), para 27.  
66 David Hayward, ‘How to use OneDrive: A guide to Microsoft’s cloud storage solution’ (14 February 2016) 
<http://www.trustedreviews.com/how-to/how-to-use-onedrive-2945212> accessed 3 December 2017.  
67 See section 81(1) of RIPA 2000.It is noted that a telecommunication service ‘facilities for making use of, any 
telecommunication system (whether or not one provided by the person providing the service).’ The ‘whether or 
not provided by the person providing the service’ is akin to the ancillary purpose mentioned in the Code of 
Practice. 
68 Home Office, (n11), para 2.16-2.17.  
69 ibid, para 2.18. 
70 From the hotel and the ISP. 
71 Alan S. Reid, ‘The European Court of Justice case of Breyer’ (2017) Journal of Information Rights, Policy 
and Practice 2:1 1, 4. 
72 Quinton, B, ‘They’ll make an ISP out of you’ (1999) Telephony 237:22 88; Lipof, R. ‘Boardwatch’ (1999) 
13:12 94; Adegoke, Y, ‘Eurotel to launch virtual ISP services’ (2003) New Media Age 1, 9; Techopedia, ‘What 
is a Virtual Internet Service Provider?  <https://www.techopedia.com/definition/2540/virtual-internet-service-
provider-visp> accessed 7 December 2015.  
	153	
innocuous change. However, on deeper inspection, a public telecommunications operator by 
virtue of s.2(1)(a) and (b) now includes not only a provider of a public telecommunications 
service but also a person who controls or provides a public telecommunication system. There 
was no elaboration or clarification on what controlling a telecommunication system entails. 
 
This applied where communications data relating to that system is either, or both, processed 
and stored outside the United Kingdom,73 displaying its extra-territorial effect. The importance 
of this addition is that it would now catch those that fall under Smith’s example, the web-
hoster, as they can be argued to either control the public telecommunication system (via control 
of their PC) or provide it (by making it accessible to the public) and content and application 
providers such as Google, Facebook (whom is based in Ireland) etc,74 thus extending the 
definition to individuals or companies using computers for such purposes. This may even 
include those who have open WiFi in their place of residence which makes it possible for 
members of the public to use. The inclusion of public telecommunication system 
controllers/providers only serves to highlight that the logical explanation would be that this 
definition captures not only internet based services, but also phones and particularly smart 
phones, and the apps that are used on them.75 
 
A possible explanation for this comes from a report by Rory Cellan-Jones, where he noted that 
‘the security services may be more interested in targeting the likes of Google than your ISP if 
they want to know who you're talking to.’76  
 
Cellan-Jones believed that both Google and the mobile networks already collect a significant 
amount of data which might be of interest to the police and intelligence services.77 This could 
also be applied to web-based services. 
 
DRIPA 2014 had been deliberately crafted with the intention to avoid doubt78 about whether 
the internet and services provided over the internet can be caught by it. This would be a clear 
extension on who could obligate to retain, beyond that of EU law. This, technologically 
broadened definition, which potentially has a wide ambit79 would not, however, be the end of 
it. 
 
f. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016: A further extension 
 
1. Extending beyond DRIPA 2014 
 
The IPA 2016 (replacing DRIPA 2014), like the draft form sought to, amongst other things, to 
bring communications data retention within a single, clear piece of legislation.80  Under the 
IPA 2016, the retention notices are provided for by s.87 which notes that the Secretary of State 
may impose, (subject to Judicial Commissioner approval)81 a retention notice on a 
																																																						
73 Home Office, (n11), para 1.5. 
74 See above. 
75 More on smart technology will be discussed when considering the Internet of Things. 
76 Rory Cellan-Jones, ‘Web surveillance - who’s got your data?’ BBC News (London, 2 April 2002) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17586605> accessed 4 December 2017.  
77 ibid. 
78 Explanatory Notes to DRIPA 2014, para 7.  
79 Graham Smith, ‘Mandatory communications data retention lives on in the UK - or does it?’ (21 August 2014) 
<http://uk.practicallaw.com/8-577-6488> accessed 4 December 2017.  
80 Home Office, Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (Cm 9152 2015) para 26. 
81 Section 89 of the IPA 2016. 
	154	
telecommunications operator. The major difference between IPA 2016 and DRIPA 2014 is the 
omission of ‘public’ in telecommunications operators, which would therefore apply to hosted 
services offering communications to businesses, or those running cloud-based communications 
services on behalf of businesses.82 It would also mean that even if the web-hoster in Smith’s 
example did not make mp3s/photos accessible to the public they could still be put under an 
obligation to retain. Smith himself notes that ‘[a] home router or domestic WiFi setup, a 
network within an office, school or university, or a private network of any sort would all be 
caught.’83 According to Smith, this demonstrates ‘a significant change from existing 
legislation’ in which the Home Office ‘has made no attempt to justify the extension to all 
private networks.’84 This also highlights that the government has gradually reintroducing by 
stealth, the wide-reaching application of the failed dCDB.85  
 
Section 261 contains definitions relevant to telecommunications, with s.261(10) noting 
similarly to s.2(1)(a) and (b) of DRIPA 2014 a telecommunications operator offers or provides 
a telecommunication service to persons in the UK or controls or provides a telecommunication 
systems which is wholly or partly in or controlled from the UK. The fact that a 
telecommunications services is offered to the person in the UK highlights the extra-territorial 
application of IPA 2016, as it’s not the location of the service that is important, but to whom 
the service is offered to. This can be illustrated by Northern Ireland Court of Appeal (NICoA) 
in CG v Facebook Ireland Ltd & McCloskey.86 Although the case concerned the e-Commerce 
Directive, the way in which the NICoA determined whether Facebook provided services to 
those in the UK is of importance. Facebook had argued that the mere fact that its services were 
accessible did not mean that it was established there, and therefore, could not be a data 
controller for the purposes of s.5 of the Data Protection Act 1998.87 Facebook maintained that 
it was established in Ireland, and therefore it was Irish data protection law which had applied 
to them.88 However, the NICoA disagreed holding that evidence indicates that Facebook (UK) 
Ltd was established for the sole purpose of making it more profitable. The NICoA continued 
that it conducts its activities within the UK, is responsible for engaging those within the UK 
who seek to use Facebook services for advertising. In addition to this, the NICoA maintained 
that it holds relevant data which it processes on behalf of Facebook, and even though there was 
no direct evidence of its connection with Facebook, there is an irresistible inference that ‘in the 
absence of any further explanation that Facebook (UK) Ltd was established to service 
Facebook and is part of the wider Facebook group of companies.’89 The NICoA was therefore, 
satisfied that Facebook (UK) Ltd engaged in the real and effective exercise of activity: 
 
[T]hrough stable arrangements in the United Kingdom and having regard to the 
importance of those activities to Facebook’s economic enterprise the processing of data 
by Facebook was carried out in the context of the activities of that establishment.90 
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This establishes that even providing ancillary services to those in the UK, this could attract the 
application of UK law, similar to the effects doctrine under EU law.91 
 
The definition of a telecommunication service92 is a near replica of that stipulated to in s.5 of 
DRIPA. There are two differences, first, a telecommunication service is (if it ever was) not 
dependent on whether the person who provides the service also provides a telecommunication 
system. Second, another important point requires attention, not within the definition itself, but 
of terminology within the definition, that of ‘communications.’ Its singular is defined in 
s.261(2)(a) as anything comprising speech, music, sounds, visual images or data of any 
description, and s.261(2)(b), signals serving either for the impartation of anything between 
persons, between a person and a thing or between things or for the actuation or control of any 
apparatus. This confirmed the presumption highlighted earlier about communications having a 
wide-ranging meaning which would cover essentially any website. This is also true as this 
definition was inserted into DRIPA 2014 a year after it came into force via s.21(4)(a) of the 
CTSA 2015.93 This is also a replica of s.81(1) of RIPA 2000, but the difference here is that 
‘communication’ was not relevant to data retention as the word was not present in the old 
definition of telecommunication service (only telecommunication system) as it now in the IPA 
2016.  
 
2. Difficulty with defining ‘communications’ 
 
The terminology of s.261(2)(b) is not straightforward in terms of its meaning. It stipulates that 
a communication also entails signals serving either for the impartation of anything between 
persons, between a person and a thing or between things or for the actuation or control of any 
apparatus. There is no indication of what a signal actually means under this subsection, is it 
electrical signals? If this is the case, why is this not indicated with clear terminology as such 
when describing telecommunication system?94 Would hand gestures constitute impartation of 
anything between persons? If this is the case, how could it be suggested to be terminology 
relevant to telecommunications if telecommunications are not necessarily required for the 
specified act?95 Would it be hand gestures that are carried out whilst using a telecommunication 
service i.e. Skype video call? What is a ‘thing’? Anything? Something? Nothing? It is likely a 
device or object (see below), but there is no clarity. What does ‘for the actuation or control of 
any apparatus’ mean? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, actuation means to make a 
machine or device operate.96 According to s.263(1) ‘apparatus’ ranges from ‘any equipment, 
machinery or device (whether physical or logical)97 and any wire or cable. What does physical 
and logical mean in this instance?98 What if the physical and logical components are not 
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controlled by the same entity, who then is said to be in ‘control’? Are they jointly in control or 
does control of one component take precedence over the other? There is no attempt to explain 
this subsection in the explanatory notes or anywhere else, instead just referenced throughout 
the IPA 2016 several times. One could only assume that physical and logical are meant as a 
substitute for software and hardware. This subsection requires important clarifications because 
the definition of telecommunication services relies on what ‘communication’ means thus 
enabling a determination to which services the definition of telecommunication services apply. 
It is only later in section 8 that s.261(2)(b) begins to make sense. 
 
3. Difficulty in defining telecommunications operators 
 
Danezis highlights the difficulty in determining what a telecommunications operator is. He 
highlights that telecommunication services in s.261(11) is intended to include those providing 
services over infrastructure, logical or physical, provided by others; or software and hardware 
provided by others.99  Section 261(12) maintains the notion of facilitation of the creation, 
management or storage of communications where Danezis is troubled by the mention of 
‘creation’ as it might be used to argue that client side applications do facilitate the creation of 
communications (and their storage), and therefore are a telecommunications service. This 
provision thus makes potential creators of software and apps telecommunication operators.100 
It is suggested here that Danezis’s concern is well founded about who this may apply to if we 
look back to the definition of communication in s.261(2)(a) which would include speech, 
music, sounds, visual images or data of any description. The ‘data of any description’ would 
seemingly catch all software and apps that communicates via a telecommunication system and 
thus creators themselves and the software such as web browsers101 which can now be synced 
with other devices,102 Microsoft Word,103 and apps like WhatsApp, Google Maps104 and any 
software or app that uploads and downloads (such as updating) via the internet etc would be 
classed as telecommunication services. Updating105 was used as opposed to other descriptions 
because whilst some apps transfer images etc,106 they all transfer data via the internet and the 
one thing that most if not all apps have in common is that they are frequently updated. It 
therefore is logical to maintain that updates are a service making software and apps that require 
updating is one example of making a service a telecommunication service.  
 
4. What does ‘control’ mean? 
 
The issue of the meaning of the word ‘control’ was mentioned above. Danezis noted the subtle 
differences in terminology when it came to telecommunications system and service where the 
former uses terminology such as ‘provide’ and ‘control’ and the latter uses ‘offer.’107 It is 
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therefore suggested here that the use of ‘control’ in telecommunication systems would include 
home area networks (HAN). These are networks that are deployed or operated within a small 
boundary, typically a house or small office. This enables the communication and sharing of 
resources i.e. the internet between computers, laptops, mobiles, tablets, fax machines, printers, 
scanners,108 games consoles, home audio systems TVs etc over a network via wired or wireless 
means. The contention here is that whoever controls this network, mostly likely the 
house/office owner/occupier or subscriber to the wide area network (WAN) service would be 
regarded as having ‘control’ of the telecommunication system for the purposes of the IPA 2016 
and thus the obligation to retain could theoretically also be imposed upon them. This would 
likely also be the case for whoever controls, wireless personal area networks (WPAN),109 
(wireless) local area networks ((W)LAN), wireless body area networks (WBAN) which 
‘provides a continuous health monitoring of a patient without any constraint on his/her normal 
daily life activities’110 or the intranet in, for example, schools/universities.111 This may also 
raise Article 6 of the ECHR self-incrimination issues as an individual could be compelled to 
retain data on themselves.112  
 
The addition of ‘offer’ a telecommunications service requires some attention, as this was not 
present in the dCDB113 or DRIPA 2014114itself which used the word ‘provide.’ The difference 
between offer and provide is that the later involves actually giving something, while the former 
is usually the initial step in giving something. So, the contention here is that whether software 
or apps are actually given they too would be classed as telecommunication services. For 
example, an app that has no downloads would still fall under this definition of 
telecommunication service even if they have not actually provided anyone with the service in 
question, in essence this could be software, app, web creators etc who have yet to finish a 
product. This idea is supported by the fact that CSPs which are subject to technical capability 
notices must notify the Government of new products and services in advance of their launch, 
to allow consideration of the necessity and proportionality of requiring a technical capability 
notice on the new service.115 Although this refers to technical capability notices, it does not 
change the truth of the matter, in that the Government would be aware of a new service and 
could use this knowledge to put the creators under retention obligations. 
 
5. Software and Hardware vendors 
 
Danezis makes a further point on the ambiguity of whether ‘telecommunication operators’ 
apply to software and hardware vendors.116 Danezis notes that one could argue a software 
vendor provides a telecommunication system if by ‘system’ one is to mean the software used 
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to facilitate transmissions which include the ‘apparatus comprised in it’117 with software and 
hardware falling in the definition of apparatus.118 Danezis believes that software and hardware 
vendors of general computing equipment may be considered telecommunications operators — 
when their kit is used in the context of telecommunications.119 Danezis warns that this 
interpretation could include operating systems and even processor manufacturers.  
 
An example to highlight the scope of Danezis’s observation would be to consider deep packet 
inspection (DPI) which can be used to detect application level threats120 (tantamount to 
interception121) for example, in next generation firewalls122 (NGFW).123 This is already a 
feature of websites124 and companies, such Alcatel, Cisco, Ericsson, IBM, Microsoft, Nokia 
and Symantec began aggressively marketing DPI technology as components of hardware and 
software firewalls.125 The contention here is that software and hardware vendors employing 
DPI technology which is used in the context telecommunications i.e. updating could also fall 
within this definition of telecommunications operator. 
 
6. Applying Danezis’s principles to possibilities under the IPA 2016 
 
These operators wherever in the world,126 could be, after consultation,127 put under further 
obligations by way of Regulations to provide facilities or services of a specified description or 
relating to apparatus owned or operated by a relevant operator. 128 These technical capabilities 
notices only apply to Part 2, 3, 5 and 6, but this would incidentally be caught by obligations 
under Part 4, which could be to retain data129 that has been DPI’d by their software/hardware, 
a kind of backdoor interception and subsequent retention which could later be analysed. Kieren 
McCarthy argues that there may not be much point in using a virtual private network (VPN) 
(which would be a telecommunications service) to encrypt and conceal your web activities 
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because they could be blown open by a technical capability notice.130 Some VPNs do not log 
internet traffic, but if they were required to under a technical capability notice (or under the 
guise of generating data), then they could also subsequently be ordered to retain this data. Lack 
of compliance with a technical capability notice could result in civil proceedings by virtue of 
s.255(10).  
 
Any telecommunication operator and by extension service, whether it be an app, software, 
website, webmail or creators of said services etc could be compelled to make data retention 
capabilities possible if it was not possible already incidentally. Section 253(5)(c) allows the 
removal of electronic protection to any communications data, coupled with s.253(5)(b) the 
telecommunication operator could be obligated to retain by way of removing electronic 
protection and disclose it via s.253(5)(e). This is all possible because s.253(5) leaves open the 
possibility of other undefined obligations as it makes note of ‘among other things’ which could 
be used as a basis for issuing retention notices under Part 4 whether the operator is in the UK 
or not.131  
 
When one considers the application of Bluetooth, a wireless (radio waves) technology standard 
for exchanging data over short distances,132 the application of the IPA 2016’s extent can further 
be explored. Bluetooth capabilities exists in products ranging from telephones, tablets, media 
players, robotics systems, handheld, laptops and console gaming equipment, and some high 
definition headsets, modems, and watches.133 As Danezis warned with regards to operating 
systems, Bluetooth is incorporated in them.134 If enabled Bluetooth is regarded as a 
telecommunication system,135 then at the very least, devices mentioned could be regarded as 
telecommunication services because they provide access to or facilitate the use of Bluetooth. 
Also, if these devices require updating then the argument that these devices provide a 
telecommunication service strengthens. There is another argument that Bluetooth and indeed 
WiFi (and other wireless technology) enabled devices would fall under telecommunication 
systems because they enable the transmission of communications via various means of 
electrical and electromagnetic energy, or they could be regarded as ‘apparatus,’ thus whichever 
way it is looked at, they would fall under telecommunications operator regardless. Importantly, 
Bluetooth connects to the IoT.136    
 
6.3 The Internet of Things and the beginning of the beyond 
 
(a) A Brief Summary of the Internet of Things 
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Wortmann and Flüchter have maintained, it is next to impossible in the last few months to not 
have come across the term ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT).137 But what exactly does IoT mean? Now 
that the terminology is being used in a broad manner, there is no common definition.138 The 
term dates back more than 15 years has been attributed to the work of the Auto-ID Labs at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on networked radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) infrastructures.139 This term had been applied in various contexts140 but can be 
summarised as ‘inanimate objects that surround human beings constantly monitor, track and 
react to changes occurring in the local environs’141 such as books, cars, electrical appliances 
and food.142  Mattern and Floerkemeier  point out that from a technical point of view, the IoT 
works by way of several complementary technical developments which taken together provide 
capabilities that help to bridge the gap between the virtual and physical world.143 These 
capabilities include: 
 
Communication and cooperation Objects have the ability to network with 
Internet resources or even with each other, to 
make use of data and services and update their 
state. Wireless technologies such as GSM and 
UMTS, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, ZigBee and various 
other wireless networking standards currently 
under development, particularly those relating 
to Wireless Personal Area Networks 
(WPANs). 
 
Addressability Within an Internet of Things, objects can be 
located and addressed via discovery, look-up 
or name services, and hence remotely 
interrogated or configured. 
 
Identification Objects are uniquely identifiable. RFID, NFC 
(Near Field Communication) and optically 
readable bar codes are examples of 
technologies with which even passive objects 
which do not have built-in energy resources 
can be identified (with the aid of a “mediator” 
such as an RFID reader or mobile 
phone). Identification enables objects to be 
linked to information associated with the 
particular object and that can be retrieved 
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from a server, provided the mediator is 
connected to the network. 
 
Sensing Objects collect information about their 
surroundings with sensors, record it, forward 
it or react directly to it. 
 
Actuation Objects contain actuators to manipulate their 
environment (for example by converting 
electrical signals into mechanical movement). 
Such actuators can be used to remotely control 
real-world processes via the Internet. 
 
Embedded information processing Smart objects feature a processor or 
microcontroller, plus storage capacity. These 
resources can be used, for example, to process 
and interpret sensor information, or to give 
products a “memory” of how they have been 
used. 
 
Localization Smart things are aware of their physical 
location, or can be located. GPS or the mobile 
phone network are suitable technologies to 
achieve this, as well as ultrasound time 
measurements, UWB (Ultra-Wide Band), 
radio beacons (e.g. neighbouring WLAN base 
stations or RFID readers with known 
coordinates) and optical technologies. 
 
User interfaces Smart objects can communicate with people 
in an appropriate manner (either directly or 
indirectly, for example via a smartphone). 
Innovative interaction paradigms are relevant 
here, such as tangible user interfaces, flexible 
polymer-based displays and voice, image or 
gesture recognition methods. 
 
Table A 
 
The European Commission summarises the mode of communications as: things-to-person 
communication and thing-to-thing communications, including Machine-to-Machine (M2M) 
communication.144 Mattern and Floerkemeier describe this interaction as an individual using 
their smart phone, to communicate with the Thing (smart object) which then communicates 
with the internet, which then communicates back to the smart phone and displaying information 
to the individual.145   
 
(b) The IoT and the IPA 2016 
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The Institute for Human Rights and Business were (IHRB) concerned about the definitions of 
telecommunications services and systems as these definitions would encompass ‘Big Data’ and 
the IoT.146 The IHRB felt it was unclear as to whether the definitions in the IPA 2016 would 
include ‘devices that generate data relating to individuals that may not involve communication 
between two people, but instead machine-to-machine communication.’147 It is only once a basic 
understanding of the IoT is gained can one properly comprehend s.261(2)(b) of the IPA 2016 
that can address IHRB’s concerns in the affirmative. Section 261(2)(b) indicates that 
‘communication’ involves signals serving either for the impartation of anything between 
persons, between a person and a thing or between things or for the actuation or control of any 
apparatus. Section 261(2)(b) is intended to cover communications by way of the IoT, but this 
inclusion would mean that the machinery behind the IoT would fall under the definition of 
telecommunication service as it consists in or includes facilitating the creation, management 
or storage of communications transmitted, or that may be transmitted, by means of such a 
system e.g. Bluetooth enabled devices and WiFi. Furthermore, devices, objects or Things 
would also be caught under the definition of telecommunication system because of conveyance 
of signals i.e. Bluetooth including the apparatus comprised, thus the IoT and associated 
hardware would fall under telecommunication operator however these definitions are 
approached. Moreover, the obligation to retain could fall upon natural or legal persons owning 
IoT devices as a telecommunications operator includes one who provides or controls the 
telecommunications system. The magnitude of the implications of this inclusion cannot be 
overstated because such technologies are already in place to some degree such as wearable 
tech,148 smart electricity meters,149 TVs150 future smart cities,151 the list could continue to 
applications such as transportation and logistics, healthcare, personal and social settings152 and 
even the home153 in which the US director of national intelligence has admitted will occur in 
the future.154 All would fall within the definition of telecommunications operator. The concern 
with smart objects is that they can accumulate a massive amount of data155 which the 
characteristics of such traffic are currently unknown156 could subsequently be retained, thus 
potentially turning our home into the least technologically private place in the IoT era. As 
Atzori et al have maintained that the ways in which data collection, mining, and provisioning 
will be accomplished in the IoT are completely different from current methods, providing an 
amazing number of occasions for personal data to be collected, thus making it impossible for 
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individuals to control disclosure.157 This information could be retained indefinitely and will 
affect individuals that do not even use any IoT service.158 There have already been privacy 
concerns raised by the Global Privacy Enforcement Network Sweep (GPENS) about the IoT 
and how companies handle personal data.159 The ICO made a statement highlighting the 
potential benefits of the IoT but that it should not be at the cost of our privacy.160 The European 
Commission made the distinction between connection in restricted areas (intranet of things) as 
opposed to the IoT which they regard as publicly accessible,161 DRIPA 2014 only applied the 
public element whereas the IPA 2016 makes no such distinction. Given the concerns 
highlighted above, it is appropriate to consider the ‘family life’ and ‘home’ aspects of Article 
8. 
 
(c) Home and Family Life in the IoT  
 
1. Home 
 
In Klass the ECtHR did not rule out that secret surveillance could interfere with a person’s 
home.162 The ECtHR noted that the living instrument doctrine (interpretation in light of societal 
changes and in line with present-day conditions) has allowed an extensive163 interpretation of 
home. 164 In Szabo and Vissy165 the ECtHR held that searching and surveillance ‘to monitor 
their electronic communications and computer data transmissions and to make recordings of 
any data acquired through these methods’ interfered not only with private life and 
correspondence, but also the home. Home would be interfered with even if this was not a 
seizure imposed in criminal proceedings.166 
 
The IoT brings hidden risks into the home,167 such as the ease ‘for a passive network observer 
to infer user behavior from encrypted smart home traffic’168 from metadata (IP packet headers, 
TCP packet headers, and send/receive rates)169 without the use of DPI.170 Such network 
observers include ISPs (a telecommunications operator), Wi-Fi eavesdroppers, or state-level 
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surveillance entities171 and such behaviour included sleep patterns, when appliances were used, 
when a camera feed was monitored and when it detects motion,172 or Amazon’s Alexa which 
can detect and ignore even in sleep mode.173 It has also been demonstrated that medical IoT 
devices can reveal ‘cleartext information that may reveal sensitive medical conditions and 
behaviours.’174 If this trend continues, Silkie Carlo of Big Brother Watch argues we will 
become ‘society of watched consumers subjected to the most granular, pervasive and 
inescapable surveillance. It is a terrifying thought.’175 
 
2. Family Life, the Home and Smart Meters 
 
Baroness Hale in Countryside Alliance highlighted the separate but related fundamental values 
of ‘the inviolability of the home and personal communications from official snooping.’176 
Smart metering is used as an example to demonstrate this. Smart metering can be described as: 
 
[A] new generation of advanced and intelligent metering devices which have the ability 
to record the energy consumption of a particular measuring point in intervals of fifteen 
minutes or even less…[that] can also communicate and transfer the information 
recorded in real time or at least on a daily basis by means of any communications 
network to the utility company for purposes such as monitoring of the system load as 
well as for billing purposes (author’s emphasis).’177 
 
The utility company could be a telecommunications service because it consists in or includes 
facilitating the creation, management or storage of communications transmitted, or that may 
be transmitted. It may also be a telecommunications system because providing the smart meter 
includes the conveyance of signals and the apparatus comprised. Thus, the utility company 
would be a telecommunications operator for providing an ancillary service. 
 
Smart meters can give insights into patterns of living.178 It can determine when a person is at 
home, sleeping, when they are preparing meals and the type (hot or cold), what appliances are 
used, when the kids are at home and even the channel the TV is tuned into.179 It can even be 
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utilised to inform health care professionals.180 This was argued to constitute a breach of the 
inviolability of the home and right to family life because smart meter usage does not just 
concern informational privacy, but also the effects the generation of that data has on spatial 
and relational privacy.181 Cuijpers and Koops asked the important questions of how smart 
meters could induce a chilling effect in the home and thus also interfere with family life: 
 
Are the occupants hindered in their right to an uninhibited home life? Do the occupants 
feel free to enter into relationships? It is by no means unthinkable that some occupants 
might feel embarrassed by the knowledge that their grid manager is ‘watching’ behind 
the front door and, for example, might be able to deduce from the meter readings that, 
with an otherwise ‘average’ energy-consumption pattern, the occupant regularly comes 
home between the hours of 2 and 3 a.m. on Friday nights and consumes more energy 
the next morning than on other days. Does this mean that two people are showering in 
this single-person household?182 
 
This has demonstrated that whether the telecommunications operator is the ISP or the provider 
of the IoT device, how family life and home can and will be interfered with. The smart meter 
was just one example of how our homes are becoming more transparent.183  
 
6.4 The Obligation to retain extends beyond the Secretary of State and Judicial 
Commissioners 
 
(a)  Who else can obligate Data Retention? 
 
Under s.61(1) of the IPA 2016, a designated senior officer (DSO) of a relevant public authority 
can obtain communications data for specific investigations/operations or for testing, 
developing or maintaining ways relating to the availability or obtaining communications data. 
A DSO is defined in s.70(3) of the IPA 2016, as a person holding office, rank or position in 
relation to the authority i.e. Superintendent of a police force.184 
 
(b) DSO Authorisations 
 
Section 61(2) allows the DSO authority to engage in conduct which is for the purpose of 
obtaining the data from any person which relates to a telecommunication system, or data 
derived from a telecommunication system. It is unclear whether data in this section is 
interchangeable with communications data. As noted above, data is far broader in scope than 
communications data, and if the former is used, this increases the severity of interference with 
fundamental rights. 
 
Section 61(4)(c)(i) allows an authorised officer to where they believe a telecommunications 
operator is not already in possession of but maybe or is capable of obtaining any 
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communications data (author’s emphasis), by notice, require them to obtain data that is not 
already in their possession and disclose data subsequently obtained by them. Moreover, 
s.61(5)(a) allows authorisations for data that did not exist at the time of the authorisation. This 
could require telecommunications operators to generate and retain they may normally would 
not. The explanatory notes for the IPA 2016 maintains that s.61(5)(a) allows a relevant public 
authority to request communications data on a forward-looking basis in respect of a known 
subject of interests.185 This also implies that if data is not already in existence, the 
telecommunications operator in question has not been served with a retention notice. Section 
61(5)(b) allows for the authorisation of obtaining or disclosure of data by those who are not 
authorised officers for the enabling of obtaining communications data. Section 61(5)(b) does 
not indicate who would fall into the category of ‘not an authorised officer’ and therefore leaves 
the DSO with wide discretion on who that may be in any instance. Could this be an officer who 
do not have authorisation within the relevant public authority? Or could it be anyone (as 
s.61(5)(b) refers to ‘person’) who the DSO chooses? An indicator of the definition of person 
can be found under s.81(1) of RIPA 2000 as including any organisation and any association or 
combination of persons. Therefore, the possible obligations to generate or retain data could be 
imposed on a very broad category of persons. Section 61(5)(c) indicates that an authorisation 
can require a telecommunications operator who controls or provides a telecommunication 
system to obtain or disclose data relating to the use of a telecommunications service provided 
by another telecommunications operator, therefore requiring third-party interception. Due to 
the references to ‘data’ rather than ‘communications data,’ this potentially widens the scope of 
what data a telecommunications operator could obtain from third parties (given that s.86(3) 
refers to general definitions). In order to quell this inconsistency, it would be advisable to add 
to s.86(1) that ‘in this Part any reference to ‘data’ means communications data within the 
meaning of s.261(5).’ This is also possible through the purposive interpretation of s.3(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) (which has been linked to the EU principle of indirect 
effect)186 which provides that ‘so far as it is possible to do so’ all legislation ‘must be read and 
given effect in a manner which is compatible with the’ ECHR.187 The White Paper of the HRA 
1998, acknowledged that s.3 was to go ‘far beyond the present rule which enables the courts to 
take the Convention into account in resolving any ambiguity in a legislative provision (author’s 
emphasis).’188 One way of doing so, as the majority of the UK House of Lords endorsed is to 
‘read in words which change the meaning of the enacted legislation, so as to make it 
Convention-compliant.’189 Another way is to interpret data restrictively190 as only meaning 
communications data. Any of the approaches identified would ensure that any powers, if used 
to retain communications data, are not just as broad, or broader than the powers provided by 
retention notices, which could ultimately defeat the purpose of that provision. It would also 
serve to prevent hidden interpretations.191 
 
(c) Who can be obligated to retain by Public Authorities? 
 
Section 86(3) of the IPA 2016 when referring to telecommunications definition indicating the 
definition of telecommunications operator applies, thus highlighting that public authorities can 
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obligate data retention on the same services as the Secretary of State and Judicial 
Commissioners. The caveat is that s.61(4)(a) allows authorised officers to obtain 
communications data themselves or from any person or telecommunications system. There are 
grounds to believe this is already occurring where six police forces in the UK have brought 
‘IMSI-catchers’ that can both track the movements of mobile phone users within a given area, 
and intercept texts and calls.192 Section 61(4)(b)(i) allows authorised officers to ask any person 
whom the authorised officer believes is, maybe or is not in possession of the communications 
data but is capable of obtaining it, to obtain it.’ The requirement of telecommunications 
operator is not present and would therefore not require the telecommunications operator to do 
anything, so long as a person, any person could achieve the same objective. This creates a 
variety of problems, one being, would this allow the authorised officer to ask a hacker to 
retrieve communications data from a telecommunications operator? This highlights another 
issue, s.61(4)(b) does not specify where this person must obtain communications data from.  
All that is required is that this person is believed to be capable of obtaining it. Beyond the 
definition of telecommunications operator, public authorities may have broader powers of who 
they can obligate and what they can do to retain than the Secretary of State/Judicial 
Commissioners, nor does the communications data require the condition of relevancy.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that the obligation to retain has expanded from ISPs, to now 
also include webhosts, websites, cloud based services, controllers of various networks 
(personal, home, local), the devices that are associated with them, to apps, software, hardware 
and devices falling under the IoT and essentially anything that communicates. This represents 
an extension beyond EU law. This Chapter also supplemented Chapter 4 in highlighting that 
who is obligated to retain has implications for the family life and home aspects of Article 8 
given that IoT devices will be sending data about traditional home products. Chapter 5 
concluded on the idea the people are more likely to feel the surveillance aspects of laws when 
it applies to IoT devices. One of the tasks of this Chapter is considering whether data retention 
would be applicable to IoT devices, and has concluded that it would, and so not only would 
private companies be able to spy on individuals through IoT deivces, but the UK government 
could compel them to keep that data for their own purposes. 
 
When giving written evidence on the IPA 2016, Adrian Kennard, Director of ISP Andrews & 
Arnold Ltd maintained that ‘[t]he [IPA 2016] should use a consistent set of definitions such as 
reference to the Communications Act, and should only apply powers to public communications 
providers.’193 Finally, this Chapter highlighted that the power to obligate retention is not 
exclusively with the Secretary of State and Judicial Commissioner, but also relevant public 
authorities and anyone they believe is capable of carrying out such a task. As of writing this 
thesis, the UK Government have opened a (now closed) consultation on changes to s.61 in 
terms of the purposes to obtain communications data,194 the implications of these will be 
considered in Chapter 8 (Conclusions). 
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Chapter 7: Data Retention is Incompatible with the ECHR 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
…the level of protection afforded by the Charter must never be inferior to that 
guaranteed by the ECHR.1 
 
Advocate General (AG) Saugmandsgaard Øe acknowledged that the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (CFR) must be at the very least, equal to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR or Convention Rights) in regards to the protections they offer.  
 
This Chapter has two tasks, it first highlights the deficiencies of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s (CJEU) judgments in both Digital Rights Ireland2 and Tele2 and Watson.3 
Namely, the CJEU did not, at the very least adhere to the strict requirement of data retention 
measures being in ‘accordance with the law,’ a principle well established in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The CJEU’s basis for permissible retention 
i.e. identifying a public, is much looser than the ECtHR’s reasonable suspicion. The CJEU’s 
acceptance of geographical data retention is also problematic from an ECHR discrimination 
perspective. Despite the highlighted deficiencies in the CJEU’s approach, it will be highlighted 
that the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016) does not even satisfy the requirements of 
Digital Rights Ireland or Tele2 and Watson.  
 
The second task, takes a step further, in arguing that data retention found within Part 4 (mainly 
s.87) of the IPA 2016 does not satisfy any of the requirements of legality, necessity and 
proportionality found within the Convention Rights (Articles 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4). It 
will also highlight that Article 6(2) and 6(3)(c) of the ECHR is potentially violated, and all the 
above Convention Rights are violated in conjunction with Article 14. Such discussion will also 
consider data retention judgements in other EU member states,4 the severity of interference 
with fundamental rights, who is obligated to retain,5 and therefore what data is retainable, to 
supplement ECHR arguments. 
 
The compatibility of the IPA 2016 with the ECHR undergoes the strict tests of whether the 
measures are ‘in accordance with the law,’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society.’ These two 
tests subdivide, with the former being broken down into the IPA 2016’s accessibility and 
foreseeability. Regarding foreseeability, the case law of the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber GC) has 
reaffirmed several minimum safeguards in the area of secret surveillance to avoid abuses of 
power, notably that: 
 
1. the nature of offences which may give rise to an interception order;  
2. a definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped;  
																																																						
1 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson [2016] ECR I-572, Opinion of 
Saugmandsgaard Øe, [141]. 
2 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] ECR I-238. 
3 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson [2016] ECR I-970. 
4 Matthew White, ‘Protection by Judicial Oversight, or an Oversight in Protection?’ (2017) Journal of 
Information Rights, Policy and Practice 2:1, 2. 
5 See Chapters 3 and 5. 
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3. a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for 
examining, using and storing the data obtained;  
4. the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties;  
5. and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or destroyed.6 
 
With regards to the latter, the question becomes whether the IPA 2016 corresponds to a 
‘pressing social need,’ whether it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,’ i.e. least 
restrictive measure and whether the reasons given by the national authorities to justify it are 
relevant and sufficient. Not only will this analysis highlight the deficiencies in the IPA 2016, 
but also highlight where the interpretation of the CFR is inferior to the ECHR. 
 
7.2 Criticism of the CJEU’s approach to data retention 
 
Digital Rights Ireland has been regarded as ground-breaking,7a milestone,8 a significant step 
in developing fundamental rights protection9 (even in the national security context)10 and a 
landmark judgment.11 Marie-Pierre Granger and Kristina Irion noted that the ruling meant that 
blanket data retention was no longer possible,12 a position agreed upon by Michael Ryan.13 It 
also meant that limitations included retention being confined to situations which pose a threat 
to public security by restricting the measure to a time period, geographical zone or groups of 
persons likely to be involved in a serious crime or, more broadly, to persons whose 
communications data can otherwise contribute to law enforcement.14 
 
The CJEU’s position is regarded as closing ranks with the ECtHR jurisprudence by treating 
collection and use of data as two separate interferences with privacy and data protection.15 
McIntyre argues that it in fact extends protection beyond the ECtHR jurisprudence in that it 
relied on ex post facto controls and takes a step further with regards to need for prior judicial 
control.16 However, it has also been argued that this merely reflects already (but not often cited) 
																																																						
6 Roman Zakharov v Russia App no. 47143/06 (ECHR, 4 December 2015), [231]. 
7 Emily Barabas, ‘European Court of Justice: EU Data Retention Directive Infringes on Human Rights’ (April 
10 2014) <https://cdt.org/blog/european-court-of-justice-eu-data-retention-directive-infringes-on-human-
rights/> accessed 12 June 2017.  
8 Federico Fabbrini, ‘Human Rights in the Digital Age The European Court of Justice Ruling in the Data 
Retention Case and its Lessons for Privacy and Surveillance in the U.S.’ (2015) Harvard Human Rights Journal 
28 65, 67. 
9 Judith Rauhofer and Daithí Mac Síthigh, ‘The Data Retention Directive Never Existed’ (2014) SCRIPTed 11:1 
118; EDPS, ‘Press Statement: The CJEU rules that Data Retention Directive is invalid’ (8 April 2014) 
<https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/edpsweb_press_releases/edps-2014-08_press_statement_drd_en.pdf> 
accessed 12 June 2017. 
10 Federico Fabbrini, (n8), 84. 
11 Marie-Pierre Granger and Kristina Irion, ‘The Court of Justice and the Data Retention Directive in Digital 
Rights Ireland: Telling Off the EU Legislator and Teaching a Lesson in Privacy and Data Protection’ (2014) 
European Law Review 6 835, 844; Nora Ni Loideain, ‘EU Law and Mass Internet Metadata Surveillance in the 
Post-Snowden Era’ (2015) Media and Communication 3:2 53, 54. 
12 Marie-Pierre Granger and Kristina Irion, (n11), 848. 
13 Michael. H. Ryan, ‘Is government access to your communications data lawful? The decision of the Divisional 
Court in Davis v Home Secretary’ U.L.R. [2015] 20:5, 55-60. 
14 Marie-Pierre Granger and Kristina Irion, (n11), 848. 
15 ibid, 847. 
16 T.J. McIntyre, ’Judicial Oversight of Surveillance: The Case of Ireland in Comparative Perspective’ in Martin 
Scheinin, Helle Krunke, and Marina Aksenova (eds) Judges as Guardians of Constitutionalism and Human 
Rights (Edward Elgar 2015). 
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existing ECtHR jurisprudence.17 It has also been regarded as putting an end to mass 
surveillance and comes to the same conclusion as AG Cruz Villalón, but for different reasons.18  
 
Initial reactions to the CJEU’s judgment in Tele2 and Watson were positive, many regarding it 
as a blow to the UK data retention surveillance regime.19 The Legal Services of the Council of 
the EU acknowledged that ‘a general and indiscriminate retention obligation for crime 
prevention and other security reasons would no more be possible at national level than it is at 
EU level.’20 
 
a. Were all the criticisms in Digital Rights Ireland mandatory requirements? 
 
One of the issues for disagreement between the English and Welsh High Court (HC) and Court 
of Appeal (CoA)21 was whether the criticisms of Digital Rights Ireland were mandatory 
requirements. AG Saugmandsgaard Øe believed that they were,22 whereas the CJEU did not 
hold that the safeguards mentioned in Digital Rights Ireland were mandatory requirements, but 
cited it approvingly.23 This raises the question whether the requirements were mandatory at all. 
For Open Rights Group (ORG), particularly prior judicial/independent authorisation was 
enough to signal a blow to the current self-authorisation system in the UK,24 which the UK 
Government, in any event is seeking to comply with (in terms of authorisation),25 and the CoA26 
partially27 ruled consistently with. 
 
																																																						
17 Matthew White, (n4), 5-6. 
18 Steve Peers, ‘The data retention judgment: The CJEU prohibits mass surveillance’ (8 April 2014) 
<https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2014/04/the-data-retention-judgment-cjeu.html> accessed 13 June 2017.  
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<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2016/eu-court-slams-uk-data-retention-surveillance-regime> accessed 
21 June 2017; Julia Fioretti, ‘EU court says mass data retention illegal’ (21 December 2016) 
<http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-court-privacy-idUKKBN14A0YD> accessed 21 June 2017; Owen Bowcott, 
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accessed 21 June 2017; Nicole Kobe, ‘Blow for Snoopers Charter as EU court bans mass data collection’ ITPro 
(21 December 2016) <http://www.itpro.co.uk/public-sector/snoopers-charter/27819/blow-for-snoopers-charter-
as-eu-court-bans-mass-data-collection> accessed 21 June 2017; Liberty, ‘Government IS breaking the law by 
collecting everyone's internet and call data and accessing it with no independent sign-off and no suspicion of 
serious crime’ (21 December 2016) <https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releases-and-
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20 Legal Services letter to Permanent Representatives Committee, Brussels, 1 February 2017 (OR. en) 5884/17, 
para 14; see also Anna Biselli, ‘EU discusses future of data retention: “Indiscriminate retention no longer 
possible”’ (31 May 2017) <https://edri.org/eu-discusses-future-of-data-retention-indiscriminate-retention-no-
longer-possible/> accessed 22 June 2017.  
21 See Chapter 2. 
22 Opinion of Saugmandsgaard Øe, (n1), [221]. 
23 Lorna Woods, ‘Data retention and national law: the ECJ ruling in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 
and Watson (Grand Chamber)’ (21 December 2016) <https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2016/12/data-
retention-and-national-law-ecj.html> accessed 21 June 2017. 
24 Javier Ruiz, (n19). 
25 Alexander J Martin, ‘Home Office admits it's preparing to accept EU ruling on surveillance’ The Register 
(London, 21 March 2017) 
<https://www.theregister.co.uk/AMP/2017/03/21/home_office_admits_its_preparing_to_accept_eu_ruling_on_s
urveillance/> accessed 21 June 2017; Home Office, ‘Investigatory Powers Act 2016’ (30 November 2017) 
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26 Tom Watson and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 70. 
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b. In accordance with the law 
 
The legal requirement for measures that interfere with qualified fundamental rights, under the 
ECHR must be what is described as being ‘in accordance with the law.’28 In Digital Rights 
Ireland, the CJEU skipped this requirement entirely29  where Ojanen noted that the ‘absence 
of the explicit application of the ‘quality of the law’ requirement is all the more striking’ as 
AG Cruz Villalón considered this in great detail.30 
 
In Tele2 and Watson AG Saugmandsgaard Øe invited the CJEU to confirm that ‘in accordance 
with the law’ under the ECHR meant the same thing for data retention.31 He noted that the 
ECHR requirement32 and that ‘provided by law’ in Article 52(1) CFR needs to be the same as 
the ECHR for the following reasons (author’s emphasis):33 
 
i. The level of protection provided by CFR ‘must never be inferior to that guaranteed by 
the ECHR’ and ‘must be at least as stringent as that given to it by the [ECtHR] in 
connection with the ECHR;’ (author’s emphasis) and 
ii. It would be inappropriate to impose different criteria on Member States ‘depending on 
which of those two instruments was under consideration.’34 
 
Therefore, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe felt that ‘retention obligations…must be founded on a legal 
basis that is adequately accessible and foreseeable and provides adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference’ (author’s emphasis).35 This would also prevent the CJEU falling into 
‘the trap of tautologically regarding a legal norm, the validity of which is being questioned, as 
being allegedly in accordance with the law because it is a law.’36 The CJEU, however, did not 
address AG Saugmandsgaard Øe’s invitation and thus leaves a deficiency in the protection of 
fundamental rights (see section 7.4 below). 
 
c. Essence of the Right 
 
The CJEU has consistently held that although interference posed by data retention is 
particularly serious, this did not affect the essence of Article 7 because content of 
communications was not retained.37 However, as was argued in Chapter 3, this line of 
reasoning is unsustainable whether retention was under Directive 2006/24 (the Data Retention 
Directive (DRD)) or Part 4 of the IPA 2016, as such measures affect the very substance of the 
right, and the essence of the right.38 
 
																																																						
28 See section 7.3 below. 
29 Marie-Pierre Granger and Kristina Irion, (n11), 842. 
30 Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Privacy Is More Than Just a Seven-Letter Word: The Court of Justice of the European 
Union Sets Constitutional Limits on Mass Surveillance’ (2014) European Constitutional Law Review 10: 528, 
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31 Opinion of Saugmandsgaard Øe, (n1), [137]. 
32 ibid, [138-9]. 
33 ibid, [140]. 
34 ibid, [141-2]. 
35 ibid, [143]. 
36 Gloria González Fuster, ‘Fighting For Your Right to What Exactly? The Convoluted Case Law of the EU 
Court of Justice on Privacy and/or Personal Data Protection’ (2014) Birkbeck Law Review 2:2 263, 271. 
37 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, (n2), [39]; Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson, (n3), [101]. 
38 Marie-Pierre Granger and Kristina Irion, (n11), p847. 
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The CJEU also acknowledged, just as AG Saugmandsgaard Øe had, that communications data 
is no less sensitive than the actual content of communications,39 but still refused to suggest this 
would adversely affect the essence of the right.40 This appears paradoxical given that the CJEU 
agreed with AG Saugmandsgaard Øe that ‘that data retention creates an equally serious 
interference with rights as measures which intercept the content’ and  ‘that the risks associated 
with the access to communications maybe greater than access to the content of 
communications (author’s emphasis).’41 This is also now in contrast with the position of the 
ECtHR in Big Brother Watch (see Chapter 3) in which they were not persuaded that content is 
more intrusive than communications data. This is because as Chapter 3 (with many more 
examples) noted, communications data is highly intrusive, structured, making it more suitable 
for aggregation and analysis. Furthermore, content can be disguised more easily through 
encryption42 or using coded language.43 Bernal notes many intimate subjects are often 
deliberately avoided (to avoid disclosure of sexuality, religion and health information) when 
writing content, this can be determined by communications data analysis.44 Simply put, your 
internet activity reveals everything you do online (author’s emphasis).45 This also does not even 
consider factors such as Big Data (where data is already aggregated) as Chapter 3 highlighted. 
In not ruling that communications data adversely affects the essence of the rights, the CJEU 
automatically reduced the protections available. 
 
d. Effectiveness of data retention 
 
On the appropriateness of data retention, the CJEU noted that data retention was an appropriate 
means for criminal investigations, and a ‘valuable tool.’46 Marie-Pierre Granger and Kristina 
Irion pointed out that the CJEU ‘tiptoed’ around the effectiveness and purposes of the DRD.47 
Orla Lynskey48 notes that the CJEU does not adequately address whether data retention is a 
suitable tool to enhance law enforcement.49 This was the most important omission for Lynskey  
as there was a lack of detailed ‘consideration of whether data retention is in fact appropriate 
for the purposes of tackling serious crime’50 in which the CJEU believed that it was. Lynskey, 
however, questions this belief, referring to the obiter dictum from the Czech Constitutional 
Court (CCC) (which questioned the necessity of data retention),51 the flawed European 
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Commission (Commission) statistics,52 to which the CJEU did not examine.53 Lynskey 
continued that given that the CJEU admits the ‘particularly serious’ interference posed by data 
retention, ‘empirical evidence is needed to sustain the claim that data retention is an appropriate 
instrument to combat serious crime.’54 Lynskey’s position is supported by the European Data 
Protection Supervisor (EDPS)55 who criticised the Commission’s statistics as the DRD was 
based on the assumption of necessity.56 The EDPS also criticised the Commission’s assertion 
that most Member States considered data retention a necessary tool when conclusions were 
based on just over a third of them,57 which in fact, were only statements.58 The EDPS further 
noted that since the DRD was already in place:  
 
[T]here should be sufficient qualitative and quantitative information available which 
allows an assessment of whether the measure is actually working and whether 
comparable results could have been achieved without the instrument or with 
alternative, less-privacy intrusive means. Such information should constitute genuine 
proof and show the relationship between use and result (author’s emphasis).59 
 
To which the EDPS concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to demonstrate the 
necessity, and that further investigations into alternatives should commence.60  
 
The EDPS laid further criticism, on the quantitative data, noting crucial information was 
missing, such as under what circumstances the data was sought, whether all the data accessed 
was a ‘consequence of the legal obligation to retain data or for business purposes’61 nor were 
results provided on the use of data.62 Moreover, it was noted it was difficult to draw conclusions 
as data was only based on information from nine Member States, which are not always fully 
comparable.63 
 
On the qualitative, the EDPS noted that a problem was that not all cases were clear that 
‘whether use of the retained data was the only means to solve the crime involved.’64 Further, 
the EDPS pointed out that while interesting, the use of communications data to exclude 
suspects and verify alibis, such an argument should be treated with caution as such a position 
might be misunderstood as implying data retention is ‘necessary for proving the innocence of 
citizens, which would be difficult to reconcile with the presumption of innocence.’65 In addition 
to this, the EDPS highlighted that the report does not make comparisons with Member States 
that did not implement the DRD, or where it was annulled.66 The EDPS also noted the 
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Commission’s own admission of the limits of their report and criticised them for not being 
critical enough of Member States’ and relying on statements and not evidence of the necessity 
of data retention.67 The UK representatives even admitted to the CJEU that there was no 
‘scientific data’ to underpin the need of data retention which raised the question of what data 
the DRD had been therefore based upon.68 This highlights the regrettable acceptance of the 
appropriateness of data retention by the CJEU. 
 
Another justification made by the CJEU in justifying the appropriateness of retention is regards 
to Article 6 CFR which guarantees the right of liberty and security.69 However, the dichotomy 
between privacy and security has been described as ‘miscast,’70 ‘misleading’71 and ‘false,’72 
even if well intentioned73 because ‘measures to protect privacy may improve security’74 (such 
as preventing data phishing and identity theft)75 ‘and measures that purport to improve security 
may in other ways actually reduce that security’76 (such as exceptional access which would put 
the security of Internet infrastructure at risk),77 or even be ineffectual.78 
 
e. Did not rule out mass suspicionless surveillance 
 
The CJEU, did not per se hold mass surveillance as unlawful, but Lorna Woods argues, it 
supports the retention of data following justified suspicion, even perhaps generalised 
suspicion, rather than using the analysis of retained data to justify suspicion (author’s 
emphasis). 79 This point is elaborated upon further by Matthew White, who argues that: 
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Even taking into account the CJEU’s ban of general and indiscriminate catch all data 
retention, this is still profound because suspicion would not be a necessary component 
for the justification of retention.80 
 
This is due to the ‘identifiable public’ with a direct or indirect relationship with serious crime, 
and even the data and communication type, persons liable is a much lower threshold than what 
is required by the ECHR.81 Moreover, this ‘public’ was not elaborated upon, nor was the 
geographical requirement, giving Member States considerable discretion82 but also raising 
problems with residence and discrimination.83 
 
f. Retention period 
 
The CJEU was silent on the retention period,84 but AG Saugmandsgaard Øe mistakenly 
ascribed a six-month period as acceptable85 based on the GC’s judgment in Roman Zakharov 
v Russia, when in fact, the GC referred to a six-month period (of intercept data) as being 
acceptable in the individual context (author’s emphasis).86 The problem of the CJEU’s silence 
is that it creates too much discretion for Member States. 
 
g. The scope of EU law in relation to data retention is limited to the e-Privacy Directive 
 
The application of Digital Rights Ireland/Tele2 and Watson is limited to the scope of the e-
Privacy Directive in that it only concerns publicly available electronic communications 
services and is limited to traffic and location data.87 Chapter 3 and 6 demonstrated that data 
retention in the IPA 2016 includes services and communications data which extend beyond the 
e-Privacy Directive and therefore, the CJEU’s judgments may not strictly be applicable to 
much of Part 4 of the IPA 2016. Although, there is a contrary view that the CJEU’s judgments 
will have an impact88 because the CJEU refers to electronic communications and electronic 
communications services. However, there is no guarantee of this without clarification by the 
CJEU.  
  
h. UK law not even compatible with EU law 
 
Despite the critique of the CJEU’s approach above, questions still remain regarding the UK’s 
implementation of national data retention laws. Niklas Vainio and Samuli Miettinen were 
unconvinced of the then UK Government’s position that the Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014) satisfied many of the requirements of Digital Rights Ireland 
as the differences between DRIPA 2014 and the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 
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2009 (DRR) were ‘minimal.’89 The CoA in Tom Watson and Others90 partially91 ruled that 
DRIPA 2014 was incompatible with EU whilst avoiding the question of whether DRIPA 2014 
permitted blanket indiscriminate data retention.  
 
The powers to require data retention in the IPA 2016 ‘are broader in every respect than those 
in’92 DRIPA 2014. Cobbe argues that the types of communications data retained in IPA 2016 
is compatible with EU law because it does not allow the acquisition of knowledge and therefore 
respects the essence of Article 7 CFR (respect for private and family life, home and 
communications).93  However, Cobbe maintained that because EU law now requires a higher 
standard of security, and for communications data to be retained within the EU, the IPA 2016 
falls short on both counts and therefore unjustly interferes with Article 8 CFR (data 
protection).94 Moreover, as Cobbe points out, the purposes for which data is to be retained in 
the IPA 2016, extends beyond serious crime and would thus go beyond what is permitted by 
Tele2 and Watson.95 Cobbe notes that data retention in the IPA 2016 fails to meet the 
proportionality requirements of Digital Rights Ireland or Tele2 and Watson because it can 
allow telecommunications operators to retain all data indiscriminately, without differentiation, 
limitation or exception and without safeguards for data subject to professional confidentiality.96 
Additionally, Cobbe notes the IPA 2016 fails to establish a relationship between the data to be 
retained, the purposes being pursued or any link between that data and public security, nor is 
the 12 month retention period based on objective criterion and limited to what is strictly 
necessary.97 Finally, Cobbe notes that the IPA 2016 does not set out clear and precise rules on 
the scope and application of data retention, and it does not provide only for retention that is 
justified as strictly necessary, and therefore disproportionate to Articles 7 and 8 CFR, as it 
makes data retention the rule and not the exception.98  
 
i. UK law incompatible with EU law, but does not permit general and indiscriminate data 
retention 
 
Both the HC and CoA have ruled that the IPA 2016 and DRIPA 2014 respectively do not 
permit general and indiscriminate data retention.99 Both ruled that the CJEU in Tele2 were 
referring specifically to Swedish law.100 However, this has been argued to be a semantic 
argument101 ‘of distinguishing a catch all power, and a power that can catch all, which of 
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course, in any event, amount to the same thing.’102 The HC felt it impracticable and 
unnecessary to set out detailed factors to be applied to matters such as national security,103 
despite both the CJEU and ECtHR requiring this.104 The HC proceeded to consider data 
retention without due consideration to the ECHR,105 the next section will demonstrate the 
problems data retention raises under the ECHR. 
 
7.3 Data Retention under the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Anthony Speaight QC has twice argued that the ECtHR has never held to preclude general 
retention for a period.106 However, the GC of the ECtHR have held that that indiscriminate data 
retention,107 indiscriminate capturing of communications108 and the ‘[t]he automatic storage 
for six months of clearly irrelevant data cannot be considered justified under Article 8.’109  
 
This Chapter will demonstrate in a comprehensive manner, how data retention under the IPA 
2016 violates not only Article 8, but Articles 9-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4. It will further 
demonstrate how data retention under the IPA 2016 potentially violates Article 6(2)/(3)(c) and 
all of the mentioned Convention Rights in conjunction with Article 14. 
 
a. Relevant Law 
 
In order to test the compatibility of the UK’s data retention regime with the ECHR, it is first 
necessary to lay out the relevant law from the IPA 2016. Section 87(1) (or Part 4) of the IPA 
2016 states that the Secretary of State may issue a retention notice on a telecommunications 
operator to retain relevant communications data if it is considered necessary and proportionate 
on approval by a Judicial Commissioner (JC). 
 
The purposes for retention notices in s.61(7) are set out as follows:  
 
(a) in the interests of national security,  
(b) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder,  
(c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those 
interests are also relevant to the interests of national security,  
(d) in the interests of public safety,  
(e) for the purpose of protecting public health,  
(f) for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition, 
contribution or charge payable to a government department,  
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(g) for the purpose of preventing death or injury or any damage to a person’s physical 
or mental health, or of mitigating any injury or damage to a person’s physical or mental 
health,  
(h) to assist investigations into alleged miscarriages of justice,  
(i) where a person (“P”) has died or is unable to identify themselves because of a 
physical or mental condition—  
(i) to assist in identifying P, or  
(ii) to obtain information about P’s next of kin or other persons connected with 
P or about the reason for P’s death or condition, or  
(j) for the purpose of exercising functions relating to—  
(i) the regulation of financial services and markets, or  
(ii) financial stability. 
 
It must be noted that at the time of writing this Chapter, the UK Government are proposing to 
amend the purposes for which data communications data can be retained.110 Section 87(2) 
stipulates that a retention notice may: 
 
(a) relate to a particular operator or any description of operators,  
(b) require the retention of all data or any description of data,  
(c) identify the period or periods for which data is to be retained,  
(d) contain other requirements, or restrictions, in relation to the retention of data,  
(e) make different provision for different purposes,  
(f) relate to data whether or not in existence at the time of the giving, or coming into force, 
of the notice. 
 
Section 87(3) continues that can only be retained for a maximum of 12 months. Section 
87(4)(d) notes that: 
 
A retention notice must not require an operator who controls or provides a 
telecommunication system (“the system operator”) to retain data which— 
(d) is not retained or used by the system operator for any other lawful purpose. 
 
Section 87(8) notes that a retention notice must specify: 
 
(a) the operator (or description of operators) to whom it relates,  
(b) the data which is to be retained,  
(c) the period or periods for which the data is to be retained,  
(d) any other requirements, or any restrictions, in relation to the retention of the data. 
 
Section 87(9) notes that the requirements or restrictions mentioned in subsection (8)(d) may, 
in particular, include: 
 
(b) requirements or restrictions in relation to the obtaining (whether by collection, 
generation or otherwise), generation or processing of—  
(i)data for retention, or  
(ii)retained data. 
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Section 89(1) and (2) notes that when a JC approves a decision of the Secretary of State, they 
must review the necessity and proportionality of their conclusions on principles of judicial 
review. Section 97(1) stipulates that retention notices have extra-territorial application. 
 
Section 61(1)(a), (b) and (c) note that a designated senior office (DSO) of a relevant public 
authority may obtained communications data for the purposes mentioned in s.61(7) for the 
purposes of a specific investigation/operation or testing, maintaining or developing equipment, 
systems or other capabilities relating to the availability or obtaining of communications data. 
Provided that this is necessary and proportionate. Section 62(2)(a) and (b) allows the DSO to 
authorise any officer of the authority to engage in conduct for the purposes of obtaining data 
from any person which relates to a telecommunication system or data derived thereof. Section 
62(4)(a), (b) and (c) stipulate that this can be done by either obtaining it themselves or asking 
any person or telecommunications operator the authorised officer believes may be in 
possession of or is capable of obtaining/disclosing (if not already in possession of it) data. 
Section 62(5) note that authorisations may relate to data which may or may not already exist 
at the time of the authorisation, may authorise the obtaining/disclosure of data by persons who 
are not authorised officers or any conduct which facilitates/enables the obtaining of 
communications data and may require a telecommunications operator who controls or provides 
a telecommunication system to obtain/disclose data relating to the use of a telecommunications 
service provided by another telecommunications operator in relation to that system. Such 
authorisations are also subject to amendments.111  Section 263(1) notes that ‘data’ includes 
electronic and non-electronic data/information. 
 
b. The Margin of Appreciation and Qualified Rights 
 
The margin of appreciation is described as ‘the measure of discretion allowed the Member 
States in the manner in which they implement the Convention’s standards, taking into account 
their own particular national circumstances and conditions.’112 The margin of appreciation is 
most relevant ‘for articles containing express limitation clauses.’113 Chapter 4 already detailed 
how data retention interfered with Articles 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4. The ECtHR has 
acknowledged that ‘interference’ with qualified rights must correspond to ‘pressing social 
need,’ whether it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued,’ whether the reasons given 
by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient...’114 This was reaffirmed in 
the later judgment of Silver and Others v United Kingdom where the ECtHR expressed that 
‘those paragraphs of Articles of the Convention which provide for an exception to a right 
guaranteed are to be narrowly interpreted (author’s emphasis).’115 
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The ECtHR has noted that while it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment 
in all these respects, the final evaluation of whether the interference is necessary remains 
subject to review by the Court for conformity with the requirements of the Convention.116 
Nevertheless, a margin of appreciation must be left to the competent national authorities in this 
assessment. The breadth of this margin varies and depends on a number of factors including 
the nature of the Convention right in issue, its importance for the individual, the nature of the 
interference and the object pursued by the interference and the proportionality and pressing 
social need of the issue. The margin will tend to be narrower where the right at stake is crucial 
to the individual's effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights (author’s emphasis). Where a 
particularly important facet of an individual's existence or identity is at stake, the margin 
allowed to the State will be restricted.117 Given that Chapter 3 highlighted the seriousness of 
interference with a collection of Convention Rights, which are crucial to effective enjoyment 
of online/offline freedom, and in some cases very important for an individual’s identity the 
margin should be particularly narrow. The ECtHR has stressed on more than one occasion that 
the ‘protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his 
or her right to respect for private and family life’ and ‘that the need for such safeguards is all 
the greater when it comes to protecting personal data subject to automatic processing, 
especially when these data are used for police purposes (author’s emphasis).’118 
 
7.4 Is Data Retention in accordance with the/prescribed by law? 
 
Articles 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4 are known as qualified rights due to the fact that the state 
can set limitations upon them in certain circumstances (margin of appreciation). Interferences 
with Article 8 and Article 2 Protocol 4 have to be ‘in accordance with the law’ whereas with 
Articles 9-11, interferences have to be ‘prescribed by law.’ In the partly dissenting opinions of 
Loucaides and Judge Jočienė, they noted the link between the two terms.119 It has also been 
noted that the expressions are recognised as being similar, the same,120 and identical.121 
Therefore, when considering the ‘quality of the law’122 this will apply uniformly amongst the 
qualified rights in question. From here on in, ‘in accordance with the law’ will also mean 
‘prescribed by law.’123 
 
The ECtHR have noted that the wording ‘in accordance with the law’ requires the impugned 
measure to have some basis in domestic law.124 This also relates to the ‘quality of the law’ 
requiring it ‘to be compatible with the rule of law, a concept inherent in all the Articles of the 
Convention (author’s emphasis).’125 It also should be accessible to the person concerned and 
foreseeable as to its effects.126 
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A. Accessibility 
 
The ECtHR has noted, that publication of the law is likely to meet accessibility.127 Paragraph 
4, Schedule 9 of the IPA 2016 allows retention notices to be made for up to three months after 
JCs are appointed. The most problematic provision on retention notices in this regard is 
s.87(2)(e) which allows the Secretary of State to make different provision for different 
purposes. Provisions, and purposes are nowhere defined within Part 4, thus making this 
particular aspect unclear and problematic. Moreover, (as of writing this thesis), there is no Code 
of Practice to further clarify the matter, which the ECtHR regards as very important.128  
 
In Liberty v UK regarding the issue of arrangements to be made by the Secretary of State in 
relation to external communications under the old Interception of Communications Act 1985 
(ICA 1985), the ECtHR noted that ‘that details of these “arrangements” made under section 6 
were not contained in legislation or otherwise made available to the public (author’s 
emphasis).’129 This would mean that at the relevant time the IPA 2016 did not ‘set out in a 
form accessible to the public any indication’130 as to what provisions the Secretary of State 
could make, and the purposes for them, therefore, not open to public knowledge or scrutiny.131 
Whilst finding a violation in Liberty for UK law not being ‘in accordance with the law’132 the 
ECtHR noted that despite the then Commissioner in annual reports concluding that 
arrangements had been complied with, this did ‘not contribute towards the accessibility and 
clarity of the scheme, since he was not able to reveal what the “arrangements” were.’133 This 
would be no different under the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC) who is not 
required134 to publish reports on retention notices,135 and in any event only produces annual 
reports on JCs.136  
 
Therefore, even with a Code of Practice in place and a clarification on s.87(2)(e), up until that 
point, s.87(2)(e) of the IPA 2016 does not satisfy accessibility. A finding of a law failing to 
satisfy the ‘in accordance with the law’ criteria ‘obviates the need for the Court to determine 
whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” for one of the aims 
enumerated therein.’137 However, it is contented that it is necessary and possible138 to progress 
through to the requirement of foreseeability in order to demonstrate how deeply flawed much 
of s.87 becomes under deeper scrutiny. 
 
B. Foreseeability 
 
A rule is ‘foreseeable’ if it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual – if 
need be with appropriate advice – to regulate his conduct.139 This is to ensure that there is 
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adequate indication of the conditions and circumstances in which the authorities are 
empowered to resort to any such measures,140 thus, allowing individuals to avoid exposure to 
unwelcome intrusions by the State.141  
 
In Zakharov, the GC reiterated that foreseeability in the context of interception cannot be the 
same as other fields.142 For the GC, foreseeability in the special context of secret surveillance, 
which extends to measures such as (including data retention)143 the interception of 
communications.144 The GC did note that, foreseeability ‘cannot mean that an individual should 
be able to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he 
can adapt his conduct accordingly.’145 The GC noted that where a power vested in the executive 
is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident.146 Therefore, the law needs to be 
particularly precise,147 a position agreed upon by the Constitutional Courts of Romania148 and 
the Czech Republic.149 It is also essential to have clear, binding150 detailed rules, especially as 
the technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated (author’s 
emphasis).151 This sentiment was echoed by the ECtHR in Szabo where it was noted that: 
 
Given the technological advances since the Klass and Others case, the potential 
interferences with email, mobile phone and Internet services as well as those of mass 
surveillance attract the Convention protection of private life even more acutely 
(author’s emphasis).152 
 
Furthermore, the ECtHR in Szabo noted that the guarantees required by the extant Convention 
case-law on interceptions need to be enhanced so as to address the issue of such surveillance 
practices (author’s emphasis).153 Moreover, regarding foreseeability: 
 
 
In its case-law on secret measures of surveillance, the Court has developed the 
following minimum safeguards that should be set out in statute law in order to avoid 
abuses of power: the nature of offences which may give rise to an interception order; a 
definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on 
the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using 
and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the 
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data to other parties; and the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased 
or destroyed (author’s emphasis)…	
	
Furthermore, there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law against 
arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by Article 8 § 
1. Especially where a power of the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of 
arbitrariness are evident. Since the implementation in practice of measures of secret 
surveillance of communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or 
the public at large, it would be contrary to the rule of law for the discretion granted to 
the executive or to a judge to be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. 
Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the 
competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity to give the 
individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference…154 
 
It is important to note that although the ECtHR has held that Code of Practices are very 
important with regards to legality, they are not binding, nor are they set out in statute as the 
ECtHR regards as a minimum. Therefore, even if as mentioned in section 7.4(A) the Codes of 
Practice are now in force, this cannot be said to prevent abuses of power or arbitrary 
interferences with Article 8 because they are not set out in statute nor are they legally binding. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that combining Codes of Practices with Part 4 sufficiently ensures 
foreseeability.    
 
Continuing with foresseability, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in his partly 
concurring/dissenting opinion, argued further in Draksas adding the degree of reasonable 
suspicion required for a surveillance measure, notification and special guarantees with regards 
to special communications i.e. lawyer-client etc are all necessary in determining whether a 
measure sufficiently clear.155 Reasonable suspicion,156 notification,157 and special guarantees 
regarding special communications158 are guarantees that has been endorsed (as will be 
discussed below) by the ECtHR in judgments. 
 
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe and the CJEU agreed that general data retention obligations poses 
just as serious of an interference (in the individual context) as interception and greater risks 
with access (see above).159 Given that Chapter 3 thoroughly illustrates that communications 
data is at least just as serious of an interference as interception (with some communications 
data requiring interception), the ECtHR accepting this position and given that Chapter 5 
demonstrates how and why data retention is a measure of (mass) secret surveillance, the same 
safeguards regarding secret surveillance must apply.160 Moreover, given the gravity of 
interference, not just with Article 8, but Articles 9-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4, these strict 
standards must be maintained,161 irrespective of the fact that data retention is generalised 
surveillance.162 
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1. Unfettered and Arbitrary Interferences 
 
The HC in Davis with regards to retention notices under DRIPA 2014, acted on the assumption 
that a telecommunications operator would be required to retain all communications data for a 
period of 12 months, a general retention regime (author’s emphasis).163 Moreover, s.87(2)(a) 
and (b) theoretically allows for the possibility ‘all operators in the UK to be required to retain 
all data of users and subscribers’164 and thus should be treated as a blanket and indiscriminate 
power.165 Although the Home Office assured that they ‘certainly [would] not place obligations 
on every one of [the “200 or 300” communications service providers]’166 and the HC (in a later 
judgment) not conceiving how the tests of necessity and proportionality would permit general 
indiscriminate data retention,167 ‘[i]t is the potential reach of the power rather than its actual 
use by which its legality must be judged (author’s emphasis).’168 All are potentially subject to 
this power and insufficient legal restraints does not become legal simply because self-restrain 
may be exercised.169 Simply put, it is not the application of the power that should be questioned, 
but the power itself. When it cannot be ruled out that national legislation can be taken to enable 
so-called strategic, large-scale interception/surveillance, it becomes a matter of concern.170 
Given that Chapter 6 highlighted that retention obligations can be imposed upon essentially 
anything that can communicate, whether it be an Internet Service Provider (ISP), webmail 
provider, software vendor or anything under the umbrella of the Internet of Things (IoT), it 
must be concluded that ‘that the legislation directly affects all users of communication systems 
and all homes (author’s emphasis).’171 
 
When the UK Government in Liberty admitted that it was possible for any person who 
sent/received any form of telecommunication outside the British Islands to have their 
communications intercepted, the ECtHR noted that the capture of external communications 
was virtually unfettered (author’s emphasis).172 Just as s.97(1) noted, retention notices have 
extra-territorial application, and thus not only has the potential to capture communications data 
of everyone within the UK, but is also possible to capture communications data of everyone 
outside the UK. Whether it is the UK or abroad, s.87(2)(a) and (b) in combination with s.97(1) 
is nothing short of a virtually unfettered blanket indiscriminate power.  
  
Abu Bakar Munir and Siti Hajar Mohd Yasin noted ‘[t]he requirement of foreseeability is not 
satisfied by blanket regulations…that allow everyone to foresee that the State will interfere 
with their right to a private life.’173 Therefore, in other words, data retention occurs, and affects 
the fundamental rights of individuals irrespective of conduct.174 This position has been echoed 
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by the Austrian Constitutional Court (ACC) where it noted that data retention ‘affects almost 
exclusively persons who do not give rise to a cause for data retention’ meaning nothing in their 
conduct would require state intervention as the overwhelming majority use services to exercise 
their fundamental rights i.e. freedom of expression, information and communication (author’s 
emphasis).175 The German Federal Constitutional Court (GFCC) noted that data retention laws 
‘does not give the citizen a regular possibility of avoiding storage.’176 The Romanian 
Constitutional Court (RCC) noted that law must be accessible, clear, predictable and 
unambiguous and there ‘must have a clear representation of the applicable legal provisions, in 
order to adapt their conduct and to foresee the consequences that may occur from their 
breach.’177 The CCC noted that legal regulations must be precise and unambiguous while also 
being sufficiently predictable so that it can provide the potentially affected individuals with 
sufficient information on the circumstances and conditions under which the public authority is 
entitled to interfere with their privacy and so that they can act accordingly in order to avoid 
conflict with the restricting norm (author’s emphasis).178 The CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland179 
and AG Saugmandsgaard Øe acknowledged that ‘the vast majority of the data retained will 
relate to persons who will never be connected in any way with serious crime (author’s 
emphasis).’180 
 
The GC has previously noted that ‘legal provisions which allowed an unfettered 
discretion…[do]… not meet the required standards of clarity and foreseeability’181 and thus 
results in a violation.182 Indiscriminate data capture is also contrary to Article 8183 as it subjects 
‘every citizen to the certainty of ongoing and unremitting interference in his or her private 
life.’184 Thus, without even considering other potential limiting aspects of s.87, it becomes clear 
that data retention envisaged in this section has the potential to be blanket and indiscriminate,185 
(just as DRIPA 2014 was) and therefore incompatible with foreseeability and thus not in 
accordance with the law. 
 
In Mustafa Sezgin Tanrikulu v Turkey the Turkish intelligence agency (MIT) had obtained 
permission by the Diyarbakır Assize Court:  
 
[T]o intercept all domestic or international telephone calls and communications… to 
obtain information contained in SMS, MMS, GPRS and fax communications, as well 
as caller IDs, correspondents’ IP addresses and all other communication-related 
information.186 
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This permission lasted nearly two months.187 Excluding the actual phone calls, Table A from 
Chapter 3 highlights that MIT were allowed to obtain all the communications data that the 
Home Office listed to the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill (JCDIBP).188 
Therefore, the findings of the ECtHR become crucial due to the measure being applicable to 
everyone within a particular jurisdiction.189 Although the ECtHR ruled in this specific case that 
Diyarbakır Assize Court’s decision did not even satisfy the requirements of Turkish law,190 and 
was therefore, not ‘in accordance with the law’191  their reasoning is important. First, the 
decision ‘was not limited to people suspected of the criminal offences’192 laid down in Turkish 
law. Secondly, the decision did not contain any findings or strong indicators of crime, only 
making references to activities covered by Turkish law, nor did it specify which factors had 
been taken into account for determining that there were strong indications those crimes had 
been committed.193 And finally, the decision did not try determine whether the aims in question 
could not be achieved by other, less intrusive, means.194 Retention notices suffer the same 
problems (particularly the first and second), especially with the extra-territorial effect in that 
‘conduct’ and ‘persons’ outside the UK is not defined, thus highlighting they would not be ‘in 
accordance with the law.’ 
  
2. Unfettered powers that are sporadically used 
 
As noted above, when the Home Office gave evidence to the Science and Technology 
Committee, they noted that that obligations to retain would not be imposed on all 
telecommunications operators. Such a position could satisfy the requirements of Tele2 and 
Watson because it could be argued not to be a ‘catch all’ power.195 However, as Lord Kerr’s 
dissent highlights ‘an unfettered power which may be arbitrarily or capriciously used does not 
become legal just because people generally do not take exception to its use.’196 It will be 
highlighted even if a retention notice was issued on just one telecommunications operator, the 
requirement of foreseeability would still not be met. As the Council of Europe’s Commissioner 
for Human Rights (Commissioner HR) noted that ‘suspicion less mass retention of 
communications data is fundamentally contrary to the rule of law.’197 What this demonstrates 
is that, according to the Commissioner HR, data retention does not have to be blanket, the 
measure just has to be encompassed on a large scale for it to be unlawful, a discriminatory 
indiscriminate power.198 This subsection will attempt to demonstrate why this is the correct 
view under the ECHR.  
 
i. Nature of the offences 
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It still has to be assumed that all data from one telecommunications operator is retained for 12 
months, in line with the HC in Davis, White, Cobbe and Murray. Given that one of the 
requirements for foreseeability is for there to be sufficient detail regarding the nature of 
offences that give rise to a surveillance measure, it is important to consider the purposes for 
data retention set out in s.61(7). 
 
a. In the interests of national security 
 
Speaight suggests that, national security grounds could be invoked to bypass EU law and 
implement a ‘catch all’ blanket indiscriminate data retention.199 The European Parliament 
rejects such notion,200 moreover, as Schrems demonstrates, national security cannot be used as 
a ‘trump card’ even for ‘third-countries.’201 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) has 
sought clarification by the CJEU of Tele2 and Watson in the national security context.202 That 
judgment, however, fails to consider the wider context of fundamental human rights protection 
in the context of mass surveillance.203 Where the CFR may not apply204 (for example, national 
security),205  due to its application being narrower,206 the ECHR would,207 and ‘[t]he ECtHR 
could alternatively also solve the issue with the national legislation on data retention’ legality 
under Article 8 ECHR.208 In any event, national security grounds for data retention would fall 
foul of Article 8(2) for the reasons mentioned in sections 7.2(A) and (B) due to failures of 
accessibility and particularly foreseeability.  
 
Therefore, it is important to consider the grounds of national security itself. Lack of clarity on 
national security for data retention was already highlighted by the RCC.209 The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Frank LaRue regards national security as ‘[v]ague and 
unspecified’ and the use of the amorphous concept to justify invasive limitations on human 
rights is concerning because it is vulnerable to state manipulation.210 Nearly two decades prior 
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to this, judge Pettiti in Kopp uttered that numerous European States have failed to comply with 
Article 8 abusing concepts such as national security, by distorting the meaning and nature of 
that term.211 Pettiti recommended that some clarification was needed in order to refine and 
improve the system for the prevention of terrorism.212 In Roman Zakharov, the GC 
acknowledged that foreseeability cannot mean States must enact ‘provisions listing in detail all 
conduct that may prompt a decision to subject an individual to secret surveillance on “national 
security” grounds.’213 This is due to national security varying in character or being difficult to 
define in advance.214 The GC noted, however, at the same time, reiterated that this does not 
permit States to have unfettered power. Even in the national security context, the GC noted that 
Member States only enjoy a certain margin of appreciation and that215 the law must indicate 
the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its 
exercise with sufficient clarity to prevent arbitrary interferences.216 The GC noted it was 
‘significant’ that Russian law did ‘not give any indication of the circumstances under which an 
individual’s communications may be intercepted on account of events or activities endangering 
Russia’s national…security.’217 This left:  
 
[A]uthorities an almost unlimited degree of discretion in determining which events or 
acts constitute such a threat and whether that threat is serious enough to justify secret 
surveillance, thereby creating possibilities for abuse.218 
 
The failure to define ‘national security’ was also highlighted by the ECtHR in Iordachi.219 In 
the UK, although there is no exhaustive definition of national security, the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner (IoCCO) in his 1986 Report defined it as activities ‘which 
threaten the safety or well-being of the State, and which are intended to undermine or 
overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means’220 which the 
ECtHR accepted.221 Though, this may be problematic as it is not binding.222 The UK House of 
Lords (UKHoL) in Rehman highlighted some potential characteristics of national security.223 
The Information Tribunal in Baker summarised this as follows: 
 
(i) “national security” means “the security of the United Kingdom and its people.”;  
(ii) the interests of national security are not limited to action by an individual which 
can be said to be “targeted at” the UK, its system of government or its people; 
(iii) the protection of democracy and the legal and constitutional systems of the state is 
a part of national security as well as military defence;    
(iv)  “action against a foreign state may be capable indirectly of affecting the security 
of the United Kingdom”; and  
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(v)  “reciprocal co-operation between the United Kingdom and other states in 
combating international terrorism is capable of promoting the United Kingdom’s 
national security”224  
 
The IPA 2016, however, makes no reference to the IoCCO’s Report, Rehman or Baker 
regarding national security, despite the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill 
(JCDIPB) recommending that national security should be defined.225 Baroness Jones of 
Moulsecoomb attempted226 to introduce a definition during the IPA 2016’s passage, but was 
rejected and was subsequently withdrawn.227 Baroness Jones did note ‘if you have not 
described it, how can you be sure that you are doing the right thing?’228 because ‘[n]ational 
security as a legal test is absolutely meaningless if left without a statutory definition’ (author’s 
emphasis).229 
 
Even without a definition of national security the ECtHR still holds that the law in question 
should specify the circumstances in which an individual may be at risk of surveillance on those 
grounds.230 In Zakharov, the GC acknowledged that prior judicial authorisation, may act as a 
sufficient safeguard when definitions are lacking detail.231 For this safeguard to be sufficient, 
the GC ruled that secret surveillance should not be ordered ‘haphazardly, irregularly or without 
due and proper consideration.’232 The GC noted, in making this assessment, consideration will 
be given to the authority authorising surveillance, its scope of review and content of 
authorisation.233 When national security is at stake which affects fundamental rights, they must 
be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body able to review 
reasons for decisions.234 Further, this independent body must be able to react in cases where 
invoking that concept has no reasonable basis in the facts or reveals an interpretation of 
“national security” that is unlawful or contrary to common sense and arbitrary.235 
 
The first safeguard the GC referred to in Zakharov was the prevention of arbitrary or 
indiscriminate secret surveillance.236 Reasoned requests with supporting material from the 
requesting authority, and the fact that a judge must give reasons for authorisations is also an 
important safeguard.237 The scope of review, the GC reiterated that it must be capable of 
verifying the existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned. This included, 
in particular, whether there are factual indications for suspecting a person of planning, 
committing or having committed criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret 
surveillance measures e.g. which engagers national security.238 Such requests for surveillance 
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measures must also be necessary in a democratic society, proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued i.e. least restrictive measure.239 
 
For the purposes of the IPA 2016, judicial control comes under power of JC’s. It must be noted 
that JC’s review of retention notices fail the first requirement that surveillance measures must 
not be arbitrary or indiscriminate. Whether retention notices are issued on all 
telecommunications operators, or just one, the potential communications data to be retained is 
all for 12 months in each case. As the GC has noted, it would be contrary to the rule of law if 
discretion was granted to even judges in terms of an unfettered power.240 An unfettered power 
as described in section 7.4(B)(1), would not satisfy the requirements of foreseeability.   
 
As noted above, JC’s can only consider retention notices on judicial review principles. There 
is, however, concerns with the JC’s being solely confined to principles of judicial review as it 
is much less stringent than judicial authorisation241 and is more restrictive as judges are 
unlikely to stray beyond conventional Wednesbury principles.242 Judicial review principles 
are even more constrained in the context of national security pre-Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA 1998), with very little changing post-HRA 1998.243 The Information Tribunal noted 
that even in ECHR territory, judges operating judicial review principles are not to act as 
second-stage administrators,244 and in the national security context a ‘no less, but no more’245 
approach was adopted. This is despite, the adjudicatory role of courts in human rights and 
judicial review cases being different. With the former, the merits are considered,246 however, 
the latter, it has been criticised by partly dissenting judges’ Walsh and Russo for a lack of 
merits review (author’s emphasis).247 The IPC has offered assurances, but this will be 
considered in subsection 7.6(C)(c)(f). 
 
 
Another problem with the JC’s review process is that s.89(1) only permits the JC’s to review 
the Secretary of State’s conclusions. There is no obligation on the Secretary of State to make a 
full and frank disclosure (like with judicial authorisation) to the JC, and therefore, JC’s could 
be misled, and would in any event be unable to give rigorous and critical analysis.248 David 
Anderson noted that he had private assurances that JC’s would receive the same evidence as 
the Secretary of State, but this cannot be guaranteed because it is not present on the face of the 
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IPA 2016.249 Even if the JC’s received the same evidence as the Secretary of State, this could 
in effect amount to ‘a summary of a summary of a summary of a summary of a summary of 
the original intelligence case.’250 The GC in Zakharov ruled it essential that the supervisory 
body has ‘access to all relevant documents, including closed materials’ and ‘that all those 
involved in’ surveillance ‘activities have a duty to disclose to it any material it required.’251 
There is no requirement of the JC’s to give reasons for allowing a retention notice, only their 
refusal, nor is there any requirement to verify the existence of a reasonable suspicion (discussed 
below) which is contrary to Zakharov.252 
 
There is a lack of adversarial process with regards to issuing retention notices, even with 
judicial authorisations.253 Lord Pannick,254 and Byron Karemba255 both articulate for an 
adversarial process (e.g. use of special advocates which is already the case for national security 
in the immigration context) if at least to allow the JC’s to hear contrasting views as to intensity 
of what review applies.256 Even if this were the case, questions of the JC’s independence 
remain.257  
 
Finally, and possibly the greatest threat of arbitrary data retention on grounds of national 
security comes not from Part 4, but Part 3 of the IPA 2016. Chapter 6 highlighted how s.61(1) 
and (2) in conjunction with s.61(7)(a) gives designated senior officers (DSO’s) of police forces, 
security services and many others258 powers to authorise any officer (or who is not an 
authorised officer)259 to obtain data from any person which relates to a telecommunication 
system, or data derived from a telecommunication system for national security purposes 
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(author’s emphasis). The draft Communications Data Bill Joint Committee (dCDBJC) were 
satisfied with six260 pubic authorities. 261 The dCDBJC also recommended that any public 
authority ‘which make a convincing business case’ should be listed on the statute.262It has not 
been made public, the business cases for the relevant public authorities, and when there has, it 
has not been satisfactory.263 Chapter 6 also noted that the IPA 2016 was not clear if ‘data’ in 
s.61(2) meant communications data or the much broader definition found within s.263(1).  
 
Section 61(4) allows officers to obtain data themselves from any person or telecommunications 
system,264 ask any person whom is believed to be capable of obtaining communications data 
to do so,265 and where they believe a telecommunications operator is not already in possession 
of but maybe or is capable of obtaining any communications data, by notice, require them to 
obtain data that is not already in their possession and disclose data subsequently obtained by 
them (author’s emphasis).266 This includes data that did not exist at the time of authorisation,267 
which could require telecommunications operators to generate and retain they may normally 
would not.  Chapter 6 noted that ‘public authorities may have broader powers of who they can 
obligate to retain than the Secretary of State’ such as the ‘IMSI-catchers’ that can both track 
the movements of mobile phone users within a given area, and intercept texts and calls.268 
 
It must be noted that said data can only be retained in specific investigations/operations,269 and 
more worryingly for testing, maintaining or developing equipment, systems or other 
capabilities relating to the availability or obtaining of communications data.270 Under both 
circumstances, massive amounts of communications data can be retained and masked due to 
the way in which items of communications data are recorded,271 which may well strike the 
ECtHR as excessive in all aspects.272  In dealing with the former, this still does not indicate 
what circumstances national security could be used as justification of said measure in specific 
investigations/operations. In dealing with the latter, there is no detailed indication as to what 
circumstances (reference to a specific investigation is an empty vessel) or when/how it would 
be necessary to conduct measures detailed in s.61(1)(b)(ii). The London Internet Exchange 
(LINX) in their written submissions to the draft Investigatory Powers Joint Bill Committee 
(dIPBJC) noted that it was ‘not normally considered good practice to do systems development 
using live data: to reduce the risk of security breaches, dummy data is used (author’s 
emphasis).’273 They also noted that the use of data for the purpose of ‘developing …other 
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capabilities’ would allow, under the guise of such development, analysis of data in ways that 
would not be authorised elsewhere.274 Professor Lorna Woods also questioned how subjects 
will be chosen regarding testing capabilities.275 The DSO’s cannot be independent276 and the 
fact that JC’s approval is not required places any data retention obligations on the same 
arbitrary standing as the GC noted in Zakharov because there is no constraining power to limit 
under what circumstances said powers may be exercised.277 Therefore, neither of these 
measures are foreseeable, and the latter is not even necessary. 
 
Neither retention notices made by the Secretary of State and approved by the JC’s or potential 
data retention obligations made by (un)authorised officers give any indication of the 
circumstances under which an individual’s communications data (or data) may be retained on 
account of events or activities endangering national security. Therefore, it must be concluded 
that, due to the lack of definition of national security, no indication as to when national security 
may be invoked to issue a retention notice, the JC’s judicial review process and the DSO’s self-
authorisation process not being a sufficient safeguard. Data retention obligations issued on 
even one telecommunications operator (or even in specific operations/investigations) cannot 
said to be foreseeable for the purposes of Article 8(2), because it grants unfettered powers to 
both JC’s and DSO, does not indicate the scope of discretion conferred upon them, nor does it 
protect against arbitrary interference and is contrary to the rebuke of ‘volenti nolenti 
widespread, non-(reasonable) suspicion-based, “strategic surveillance” for the purposes of 
national security’ established in Zakharov.278 Therefore, even if EU law is not applicable in the 
national security context of retention, it would not pass the first ECHR hurdle.279  
 
b. for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder 
 
For the remainder of this subsection, the possible retention powers in s.61 will not be 
considered alongside powers in s.87. Where a violation is found, this will apply to equally to 
s.61.280 In Zakharov the GC noted a specific list of offences is not necessary for foreseeability, 
but sufficient detail is required on the nature of the offences (author’s emphasis).281 In Kennedy 
the ECtHR accepted the UK’s definition of ‘serious crime’ and its detection.282 In the IPA 
2016, serious crime283 and its detection284 has the same definition. However, the caveat when 
it comes to data retention, retention notices or possible retention via s.61 are not issued on the 
basis of ‘serious crime,’ just crime. Crime, nor disorder are defined in the IPA 2016. It has 
already been noted that the CJEU has held that only serious crimes could be used to justify data 
retention. The dCDBJC noted that ‘"[c]rime" can of course include trivial offences, and only 
the requirements of necessity and proportionality can prevent communications data being used 
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for such crimes.’285 This is true, but this too would fall foul of being in accordance with the 
law as the ECtHR has noted concerns with laws that allow surveillance in ‘respect of a very 
wide range of criminal offences’286 as it would ‘not provide adequate protection against abuse 
of power by the State.’287 An example of abuse the ECtHR has noted is where ‘the nature of 
the offences which may give rise to such an order are nowhere defined.‘288 
 
When justifying the dCDB to the dCDBJC, the Home Secretary said that the ‘main purpose’ 
was ‘[o]nly suspected terrorists, paedophiles or serious criminals will be investigated.’289 This 
implies that it would not be the only purpose for data retention and its access, and given that 
the possibility to retain is possible by relevant public authorities via s.61 of the IPA 2016, it is 
of concern that the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead on digital crime, Stephen Kavanagh 
said officers should sometimes ‘push the boundaries’ and sometimes ‘go beyond what the 
regulations or courts accept’ to protect the public.290 This adds to the conclusion that a lack of 
definition of crime and disorder makes retention notices unforeseeable as there is no indication 
as to what circumstances data retention is permissible. 
 
One would go further in agreeance with Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in Szabo where he noted 
that:  
 
I cannot share the Chamber’s statement that “the requirement of “foreseeability” of the 
law does not go so far as to compel States to enact legal provisions listing in detail all 
situations that may prompt a decision to launch secret surveillance 
operations”…which not only downgrades the role of the principle of legality in a field 
of law where its rigorous reading is most needed, but also leaves the door wide open 
to creative interpretation of the law by Government and therefore to State abuse 
(author’s emphasis).291 
 
An exhaustive list of offences for the purposes of data retention was also the position of the 
GFCC,292 EU’s Article 29 Working Party (WP29)293 and was accepted by the ECtHR’s (among 
other safeguards) admissibility in Weber and Saravia294 as containing the minimum safeguards 
against arbitrary interference.295 Given that in the Szabo the ECtHR called for more acute 
protection of Article 8 in the era of mass surveillance,296 such an addition would be welcome 
and consistent with the requirements for foreseeability in this context. 
 
c. in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom so far as those 
interests are also relevant to the interests of national security 
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Like national security and crime, ‘economic well-being’ is not defined in the IPA 2016. Nor is 
there any indication as to what ‘relevant to the interests of national security’ means.  The 
JCDIPB noted that witnesses felt the term was too vague.297  Professor John Naughton and 
Professor David Vincent suggested that it was appropriate that the term receive critical scrutiny 
by Parliament.298 Lord Carlise, although against a statutory definition called for ‘greater 
understanding’ for clarity on the process of certification and who is involved.299 The JCDIPB 
recommended a statutory definition of ‘economic well-being.’300 Days later, the Intelligence 
and Security Committee (ISC) noted that the term was unnecessarily confusing and 
complicated.301 They continued that it is also redundant because it is a subset of national 
security.302 Worryingly, when the ISC questioned the intelligence agencies and the Home 
Office ‘neither [had] provided any sensible explanation’303 for its inclusion. The ISC 
recommended that ‘economic well-being’ be removed altogether from the legislation.304 
Baroness Jones also sought to clarify ‘economic well-being’ because the core purposes for 
which extraordinary powers may be used remain undefined and dangerously flexible.305 Jones 
continued that: 
 
[T]he undefined tests of…economic well-being risk interference with political and 
other lawful activity that ought to be unimpeded in a democratic society. In an era when 
parliamentarians from both Houses have been subjected to inappropriate surveillance 
by security services and the police, the continued undefined use of these terms in 
enabling legislation is not appropriate or sustainable.306 
 
Vague terminology such as ‘economic well-being’ does not indicate the circumstances in 
which retention via Part 4 or Part 3 would be used, and thus also does not satisfy the foreseeable 
requirement. 
 
d. in the interests of public safety and for the purpose of protecting public health  
 
These two grounds are dealt with together due to their vagueness leading to the same result. In 
Iordachi the ECtHR noted that: 
 
[I]t is unclear under the impugned legislation who – and under what circumstances – 
risks having the measure applied to him or her in the interests of, for instance, 
protection of health or morals or in the interests of others. [Moldovan law] fails, 
nevertheless, to define “national security”, “public order”, “protection of health”, 
“protection of morals”, “protection of the rights and interests of others”, “interests of ... 
the economic situation of the country” or “maintenance of legal order” for the purposes 
of interception of telephone communications. Nor does the legislation specify the 
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circumstances in which an individual may be at risk of having his telephone 
communications intercepted on any of those grounds (author’s emphasis).307 
 
This clearly indicates that the ECtHR does not accept a simple reference to the qualified aspects 
of Convention Rights as justification for interference. In Doerga v Netherlands the 
Government argued that tapping and retention of conversations308 were justified on the grounds 
of public safety and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.309 However, when 
examining the law under ‘foreseeability,’310 the ECtHR noted they lacked both clarity and 
detail nor did it ‘give any precise indication as to the circumstances in which prisoners’ 
telephone conversations may be monitored, recorded and retained or the procedures to be 
observed.’311  The ECtHR concluded that this was not ‘in accordance with the law’312 and 
therefore demonstrates reliance on a specified qualified ground in and of itself will fall foul of 
the ECtHR’s standard of legality.  
 
e. Other purposes 
 
The remaining purposes for retention are dealt with together under this subsection. Reasons for 
retention notices set out in s.61(7)(g)-(i) deal with specific instances. It is not clear how the 
retention of communications data would prevent death/injury/damage to a person’s 
physical/mental health as data preservation would be more suited to deal with such immediate 
situations. Moreover, the fact that this specific circumstance can elicit the retention of data on 
a massive scale (any or all data, from one313 or all telecommunications operators) renders a 
well-intentioned reason for retention indiscriminately314 arbitrary315 and thus not satisfying 
foreseeability for creating an unfettered and arbitrary power.  Similarly, with identifying a 
person, such a power can impose retention of data arbitrarily and indiscriminately, thus lacking 
foreseeability. With regards to miscarriages of justice, it is not clear what miscarriages of 
justice entail and under what circumstances a retention notice may be issued on those grounds, 
therefore, again, not foreseeable.   
 
Sections 61(7)(f) like with most reasons for a retention notice does not indicate under what 
circumstances a retention notice could be issued for assessing or collecting tax/duty/levy etc. 
This provision also becomes arbitrary and indiscriminate because of the amount of data that 
could be retained on the off chance that someone may owe the government money. Finally, 
s.61(7)(j) too does not indicate under what circumstances retention is permissible for the 
regulation of financial services and markets. It is also not indicated what ‘functions’ exercised 
are relevant for the retention of communications data. Moreover, is also not clear on what is 
meant by functions relating to financial stability i.e. for whom or what? Is this synonymous 
with ‘economic well-being’ as a standalone justification? In Iordachi, it was already noted that 
the ‘interests of the economic situation of the country’ was too vague, so too is financial 
stability. This renders both provisions unforeseeable for the purposes of legality and are 
therefore nor ‘in accordance with the law.’  
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ii. Persons liable 
 
a. A failure to distinguish between suspects and non-suspects 
 
What makes a law foreseeable is the extent to which it distinguishes between different 
classes of people, thereby placing a limit on arbitrary enforcement by the authorities.316 
 
Although S and Marper concerned the retention of DNA/fingerprint data, it still has clear 
applications to communications data retention.317  The GC criticised the UK regime for not 
distinguishing between those who had been suspected and those who had committed 
offences.318 Data retention in the IPA 2016 does not distinguish between those who have 
committed offences, those who are suspects, and those who are not suspects at all. This is 
problematic for foreseeability purposes. The GC in Zakharov noted that the authorisation 
authority’s (JC’s) scope of review must be capable of verifying:  
 
[T]he existence of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned, in particular, 
whether there are factual indications for suspecting that person of planning, committing 
or having committed criminal acts or other acts that may give rise to secret surveillance 
measures, such as, for example, acts endangering national security (author’s 
emphasis).319 
 
Not only that, the GC noted that, even if reasonable suspicion has been verified, the 
authorisation of a surveillance measure should only occur ‘if it meets the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality.’320 This criminal activity and reasons for authorisation must be 
serious,321 which would be consistent with the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Committee of 
Ministers (CoM) Recommendation Rec(2005)10 Chapter II(b)(4).322 Said ECHR principles 
applies to targeted or generalised surveillance.323 Given that the ECtHR has transferred 
principles of independence from its interpretation of ‘officer’ in Article 5(3) into the 
surveillance context, ‘reasonable suspicion’ found within Article 5(1)(c) is also transferable.324 
Reasonable suspicion requires the circumstances mitigating for and against a measure, deciding 
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by reference to legal criteria whether the reasons justify the measure,325 in other words a 
consideration of the merits of the decision.326 When the requirements of reasonable suspicion 
are not met, or the measure is unlawful, the measure must stop.327 Reasonable suspicion 
requires more than suspicion held in good faith, it ‘requires the existence of facts or information 
which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the 
offence’ which is dependent in all the circumstances.328 This threshold is higher than the 
‘identifiable public’ the CJEU eluded to in Tele2 and Watson as suspicion would not be 
necessary for data retention.329 Most data retained will be of individuals who bear no relation 
to serious crime and therefore such retention of data is clearly irrelevant.330 Even prior to the 
CJEU’s position in Tele2 and Watson, AG Kokott in Promusicae doubted whether the storage 
of traffic data of all users without any concrete suspicions, laying in a stock, is compatible with 
fundamental rights (author’s emphasis).331 
 
Data retention all but eliminates any prospect of reasonable suspicion being applied. Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque noted that any watering down of reasonable suspicion assumes that the 
fight against terrorism requires a: 
 
[P]ool of information retrievable by the authorities applying highly efficient methods 
and processing masses of data, potentially about each person, should he be, one way or 
another, connected to suspected subjects or objects of planned terrorist attacks.332 
 
As noted in section 7.4(B)(1)), data retention affects those irrespective of conduct, almost 
exclusively affects persons who do not give rise to a cause for it, nor will they ever be connected 
in any way to serious crime. Tom Sorell highlights that there is no reason to think most of the 
population is contemplating criminal activity.333 Suspicionless searches, as Daniel Solove 
contends, provides law-enforcement officials with too much power and discretion and little 
oversight.’334 Judge Pettiti in Kopp v Switzerland335 noted that surveillance ‘must be used for 
a specific purpose, not as a general “fishing”336 exercise to bring in information (author’s 
emphasis).’ Fishing has been likened to data retention as individuals are not targeted.337 
 
Milaj and Bonnici note that mass surveillance is more intrusive than targeted since they 
interfere largely with the life of innocent individuals, devoid of any suspicion, only on the basis 
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of making use of certain ways of communication or of certain devices.338 One would go further 
and argue that the requirement of verifying reasonable suspicion is not and cannot be addressed 
because it is not based on individual actions, or even group actions, but on service used,339 a 
point also noted by the GFCC.340 Applying judicial review principles would not remedy the 
absence of proving reasonable suspicion,341 and thus would not curb wide powers ‘to offer the 
individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.’342 The failure to define 
sufficiently clearly the categories of persons liable for surveillance would concern the 
ECtHR343 which would lack foreseeability.344 As the CoE’s Commissioner HR noted that 
‘suspicionless mass retention of communications data is fundamentally contrary to the rule of 
law.’345 
 
b. When a person who is not a suspect but may have information for a derogation purpose 
 
In Zakharov the GC reiterated that ‘interception measures in respect of a person who was not 
suspected of any offence but could possess information about such an offence might be justified 
under Article 8.’346 However, this requires the offences and persons liable to be sufficiently 
clear,347 which if not (as is the case with regards to Part 4) can lead to a violation.348 
 
c. A failure to make provisions for special categories of communications 
 
Privacy International noted that:  
 
Blanket data retention laws also offend the principle of foreseeability because they 
make no distinction for relationships that the State already recognises as sufficiently 
special to warrant a degree of protection.349 
 
The interference with lawyer-client privilege posed by data retention was highlighted in 
Chapter 4. The absence of protections for (not just lawyer-client privilege) in the data retention 
context was highlighted by the CJEU350 and AG Saugmandsgaard Øe who noted it would be 
desirable to exclude said data from retention obligations.351  In Iordachi, the ECtHR were 
‘struck by the absence of clear rules defining what should happen when, for example, a phone 
call made by a client to his lawyer is intercepted.’352 In Kopp the ECtHR found Swiss law to 
fail foreseeability because it provided ‘no guidance on how authorities should distinguish 
																																																						
338 Jonida Milaj and Jeanne Pia Mifsud Bonnici, ‘Unwitting subjects of surveillance and the presumption of 
innocence’ (2014) Computer Law and Security Review 30:4 419, 423. 
339 Matthew White, (n4), 41. 
340 BVerfG, (n176), [177]. 
341 Gillan Quinton v UK App no. 4158/05 (ECHR, 12 January 2010, [86]; Beghal, (n168), [98]. 
342 ibid, [79]. 
343 Iordachi, (n219), [44]. 
344 Abu Bakar Munir and Siti Hajar Mohd Yasin, (n173), 755. Though Kruslin, (n288), [35] and Huvig v France 
App no. 11105/84 (ECHR, 24 April 1990), [34] highlighted more than just lack of clarification on persons 
liable. 
345 Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, (n197), para 6, p22. 
346 Roman Zakharov, (n6), [245]; Greuter v the Netherlands App no. 40045/98 (ECHR, 19 March 2002). 
347 Roman Zakharov, (n6), [245]; Iordachi, (n219), [44]. 
348 Kruslin, (n288), [35-36]; Amann, (n126), [60], [62].  
349 Privacy International, (n141), p9. 
350 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, (n2), [57-8]; Tele2 Sverige AB and Watson, (n3), [105]. 
351 Opinion of Saugmandsgaard Øe, (n1), [212]. 
352 Iordachi, (n219), [50]. 
	201	
between protected and unprotected attorney-client communications.’353 Data retention in Part 
4 suffers from the same flaw because they ‘make no effort to distinguish between such 
communications (and others like it) and “normal” communications.’354With regards to 
journalistic sources, the ECtHR defines it as: 
 
“any person who provides information to a journalist”; it understands “information 
identifying a source” to include, as far as they are likely to lead to the identification of 
a source, both “the factual circumstances of acquiring information from a source by a 
journalist” and “the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a 
journalist (author’s emphasis).”355  
 
Due to the failure to make laws specifically for journalistic sources, though acceptable in 
Weber356 the ECtHR noted that one cannot restore the confidentiality of journalistic sources 
once it has been destroyed.357 
 
Subsection 7.4(B)(2)(i)) has demonstrated that where persons liable for surveillance measures 
and of the nature of offences for surveillance measures are not defined, this fails foreseeability. 
This is the case in either the former, or latter, or when both are considered together.358 Privacy 
International have argued that data retention laws that fail to distinguish between different 
classes of people would have a more pernicious impact on individual privacy than the vague 
laws at issue in Kruslin and Amann.359 
 
iii. Incidental Data Retention 
 
This relates particularly to the correspondence aspect of Article 8. As the RCC noted, data 
retention unjustly restrains the privacy of the recipient as the person becomes exposed to data 
retention irrespective of their own act, but based on the behaviour of another person.360 This 
exposes them to bad faith and blackmail.361 The RCC also pointed out that this makes passive 
subjects of communications suspects from the point of view of the authorities, which was 
regarded as an excessive intrusion into their private life.362Thus, in the RCC’s view, was 
excessive.363 In Kruslin, the case actually concerned the incidental interception364 of the 
applicant’s communications. Due to there being a lack of clarity on the persons liable nor nature 
of offences defined, the French law was not ‘in accordance with the law.’365 Part 4 of the IPA 
2016 suffers from the issue of incidental data retention, and would too similarly violate the 
ECHR. 
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iv. Data by type 
 
It was already noted above that a requirement for foreseeability was to have clear binding rules 
especially in light of the sophistication of modern technology. Data retention is a unique 
surveillance power in which it can detail what data is to be retained. Chapter 3 detailed the 
types of communications data that is likely to be retained. The RCC noted ‘that the lack of a 
precise legal provision that will exactly determine the sphere of the data necessary to identify 
physical and legal users, opens up the possibility for abuses in the activity of retaining.’366 
Chapter 3 noted the problems of obliging telecommunications operators to generate data 
because it allows for undefined types of data to be retained. It also noted that it is possible to 
oblige telecommunications operators to oblige third parties to generate and hand over 
communications data. Even with regards to ICRs (which the IPA 2016 does not limit itself to), 
the Home Office noted that ‘there is no single set of data that constitutes an internet connection 
record.’367 Then with regards to smart objects (to which retention notices can be applied to), 
they can accumulate a massive amount of data368 which the nature of such traffic are currently 
unknown.369 Even with explanatory notes, the IPA 2016 does not account for the types of data 
that can be generated, admits that ICR lacks precision and with the IoT, there is a void in what 
types of data that can be created (and subsequently retained). Chapter 3 also highlighted that 
Big Data could be retained in various possible ways via generation, entity data retention, and 
retaining any/all descriptions of data. There is also the fact that the IPA 2016 does not explicitly 
rule out data for the purposes of s.263(1) not falling within the ambit communications data 
which allows nigh unlimited amounts of types of data to be retained. The JCDIPB 
recommended that the government clarify the types of data it expects CSPs to generate and in 
what quantities so that this information can be considered when the Bill is introduced.370 This 
did not occur. Moreover, Chapter 3 highlighted that telecommunications operators could 
subsequently retain third party data because they were permitted to conduct interception for 
non-defined ‘business activities.’ Finally, Chapter 3 noted that content can be retained that is 
imbedded within communications data. Therefore, in this regard, the rules on the types of data 
to be retained are not sufficiently clear and thus, not foreseeable. 
 
C.  Utility 
 
Lord Kerr in Beghal noted that even if the utility of a measure is demonstrated, it would be 
‘misconceived’ to assume it ‘meets the requirement that the measure be "in accordance with 
law."’371  This is especially so when the powers (as demonstrated above and will do so below) 
are used in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.372 Therefore, even if the utility (discussed 
below) is sufficiently proven, the fact remains, data retention as currently envisioned in the 
IPA 2016, does not meet the requirements of being ‘in accordance with the law’ because it is 
inherently general and indiscriminate. 
 
D.  A violation of Article 8 is a violation of Articles 9-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4 
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Section 7.4 noted that prescribed by/in accordance with the law were to be treated as the same 
for the purposes of Articles 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4. Although Article 2 Protocol 4 has 
not been ratified by the UK or incorporated through the HRA 1998, it can be used to inform 
Article 8,373 due to the collection of data concerning movement interferes with Article 8.374 
This discussion is also important for Member States that have incorporated Article 2 Protocol 
4. Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others v Sweden375 concerned the storage of information (retention) 
by the Security Police.376 After finding a violation of Article 8377 it was further argued due to 
their political affiliations Articles 10 and 11 were also violated.378 Even though the ECtHR 
noted that the applicants did not deduce any evidence of a chilling effect on their political 
freedoms it nevertheless considered that: 
 
[T]he storage of personal data related to political opinion, affiliations and activities 
that is deemed unjustified for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 ipso facto constitutes an 
unjustified interference with the rights protected by Articles 10 and 11 (author’s 
emphasis).379 
 
 
This demonstrates that any measure in the surveillance context which violates Article 8, which 
engages Articles 10 and 11 for the same reason, also violates those Articles, even when the 
severity of the interference cannot be demonstrated.  In addition, communications data 
potentially allows the storage of personal data which relates to one’s movements (Article 2 
Protocol 4) and religious beliefs (Article 9) and similarly with Articles 10-11, this would 
amount to violations for not being ‘in accordance with the law.’ 
 
E.  Conclusions 
 
This subsection has demonstrated that had the CJEU not skipped the legality requirement, 
observed AG Saugmandsgaard Øe’s request for clarification380 and followed ECtHR 
jurisprudence faithfully, whether it be on the basis of an unfettered arbitrary power, or strict 
surveillance requirements set out in the ECtHR’s case-law, the assessment of proportionality 
would not have been necessary. Although the position of the ECtHR when finding a measure 
not to be ‘in accordance with the law’ is sometimes to discontinue its assessment, the ECtHR 
can still consider whether the measure pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate.381  
 
7.5 Does data retention pursue a Legitimate aim?  
 
A legitimate aim is the list of exceptions382 found within a Convention Right i.e. national 
security. Such exceptions are exhaustive and their definition is restrictive, and for a 
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qualification to be compatible with the ECHR, it must pursue an aim ‘that can be linked to one 
of those listed in that provision.’383 In S and Marper the GC agreed that DNA/fingerprint 
retention pursued the legitimate aim of detection/prevention of crime.384 Gerards notes that the 
ECtHR usually accepts very general and abstract aims such as national security, it however, 
adds very little to its reasoning.385 However, Judge Wildhaber’s et al’s386 concurring opinion 
in Rotaru v Romania stressed that:  
 
[I]n respect of national security as in respect of other purposes, there has to be at least 
a reasonable and genuine link between the aim invoked and the measures interfering 
with private life for the aim to be regarded as legitimate. To refer to the more or less 
indiscriminate storing of information relating to the private lives of individuals in terms 
of pursuing a legitimate national security concern is … evidently problematic (author’s 
emphasis).387 
 
Although the case concerned the continued storage of information for decades, the judges 
continued that the ECtHR were entitled to find that the measure did not pursue a legitimate 
aim. It is also important to note that the concurring judges did not confine this point to national 
security, but all the limitations set out in Article 8, therefore, the same logic applies. Moreover, 
as Chapter 3 noted, algorithms, profiling and data mining techniques could be utilised in 
retention notices or to retain data that has been subject to such techniques. The Consultative 
Committee of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals Data with regards to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data noted that any dynamic-algorithmic-based data mining and 
profiling for predictive or preventative policing is not a legitimate aim in a democratic 
society.388 They continued that any bulk data on general populations for data-mining and 
profiling should also be rejected.389 
 
There is but another problem with regards to data retention in pursuit of a legitimate aim, the 
grounds themselves. Although it was highlighted that ‘in accordance with the law’ and 
‘prescribed by law’ meant the same thing, this does not ring true for the actual derogations in 
Articles 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4. For example, Articles 8, 10, 11 and Article 2 Protocol 
4 all allow restrictions in the interests of national security. However, because there is no 
national security exemption in Article 9, ‘[s]tates may therefore not interfere with that right on 
that ground.’390 This was highlighted by the ECtHR in Nolan and K v Russia where it was 
noted that: 
 
Far from being an accidental omission, the non-inclusion of that particular ground for 
limitations in Article 9 reflects the primordial importance of religious pluralism as “one 
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of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the meaning of the Convention”...It 
follows that the interests of national security could not serve as a justification for the 
measures taken by the Russian authorities...391  
 
As Breyer suggests, even when rights are partially identical, they have different purposes and 
therefore need to be applied independently of each other.392 When retention notices are issued 
in the interests of national security, this becomes problematic due to the interference with 
Article 9. Blanket data retention whether by one or multiple telecommunications operators 
makes it impossible to distinguish between interferences with Article 8, 9, 10, 11 and Article 
2 Protocol 4, hence why Chapter 4 argued they were all engaged. Therefore, the only way to 
ensure Article 9 is respected and/or to prevent any incidental interference, data retention on 
national security grounds must not be permitted. Out of the five Convention Rights mentioned, 
it is only Article 8 that refers to ‘economic well-being’ and therefore, retention notices on this 
ground are not permissible for the rest. Public order is a derogation that is not permissible under 
Article 8, but is for Article 9 and Article 2 Protocol 4.  
 
Furthermore, to confine a legitimate aim to what is mentioned in the derogations of qualified 
rights prevents the ECtHR from distinguishing between various aims.393 This is not desirable 
as the easy acceptance of broad terms which are mostly empty and meaningless in character 
has the result of that the requirement of a legitimate aim does not add anything substantial to 
the judicial reasoning in cases of conflicts between rights or interests.394 When the margin of 
appreciation is narrowed the Court should be more precise than it currently appears to be in 
determining the interests served by the measure.395 This demonstrates just as Judge 
Wildhaber’s et al’s and the other judges noted in Rotaru, the more or less indiscriminate storing 
of personal information makes any legitimate aim problematic. This needs to be seriously 
considered in order for the Convention to be practical and effective, and not theoretical and 
illusory,396 as a failure to establish a legitimate aim will result in a violation.397 This also 
highlights an example where the ECHR is narrower with regards to exemptions to qualified 
rights as the CFR only requires satisfying the general interest.  
 
7.6 Is data retention necessary in a democratic society? 
 
As the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies noted privacy could regain something 
of its esteem if the ECtHR would stop to focus only upon the legality criterion and start again 
taking the necessity test seriously.398 The GC did just that in Zakharov in which ‘in accordance 
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with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’ were considered jointly.399 Judge Pinto 
de Albuquerque in his concurring opinion in Szabo noted that mandatory data retention 
‘appears neither necessary nor proportionate.’400 This section will highlight why this is correct. 
 
A. Pressing Social Need 
 
[T]he term ‘pressing social need’ implies a greater level of severity, urgency or 
immediacy associated with the need that the measure is seeking to address (author’s 
emphasis).401 
 
a. Necessity  
‘Necessary,’ the ECtHR has asserted, is not synonymous with “indispensable” but it also did 
not have the flexibility of an expression such as ‘admissible,’ ‘ordinary,’ ‘useful,’ ‘reasonable’ 
or ‘desirable.’402 It is not sufficient to establish the utility of a measure, thus ‘[t]he onus upon 
the public authority seems to be significantly higher.’403 This onus intensifies further given that 
data retention significantly interfere with wide spectrum of human rights.404 ‘Necessity’ relates 
not just to a measure applying the law, but the law itself.405  
 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) have opined that ‘[t]here must be a sufficient 
factual basis for believing that there was a real danger to the interest which the State claims 
there was a pressing social need to protect.’406 The necessity requirement will subdivide into 
four components, whether there was a pressing social need for the definition of 
telecommunications operators to be extended, for the type of retention itself, the retention 
length, and the inclusion of ICRs, all the other types of data and the ability to generate data. 
 
i. Is there a pressing social need for retention obligations to encompass everything 
that can communicate? 
 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that retention obligations could be imposed on essentially any service, 
system, device etc that communicates, and on any person, organisation, entity that controls said 
services/systems/devices. Chapter 6 noted, this increases the severity of the interference further 
in light of the IoT, in which many aspects of a person’s home would be their own personal 
Panopticon. It could be argued to be justified on the basis of the increase in use and in diversity 
of technology, as such, a broad and technologically neutral definition was appropriate as means 
of future-proofing the law.407 However, Smith highlighted that the JCDIPB did not explicitly 
address ‘whether a case for extension to private networks (as opposed to smaller public 
networks) has been made out.’408 Smith continues that the Home Office made no attempts ‘to 
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justify the extension to all private networks.’409 Smith concluded with an important question, 
that remains unanswered: If there is no intention to use the powers against private networks, 
why are the powers that broad? If it is intended, where is the justification?410 There is a lack of 
consideration into how the definition includes IoT services/devices etc let alone justification. 
It is this lack of consideration and justification which renders the pressing social need in this 
regard non-existent. As the ACC noted ‘mere possibility of using new technology in addition 
to existing surveillance measures does not a priori justify an interference.’411 Failing on the 
grounds of establishing a pressing social need will in itself amount to a violation,412 and would 
thus violate all the relevant rights mentioned above. 
 
ii. Is there a pressing social need for retention in its current form? 
 
The justification for the IPA 2016’s necessity413 under the ECHR is derived from the case of 
K.U. v Finland.414 This concerned Finland’s inability to obtain the identity of a person who 
subjected a minor to advertisements of a sexual nature,415 which lead to a violation of Article 
8.416 The ECtHR referred to the State’s positive obligation under Article 8417 to criminalise 
offences and attempts against a person and to ‘reinforce the deterrent effect of criminalisation 
by applying criminal-law provisions in practice through effective investigation and 
prosecution’ with even greater importance when it concerns children.418 The ECtHR noted that: 
 
Although freedom of expression and confidentiality of communications are primary 
considerations and users of telecommunications and Internet services must have a 
guarantee that their own privacy and freedom of expression will be respected, such 
guarantee cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate 
imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder or crime or the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others (author’s emphasis).419 
 
Such a positive obligation is also prevalent in the wording of Article 2 (right to life) by 
requiring everyone’s life to be protected by law and also in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
with regards to effective criminal law provisions,420 whether the State is directly involved.421 
This also includes effective official investigations.422 However, in K.U. the ECtHR also noted 
that Article 8 and 10 must yield on occasion423 to imperatives, such as effective criminal laws. 
Moreover, with regards to positive obligations for effective criminal laws/investigations, the 
ECtHR has noted: 
																																																						
409 ibid. 
410 ibid. 
411 Austrian Constitutional Court, (n175), [2.3.14.1]. 
412 Faber v Hungary App no. 40721/08 (ECHR, 24 July 2012), [59].  
413 Investigatory Powers Bill European Convention on Human Rights Memorandum 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473763/European_Convention_
on_Human_Rights_Memorandum.pdf> accessed 6 March 2018, para 50. 
414 K.U. v Finland App no. 2872/02 (ECHR, 2 December 2008). 
415 ibid, [40]. 
416 ibid, [50]. 
417 ibid, [42-3]. 
418 ibid, [46]. 
419 ibid, [49]. 
420 Osman v UK App no. 23452/94 (ECHR, 28 October 1998), [115]; L.C.B. v UK App no. 23413/94 (ECHR, 9 
June 1998), [36]. 
421 Angelova and Iliev v Bulgaria App no. 55523/00 (ECHR, 26 July 2007), [93]. 
422 McCann and Others v UK App no. 18984/91 (ECHR, 27 September 1995), [161]. 
423 K.U., (n414), [49]. 
	208	
 
Another relevant consideration is the need to ensure that powers to control, prevent and 
investigate crime are exercised in a manner which fully respects the due process and 
other guarantees which legitimately place restraints on crime investigation and bringing 
offenders to justice, including the guarantees contained in Articles 8 and 10.424 
 
This demonstrates as the ECtHR in Klass noted ‘Contracting States may not, in the name of 
the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem 
appropriate.’425 Any such measure must be necessary.426 
 
It must be repeated that UK representatives before the CJEU conceded that there was no 
‘scientific data’ to underpin the claimed need for data retention.427 Ian Brown holds that 
governments have provided very little evidence that interference is proportionate and are 
‘prone to highlighting individual cases of repugnant crimes without any detail as to the 
significance of the role played by retained communications data.’428 He makes reference to 
such ‘sweeping claims’ such as ‘communications data and intercept intelligence are key factors 
in over 95% of the most significant investigations directed at the Serious Organised Crime 
groups assessed as causing the most harm to the UK.’429 Such ‘sweeping claims’ were repeated 
in the Home Office’s operational case for the retention of ICRs.430  
 
The  German NGO Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung (AK Vorrat) noted that 
communications data retention is ineffective and counterproductive for the purposes of 
prosecution of serious crime.431 This is important given that the GC is willing to accept third-
party statistical evidence.432 They noted that there is no proof that the number of cleared cases, 
the crime rate or the number of convictions, acquittals or closed cases significantly depends on 
whether a blanket data retention scheme is in operation in a given country or not.433 Such 
sentiments were echoed by Munir and Yasin who were unable to establish how pressing the 
need is ‘or how often the police and security and intelligence services find it necessary to make 
use of such data or are significantly hampered by its absence.’434 Section 7.1(d) demonstrated 
that even at an EU level, the EDPS was not convinced of the necessity of data retention, nor 
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were the CCC convinced when speaking in obiter dictum. The RCC criticisms were seen as 
criticising ‘the spirit of data retention as a whole’435 and the DCH noted the necessity and 
effective of data retention had not been established, even after five years.436 
 
In David Anderson’s A Question of Trust, he recommended that compulsory data to remain 
legal.437  Anderson referred to statistics the European Commission used to justify the necessity 
of data retention,438 but as noted above, this did not convince the EDPS of the necessity. 
Anderson then relied upon a 2-week detailed survey into how communications data are used.439 
Anderson does not elaborate on the types of communications data utilised, nor how could a 
two-week survey justify such wide-ranging powers. Furthermore, Anderson noted that a 
quarter of communications data requests related to threat to life, an immediate risk or urgent 
operational necessity in relation to serious crime or national security.’440 These are, under EU 
law, the only permissible grounds for retention, highlighting that three-quarters of 
communications data accessed (let alone retained) is not necessary. Anderson also highlighted 
that 28% of requests were for communications data that were over three months old.441 
Anderson gives the example of Operation Notarise as an example of how retained data can be 
put to use.442 This involved the arrest of over 600 suspected paedophiles based on 3982 requests 
for communications data. There are, however, problems of oversimplification, because there is 
no indication as to what type of communications data was used, how long the communications 
data was stored before its use, whether any data stored was a result of routine business practice 
or data retention laws. It is not detailed how443 (and in what ways) the communications data 
was essential to identifying 92% of suspects nor whether the 336 requests for communications 
data older than 12 months affected the identifying suspects. It does not indicate whether other 
surveillance measures were used and what benefit they may have brought. Given that the 
suspects used TOR (a VPN), which can make communications data444 and ICRs445 useless, it 
was argued that any ‘successful attack against Tor anonymity would probably have been based 
on targeted surveillance and perhaps even on direct interference (author’s emphasis).’446 
Boiten and Hernandez-Castro noted that this strongly suggested that the National Crime 
Agency’s (NCA) conveniently timed success ‘actually lends little evidence to support the need 
for blanket data retention powers (author’s emphasis).’447 Anderson’s analysis in this regard 
squares with the European Commission’s own draft conclusions: 
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[T]he relevance of [communications] data decreases significantly with their age: [70%] 
of all data are use within 0-3 months of their storage and [85%] within 0-6 months. For 
the added value of older data, only anecdotal evidence is available (author’s 
emphasis).448 
 
Brown in 2010,449 noted that little had changed, and Anderson’s observations in 2015 highlight 
this. This also questions the necessity of the length of data retention (discussed below). Some 
problems are also highlighted when Anderson discusses utility, where he mentions access to 
communications data will often be needed in real time450 (therefore undermining necessity of 
retention). Anderson also noted that the ability to ‘to extract evidence from social media and 
messaging’451 (which is not the same as retaining communications data and accessing it) lead 
to the conviction of Imran Khawaja.452 Thus making it unclear the role of communications 
data, let alone its retention in this regard. 
 
Anderson also refers to the Director of Europol, Robert Wainwright who answers his own 
tautological question453 of:  
 
Ask yourself what the end of data retention would mean in concrete terms? It would 
mean that communication data that could have solved a murder or exonerate a suspect 
is simply deleted and no longer available.454 
 
There may be instances where communications data could solve a murder, but this question 
creates the impression that without data retention murders could not be solved. This confuses 
utility of communications data and its retention and sails dangerously close to a presumption 
of suspicion, rather than innocence. The premise of this question, simply put, is loaded. 
Anderson also refers to the European Commission drawing negative conclusions for law 
enforcement in Germany and the Czech Republic where data retention ended.455 However, 
these negative consequences relied upon claims/statements (which the EDPS highlighted and 
wanted evidence of consequences before and after annulments).456 Although, almost two 
decades ago,457 the Earl of Northesk noted ‘there is no evidence whatever that a lack of data 
retained has proved an impediment to the investigation of the atrocities’ of 9/11.458 
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Anderson once again refers to Europol who compared the UK and Germany in that in the 
former 121 suspects were arrested or convicted and in the latter no arrests could be made.459 
But once again, such statements suffer from being vague basing the only difference in numbers 
on the fact the Germany did not have any compulsory data retention laws at the time. In this 
regard, Liberty responded to Anderson’s report, noting that even with the usefulness of 
communications data,460 blanket data retention was unnecessary461 due to its necessity not 
being shown.462  
 
The WP29 noted another facet of the assessment that may be important to establishing a 
pressing social need, public concern.463 Chapter 5 highlighted that particularly to the UK, 
public concern since Snowden’s revelations has largely been muted due to media bias and the 
government expanding powers anyway. Though Dimitris Potoglou et al has demonstrated a 
lack of appetite for a 12-month data retention period noting that: 
 
[O]n average, respondents across the EU27 were less likely to choose ISPs that retained 
data for more than one month and shared any type of data related to their Internet 
activity.  
 
This is to some degree reflected in mass petitions across Europe and the constitutional 
challenges (mentioned above).464 Anderson documents a range of threats the UK faced465 but 
this does not demonstrate a pressing social need to adopt data retention measures, it just 
highlights the threats the UK face. It has been demonstrated that there is not a pressing social 
need for data retention, at the very least in the manner envisaged in the IPA 2016. The pressing 
social need for law enforcement purposes are weak and vague. Furthermore, Nora Ni Loideain 
noted all the arguments in favour of communications data retention and access were based on 
studies involving serious crime.466 There was no evidence for a pressing social need for the 
other purposes for access to communications data (let alone its retention) for tax assessment, 
public health or other grounds.467 This problem becomes more profound due to the grounds 
from s.61(7)(c), (d), (e), (f), (h) and (i) accounted for 0.4% requests for access to 
communications data in 2013468 and 0.2% in 2015.469 For 2015, national security accounted 
for 6% of requests for communications data which would make s.102(3) of the Anti-terrorism, 
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Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA 2001) suspect, given that national security was the sole 
ground for data retention up until it was repealed by the IPA 2016.  
 
This subsection has demonstrated that the only ground with any supporting evidence for data 
retention is for fighting serious crime. This ground, however, has not sufficiently demonstrated 
that there is a pressing social need to allow data retention that can affect all telecommunications 
operators in the UK and aboard and all the communications data that can be obtained from 
them. For the rest of the grounds, no evidence has been provided, and so a pressing social need 
cannot even be countered. This lends greater weight to the reasoning of the CJEU in that data 
retention should only be permissible for serious crime. In any event, a pressing social has not 
been established because although data retention will make more communications data 
available, availability is not the same as necessity470 and thus again amounts to a violation of 
all the relevant rights. 
 
iii. Is there a pressing social need for a 12-month retention period? 
 
Section 87(3) stipulates a 12-month data retention period. Such a position is likely derived 
from the fact that was the position in the DRR, and that AG Cruz Villalón was not convinced 
of the proportionality of a longer period.471 However, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe noted that 
Member State courts must check whether the retention period is based on objective criteria 
such that it may be ensured that it is limited to what is strictly necessary.472 The 12-month 
period is questioned by Ni Loideain in that it was noted that: 
 
[L]ess consideration has been given to showing detailed evidence and reasons justifying 
the proposed mass and indiscriminate retention period of twelve months. In other 
words, an evidence-based approach is lacking (author’s emphasis).473 
 
Ni Loideain took the same position with regards to ICRs,474 therefore, an objective justification 
for a 12-month retention period is lacking. Yet the JCDIPB felt the case for 12-month retention 
periods was justified475 mainly based on surveys476 which either concerned requests for 
communications data or a vague statement of communications data being applicable (and 
therefore, not necessary). The number of requests does not, in and of itself establish necessity 
considering that all requests were not independently scrutinised.477 There was a lack of detailed 
analysis of what communications data were necessary and for what periods of time, given that 
communications data is a generic term. 
 
AG Saugmandsgaard Øe mistakenly ascribed a six-month period as acceptable based on 
Zakharov, when in fact, the GC referred to a six-month period (of intercept data) as being 
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acceptable in the individual context.478 It was noted that the London Internet Exchange (LINX) 
recommended ‘that ISPs retain log data for three to six months.’479 At this point in time, it has 
not been demonstrated that there is a pressing social need for a 12-month data retention period, 
as this assertion is mainly based upon anecdotal evidence or assumption. This, too would lead 
to violations. 
 
iv. Is there a pressing social need for Internet Connection Record, the types of 
(relevant communications) data, and the generation thereof? 
 
As noted above, Articles 2 and 8 require effective criminal law and investigations. The ECtHR 
‘must have regard to the changing conditions within Contracting States and respond, for 
example, to any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved.’480 Anderson 
recommended that the Government provide an operational case for retaining web logs.481 The 
Government responded with an operational case for the retention of ICRs482 as they comprise 
of web logs and much more. The operational case identifies the value of ICRs (determining 
who sent the messages, what service used, and ascertain access to illegal services) and some 
problems associated with not retaining them (difficulties in fighting online child abuse, human 
trafficking and fraud),483 with examples.484 It can be argued that allowing the retention of ICRs 
corresponds to the UK’s positive obligations under Articles 2 and 8 given the way technology 
(and its use) has evolved. It could also be argued that communications data is not as serious of 
an interference as interception,485 and thus the pressing social need threshold, need not be as 
high. 
 
The operational case attributes the change in the way we communicate (due to technology) can 
exasperate the problem caused by not retaining ICRs, but admits this is not evidence in itself 
‘of the specific problems that law enforcement currently face.’486 The operational case also 
used case studies to demonstrate damage being caused to law enforcement investigations 
because it is not possible to establish what communications services suspects have been using 
online.487 It was noted that 862 case referrals could only be taken further it ICRs were 
retained.488 
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Chapter 3 already demonstrated why communications data retention is just as serious as 
interception, therefore the pressing social need for it should not be lowered. Gareth Llewellyn 
of Brass Horn Communications (an ISP) noted that ICRs retention will not be the panacea that 
the IPA 2016 envisages them to be and should therefore be removed.489 Lyewellyn also added 
they will not be effective in preventing crime and are a direct risk to the well-being of UK 
citizens (author’s emphasis).490 Dr Julian Huppert argues further that operational case is 
‘strikingly short on detail and evidence’ for the benefits from ICRs retention.491 Huppert 
additionally noted that argument of the 862 referrals was ‘far from clear that even with ICR 
retention these cases could or would be progressed; there is no evidence provided to suggest 
that would be the case.’492 Huppert also noted how the failure to act on part of the police on 
information regarding a child abuse ring, for 14 months demonstrated that ‘should focus 
resources on processing the data they already have’ as no new powers were required.493 Lord 
Paddick also noted that Mi5/6 said that ICRs are of limited value to them,494 significantly 
weakening the national security case for them.  
 
After considering the arguments for and against ICRs, the JCDIBP noted that ICRs could prove 
to be a desirable tool, but the Government had to address concerns of invasiveness and 
practicality.495 As noted above, the ECtHR does not consider ‘desirable’ synonymous with 
‘necessary,’ and as noted above, the utility of a measure in and of itself does not even ensure 
legality. Furthermore, the operational case did not demonstrate the pressing social need for the 
indiscriminate retention of ICRs,496 which was only supported by two studies,497 and only 
relates to serious crime.498  Therefore, the pressing social need element is potentially lacking, 
is outweighed by the risks499 and as ORG notes, ‘[t]echnology opens up possibilities for what 
can be done, but this does not mean it should be done.’500 Thus, amounting to a violation. 
 
Regarding the types of communications data that could be retained prior to the IPA 2016 i.e. 
in the DRR, the EDPS made a comment on the DRD (which the DRR mirrored) noting that ‘it 
is not clear from the report whether all categories of retained data have proven to be 
necessary.’501 This strikes at the heart of the justification for the data types to be retained, there 
has never been an operational case for anything other than ICRs and a generic reference to 
‘communications data’ and so the necessity of each type of communications data has to be 
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questioned, considering almost all communications data requests related to subscriber details 
(already kept by service provider irrespective of retention notices) in 2000 and just under half 
in 2015.502 Without any reference to the necessity of each type of communications data, a 
pressing social need cannot be established, thus, resulting in a violation. 
 
Regarding relevant communications data, as noted in Chapter 3, this encompasses a wide range 
of data types, including the IoTs.503 These types of data extended beyond previous laws.504 
There has never been a pressing social need established for each and every type of 
communications data retained (such as email data),505 now with the communications data types 
being extended, there is a greater need for justification. This is currently not the case, and thus 
a pressing social need has not been established, thus a violation ensues.  
 
In relation to the retention period, it has been noted that the DRD required that those data be 
retained for a period of at least six months, without any distinction being made between the 
categories of data on the basis of their possible usefulness for the purposes of the objective 
pursued or according to the persons concerned.506 This demonstrates that at an EU level, the 
retention period should be based on communications data by type, not a general rule applicable 
to all. The UK previously did this in that retention periods were 12 months for subscriber 
information as well as telephony data, six months for SMS, EMS and MMS data, six months 
for e-mail data, six months for ISP data, and four days for web activity logs (ICRs equivalent) 
(author’s emphasis).507 It was explained this was chosen because ‘that types of communications 
data, as personal data, vary with respect both to their usefulness to the agencies, and to their 
sensitivity.’508 This is not to say that the retention periods under ATCSA 2001 were ECHR 
compatible, but it demonstrates the departure on part of the UK in distinguishing retention 
period by communications data type. There has been no attempt in the IPA 2016 to distinguish 
communications data by their sensitivity and necessity as there is a clear pressing social need 
to do so, ultimately resulting in a violation.  
 
As noted above, the JCDIPB recommended that the Government clarify the types of data it 
expects CSPs to generate and in what quantities so that this information can be considered 
when the Bill was introduced.509 This did not occur, and therefore, no consideration could be 
given to what (not defined in the IPA 2016) could be generated. Such an argument for the 
generation of communications data was rejected by the dCDBJC where they did not accept that 
Parliament should grant powers that are required only on the precautionary principle because 
there should be a current and pressing need for them (author’s emphasis).510 This ultimately 
means that no pressing social need has been established for the need to compel 
telecommunications operators to generate data, thus another violation. A similar conclusion 
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can be drawn if one were to construe communications data as including ‘data’ in s.263(1), no 
pressing social need has been identified. Chapter 3 indicated how Big Data could be retained 
via s.263(1), s.87(9)(b) and through entity data, which pose a more serious interface with 
fundamental rights because data is already aggregated and thus the profiles (which can be 
biased and discriminatory) built from them are readily available. As Feiler notes, traffic 
analysis allows much more inferences to be made from retained data, which can include 
sensitive personal data.511 This would in turn allow for fishing expeditions512 (something Judge 
Pettiti warned against, see above) and continuous surveillance.513 This potential has never been 
acknowledged, let alone justified. In Tele2 and Watson the CJEU noted that: 
 
[W]hile the effectiveness of the fight against serious crime, in particular organised 
crime and terrorism, may depend to a great extent on the use of modern investigation 
techniques, such an objective of general interest, however fundamental it may be, 
cannot in itself justify that national legislation providing for the general and 
indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data should be considered to be 
necessary for the purposes of that fight (author’s emphasis).514  
 
In concurrence, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Joseph A. Cannataci noted:  
 
[T]he SRP welcomes the CJEU’s judgement precisely because this evidence has not 
yet been made available that would persuade the SRP of the…necessity of laws 
regulating surveillance which permit bulk acquisition of all kinds of data including 
metadata (author’s emphasis).515 
 
It has been demonstrated that there is no pressing social need that can justify the scope of 
telecommunications operators that can be covered by a retention notice, data retention in and 
of itself, the 12-month period of a retention notice and the types of communications data that 
can be retained or for what purposes.  
 
B. Relevant and Sufficient 
 
Another component of assessing whether a measure is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is to 
consider whether the reasons for interference were relevant and sufficient.516 Although the 
requirement is not often apparent, and its meaning obscure517 judges Sajó and Tsotsoria regard 
it as: 
 
[A] threshold question to determine whether and how the margin of appreciation is to 
be applied; it is relevant in the determination of the existence of a pressing social 
need.518 
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Moving from necessity to the effectiveness of a measure is something that the ECtHR already 
entertains.519  Though Janneke Gerards holds that the real challenge lies in applying the test in 
more difficult cases, where it needs to rely on factual, statistical, or empirical information as 
to the effectiveness of a certain measure (author’s emphasis).520 If the margin of appreciation 
is narrowed, then the demands of the effectiveness need to be higher in which the state has to 
demonstrate, justify with evidence and the ECtHR to assess.521 
 
In S and Marper, the GC looked to statistics consider whether the UK’s justification for 
DNA/finger print retention was relevant and sufficient.522 The GC concluded that despite 
neither statistics or examples provided by the UK in themselves establish that the successful 
identification and prosecution of offenders could not have been achieved without the 
permanent and indiscriminate retention it accepted that extension of the database had 
nonetheless contributed to the detection and prevention of crime.523 This Chapter is not here to 
discuss this problematic formulation by the GC in S and Marper524 but to highlight a distinction 
in which the ECHR requires a stricter interpretation regarding the effectiveness. The 
interferences of communications data retention extend beyond what was envisaged in S and 
Marper in that it mainly affects persons who will never be connected to or suspected of a crime, 
it retains much more intrusive data, and it does not just interfere with Article 8. In this regard, 
the margin of appreciation should be narrower than in S and Marper, and the justifications 
more compelling. 
 
Given that an operational case was only given for ICRs, the focus of effectiveness will focus 
upon them first. Tim Panton, a software developer considered the 3 operation values 
(mentioned above) of ICRs and gave it a ‘4/10’ in achieving its operational objectives.525 
Panton, did however, note that falling into the wrong hands, much more could be learnt which 
would be useful for identity thieves and robbers.526 Others have highlighted that the operational 
value of ICRs is based on the assumption that online criminals will not employ methods to 
avoid detection such as VPNs, proxy web browsers etc.527 The retention would push internet 
traffic (legitimate and otherwise) into more protected spaces (such as Tor’s mobile ORBOT 
which anonymises internet traffic)528 leaving almost exclusively a database529 of innocent 
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citizens lives, an ineffective strategy,530 which can contribute to the escalation of crimes 
(author’s emphasis).531 Identifying suspects is limited as it only identifies the device used as 
the data is ‘inexact and error-prone.’532 ICRs would also not aid in missing children cases 
because of the ‘always on’ connection therefore not indicating when a service was used533  nor 
would it be practical for an ISP to indicate that the missing person accessed Twitter (if at all) 
before vanishing (author’s emphasis).534 Not only was the idea of retaining ICRs 
questionable,535 data retention in itself was argued to not be viable in the long term.536 Some 
have argued ICRs will generate misleading results, Adrian Kennard demonstrated that visiting 
his blog would create an ICR for pornhub.com.537 Daniel Walrond highlighted that this is very 
important such ICRs could be generated for ‘hate websites, child pornography, how to make a 
bomb, and how to circumvent being tracked by’538 the IPA 2016.  
 
It has also been noted that illegal websites create a needle in the haystack problem as Denmark 
experienced.539In their written submission to the JCDIPB, the IT-Political Association of 
Denmark discussed the Danish equivalent of ICRs retention which was dropped for lack of 
effectiveness.540 The  Ministry of Justice published a self-evaluation report about Danish data 
retention noting that it had only been used in a limited number of cases, even within the 
intelligence community.541 Due to ineffectiveness of achieving said aim, the Ministry of Justice 
decided to repeal session logging.542 The JCDIPB accepted that the highlighted differences 
between the UK and Danish system, and that the UK had learnt lessons from the Danish failure 
in using session logging data for investigating and prosecuting criminal offences.543 The 
JCDIPB recommended that the Government publish a full assessment of the differences 
between Danish session logging and ICRs retention.544 However, as the IT-Political 
Association of Denmark later noted ‘the Home Office comparison is much less clear in 
describing what the UK ICR implementation will do differently and why it will work’ (author’s 
emphasis).545 For this reason, its lack of effectiveness, its expensiveness, intrusiveness and lack 
of proportionality, it was recommended that ICRs retention be dropped.546 Some form of data 
																																																						
530 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, written evidence, (n43), Liberty, para 47, p868; 
George Danezis, ‘Covert Communications Despite Traffic Data Retention’ 
<http://www0.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/G.Danezis/papers/cover.pdf> accessed 10 August 2017. 
531 Peter Shields, ‘Electronic Networks, Enhanced State Surveillance and the Ironies of Control’ (2006) Journal 
of Creative Communications 1:1. 
532 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, written evidence, (n43), Liberty, para 48, p868. 
533 ibid, Andrews & Arnold Ltd, p62. 
534 ibid. 
535 ibid, p63. 
536 ibid, p64. 
537 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, oral evidence, (n256).  
538 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, written evidence, (n43), Daniel Walrond, p1345. 
539 ibid, IT-Political Association of Denmark, para 26, p705. 
540 ibid, para 2, p701.  
541 ibid, para 9, p702; ‘Redegørelse om diverse spørgsmål vedrørende logningsreglerne’ (December 2012) 
<http://www.ft.dk/samling/20121/almdel/reu/bilag/125/1200765.pdf> accessed 10 August 2017; There is no 
English translation but it is covered in Torben Olander, ‘In Denmark, Online Tracking of Citizens is an 
Unwieldy Failure’ (22 May 2013) <http://techpresident.com/news/wegov/23918/denmark-government-will-not-
allow-ordinary-citizens-have-digital-privacy>  accessed 10 August 2017. 
542 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, written evidence, (n43), para 12, p 702; Press 
Release: The Minister of Justice repeals the rules for session logging (2 June 2014) 
<http://justitsministeriet.dk/nyt-og-presse/pressemeddelelser/2014/justitsministeren-oph%C3%A6ver-reglerne-
om-sessionslogning> accessed 10 August 2017. 
543 Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, (n45), para 146. 
544 ibid, para 147. 
545 Written evidence: IT-Political Association of Denmark (IPB20), para 5. 
546 ibid, paras 31-35. 
	219	
retention in Denmark, has however, re-emerged.547 It is inconceivable based on the arguments 
against ICRs retention for there to be a sufficient reason to justify this power and in the manner 
it can be exercised. 
 
 
Continuing with data retention in other European countries. A comprehensive analysis of data 
in the Netherlands highlighted that although the value of traffic data is clear from court rulings, 
they shed no light on the age of the requested data (author’s emphasis).548 The District Court 
of the Hague (DCH) noted that the necessity of data retention had not been established.549 It 
has already been noted above by the EDPS, WP29, Commission and AK Vorrat the assumed 
effectiveness of data retention is utterly questionable.550 Moreover, the needle in the haystack 
problem creates the ‘false positive’ and ‘false negative’ problem.551 
 
It was already argued that a pressing social need for data retention could not be sustained 
because most of the evidence was either anecdotal, conflated the utility of communications 
data with its retention. Furthermore, arguments in favour of communications data retention did 
not detail what actual communications data were necessary in anecdotal cases, why all 
communications data needed to be retained for 12-months, nor an operational case for all the 
types of communications data that could be retained or generated. Finally, and probably most 
importantly it was never explained why the obligation to retain expanded to essentially 
anything that could communicate, making one’s home a personal Panopticon. Some of the 
reasons are not only insufficient, but non-existent. 
 
As the ECtHR in Sunday Times v United Kingdom552 noted, it is not sufficient that the 
interference involved belongs to that class of the exceptions i.e. national security, nor is it 
sufficient that the interference was imposed because its subject-matter fell within a particular 
category or was caught by a legal rule formulated in general or absolute terms (author’s 
emphasis). The ECtHR has to be satisfied that the interference was necessary having regard to 
the facts and circumstances prevailing in the specific case before it.553 However, even if it is to 
be argued that the arguments in favour of the scope of data retention obligations are deemed to 
be relevant, this does not equate to them being sufficient.554 It has been strongly demonstrated 
that the reasons elucidated to are not sufficient, and thus would lead to a violation.555 
 
C. Proportionality 
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Proportionality appears prevalent in many forms556 though in the context of the ECtHR it has 
often been described as ‘striking a fair balance’557 between the interests (or right of the 
individual)558 at stake.559 In this assessment of proportionality, which is ‘inherent in the whole 
of the Convention’560 it is important to consider numerous factors,561 such as whether retention 
strikes at the substance of the right, whether there was a least restrictive measure to achieve 
said objective, and whether the fair balance has been struck given all the circumstances. 
 
a. Striking at the substance of the Right? 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted how communications data retention interferes with the very 
substance/essence of the right to Article 8 in terms of the seriousness of the interference. 
Chapter 4 highlighted how data retention strikes at the freedom of communication in relation 
to Article 10, which forms the basis of the substance of Article 10. Chapter 4 further noted 
forced disclosure and making the possibility of deducing religious beliefs would interfere with 
Article 9. Further, the ECtHR has noted that to construe Article 9 as permitting every kind of 
compulsion with a view to the disclosure of religion or belief would strike at the very substance 
of the freedom it is designed to guarantee.562 As Taylor notes if a measure impairs the very 
essence of the right it will almost certainly be disproportionate.563 Although Article 11 and 
Article 2 Protocol 4 were not discussed specifically, it is maintained that a measure unjustified 
under Article 8(2) ipso facto constitutes an unjustified interference with those said rights. 
 
b. Least Restrictive Measure 
 
Brems and Lavrysen describe the concept of a least restrictive measure (LRM) as using a 
nutcracker, instead of a sledgehammer to crack a nut.564 In Nada v Switzerland it was noted 
that for a measure to be proportionate and necessary, the possibility of recourse to a less 
damaging measure to fundamental rights which fulfils the same aim must be ruled out. 565 Glor 
v Swtizerland566 is the first ECtHR case that states the LRM rule as a general principle, 
regardless of the Convention provision invoked and regardless of the context of the case.567 In 
Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v Switzerland568 the ECtHR took a 
procedural569 and substantive570 view of the LRM principle.  
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Although Brem and Lavrysen acknowledge that there is no clear affirmation of the LRM in 
general terms,571 ECtHR case law is clearer in the surveillance context. In Zakharov the GC 
affirmed its case law in determining whether it is possible to achieve the aims by less restrictive 
means.572 An example of a LRM is individual measures are less restrictive than measures 
affecting a plurality of individuals.573 Thus in Klass, the ECtHR accepted that German law 
confined secret surveillance to where there were factual indications of suspicion of serious 
crimes, where other measures were without the prospect of success or considerably more 
difficult, thus preventing general surveillance.574 
 
One suitable alternative to data retention, argued by many575 is what is known as ‘data 
preservation.’576 Data preservation also known as quick freeze and freeze plus in which 
communications data is temporarily secured relating only to specific suspects of criminal 
activity, which may subsequently be made available to law enforcement authorities through 
judicial authorisation (author’s emphasis).577 Data preservation is argued to be a LRM in 
relation to data retention because it will likely only affect 1% of the population,578 is less 
intrusive to privacy579 and other fundamental rights in terms of the scale and number of people 
it affects. 
 
Although not mentioned as a principle within cases concerning LRM, judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque regarded a LRM should be equally effective to the measure in question.580 It has 
been argued by the UK that data preservation is futile,581 and ‘wholly impracticable.’582 The 
JCDIPB accepted that preservation was not a viable alternative as they do not provide 
retrospective information and would be of limited value in instances where criminal action had 
ceased.583 In any event, the ECtHR would need to consider the reasonableness of the national 
authorities’ choice between a slightly more effective measure that is more detrimental to 
individual interests and a rather less effective, but also less restrictive provision.584 Though, 
arguments about not being sure who might become suspects and therefore not being sure about 
which data to retain for the future really does sound like the pleadings of a paranoid police 
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state.585 Also, the retrospective aspect of data retention, assumes that in the absence of data 
retention, no data is available, as this was not the case in the aftermath of the Madrid 
bombings,586 and in the UK, both in the aftermath of 9/11587 and the London bombings, ISPs 
voluntarily preserved data.588 In relation to the 9/11 preservations, Detective Inspector Mike 
Ford of the National Hi-Tech Crime Unit said ‘I can assure you that the existence of the data 
has been of significant benefit and value.’589  
 
Given that it has been argued data retention is not necessary, even if data retention was more 
effective than preservation the fact that the LRM scores worse on cost–benefit analysis is 
irrelevant.590 Moreover, any added effectiveness of data retention is minimal and the associated 
financial and privacy costs are high.591 The likelihood of being able to identify threats out of 
vast stores of data absent an initial lead is practically zero, even if content were monitored.592 
Evidence presented to the Commission concluded that ‘data retention and data preservation are 
complementary rather than alternative instruments.’593 However, the study noted that three 
Member States (did not state which) stated that data preservation is never or rarely used, and 
seven noted that no statistics were available,594 therefore, drawing questions on comparability 
of conclusions. Only 14 countries took part in the survey, that displayed no statistical evidence, 
and thus suffers from similar criticisms the EDPS highlighted with the Commission’s report. 
Furthermore, as European Digital Rights (EDRi) pointed out, Austria, Germany, Greece, 
Norway, Romania, Sweden and Canada all use data preservation instead of retention. They 
continued that the absence of data retention legislation did not lead to a rise in crime in those 
states, or to a decrease in crime clearance rates, not even in regard to Internet crime. Nor did 
the coming into force of data retention legislation have any statistically significant effect on 
crime or crime clearance.595  
 
Data preservation is a position preferred by the CoE as noted in Article 16 of the Budapest 
Convention,596 and despite criticisms,597 the UK ratified in 2011. Although the ECtHR has 
frequently based its finding of a violation (amongst others) on the national authorities’ lack of 
consideration of less restrictive alternatives,598 in Soltsyak v Russia599 the ECtHR demonstrated 
that a violation can occur without considering the fair balance to be struck between rights and 
																																																						
585 Clive Walker and Yaman Akdeniz, (576), 177. 
586 European Digital Rights, (n470), p13. 
587 All Party Parliamentary Internet Group, (n574), para 182. 
588 Ian Brown, (n317), 108. 
589 All Party Parliamentary Internet Group, (n575), para 182. 
590 Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, (n576), 144. 
591 Ryan Hansen, ‘Data Preservation: An Effective Approach to Combating Internet Crime in the UK’ (2003) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=947371> accessed 12 August 2017. 
592 ibid. 
593 Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services, ‘Evidence of Potential Impacts of Options for Revising the Data 
Retention Directive: Current approaches to data preservation in the EU and in third countries’ (2012) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/police-cooperation/data-
retention/docs/drd_task_2_report_final_en.pdf> accessed 13 August 2017, p23. 
594 ibid, p17. 
595 European Digital Rights, (n470), p15. 
596 Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime ETS No. 185, 23.XI.2001; Ian Brown, (n317), 107; 
European Digital Rights, (n470), p6; All Party Parliamentary Internet Group, (n575), para 108. 
597 Clive Walker and Yaman Akdeniz, (576), J Fisher, ‘The Draft Convention on Cybercrime: Potential 
Constitutional Conflicts’ (2001) 32 U.West.L.A. L.Rev. 339; Article 29 Working Party, ‘Opinion 4/2001 On the 
Council of Europe’s Draft Convention on Cyber-crime’ <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2001/wp41_en.pdf> accessed 13 August 2017. 
598 Eva Brems and Laurens Lavrysen, (n576), p157. 
599 Soltysyak v Russia App no. 4663/05 (ECHR, 10 February 2011), [53-55].  
	223	
competing interests.600 This case concerned banning the movement of an ex Russian 
serviceman on the grounds preventing the transmission of confidential information. In this 
case, the ECtHR noted the ineffectiveness of this measure as confidential information could be 
passed on without leaving the country.601 This Chapter noted the ease at which blanket data 
retention can be circumvented for e.g. by use of a VPN. Therefore, due to the narrowed margin 
of appreciation,602 it is argued that a violation should be found for a LRM (data preservation) 
being effectively ruled out with compelling evidence. 
 
c. Fair Balance? 
 
The fair balance principle of the ECtHR’s case law was established very early in its history.603 
As Alastair Mowbray noted, Articles ‘8-11…by their qualified structures have provided further 
justification for the Court applying the principle.’604  This is also the case for Article 2 Protocol 
4.605 The function of the fair balance principle is to assess the proportionality of the State’s 
conduct.606 The ECtHR ‘has also taken account of other factors when utilising the fair balance 
principle.’607 It is these various factors that will form the basis of the consideration of the fair 
balance principle. 
 
i. Blanket and indiscriminate data retention is disproportionate 
 
In S and Marper, not only was the GC struck608 blanket indiscriminate nature of data retention, 
they ruled that it: 
  
[Failed] to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and 
that the respondent State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this 
regard. Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate interference 
with the applicants’ right to respect for private life and cannot be regarded as necessary 
in a democratic society (author’s emphasis).609 
 
In the specific context of communications data retention, as noted above, the CJEU ruled that 
EU law precludes the ‘general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and location data of all 
subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication.’610 For the 
HC, it was difficult to conceive how the tests of necessity and proportionality could require the 
retention of all communications data due to the wording of ‘all data’ in the IPA 2016.611 
 
However, as Lord Kerr noted, it is the potential reach of the power that needs to be assessed. 
Moreover, the GC goes further than the CJEU in this regard because it was found that data 
retention even within the confines of specific (suspects but not convicts) parameters was 
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disproportionate. If a retention notice is imposed upon only one or a select number of 
telecommunications operators, this could satisfy EU law because it could be argued that this is 
not a catch all power. Such a position doubtful,612 moreover, if one considers S an Marper, a 
retention notice on one telecommunications operator would still constitute a disproportionate 
interference with fundamental rights. An example is British Telecoms (BT), who has over nine 
million broadband subscribers.613 If a retention notice is served upon BT, nine million 
subscribers can have their rights interfered with, a discriminatory indiscriminate power.614 This 
leads to the next issue, most people whose communications data are retained bear no relation 
to the purposes of retention. 
 
ii. Most retained data are of innocent people 
 
As many have noted above, most retained data is of innocent people, who bear no relation (or 
ever will) to the aims to which retention notices can be issued. In Zakharov, the GC noted that 
the automatic storage for six months of clearly irrelevant data cannot be justified under Article 
8.615 It would be for the State to justify why such the amounts of data retainable is relevant, 
which is not possible. This, of course would also be true for the other Convention Rights 
engaged based on the ipso facto idea of violations elucidated to above. Given that most 
communications data retained is irrelevant, this highlights the importance of data retention not 
being an individual issue, but a societal one. 
 
iii. Does not even comply with Tele2 and Watson 
 
Jennifer Cobbe has argued that the IPA 2016 does not satisfy the requirements of Tele2 and 
Watson because, amongst other things:  
 
a. Retention notices can be issued in pursuit of a range of purposes other than those 
permitted.  
b. Retention is indiscriminate and is the rule rather than the exception.  
c. The length of the retention period is not objectively determined and limited to what is 
strictly necessary.  
d. IPA does not provide clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of 
retention.616  
 
The ECtHR in Big Brother Watch noted that (although in relation to whether a measure was in 
accordance with the law) where UK and EU law diverge, EU law takes primacy, and if UK 
law does not conform with EU law, there will be a violation of Article 8.617 
 
iv. The Social Value of Privacy and its underpinning of other Fundamental Rights and 
Democracy itself 
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When balancing rights and competing interests, ‘States have quite often relied upon rather 
general assertions of community interests’618 against individual rights, making it seem 
‘extravagant when weighed against the interests of society as a whole.’619 In the context of data 
retention, such an individualised position is no longer sustainable as it can affect all the 
population, significant portions of it, or simply put, more than one person at any given time. 
Moreover, framing the debate as privacy v security misconstrues the debate because ‘as both 
can be portrayed as social interests.’620 It is this social interest/value/benefit of privacy that is 
important when considering621 the fair balance regarding data retention as the necessity and 
proportionality have to be clearly ‘demonstrated by considering that privacy is not only an 
individual right of control over one’s information, but moreover a key element of a democratic 
constitutional order (author’s emphasis).’622  Moreover, ‘[i]t is hard to imagine, for example, 
being able to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom of association, or freedom of religion 
without an accompanying right to privacy.’623 The GFCC also noted that ‘the storage of 
telecommunications traffic data without cause is capable of creating a diffusely threatening 
feeling of being watched which can impair a free exercise of fundamental rights in many areas’ 
(author’s emphasis).624 
  
Not only is privacy important for other fundamental rights as noted in Chapter 4, it has a social 
value. Hughes noted that ECtHR has not developed a strong notion of the role of privacy as a 
bulwark against totalitarianism.625 As Tumay notes: 
 
The only goal of these restrictions must be the restoration of the normal functioning of 
the society. The restrictions must not overstep, in the scope of their subject-matter, the 
borders determined by this goal (author’s emphasis).626   
 
The ECtHR in Szabo and Vissy highlighted the social value of privacy when recognised that 
‘[i]n a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful 
consequences for democratic society as a whole (author’s emphasis).’ 627 In Zakharov the GC 
believed that ‘the values of a democratic society must be followed as faithfully as possible in 
the supervisory procedures if the bounds of necessity, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2, are 
not to be exceeded (author’s emphasis).’628 
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Taking into account the social value of privacy has been implicitly recognised by the Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC).629 R. v. Duarte630 concerned the investigation into alleged drug 
trafficking, the police rented an apartment for a police informer and equipped the apartment 
with audio-visual recording equipment installed in a wall.631 The SSC stated that: 
 
A society which exposed us, at the whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent 
electronic recording made…might be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be 
one in which privacy no longer had any meaning.632 
 
The SCC continued that ‘the relevant question is not whether criminals must bear the risk of 
warrantless surveillance, but whether it should be imposed on all members of society (author’s 
emphasis)’633 as privacy ‘is the very hallmark of a free society.’634 For Cockfield, these views 
serve as to acknowledge the ‘importance of the social value of privacy’635 something which the 
ECtHR can636 and should take account of. This relates to data retention in that as noted above, 
retention is not based on reasonable suspicion of individual conduct, but service used. Boehm 
and de Hert highlighted:  
 
Measures such as data retention or ‘fishing expeditions’ by the police or the secret 
service increasingly target a greater number of individuals than the ‘traditional’ 
surveillance techniques (author’s emphasis).637 
 
When data retention is looked at through the lens of what privacy i.e. Article 8, underpins (a 
collection of other Convention Rights and democracy itself) and the collective social value it 
brings, any kind of measure that interferes with these rights in a blanket and indiscriminate 
manner cannot said to be striking a fair balance with those said rights, on an individual level, 
and more importantly on a societal one. This, as said above, would be the case if a retention 
notice was served on every telecommunications operator, or just one as with the social value 
of privacy, any unjustified interference creates a social harm. 
 
v. Social Harms 
 
Although referring to the severity of interference, Feiler noted, ‘the social harm potentially 
created’ should be considered when determining the proportionality of data retention.638  
 
a. Chilling Effect 
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The chilling effect has already been mentioned in this Chapter and others but it is the ‘the fear 
of being watched or eavesdropped upon makes people change their behaviour, even behaviour 
that is not illegal or immoral.’639 Feiler asked what extent will data retention have a chilling 
effect on the exercise of people's fundamental rights? He continued that if behavioural 
modifications do ensue, what are the sociological effects? He asked would social minorities 
(based on political views, income class, religion, or any other factor) feel pressured to 
assimilate to the mainstream so as not raise any suspicions? Probably the most poignant 
question: Haven't most positive sociological developments been started by a social minority - 
that might now be deterred from deviating from what is considered appropriate by the 
majority?640  
 
David Anderson questioned the chilling effect to which the CJEU ascribed to, noting: 
 
[A] more rigorous analysis of proportionality would have focused on any actual harm 
that this useful power might be shown to have caused over its years of operation, and 
sought to avoid assertions based on theory or on informal predictions of popular 
feeling.641 
 
It is important, and ironic to note that, data retention legislation, especially the DRD were 
‘based on theory or on informal predictions’ of its utility. As Lord Kerr in his dissenting 
judgment in Beghal v DPP noted, ‘powers which can be used in an arbitrary or discriminatory 
way are not transformed to a condition of legality simply because they are of proven utility.’ 
642 Moreover, Anderson’s argument would seemingly fall into the narrow nothing-to-hide-like 
argument that looks for singular type of injury, be it some grave physical violence, a loss of 
substantial money or something severely embarrassing.643 To consider privacy harms in that 
way would result in fewer privacy problems being recognised.644 This of course would make 
fundamental rights protections theoretically and illusory if individuals would have to prove 
actual harm, data retention in and of itself is the initial harm, especially when it affects the vast 
majority of people who are in no way connected to criminal activity. When Australia enacted 
data retention laws, Virtual Private Network (VPN) NordVPN reported a 100% increase in 
users which they noted that ‘[i]t's common for people to turn to VPNs when anti-privacy laws 
are passed.’645 An increase in UK usage was also reported in the UK when the IPA 2016 and 
Digital Economy Act 2017 were being passed.646 Or by the increasing the use of ad blockers 
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in which 11 million devices in the UK now have.647 As Edward Snowden revealed ‘government 
surveillance efforts are sometimes bolstered by online advertising practices’648 making it more 
difficult to ensure privacy, security and anonymity. 
 
Rozemarijn van der Hilst noted that according to a German poll on the effects of the 
implementation of the DRD, 52% said they would not use telecommunications to contact drug 
counsellors, psychotherapists or marriage counsellors and 11% said they had already abstained 
from using phone, cell phone or email in certain occasions.649 Mitrou also found that ‘[u]nder 
pervasive surveillance, individuals are inclined to make choices that conform to mainstream 
expectations.’650 Valerie Aston by implication, highlighted that data retention has the potential 
to result in an intrusion into psychological integrity, as well as limiting personal autonomy.651  
 
As David Kaye noted, surveillance can create a chilling effect on the freedom of expression of 
ordinary citizens and a wide range of vulnerable groups.652 Penney’s research has suggested 
that chilling effects are greater with online surveillance as opposed to other regulatory actions 
and that women and younger people are more likely to be chilled and are less likely to take 
steps to defend themselves from regulatory actions and threats.653 It has also been statistically 
demonstrated that Muslim-American’s change their behaviour due to government surveillance 
fears.654 Rozemarijn van der Hilst 655 and Jillian York656 have both noted how wide-scale 
communications data retention can have a severe chilling on freedom of association ‘which is 
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a loss for the democratic functioning of society.’657 Manokha notes that since Snowden’s 
revelations, there has been chilling effects in journalism, social media behaviour (online and 
offline), political opinions and identity expressions 658 The chilling effect on rights exercised 
under Articles 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4 can lead to what Tijmen Schep coins as ‘social 
cooling’ in which ‘the long-term negative side effects of living in a reputation economy’ 
because everything is remembered.659 
 
Solove noted that the value of protecting against chilling effects is not measured simply by its 
effects on individuals exercising their rights, but its harms to society because among other 
things ‘they reduce the range of viewpoints expressed and the degree of freedom with which 
to engage in political activity.’660 In addition to the severity of the interference with an 
individual's rights to privacy and data protection, it can also be argued that the changes in 
society, potentially resulting from a constant surveillance, are contrary to the public purpose.661 
Just as the ECtHR found violations of Article 10/11 in Segerstedt-Wiberg and Others 662 
despite actual harm not being demonstrated. 
  
b. Legal Professional Privilege/Journalistic Sources 
 
As the DCH noted, data retention infringes upon Article 10 ECHR/Article 11 CFR due to the 
chilling effect of contact between journalists and source, and lawyers and clients,663 and should 
thus be excluded.664 
 
i. Legal Professional Privilege 
 
As Chapter 4 noted, Lord Neuberger highlighted that: 
 
[I]t is self-evident that knowing that a consultation or the communication may be the 
subject of surveillance could have a chilling effect on the openness which should 
govern communications between lawyer and client.665 
 
The Law Society and the Bar Council also raised concerns about data retention and LPP.666 
They noted that the problem bulk communications data retention is that it does not prevent 
LLP data from entering the ‘pool’ in the first place,667 something which the CJEU also 
highlighted.668 The Law Society and Bar Council considered that ‘new legislation should 
prevent an obligation being placed on service providers to retain data relating to 
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communications to or from users known to be professional legal advisers (author’s 
emphasis).’669 This was also the position of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Tele2 and Watson.670 
Jessica Sobey noted that ‘[k]nowing who a lawyer contacts, when the contact was made and 
even where the point of contact was in geographical terms at the time, can be enough to 
represent a material breach of privilege.’671 This is all the more important considering that the 
accused’s rights to communicate with his advocate out of hearing of a third person is part of 
the basic requirements of a fair trial in a democratic society (author’s emphasis).672 
 
ii. Journalistic Sources 
 
Journalism is regarded as the ‘fourth estate’673 in which political reporting and investigative 
journalism attract a high level of protection under Article 10.674 Protections, however, are 
uniquely challenged in the context of data retention.675 Reporters Without Borders noted how 
the UK had slipped down World Press Freedom Index, with a reason being the adoption of the 
IPA 2016 which provided ‘insufficient protection mechanisms for whistleblowers, journalists, 
and their sources, posing a serious threat to investigative journalism.’676 The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) published a report on protecting 
journalistic sources in the digital age.677 The report highlighted that many countries examined 
in the study legal source protection frameworks were being actually or potentially jeopardised 
by mandatory data retention policies.678 A key finding was that without substantial 
strengthening of legal protections and limitations on data retention, investigative journalism 
that relies on confidential sources will be difficult to sustain in the digital era, and reporting in 
many other cases will encounter inhibitions on the part of potential sources.679 UNESCO 
highlighted that even when journalists encrypt the content, they may neglect to encrypt the 
communications data meaning they still leave behind a digital trail when they communicate 
with their sources which can easily identify a source,680 such as Whatsapp usage.681 
 
c. Anonymity 
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Mitrou has argued that blanket data retention, by making communication activity potentially 
traceable, has a disturbing effect on the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas, and 
on the free exchange of information and ideas, which is of paramount importance in a 
democratic society.682 Catherine Crump has uttered similar remarks that since data retention 
would make all Internet activity traceable, its successful implementation would eliminate 
anonymity online which would be a regulation of unprecedented scope because it would 
eliminate the anonymity of those receiving information as well as those conveying 
information.683 Additionally, it can have an evident chilling effect on victims of all forms of 
violence and abuse, who may be reluctant to report for fear of double victimisation,684 which 
could also undermine the ability to solve crime.685 As Bernal maintains, strong anonymity is 
needed for whistleblowers,686 especially when going to the press as a journalist source (as 
discussed above). Similarly, the Slovenian Constitutional Court noted that data retention 
disallows the anonymous use of means of communication for cases where the communication 
is confidential.687 They continued that it was also incomprehensible for all those cases where 
the confidential and unpredictable use of means of communication is necessary in order to 
achieve its purpose (e.g. telephone assistance for help in mental distress).688 The importance of 
anonymity becomes all the more pertinent when the IPA 2016 makes it possible to compel 
VPN’s to keep logs via generating communications data. 
 
d. Surveillance by Design 
 
Chapter 3 and 6 demonstrated how the definition of telecommunications operator and 
communications data allowed retention notices to be issued on essentially anything that can 
communicate, whether it be a smart or IoT object to retain essentially any type of data including 
Big Data. The term ‘Surveillance by Design’ was first coined by Thani et al689 and for the 
purposes of this thesis, it will be used in a different context. As Tijmen Wisman notes, it only 
takes a few tweaks to turn the IoT into an ‘unprecedented surveillance-society.’690 Wisman 
continued that if data retention is applied to the IoT (which it does under the IPA 2016), the 
‘amount of data and the level of detail will increase dramatically and will leave less space for 
citizens to keep information about their lives to themselves.’691 Although Wisman refers to the 
IoT as purpose creep by design, it is argued that the concept of ‘Surveillance by Design’ is 
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more appropriate in this context because the IoT is surveillance692 and if the State can compel 
the retention of such data generated by IoT objects, it only marks a shift in who is conducting 
the surveillance. Thus, this highlights that the IoT will feed ‘into the surveillance apparatus of 
the state’693 whether it is outside, one’s home or within creating a God’s-eye view of 
ourselves.694  
 
i. Data Retention makes your City a Panopticon 
 
The IoT will extend in the form of Smart Cities.695 The Economist highlighted that clever cities 
may not be better ones and rather than becoming paragons of democracy, they could turn into 
electronic Panopticons in which everyone is watched,696 destroying the sense of privacy and 
urban anonymity.697 Rob Kitchin, referring to Solove’s taxonomy of privacy, noted that the 
‘vast quantity of highly detailed spatial behaviour data from which lots of other insights can be 
inferred (such as mode of travel, activity, and lifestyle)’ from smart cities.698 The consequences 
is that individuals are no longer lost in the crowd but ‘are being tracked and traced at different 
scales of spatial and temporal resolution.’699 This demonstrates the interferences particularly 
with Article 2 Protocol 4 and Article 11 given that tracking takes place with no attempt at 
consent, often with little notification and with no ability to opt-out.700  As Valerie Aston noted 
that surveillance undermines some of the key building blocks of successful mobilisations.701 It 
was argued that although as Aston rightly suggests, the UK courts have not adequately 
protected Article 8 and 11 regarding public space surveillance, with regards to smart cities, the 
situation, however, changes702 as this involves the systemic collection of data (personal and 
sensitive), thus the chilling effect703 intensifies.  
 
Smart cities can demonstrate how Bentham’s Panopticon is ‘child’s play compared to 
surveillance in a fully functioning IoT.’704 As Wisman continues that ‘if society is constructed 
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in a way that every act of the individual causes the processing of data that is captured in 
databases accessible by public authorities, the principle of proportionality is neglected.’705 
 
ii. Data Retention makes your Home your own Personal Panopticon 
 
It was highlighted that the ‘home’ and ‘family life’ aspects of Article 8 even more imperative 
when it came to data retention. It also turned Sir Edward Coke’s maxim on its head as the IPA 
2016 would no longer make a man’s home his castle, turning it into his own personal 
Panopticon. An example of this is the case of R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo in which the 
appellant’s energy provider were able to detect a pattern of electricity use in the residence that 
was consistent with the operation of a marijuana grow-op,706 using smart meter technology.707 
Under the IPA 2016, or even the DRD708 this could be retainable as for e.g. entity data and thus 
demonstrates the amount of insight into one’s home that can be gained from a retention notice. 
As Colette Cuijpers and Bert-Jaap Koops notes, smart meters potentially constitute a breach of 
the right to inviolability of the home and the right to family life.709 This is due to the fact that 
smart meters allow via a wall socket – to look ‘behind the front door’ with great precision 
giving grid managers and suppliers of gas and electricity will obtain information about such 
things as lifestyles, holidays, the types of electronic products present,710 and health 
professionals, health indicators.711 Baroness Hale in Countryside Alliance highlighted the 
separate but related fundamental values of ‘the inviolability of the home and personal 
communications from official snooping.’712 As the IoTs (particularly home devices) poses a 
‘serious threat to privacy’713 these two fundamental values are going to become more aligned 
than they ever have. Moreover, smart meters are a new example of technology that makes it 
possible to see from the outside what takes place inside homes and, all things considered, turns 
it into the proverbial glass house,714 which can have a chilling effect on indoor 
activities/relationships.715  
 
Although Colette Cuijpers and Bert-Jaap Koops’s study concerned compulsory use of smart 
meters, that was only one of three reasons716 why they felt it was not necessary in a democratic 
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society.717 They also raise consent issues under the GDPR.718 Smart meters are but one example 
of the increasing transparency of our home and careful consideration of the cumulative effect 
of the various developments that allow insight into how people live, in the one place where 
people most of all must feel free to do what they like because if our home will no longer be our 
castle, the house may be energy-efficient but it will be a cold place to live.719  
 
iii. Data Retention makes YOU the Panopticon 
 
Kelsey Finch and Omer Tene highlight that linking the human body with its physical, 
behavioural and psychological individuality to a government managed grid raises concerns 
about privacy, surveillance, control, and chilling effects.720 Chapter 6 highlighted that wireless 
body area networks WBAN which would fall under the definition of telecommunications 
operator, thus whoever controls it could have a retention notice issued on them. There is already 
an example of WBAN data being used in criminal matters. In the US where a Butler County, 
Ohio Judge ruled that data from a suspect’s own pacemaker could be used against them as 
evidence.721  
 
Chapter 6 noted that those who provide or control wearable tech722 would also fall under the 
definition of telecommunications operator. This is a form of sousveillance723 (inverse 
surveillance724 where the user becomes the observer)725 in which data is shared with the 
manufacturers and often others.726 Therein lays the danger as the communications data 
generated by such technology is not decentralised (no centralised database of privacy sensitive 
data)727 and thus still readily available for retention. For this reason, Mateusz Bucholski argued 
that sousveillance and surveillance are two sides of the same coin because they both infringe 
upon individual freedom.728 Chapter 3 already noted how Facebook is seeking to develop 
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technology that would be able to read a person’s mind in order to communicate,729 thus 
allowing Facebook the potential to collect data on our very thoughts.730 This data could then 
be retainable and would truly encompass what Caspar Bowden highlighted when he coined the 
term ‘CCTV for inside your head’731 with respect to data retention. This would amount to the 
greatest of threats to freedom of thought and conscious protected by Article 9 and autonomy 
in general. As Chapter 4 noted, the mind is a ‘kind of last refuge of personal freedom and self-
determination.’732 Moreover, Chapter 4 demonstrated how privacy of the mind could be 
interfered with by neurotechnologies and have Article 9 implications (which the manifestation 
is absolute). Marcello Ienca and Roberto Andorno argues that a new right to brain privacy 
should be adopted which would protect against ‘illegitimate access to their brain information 
and to prevent the indiscriminate leakage of brain data across the infosphere.’733 They 
continued that violations of mental privacy can occur when brain data is collected for research 
purposes are stored on external databases and where brain data generated by consumer-grade 
brain-computer interfaces (BCI) are sent to a connected app and can be stored in the cloud or 
other data store end points.734 
 
If neurotechnologies can be used to discern the contents of thoughts against one’s will (non-
consent)735‘it would have a chilling effect not only on expression but also on the source of 
expression, and thus it would impact the freedom people have even to entertain those 
thoughts.’736 Neurotechnologies creates risk of unparalleled intrusion into the private sphere 
causing physical or psychological harm or unduly influencing one’s behaviour.737 The very 
notion of freedom of thought could very well be put under threat as retention of thought data 
could be seen as taking ‘coercive steps to make him change his beliefs.’738 Chapter 4 concluded 
that privacy of the mind is best protected under Article 9 due to its absolute nature to protect 
freedom of thought and conscious.  
 
e. The Cyclical Nature of Retention, a Continuous Violation 
 
Section 87(3) of the IPA 2016 allows data to be retained for up to retained for 12 months. It 
was already noted above that pressing social need for this 12-month period had not been made. 
Furthermore, it was also noted that even six months of irrelevant (which is most retained data) 
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communications data storage could not be justified. Another problem is because every time 
communications data is created, the 12-month time limit starts again. This highlights a never-
ending interference irrespective of whether data is destroyed. In a sense, communications data 
retention is indefinite because of the continued indiscriminate nature. The very premise of the 
12-month period appears circular in effect, because although that specific communications data 
has been destroyed, this has no overall effect on the continuing communications data retention.  
 
The RCC highlighted this point in that the continuous character of retention derogates from the 
principle of personal data protection and their confidentiality by emptying the content of this 
principle. In this regard, the RCC also referred again to ECtHR jurisprudence in that Member 
States’ guarantee of rights must be practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory as ‘the 
continuous retention of personal data transforms…the exception from the principle of effective 
protection of privacy right and freedom of expression, into an absolute rule.739 The RCC also 
noted that the continuous limitation of rights makes the essence of it disappear by removing 
the safeguards regarding its execution. They continued that physical, legal persons and mass 
users of services would become permanent subjects of intrusions into the exercise of their 
privacy of correspondence, freedom of expression ‘without the possibility of a free, uncensored 
manifestation, except for direct communication, thus excluding the main communication 
means used.’740 The RCC also levied criticism at the fact that ‘intrusion into the free exercise 
of the right takes place continuously and independently of the occurrence of a justifying fact, 
of a determinant cause.’741 
 
The ECtHR also acknowledge ‘[t]he doctrine of "continuing violation" [which] implies a 
beginning, i.e., a critical event constituting the original breach, and its continuation.’742 Judge 
Pettit in Malone noted that it was just as serious to be subject to surveillance as to be unable to 
stop it when they are illegal and unjustified ‘as was for example the case with Orwell’s 
character who, within his own home, was continually supervised by a television camera without 
being able to switch it off (author’s emphasis).’743 
 
f. Safeguards: Judicial Oversight is Insufficient 
 
The HC refers to the JC’s role in retention notices and the fact that s.2 of the IPA 2016 and the 
general duties of JC’s in relation to privacy and the protection of sensitive information.744 This 
Chapter has highlighted the many ways in which data retention under the IPA 2016 violates a 
collection of Convention Rights and it has been noted that ‘transferring the power to issue said 
notice (in the UK’s case, a JC or IPC) would still not create a Convention compliant’745 system. 
This is because the problems highlighted above746 still persist and the JC system would still 
wield a virtually unfettered power.747 Moreover, when considering adequate safeguards, the 
ECtHR looks to the independence of the authorisation authority.748 It has already been argued 
																																																						
739 Romania Constitutional Court, (n148). 
740 ibid. 
741 ibid. 
742 Loizidou v Turkey App no. 15318/89 (ECHR, 28 July 1998), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jambrek, [5].  
743 Malone v UK App no. 8691/79 (ECHR, 2 August 1984), Concurring Opinion of Judge Pettiti.  
744 Liberty (n99), [133-135]. 
745 Matthew White, (n4), 37. 
746 See section 7.3B(2)(i)(a). 
747 Matthew White, (n4), 38. 
748 Roman Zakharov, (n6), [278-80]. 
	237	
that the JC and IPC does not establish sufficient independence749 from the executive750 and 
themselves.751  
 
The IPC released an advisory notice (which has now been removed) for JCs, public authorities 
and the public on authorisations, warrants and notices.752 The advice entails that when a JC 
considers a retention notice, they must have due regard to the general privacy duties set out in 
s.2 of the IPA 2016,753 the relevant tests of necessity and proportionality under ECHR and EU 
law,754 and where fundamental rights are engaged the Wednesbury principles will not be 
applied.755 These safeguards and more, however, are undermined by the fact that the notice is 
only advisory, and admits it lacks a binding nature,756 contrary to the ECHR757 and EU law.758 
 
Moreover, confining the JC’s role in s.2 of the IPA 2016 to consider privacy, overlooks other 
fundamental rights759 mentioned in this Chapter. With regards to the protection of sensitive 
information, this is much narrower than what is considered sensitive personal data in data 
protection instruments, and in any event would not protect against communications data from 
the result of communications with journalists and sources, lawyers and clients.760 
 
g. Crime 
 
Due to the IPA 2016 not defining crime, this creates a problem as ‘"[c]rime" can of course 
include trivial offences, and only the requirements of necessity and proportionality can prevent 
communications data being used for such crimes.’761 
 
h. Alternatives to Data Retention 
 
Data preservation was discussed in some detail above. Kristina Ringland noted, data 
preservation ’achieves a better balance between assisting law enforcement in criminal 
investigations while minimizing the costs to both corporations and consumers (author’s 
emphasis).’762 
 
i. Security Risks 
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The risks of communications data retention have been noted by many.763 Colette Cuijpers and 
Bert-Jaap Koops noted security risks of smart meters which could allow burglars to threaten 
the inviolability of the home.764 As noted, in 2014, 90% of large firms, and 74% of small firms 
in the UK suffered a security breach.765 Even telecommunications operators such as 
TalkTalk,766 Three,767 Vodafone,768 Time Warner Cable,769 energy companies,770 credit 
firms,771 and even the CIA772 were victims of security breaches.  
 
Section 92 of the IPA 2016 deals with data security. Section 92(1)(a) compels the 
telecommunications operator to secure data to the same level they normally would. This, in 
and of itself does not guarantee high data security standards. Section 92(1)(c) replicates the 
information security principles of the Data Protection Act 1998, but as the GFCC noted when 
referring their domestic data protection legislation in that it was ‘too general to ensure in a 
sufficiently specific and reliable manner the particularly high security standards with regard to 
the data to be stored.’773 Danny O’Brien notes that ‘the best form of data security is simply not 
collecting that information in the first place.’774 Data retention is the opposite of data protection 
as it raises the chances of catastrophic losses of privacy with no benefit for the people it 
endangers.775  
 
This problem intensifies with smart cities as Rob Kitchin noted that: 
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Research by cybersecurity specialists has discovered that many smart city systems have 
been constructed with no or minimal security and city governments and vendors are 
deploying them without undertaking cybersecurity testing.776 
 
Lilian Edwards noted that in short ‘smart cities are a security disaster waiting to happen.’777 
Security threats also persist with brain/mind data as Ajaya Neupane, Lutfor Rahman and Nitesh 
Saxena demonstrated that passwords and PINs could be predicted based on brain signals which 
as noted above, such signals could be retained with neurotechnologies.778 
 
Conclusions 
 
The above subsection has demonstrated why a fair balance could never be struck regarding 
data retention as envisaged in the IPA 2016. The authorisation procedures are not capable of 
ensuring that secret surveillance measures are ordered only when ‘necessary in a democratic 
society.’779 This conclusion obviates the need to consider criticisms of the ‘adequacy of certain 
particular safeguards, such as too broad an access to the personal data concerned and 
insufficient protection against the misuse or abuse of such data.’780 Therefore, even if the JC 
system was an adequate safeguard, the scale and generality of retention would make this 
inconsequential to the violations of Articles 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4. 
 
7.7. Data Protection 
 
a. A Fundamental Right in itself 
 
Fuster has argued that the CJEU’s case law on personal data protection when privacy is 
involved has been confusing as to how the two rights relate and whether they should be relied 
upon separately and how they are lawfully restricted.781 Although the ECHR has no Article 8 
CFR equivalent,782 the interpretation of Article 8 ECHR has been directly influenced by the 
emergence and development of data protection concepts and laws,783 as seen in S and 
Marper.784 The GC in S and Marper recognised how fundamental the protection of personal 
data was to the enjoyment of Article 8 ECHR, and that domestic law must afford appropriate 
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safeguards that are consistent with it.785 The CJEU in Schecke also noted that Article 7 and 8 
CFR corresponded to Article 8 ECHR.786 Although this poses its own problems,787 this section 
will demonstrate how Article 8 ECHR can inform Article 8 CFR in the specific context of data 
retention because ‘legislation limiting the right to the protection of personal data in compliance 
with Article 8 of the Charter may nevertheless be regarded as constituting a disproportionate 
interference with Article 7 (right to privacy) of the Charter.’788 
 
b. Fair and Lawful Processing 
 
Article 8(2) CFR notes amongst other things, that personal data must be processed fairly with 
consent or by some legitimate basis in law. Careful scrutiny must be taken when a measure 
authorises retention without consent.789 Fair and lawful processing can be found within many 
data protection legal texts. also, known as the First Data Protection Principle.790 It has been 
argued that lawful processing should be assessed ‘in the context of compliance or non-
compliance with the obligation to show’791 respect for Article 8 of the ECHR. In Law Society 
et all v Kordowski, Tugendhat J noted that: 
 
[W]here the DPA applies, if processing is unlawful by reason of it breaching the general 
law of confidentiality (and thus any other general law) there will be a contravention of 
the First Data Protection Principle (author’s emphasis). 792  
 
Tugendhat J also noted the link between Directive 95/46/EC and Article 8 ECHR.793 A further 
link to human rights in general and data protection can be found in Recital 73 Regulation (EU) 
2016/679 (GDPR). In an Enforcement Notice issued by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO) on Southampton City Council, the ICO noted that ‘[a] breach of Article 8 [ECHR] 
will also contravene the lawful processing requirement of the First Data Protection 
Principle.’794 An automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) system which took every number 
plate entering and leaving Royston795 breached the First Data Protection Principle when taking 
into account Article 8 ECHR, for being unlawful and excessive.796 Furthermore, processing 
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personal data has to be necessary on specified grounds.797 Pounder has argued that where 
surveillance is unnecessary, this too can breach the First Data Protection Principle.798  
 
This demonstrates that if a measure is unlawful under Article 8 ECHR where personal data is 
processed, this would also violate the lawful and fairness requirement. Sections 7.4 and 7.6 
argued how data retention under the IPA 2016 was not in accordance with the law or necessary 
in a democratic society, and therefore, as this would breach the First Data Protection Principle, 
Article 8(2) and Article 52(1)799 CFR would also be breached (excluding national security 
grounds). This too would be the case as not only is personal data processed, but sensitive 
personal data, which would in any case require stricter justifications for processing.800 In terms 
of legality, this would also solve the tautologically trap of regarding a legal norm, the validity 
of which is being questioned, as being allegedly in accordance with the law because it is a 
law801 if provided by law is equal to in accordance with. 
 
c. Purpose Limitation 
 
This is the Second Data Protection Principle which requires data must be collected for 
'specified, explicit and legitimate' purposes (purpose specification) and not be 'further 
processed in a way incompatible' with those purposes (compatible use).802 The ECtHR has 
noted where data protection issues under Article 8 arise, appropriate and adequate safeguards 
which reflect the principles elaborated in applicable data protection instruments and prevent 
arbitrary and disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights must be in place.803 
 
The WP29 have noted that a purpose that is vague or general would not usually meet the criteria 
of being specific.804  Section 7.4(B)(2)(i) noted how many of the purposes i.e. s.61(7) IPA 2016 
were vague, and not, therefore, foreseeable, specific or explicit.  WP29 also gave the example 
of the DRD which allowed processing for a clear incompatible purpose.805 The WP29 
continued this is further exasperated by the fact that citizens do not reasonably expect their 
communications data to be retained for law enforcement purposes, this data was not provided 
for (no consent), the confidentiality of the data, the volume of the data retained and the potential 
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consequences (criminal prosecution).806 The WP29 noted that although the DRD had been 
legitimised, its foreseeability, necessity and proportionally was a matter for the CJEU807 in 
which was found to not be the case for the reasons of necessity and proportionality. This 
Chapter adds to this finding whilst also demonstrating that foreseeability has also not been 
satisfied, and thus, the specified purpose under Article 8(2) CFR has not been complied with.  
 
This is another important point to note, further processing for a different purpose does not 
necessarily mean that it is automatically incompatible.808 Retention and access to 
communications data have the same purposes, however, nowhere in the IPA 2016 forbids 
retention for one purpose and accessing the same communications data for another. This 
question was put to Ben Emmerson QC and Helen Mountfield, who noted that there is a 
significant risk of a violation of Article 8 ECHR if communications data was not accessed for 
a business or national security purpose.809 This would also be a prima facie breach of the 
First810 and Second811 Data Protection Principles, especially since communications data might 
contains sensitive personal data which would therefore narrow the scope for compatible use.812 
Would this require duplication of retained communications data to satisfy purpose limitation? 
Would this not create an even greater disproportionate interference with fundamental rights? 
 
d. Relevant and Excessive 
 
This is not specifically mentioned in Article 8(2) CFR but would be inherent in Article 8(1) in 
that everyone has the right to the protection of their personal data. In S and Marper the GC 
noted that domestic law should ensure that data are relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are stored.813 This is the Third Data Protection Principle and a similar 
position is taken by the EU814 and CoE.815 It was noted above that not only is most 
communications data irrelevant for the purposes for which they are retained, the amount 
retained was neither necessary or proportionate. 
 
e. Accuracy 
 
The Fourth Data Protection Principle requires data to be kept up to date and accurate. Feiler 
noted that due data retention creating the ‘needle in the haystack problem’ of detecting vaguely 
defined behaviours, it becomes prone to false positives and negatives.816 A 'false positive' 
signifies an individual who is incorrectly identified as a 'terrorist' and a 'false negative' signifies 
a terrorist incorrectly identified as 'not a terrorist.'817 Using the DRD as an example, and the 
EU population, Feiler noted that data mining and profiling would accurately identify 99 
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terrorists for every 5 million that are incorrectly identified.818 False positives and negatives 
were also highlighted by Manon Oostveen who went further and noted that in light of Big Data 
(discussed below) noted that risks of overfitting (mistaking coincidental patterns for patterns 
that are generalizable) are high.819 This not only raises questions of accuracy, but also its 
necessity and utility. 
 
f. Data shall Not be Kept for longer than Necessary 
 
This is the Fifth Data Protection Principle. It was already argued above that necessity and 
proportionality were not satisfied for the cyclical 12-month retention period, and therefore, this 
Principle is also breached. 
 
 
7.8 Article 6 
 
a. Presumption of Innocence 
 
Chapter 4 argued how and why data retention engaged Article 6(2) (presumption of innocence) 
with reference to S and Marper and the stigmatisation it can bring,820 the RCC’s assertion that 
data retention overturning the presumption of innocence,821 the CJEU acknowledging data 
retention not distinguishing between suspects,822 the arguments made by Milaj and Bonnici823 
and Galetta,824 the position on substantially affected person and the ECHR being a ‘living 
instrument.’  
 
The main target of Article 6(2), Mendola suggests is ‘avoiding a situation where such innocent 
persons would be subjected to explorative, criminal, investigative activities.’825 Mendola noted 
that key to understanding the presumption of innocence is understanding the concept of 
reasonable suspicion and defining offences,826 in which offences must be specific and 
concrete.827 Reasonable suspicion and the nature of offences were discussed in sections 
7.4(B)(2)(ii)(a) and 7.4(B)(2)(i) respectively. Both sections highlighted that data retention was 
neither based upon reasonable suspicion nor were offences that could justify retention were 
defined. Thus, in order to increase the protection of the presumption of innocence, the ECtHR 
would need to develop this as we enter the era of crime prediction,828 or else we will become a 
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nation of suspects.829 David Anderson’s report of the investigatory powers review is titled A 
Question of Trust, yet at the same time of asking for trust, those that exercise said powers do 
not trust those whom they are supposed to protect. 
 
b. Self-Incrimination 
 
As Fischer notes, self-incrimination only applies to the active cooperation of the accused in 
which he notes that ‘an obligation to retain and disclose home grown private traffic data as a 
form of forced active cooperation.’830 This is possible under the IPA 2016 due to the definition 
of telecommunications operator as Chapter 6 noted. Moreover, as Smith noted and highlighted 
in Chapter 6, s.87(9)(b) makes it possible for telecommunications operators ‘require a third 
party to generate and hand over communications data’ to them.831 If this third party is a user, 
then the self-incrimination implications become more apparent. 
 
c. Effective Legal Assistance 
 
The ECtHR has noted that the accused’s rights to communicate with his advocate out of hearing 
of a third person is part of the basic requirements of a fair trial in a democratic society and 
follows from Article 6(3)(c) (author’s emphasis). Section 7.6((C)(c)(v)(b)(i) discussed how 
data retention would impact upon legal effective assistance and the material breach of legal 
privilege it would cause. Any limitation on relations between clients and lawyers, whether 
inherent or express, should not thwart the effective legal assistance to which a defendant is 
entitled (author’s emphasis).832 Additionally, any interference with privileged material ‘should 
be exceptional, be justified by a pressing need and will always be subjected to the strictest 
scrutiny’ (author’s emphasis).833 Data retention in its current form would not only breach 
Article 6(3)(c), but also Article 6(1) (fair trial).834  
 
7.9 Article 14 Discrimination 
 
Chapter 4 highlighted how Article 14 ECHR was applicable to data retention under the 
umbrella of ‘other status’ and is similarly applicable to Articles 6, 8-11 and Article 2 Protocol 
4. Data retention fails to discriminate between suspects and non-suspects, the legal profession 
and journalism etc. Indiscriminate data retention triggers what is known as Thlimmenos 
discrimination in that: 
 
 [T]he right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed 
under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable 
justification fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different 
(author’s emphasis).835  
 
																																																						
829 Liberty’s, ‘Liberty’s Submission to the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill’ (August 
2012) <http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy12/liberty-submission-to-the-draft-communications-
data-bill-committee-aug-2012-.pdf> accessed 24 August 2017. 
830 Conrad Fischer, ‘Communications Network Traffic Data’ (2010) 
<http://alexandria.tue.nl/extra2/689860.pdf> accessed 17 May 2017, p189-190. 
831 Graham Smith, (n92). 
832 Sakhnovskiy v Russia App no. 21272/03 (ECHR, 2 November 2010), [102]. 
833 Khodorkkovsky and Lebedev v Russia App nos. 11082/06 and 13772/05 (ECHR, 25 July 2013), [627]. 
834 ibid, [629]. 
835 Thlimmenos v Greece App no. 34369/97 (ECHR, 6 April 2000), [44]. 
	245	
This would ultimately lead to a violation of all the Convention Rights mentioned above in 
conjunction with Article 14836 as no objective reasonable justification could be made to support 
the argument of capturing massive amounts of communications data when it has been 
acknowledged most retained data is irrelevant.  
 
Another Article 14 issue is the potential created by the CJEU in Tele2 and Watson with regards 
to geographical tailored data retention. The CJEU did not define ‘public’ (which is much lower 
than the ECHR threshold of reasonable suspicion)837 or what would constitute geographical or 
multiple geographical areas.838 This left Anderson wondering if the CJEU meant that it was 
acceptable to perform general and indiscriminate data of a particular town, or housing estate?839 
As O’Neil suggests, ‘geography is a highly effective proxy for race.’840 Although such 
geographical limitations may serve to limit a catch all power, this would still constitute a 
general and indiscriminate power based on residence,841 which would again attract the 
application of Article 14.842 Even if such a retention notice was based upon objective criteria 
i.e. statistics on crimes per area843 this would not be reasonable (or proportionate, or even 
relevant)844 as this too would fail to distinguish residents in a significantly different position 
and would lead to residential profiling. Just as the GC in S and Marper found a violation of 
Article 8 even within a confined situation, ICO regarded a surveillance measure applied to a 
Parish of 15781 residents845 as incompatible with Article 8.846 Moreover, the GC in Zakharov 
noted that Russia’s surveillance measures, which amongst other things allowed ‘interception 
of all telephone communications in the area where a criminal offence has been committed’847 
violated Article 8 of the ECHR.848  This demonstrates the legal frailty of the CJEU permitting 
geographical data retention. This becomes all the more problematic when the CJEU did not 
rule on an acceptable retention time period in which under the IPA 2016 has been argued to be 
unnecessary and disproportionate, nor did it thoroughly critique the catalogue of human rights 
implications posed by data retention. 
 
																																																						
836 ibid, [55]. 
837 Matthew White, (n4), 35. 
838 ibid, 26. 
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841 Matthew White, (n4), 36. 
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843 Matthew White, (n4), 26-7. 
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846 ICO Enforcement Notice, (23 July 2012), (n792). 
847 Roman Zakharov, (n6), [265]. 
848 ibid, [305]. 
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Big Data could lead to biases based on what telecommunications are obligated to generate for 
law enforcement (due to ethnic profiling,849 which can intensify ethnic profiling)850 or inherent 
within the operations of the telecommunications operators.851 Biases852 based on race,853 
(acknowledged by the ECtHR)854 gender and socio-economic background855 would all fall 
under the ambit of Article 14. This relates to what Lyon describes surveillance as ‘social 
sorting.’ He continues that it ‘classifies and categorizes relentlessly, on the basis of various – 
clear or occluded – criteria’ and [i]t is often, but not always, accomplished by means of remote 
networked databases whose algorithms enable digital discrimination to take place.’856 Such 
surveillance can create a chilling effect on the freedom of expression of ordinary citizens and 
a wide range of vulnerable groups.857 Penney’s research has suggested that women and younger 
people are more likely to be chilled and are less likely to take steps to defend themselves from 
regulatory actions and threats.858 It has also been statistically demonstrated that Muslim-
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American’s change their behaviour due to government surveillance fears.859 Artificial 
intelligence (AI), which can collect and analyse860 large amounts of information learn through 
experience861 also suffer from gender and racial bias.862 As Christl and Spiekermann note ‘as 
long as data and algorithms are secret, it is not possible to even notice or prove 
discrimination.’863 This also demonstrates that ‘other status’ need not be solely relied upon in 
this regard as Article 14 covers amongst other things as race, colour, sex and religion. 
 
7.10 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter combines Chapters discussed previously in order to assess the compatibility of 
data retention as envisaged in the IPA 2016 with human rights guaranteed by the ECHR. 
Assessing Part 4’s compatibility with the ECHR highlighted deficiencies within the CJEU’s 
own rulings in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 and Watson. It is accepted that the CJEU did 
not specifically deal with any specific national implementation of data retention, but it did not 
use this opportunity to align itself with well-established ECtHR jurisprudence. This has been 
demonstrated by highlighting that data retention would not be accessible or foreseeable in 
terms of unfettered and arbitrary powers whether sporadically used, the nature of offences, 
persons liable, incidental retention, data by type and utility. This highlights how Part 4 is not 
in accordance with the law, something the CJEU had not dealt with. Under the examination of 
the ECHR, the utility of data retention was put into serious doubt in terms of its necessity and 
effectiveness, something which the CJEU accepted without detailed analysis or scrutiny. 
Moreover, the very idea of data retention as a legitimate aim was put under serious doubt, 
which for the CJEU, was an objective that satisfied the general interest. Furthermore, some 
problems with the CJEU’s ruling in terms of what it would allow Member States to pursue 
under vague terms like the identifiable public, which falls below the threshold of reasonable 
suspicion identified by the case law of the ECtHR. Moreover, a pressing social need for data 
retention envisaged in Part 4 in terms of data retention, who can be obligated to retain, its 
length, and the types of data to be retained were also put under considerable scrutiny, something 
the CJEU could have ruled to be considered. With regards to geographical retention, this was 
highlighted as not being compatible with the ECHR. These deficiencies could be remedied by 
national courts asking the CJEU to clarify the position of the CFR where it offers less protection 
than the ECHR.864   
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Beyond the deficiencies of Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 and Watson this Chapter 
highlighted the threat of data retention to freedom of expression, movement, 
association/assembly, religion/conscious, anonymity, relationships, data protection, 
presumption of innocence, self-incrimination, a fair trial and non-discrimination and how it is 
a social harm in various ways, and that in summary, threatens democracy. It demonstrated the 
threats specific professions such as journalism and the legal profession. This Chapter also 
demonstrated the continuous nature of data retention, in that one can never truly be free from 
such interference with fundamental rights.  
 
This analysis considered the implications of how the law (due to its broad and vaguely defined 
terms) affects modern technologies extend beyond what the CJEU and others have considered 
with regards to traditional phone companies and Internet Service Providers (which on strict 
interpretation, is what Digital Rights Ireland/Tele2 only applies to). This is done so by 
highlighting the God’s-eye view of data retention in that it allows every aspect of an 
individual’s life to be retained, by making one’s cities, homes and themselves (using mind 
privacy as one example) a Panopticion through the use of smart technologies. This may, 
however change, given that a German judge has made a preliminary reference to the CJEU to 
question whether Gmail is an ‘electronic communications service’865 which would put it within 
the scope of Digital Rights Ireland/Tele2.  
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that Part 4 of the IPA 2016 is not accessible, foreseeable, does 
not pursue a legitimate aim, does not satisfy a pressing social need, does not provide relevant 
and sufficient reasons for the measures, does not strike a fair balance and is not proportionate. 
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 Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
8.1 Summary 
 
This thesis has sought to ask the question as to whether data retention in the words of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has undermined or even destroyed democracy on 
the grounds of defending it.1 In order to assess this, Chapter 2 considered the politics behind 
data retention at a European Union (EU) and UK level. It highlighted that the UK was the main 
driver of data retention across the EU and utilised tragic events of acts of terrorism to justify 
said measures. However, harmonising data retention at the EU level was invalidated2 by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and then subsequently ruled that blanket 
indiscriminate data retention of all subscribers and all their data from all electronic 
communications services was not permissible under EU law.3 Given the UK’s pivotal role in 
data retention, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016), the threats posed to Article 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR/Convention/Convention Rights), and the 
vote to leave the EU, it was necessary to consider data retention under the ECHR. 
 
Chapter 3 went through the task of considering the types of communications data that could be 
retained via the IPA 2016. The aim of this Chapter was to highlight just how intrusive 
communications data can be, and this it should be regarded posing just as, if not a more serious 
interference with rights as the content of communications. Some examples of communications 
included usernames and passwords, which would compromise an individual’s account. Other 
types included location data which could reveal sensitive personal data such as one’s religion. 
Communications data in the form of Internet Connection Records (ICRs) and third party data 
would require interception to be retained, the very thing that is argued to distinguish it from 
content. Moreover, this Chapter revealed that many other forms e.g. mind data (and unknown 
types) of communications data could be retained, or generated for the purposes for of retention 
and went beyond what is considered traffic and location data under current EU law. 
Communications data can be used to build a precise profile of an individual, and this intensifies 
with Big Data in which said profiles (which can be discriminatory and intensify discrimination) 
are already ready available. Given that the ECtHR has acknowledged that given the 
technological advances since Klass the ‘potential interferences with email, mobile phone and 
Internet services as well as those of mass surveillance attract the Convention protection of 
private life even more acutely’ (author’s emphasis).4 Accepting that communications data 
retention poses just as serious of an interference with private life as interception is entirely 
possible under the ECtHR’s ‘living instrument’ doctrine which interprets the Convention in 
light of present-day conditions.5 In endorsing such a position, the ECtHR would not fall victim 
of its own doctrine of ensuring that Convention is practical and effective, and not theoretical 
and illusory.6 The position argued now has support of the ECtHR in the recent case of Big 
																																																						
1 Klass v Germany App no. 5029/71 (ECHR, 6 September 1978), [49]. 
2 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] ECR I-238. 
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Brother Watch. The consideration of privacy and Article 8 also highlighted its social value and 
why its protection is of fundamental importance. 
 
Chapter 4 considered that data retention raised not only issues of Article 8, but of other 
Convention Rights. This Chapter first considered the most obvious right in question, Article 8, 
and how data retention interferes with this Convention Right in various ways. This Chapter 
highlighted that although Article 8 had its own instrumental and social value, its importance 
for the fulfilment of other rights became apparent. In the digital era, Article 8 was noted to be 
essential for the exercise of one’s freedom of 
expression/association/assembly/religion/thought/conscious which are protected by Articles 9-
11 ECHR. Article’s 9-11 are important for democracy and Chapter 4 noted that Article 8 
underpins them all, making it uniquely exceptional amongst the rest of the Convention Rights. 
Given that the ECtHR has a role to play in the promotion of democracy, it must ensure chilling 
effects are minimised, a way to do this is to look beyond privacy and data protection when 
issues of surveillance arise, and instead consider the issue in terms of collective freedoms and 
democracy, which is possible under the ‘living instrument’ doctrine. Chapter 4 also 
demonstrated the data retention raised issues of freedom of movement, protected under Article 
2 Protocol 4 in that movements would be tracked and stored for vast majorities of the 
population, threatening the right to move without being traced.  Moreover, Chapter 4 also noted 
that data retention potentially engages Article 6 ECHR with regards to the presumption of 
innocence discrimination issues, as it applied to all, whether they had committed a crime or 
were the subject of an investigation. Data retention also argued to engage Article 6 in that it 
could lead to self-incrimination through passwords or through neurotechnologies and mind 
data, or imposing obligations on individuals who are telecommunications operators. It was also 
argued that Article 6 was engaged in that it can interfere with effective legal assistance, by 
interfering with a lawyer’s correspondence with their clients (Legal Professional Privilege, 
LPP). Finally, Chapter 4 noted that data retention raises issues of discrimination, which is 
protected under Article 14 ECHR on conjunction with Convention Rights. It does so in four 
ways, failing to treat those in a significantly different situation (suspect and non-suspect, or 
those whose communications data requires special protection i.e. lawyer) different, bias due to 
profiles created by Big Data, geographical data retention which would discriminate based on 
residency and can create a chilling effect to self-fulfilment if information disclosed enables 
discrimination. 
 
Chapter 5 demonstrated that from a theoretical and legal perspective (utilising the ECHR, EU 
and UK law) that communications data retention is secret mass surveillance within 
surveillance. It did so by using Foucault’s popularisation of the Panopticon in demonstrating 
that data retention puts one under a constant gaze through the collection of data with the 
ultimate aim of social control through one being unaware as to when they might be observed. 
This Panoptic glare also chills the expression of many. It also argued that data retention is 
Panspectric in that it relies on the subject’s lack of awareness of the extent that they are under 
surveillance. In line with the Panopticon, this Chapter also highlighted how Governments and 
private corporations act in synergy by the former creating laws allowing the latter to conduct 
surveillance capitalism, in which the former utilises the spoils with their own surveillance. Data 
protection laws allows companies to create and generate data, which is then subsequently 
retained (surveillance within surveillance).   
 
Chapter 6 demonstrated that from the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 
2000), to the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA 2014) to the IPA 
2016, the obligation to retain has expanded from telephone companies and Internet Service 
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Providers (ISPs) to include websites, cloud based services, controllers of networks, devices, 
apps, software, hardware and Internet of Things (IoT) objects. This Chapter highlighted that 
the obligation to retain applies to essentially to anything that communicates. This Chapter also 
supplemented Chapter 4 in that it highlighted that the obligation to retain has implications for 
the family life and home aspects of Article 8 in that IoT devices will store, create and generate 
data about traditional home products. This Chapter also highlighted that the obligation to retain 
is not exclusive to the Secretary of State and Judicial Commissioner (JC), but also a variety of 
relevant public authorities. The Government is seeking to introduce authorisations by the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC)7 for this ability to ensure independence in the 
process. This however, overlooks the fact that the IPC is also the review and auditor of said 
authorisations.8    
 
Chapter 7 assess the compatibility of data retention within Part 4 of the IPA 2016 with the 
ECHR. It first notes that the IPA 2016 is not even compatible with EU law, and then moves on 
to highlight some of the deficiencies in the CJEU’s rulings in Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2. 
Using Article 8 as a template for other qualified Convention Rights (Articles 9-11, and Article 
2 Protocol 4), it was argued that Part 4 was neither in accordance with the law or necessary in 
a democratic society, nor did it likely pursue a legitimate aim. This demonstrated that Part 4 
was not accessible or foreseeable and permitted unfettered and arbitrary powers. The utility 
and necessity of the very idea of data retention was put under serious doubt. This Chapter also 
demonstrated Part 4 did not attain the threshold for requiring reasonable suspicion for the 
measure to be utilised. This Chapter also questioned whether it was established that there was 
a pressing social need for data retention in and of itself, those who could be obligated to retain, 
the length of retention and the types of data that could be retained. Chapter 7 also highlighted 
how data retention posed a threat to freedom of expression, movement, association/assembly, 
religion/conscious, anonymity, relationships, data protection, presumption of innocence, self-
incrimination, a fair trial and non-discrimination and how it is a social harm in various ways, 
and that in summary, threatens democracy. 
 
This thesis has reached the conclusion that data retention in the IPA 2016 undermines 
democracy as it violates several key Convention Rights that are the building blocks for any 
democratic society. The assault on privacy which acts as the foundation for freedom of 
expression/religion/conscious/thought/assembly/association, the hampering of the ability of 
journalists to act as the fourth state, the erosion of the presumption of innocence as well as 
threatening LLP, the discriminatory factor, the all-encompassing ability to obligate retention 
on anything that can communicate and whatever it can generate are all factors which support 
this conclusion. As the Czech Republic Constitution Court correctly acknowledges: 
 
Unless the individual enjoys the guarantee of controlling and checking the content and 
extent of information and data provided by them to be published, stored or used for 
other than the original purposes; unless they are provided with the possibility to 
recognise and assess the credibility of their potential communication partner and adapt 
their action accordingly, then their rights and freedoms are unavoidably restricted or 
even suppressed, and consequently, it is no longer possible to perceive such a society 
as free and democratic.9  
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The question as to whether data retention in the IPA 2016 destroys democracy would depend 
on the Government of the day. What can be said is that when one considers the scale and depth 
of retention, whether it be communications data of one’s browsing habits, app, phone or 
computer use, body tech use, neurotechnologies, household appliance use or just simply 
walking down the street in a Smart City, it may not destroy democracy, but it has certainly 
sown the seeds for its destruction. For this reason, it is argued that Part 4 of the IPA 2016 
certainly undermines democracy because it is: 
 
The modern dream of the totalitarian police, with its modern techniques, is 
incomparably more terrible. Now the police dreams that one look at the gigantic map 
on the office wall should suffice at any given moment to establish who is related to 
whom and in what degree of intimacy.10 
 
8.2 Contributions to knowledge and impact 
 
a. Key Contributions to the discussion on Data Retention 
 
In undertaking this analysis, this thesis has made several original contributions to knowledge, 
namely: 
 
I. In understanding the social value privacy brings, it gives an insight into how privacy 
and Article 8 are important for the proper functioning of democracy. Thus, when one 
considers mass surveillance such as data retention, it highlights that the focus should 
not, and cannot solely be about an individual, but about society as a whole, because it 
affects the latter whether the former acknowledges it.  
 
II. Continuing with the importance of Article 8 for democracy, this thesis highlighted 
how Article 8 underpins freedom of 
expression/association/assembly/religion/thought/conscious which are protected by 
Articles 9-11. Articles 9-11, in and of themselves are crucial democracy, and Article 
8 supports each of them, hence its underpinning for democracy. It was demonstrated 
how communications data interferes with and chills said Convention Rights. Notable 
examples include having chilling effects on communications between parties, the 
search for, and exchange of ideas, journalists and their sources (including 
whistleblowers), minorities and women, political opinions, victims of violence 
willingness to come forward, the expression of religion and even the association or 
assembly of individuals or groups. This list is not exhaustive, but data retention 
ultimately impacts upon one’s autonomous ability to act freely. Another aspect which 
adds to the knowledge in this particular area was considering data retention and its 
implications for Article 6. It demonstrated that data retention poses a serious threat to 
the presumption of innocence, self-incrimination, effective legal assistance and an 
overall fair trial. It did so by arguing that the way ‘criminal charge’ should be 
understood with regards to modern technology, needs to evolve as we move ever 
closer to a preventative state. In addition to this, due consideration was given to data 
retention in relation to Article 14, and it was highlighted it raises issues of failing to 
discriminate individuals who are in a substantially different situation (i.e. non-
suspects, journalists, LPP) and the data itself which could be based on biases on what 
could be obligated to (generate) retain or what the telecommunications operators 
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themselves generate. Whilst also acknowledging the addition of other Convention 
Rights affected by data retention, this thesis took a step further to consider Article 2 
Protocol 4, although not applicable in UK law, it was important to highlight under the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence, data retention is capable of interfering with it. Adding to this 
point was the chilling effect on the freedom of movement when said movement is 
constantly logged and tracked. When one considers the variety of Convention Rights 
interfered with by data retention, it becomes clear that it is no longer, if it ever was, 
just an issue of privacy, data protection and/or freedom of expression. 
 
III. This thesis has highlighted the far-reaching powers of the IPA 2016, in terms of who 
can be obligated to retain, and what can be retained. Due to the technologically neutral 
terms, it was identified data retention obligations not only fall upon telephone 
providers and ISPs, but websites, web-based services, cloud based services, controllers 
of networks (body, home, local, or wide), devices, apps, software, hardware and IoT 
objects. It highlighted that when one considers data retention, it can no longer be 
thought of just in terms of telephone companies or ISPs, but in terms of essentially 
any device that is connected to a network or can communicate. Only then it is possible 
to understand the far-reaching implications of the definition of telecommunications 
operator as it will encompass everyday objects as the IoT takes a hold. Not only will 
one’s browsing habits, thoughts, feelings, movement and other activities on smart 
phones be subject to a 12-month retention period on a continuous basis, but everyday 
objects will also act as a Panopticon for one’s home, one’s city and even onself. When 
one considers what falls under the definition of telecommunications operator, then an 
insight into the types of communications data that can be retained materialises. In 
arguing that communications data retention is just as serious of an interference with 
Convention Rights as interception, it was demonstrated by examples, the types of data 
that would support this position e.g. passwords. Not only would telecommunications 
operators be obliged to retain your browsing habits, which can reveal sensitive 
personal data such as religion and sexual preference, but passwords and some would 
be obliged to retain the content that is embedded within the communications data. This 
thesis highlighted that there is no limit to the types of communications data that can 
be retained, either through its generation, or due to the vague terminology used, and 
as examples, Big Data and neurotechnologies which produce mind data was used. The 
ability to penetrate thoughts retain mind data would literally create CCTV for inside 
your head.11 For this reason it was argued that communications data strikes at the 
substance of the right due to the severity of the interference, which would take a step 
further than the CJEU, but is feasible under the ECtHR’s ‘living instrument’ doctrine. 
The extent at which the IPA 2016 expands upon who can be obligated to retain, and 
what, is not an issue that is yet fully realised in the discourse of data retention, yet we 
have already sleepwalked into it.    
 
IV. This thesis has contributed to the understanding that communications data retention is 
a form a mass secret surveillance within surveillance. Surveillance is often understood 
as watching the ‘focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for 
purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.’12 However, data 
retention is not focussed and thus a new way of understanding surveillance had to be 
utilised. Data retention ‘treats everyone as a suspect’, ‘monitors everyone’ and ‘puts 
																																																						
11 Caspar Bowden, ‘CCTV for inside your head Blanket Traffic Data Retention and the Emergency Anti-
Terrorism Legislation’ (2001) <http://europe.rights.apc.org/eu/cctv_for_the_head.html> accessed 7 April 2018. 
12 David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Cambridge: Polity Press 2007), 14. 
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everyone under surveillance.’13 In order to demonstrate communications data retention 
is surveillance, consideration was given to the Panopticon, Panspectron, the ECHR, 
EU and UK law. This analysis also uncovered that data retention is not only secret 
mass surveillance, but is secret mass surveillance within surveillance because much 
data is retained due to the data created and generated by surveillance capitalism.  
 
V. This is the first in depth analysis of the compatibility of communications data retention 
with the ECHR that looks beyond Articles 8 and 10. In doing so, this thesis has 
meticulously highlighted how the interpretation of the ECHR questions the very idea 
of data retention. Many surveillance cases before the ECtHR are decided on whether 
interference is in accordance with the law i.e. legal basis, accessible and foreseeable. 
When applying these principles to data retention in Part 4 of the IPA 2016, it was 
highlighted that it was not accessible, and in particular, was not foreseeable. Given 
that Articles 9-11 and Article 2 Protocol 4 are qualified just as Article 8 is, it was 
demonstrated that if a measure is not in accordance with the law for the purposes of 
Article 8, it was not in accordance with the law for the purposes of Articles 9-11 and 
Article 2 Protocol 4. This position is supported by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
This also highlighted a deficiency in the CJEU’s approach to data retention in that it 
did not expressly endorse the ECtHR’s approach to legality, thus giving Member State 
the potential to deviate from the Convention. Instead of ending the examination of Part 
4 there, it was necessary to apply all of the ECHR tests to highlight the overall the 
illegality of data retention. With regards to a legitimate aim, it was also demonstrated 
that the type of retention envisaged in Part 4 would be difficult to justify even on an 
acceptable exception. It was further highlighted, due to the unique nature of each of 
the Convention Rights, it was impossible to use the same justification for interference 
e.g. data retention for national security purposes is not permissible under Article 9. 
This again, demonstrated a deficiency in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) in 
that so long as an undefined general interest was satisfied, data retention was 
permissible. This thesis does not just question the overall proportionality of data 
retention, it asks deeper questions as to whether there is a pressing social need for data 
retention envisaged in Part 4, whether the types of telecommunications operators 
obligated to retain are necessary, whether the types of communications data to retain 
are necessary and whether the 12-month retention period is necessary. When the 
components of data retention are broken down, especially in light of Chapters 3 and 
6, it becomes apparent that there is no pressing social need for said measures. 
Questioning whether the reasons for data retention is relevant and sufficient revealed 
that the evidence to justify extending the obligations to retain, what to retain, and for 
how long were either insufficient or non-existent. This approach does not act upon the 
assumption based on what little anecdotes are provided because the efficiency of data 
retention in its current form has not been justified. Granted when the CJEU considered 
data retention, Part 4 had not been in mind, this thesis has argued that Part 4 goes 
further than data retention at an EU level, and thus the considerations for 
proportionality are not identical. In arguing that Part 4 strikes at the substance of the 
right (see Chapter 3), this could not be proportionate. This thesis also highlighted an 
alternative to data retention, advocated by many, data preservation, as a least 
restrictive measure. Due to the very questionable utility of data retention, and the lack 
of consideration for this more human rights friendly alternative, this also made Part 4 
																																																						
13 Arianna Vedaschi and Valerio Lubello, ‘Data Retention and its Implications for the Fundamental Right to 
Privacy’ (2015) Tilburg Law Review 20 14, 16. 
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disproportionate. Finally, the question remained as to whether a fair balance was 
struck in the assessment of proportionality. There were several reasons highlighted 
that Part 4 was anything but for as follows: 
 
1. Blanket indiscriminate data retention has not been permissible under the 
ECHR since S and Marper. 
2. Most data retained is of innocent people. 
3. It does not comply with EU law. 
4. When the social value of privacy is considered, such measures are unjustified. 
5. It creates social harms such as chilling effects in general and in specific 
contents such as LPP and journalistic sources. It erodes anonymity and makes 
surveillance the default. It turns one’s city, home and even oneself into a 
Panopticon.  
6. The 12-month period of retention is cyclical, and thus interference never truly 
stops.  
7. The safeguards are insufficient.  
8. The definition of ‘crime’ is not defined. 
9. The alternative of data preservation is not utilised. 
10. There will always be security issues in which large volumes of 
sensitive/personal data will be lost and used for nerfarious purposes. This will 
worsen due to the lack security of IoT objects. 
 
VI. This thesis also used Article 8 ECHR as a guide for the interpretation of Article 8 CFR. 
 
VII. Additionally, this thesis considered on the strong assertion that Article 6 was engaged 
and argued that this threatened the presumption of innocence. In order to respond to 
emerging technologies and as we move to the crime prediction era, it was strongly 
argued the ECtHR’s approach needs to evolve, if not, we become a nation of 
suspects.14 It was also highlighted how Part 4 made it possible for one to self-
incriminate themselves, and threatens LPP.  
 
VIII. This thesis also considers the discriminatory issues raised by data retention. This is 
not an issue that has been considered by the ECtHR or the CJEU in the surveillance 
context, and thus provides an insightful analysis of the issues raised based on data 
retention. It demonstrated that based on Article 14, data retention discriminated in four 
different ways, failing to differentiate those in a significantly different situation, the 
data itself that is retained or generated for retention could be biased, this can also 
reinforce biases and due to the CJEU’s ruling, geographical discrimination. The latter 
point highlights that the CJEU could lead Member States to act in a manner 
incompatible with the ECHR. This analysis is useful for any law that permits 
ubiquitous surveillance as it will undoubtedly interfere with fundamental rights in an 
Article 14 non-compliant manner.   
 
IX. This thesis also allows the principles and methodology established (particularly the 
ECHR analysis) throughout to be applied to other measures of surveillance. Measures 
such as the Home Office’s proposed super-database which would combine various 
																																																						
14 Liberty, ‘Liberty’s Submission to the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill’ (August 2012) 
<http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy12/liberty-submission-to-the-draft-communications-data-
bill-committee-aug-2012-.pdf> accessed 8 April 2018. 
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databases in which the police, government bodies and businesses could access,15 facial 
recognition and mobile phone extraction to name a few. 
  
b. Impact: Adequacy 
 
On 24 June 2016, the UK voted in a referendum, to leave the EU (Brexit). If the UK leaves as 
intended on 29 March 2019, it will become a third country for the purposes of data protection. 
The transfer of personal data to third countries is governed by Chapter V of the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).16 Article 45(1) notes that transfers are only permissible if the 
European Commission (Commission) decides that the third country in question has an adequate 
level of data protection. The CJEU have ruled that third countries require ‘a level of protection 
of fundamental rights essentially equivalent to that guaranteed in the EU legal order.’17 The 
European Council draft negotiating guidelines with regards to Brexit holds the same position.18   
 
The UK Government seeks to maintain the same position with regards to transfers as it 
currently does as an EU Member State.19 In doing so, it has avowed that the UK is a ‘safe 
destination for personal data with some of the strongest domestic data protection standards in 
the world.’20 The UK Government does ‘not see any reason for existing data flows from third 
countries to the UK to be interrupted’21 because of its ‘exceptionally high standards of data 
protection.’22 However, Commission has had concerns with the current UK data protection 
framework.23  
 
The Home Affairs Committee (HAC) highlighted several obstacles for the UK in its pursuit of 
being found adequate, but the most relevant for this thesis is the controversial IPA 2016.24 The 
HAC specifically refers to data retention25 where Murray and Cobbe have argued that Part 4 is 
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not compatible with EU law,26 and will thus undermine the UK’s ability to receive an adequacy 
decision.27 However, the UK Government assert that data retention on the grounds of national 
security fall outside the scope of EU law and therefore Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 are not 
applicable.28 The Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) has sought guidance from the CJEU on 
precisely this matter.29 Even if the UK Government’s view is correct, the ECHR still applies,30 
and any divergence in the data protection context would make the UK inadequate.31 When the 
Commission makes an adequacy decision, Article 45(2) dictates what it should take into 
account, notably: 
 
a) the rule of law; 
b) respect for fundamental rights and freedoms; 
c) relevant legislation; 
d) access of public authorities to personal data; 
e) existence of effective independent supervisory authorities; 
f) commitments to legally binding conventions. 
  
With regards to c), this specifically concerns the IPA 2016. With regards to a), the rule of law 
is not respected because it has been argued that data retention is not in accordance with the law 
for the purposes of the ECHR. With regards to b), it has been argued that data retention violates 
a collection of Convention Rights. With regards to d), it was argued that the list of relevant 
public authorities able to access communications data either was insufficient or non-existent. 
With regards to e) the Commission has long since had concerns with the UK’s supervisory 
authority, the Information Commissioner32 and this thesis has highlighted that given the nature 
of the powers in Part 4, the independence of the JC does not change their ability to violate a) 
and b). Given that this thesis has strongly argued that data retention in the IPA 2016 violates 
many provisions of the ECHR, the UK its commitment to a legally binding convention with 
regards to f). It is therefore contended that this thesis has highlighted a significant obstacle for 
the UK to obtain a finding of adequacy.   
 
The impact of this thesis and its contribution to highlighting that the UK does not have 
essentially equivalent data protection laws could hinder police and security operations, present 
non-tariff barriers to trade which could put the UK services industry at a competitive 
disadvantage.33 The UK police could also lose access to intelligence and information that are 
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vital for law enforcement.34 Thus, the UK’s attempts at strengthening law enforcement, may 
well undermine it. Therefore, this thesis will not only incentivise the UK to comply with its 
ECHR obligations, but it also acts as a warning for the consequences to its economy and law 
enforcement should data retention continue as is. In order for the UK to achieve this it must: 
 
[E]nsure that retention notices (or more correctly defined as ‘data preservation’) or 
obligations ‘must be used for a specific purpose, not as a general “fishing” exercise to 
bring in information’ based on verifiable reasonable suspicion that is necessary and 
proportionate, through the least restrictive measure with a suitable notification 
system.35 
 
c. Impact and Importance Beyond UK law 
 
The importance of considering data retention under the ECHR given its binding nature on EU 
Member States36 adds importance to the fact that as of September 2017, 40% of them surveyed 
by Privacy International are still transposing the Directive 2006/24,37 and all are inconsistent 
with Tele2.38 Thus not only are various Member States in violation of Digital Rights Ireland 
and Tele2, they are also failing under their ECHR obligations. There are also, as of writing, 
four cases pending before the CJEU on data retention.39The ECHR argument serves to 
supplement the CJEU’s rulings using UK law as an example, but takes the argument beyond 
privacy, data protection and freedom of expression, and makes it one of a collection of other 
rights including those mentioned and democracy itself.  
 
This analysis becomes all the more important as the ECHR can be said to be seen as ‘holding 
the line’ for States that are party to it, but not Member States of the EU (thus Digital Rights 
Ireland and Tele2 not applying). In Russia, a new law will require ISPs and 
telecommunications companies to store communications data for three years.40 The concern is 
that the Russian approach might inspire Eastern European non-EU legislators such as 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to take a similar approach.41 It 
is only Belarus that is not Members of the Council of Europe and thus not subject to the ECHR. 
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Considering data retention from an ECHR perspective is important as it can strengthen Eastern 
European states’ understanding of the obligations under the Convention.42 This thesis noted 
how the Romanian Constitutional Court (RCC) relied upon Article 8 and ECHR jurisprudence 
in finding that national data retention laws were unlawful.43  When comparing the Western 
states and Romania’s approach, Adrian Bannon noted that in a ‘stark twist of fate, could it be 
that West is now going East and East is now going West.’44 This demonstrates the importance 
of an ECHR perspective, whether the laws are from Eastern or Western European states.  
 
Data retention is not just a European issue, but an international one as the UK influences 
surveillance laws abroad.45 This thesis could have an impact on Australian data retention 
laws,46 which would be difficult to challenge,47 due to the fact that the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
‘has had a very important impact within Australia.’48 References to the ECtHR have increased 
in recent years, and will continue to do so.49 The ECHR has also guided and influenced thinking 
about human rights in Australia, which will also continue.50 The ECtHR role with regards to 
human rights in Australia will become ‘even more significant’ as ‘[r]easoned, serious, balanced 
judicial opinions are a powerful weapon against injustice and arbitrary or ill-conceived 
deprivation of fundamental rights.’51 The ECtHR will continue to influence Australia, and more 
importantly, ‘many non-signatory countries’ as it ‘takes a leading part in, and stimulates, the 
trans-national conversation about human rights.’52 
 
8.3 Limitations and a look to the future 
 
a. Limitations 
 
This thesis did not consider a particular aspect of Article 8 in surveillance cases with regards 
to notification. It has been argued that s.231 of the IPA 2016 regarding error reporting is not 
consistent with Article 8 jurisprudence on notification and raises Article 13 issues of s.231 
being an effective remedy.53 
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Article 3 Protocol 1, the right to free elections by secret ballot was not considered. This right 
concerns only the choice of legislature and not sporadic referendums,54 such as Brexit.55 
Communications data can not only reveal if an individual was at the polling station on election 
day, but their voting behaviour can be revealed based upon websites visited which would 
violate the free and secret nature of elections.56 
 
Fairness is an important aspect of Article 3 Protocol 1,57 and manipulation of elections falls 
within the ambit of the ECtHR’s considerations.58 Ghosh and Scott note how Cambridge 
Analytica used sensitive personal data of Facebook users to ‘manipulate American voters with 
targeted Facebook ads and social media campaigns.’59 Facebook itself boasts about its 
influence on elections60 which could be seen as hyperbolic, but dangerous nudging and 
manipulation are concrete concerns.61 If communications data that is retained can be used to 
effect the outcomes of elections by manipulating or nudging just enough people to swing or 
tip62 it in a particular way, this may raises issues as to its fairness. As the Council of Europe 
acknowledge: 
 
Whether Facebook and similar dominant online platforms may (deliberately or not) use 
their power to influence human voting or not is less the point than the fact that they – 
in principle – have the ability to influence elections.63 
 
This lack of consideration for Article 3 Protocol 1 is seen as a limitation of this thesis because 
of its prime importance to the Convention system.64 Privacy International have argued that one 
of the necessary responses to the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal is to defend privacy 
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as a fundamental right.65 Using Article 8 and Article 3 Protocol 1 to supplement each other 
would strengthen the argument that data retention undermines democracy. This is because: 
 
Data that is inconspicuously amassed, harvested and stored through algorithmic 
technologies has been likened to the new “currency of power”, as it can directly be 
employed for the micro-targeting of voters, possibly with decisive effects on 
elections.66  
 
The Council of Europe have argued, this ‘could jeopardise democracy itself’67 which highlights 
the importance of Article 3 Protocol 1 as this constitutes the most important kind of expression, 
because ‘it manifests the will of the people.’68 
 
Another important Convention Right that was not considered is Article 2 Protocol 1, a right to 
education. Privacy fosters autonomous individuals, providing them with space to develop 
opinions and ideas which can contribute to society.69 The very foundation of this thesis relies 
upon this notion as the power of writing, a production of knowledge can be seen as a form of 
resistance70 to data retention. Article 2 Protocol 1 must also be interpreted in light of Articles 
8-10,71 and its aim is to safeguard pluralism in education which is essential for the preservation 
of a democratic society.72 The ECHR requires some level of privacy ‘in order to guarantee the 
free development of the personality through education’ and ‘[o]nly if a safe, secure and private 
environment is ensured, people can freely develop their abilities.’73 Tracking down ones 
movement across the Internet is likely to cause a chilling effect on writers74 and decrease 
pluralism.75 This again would have strengthened the human rights arguments against data 
retention. 
 
Finally, from the perspective of the telecommunications operators, Article 1 Protocol 1, the 
right to property would also be relevant. Patrick Breyer has argued that data retention 
obligations would interfere with Article 1 Protocol 1 because it would allow the State to control 
the use of their property.76 The only way for this to be proportionate is for telecommunications 
operators to be fully compensated for the costs of compliance.77 Section 249 of the IPA 2016 
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does not guarantee full reimbursement and thus raises Article 1 Protocol 1 issues. This 
consideration could have had an important contribution beyond UK law as in Russia, a Russian 
telecommunications operator pointed out that complying with Russian data retention laws 
would deplete all their profits for the next 100 years.78 Although the ECtHR does not consider 
future earnings to fall within Article 1 Protocol 1,79 this thesis could have used that opportunity 
to make the case in this specific context using Russia as an example.  
 
b. A look to the future 
 
The issue of data retention is not yet settled, as the Court of Appeal recently did not find fault 
with DRIPA 2014’s blanket and indiscriminate nature,80 nor the High Court81 (though has been 
critiqued in Chapter 7) and many EU Member States are planning to ignore the CJEU’s rulings 
and expand data retention measures.82 If any such measures are implemented, an ECHR 
approach undoubtedly become crucial. The UK Government has sought to comply with the 
CJEU adding a definition of serious crime for the purposes of Part 4 of the IPA 2016.83 This 
new definition has been argued to broaden the definition that is already present in the IPA 
2016,84 beyond what the ECtHR accepted in Kennedy85 and has been heavily criticised by 
Liberty for creating a conflicting, confusing and overbroad standard for when communications 
data can be retained.86 Given that a Spanish court has made a preliminary reference to the CJEU 
as to whether serious crime should be solely determined by sentence or substance of the crime87 
to which Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe opined that access to communications data 
should not ‘be confined to cases in which the offence concerned is of a serious nature.’88 This 
would allow for further consideration and development of judge Pinto de Albuquerque 
concurring opinion in Szabo89 that by not specifying the offences in which secret surveillance 
may be employed downgrades the principle of legality in a field where rigorous reading of the 
law is most needed and opens up abuse.  
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The recent ECtHR Chamber judgment of Centrum För Rättvisa v Sweden90 has very important 
implications for data retention as it was held that:  
 
Having regard to the present-day threats being posed by global terrorism and serious 
cross-border crime as well as the increased sophistication of communications 
technology, the decision to set up a bulk interception regime in order to identify such 
threats was one which fell within the respondent State’s margin of appreciation. 
 
This position has been reaffirmed in Big Brother Watch in which the ECtHR acknowledged 
that bulk interception in principle falls within a State’s margin of appreciation.91This will 
seriously need to be considered in future works as it appears to be the first retreat of the 
ECtHR with regards to mass surveillance post-Snowden, inconsistent with Zakharov and 
Szabo and could be used as a basis to justify data retention which this thesis has argued to 
violate the ECHR. Future work must also consider the Home Office’s plans, beyond the 
definition of serious crime with regards to data retention.92 It is all the more concerning 
considering the Mi5/6 and GCHQ have admitted to unlawfully spying on Privacy 
International.93 The acceptance of bulk interception by the ECtHR exasperates the already 
high inherent risk of abuse. The ECtHR has in the past unwittingly permitted the UK to 
conduct mass surveillance,94 however, given the Snowden revelations and the increase in the 
UK’s surveillance apparatus since, it is a major concern that the ECtHR is heading in the 
direction of the acceptance of mass surveillance. 	
 
Finally, even if one were to consider the CJEU’s approach to data retention, and even this thesis 
which adds to the strength a victory, it may be largely symbolic ‘as metadata lives a long life 
in the private sector’ as much data will be available, ‘even without a mandatory data retention 
scheme.’95 This is where a greater focus on surveillance capitalism becomes key because the 
question becomes whether the communications data should be generated in the first place? As 
van der Sloot notes ‘states are held, among others, to ensure adequate protection of privacy in 
horizontal relationships.’96 Thus future research could consider whether the ECtHR’s ‘living 
instrument’ could be utilised to supplement data protection laws by putting states under a 
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positive obligation to prevent mass data generation and collection by corporations and third 
parties.  
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